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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the factors that stimulated and sustained the development of 
a railway system in northern Scotland in 1844-74 and draws contrasts with earlier 
railway development in Scotland and England. No continuous railway routes ran 
north of the Glasgow-Aberdeen axis in 1844, but, by 187 4, a railway system 
extended to the far north of the highlands despite the absence of substantial 
population or raw material sources. 
The state, strongly influenced by the ideology of free market capitalism, was 
reluctant to become involved in the planning or management of railways in Britain 
with the result that the railway system evolved in an unplanned way, promoted and 
managed by private enterprise and financed increasingly from a national capital 
market. This thesis contends that railway development in northern Scotland does 
not reflect this pattern. It questions whether the state perpetuated its detached 
stance towards railway development in northern Scotland, to what extent this 
northern railway system was planned, and how these relatively small railway 
companies were able to obtain sufficient capital and avoid insolvency given the 
unpromising economic conditions of the region. The thesis examines a coherent 
plan devised and authorised by the state that set out the framework of a Scottish 
railway network. It demonstrates that the remote northern railway system was 
founded upon the cogent strategic planning of regional interests based in Aberdeen 
and Inverness. It illustrates the substantial economies achieved in the costs of 
establishing northern railways compared to earlier railway development to the south, 
and the significance of local investment within them, increasingly made for the future 
indirect returns anticipated from national trade and improved land values. The 
critical importance of temporary credit in the financing of northern railways is 
highlighted and, in particular, the major role played by the banking sector. 
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Chapter 1: Unpromising territory 
Was Scotland different? 
In his major study of the Scottish nation, Professor Devine argues that from the 
1760s 'Scotland began to experience a social and economic transformation 
unparalleled among European societies of the time in its speed, scale and intensity' .1 
He advances the thesis that the view of English modernization as a 'cumulative, 
protracted and evolutionary' process does not match the Scottish experience, citing 
as a comparative example the 'explosive' growth of urban development in Scotland 
in 1750-1850. This disparity exemplifies earlier concerns expressed by some 
historians that regional differences have not received due attention in the 
historiography of British economic and social development.2 Devine identifies, 
however, an expansion in Scottish research over the last three decades with 'entirely 
new fields of investigation opened up which were uncharted in the older 
historiography'. 3 
Although there is general agreement that the new industrialisation and economic 
growth of nineteenth century Britain was underpinned by improved systems of 
transport that facilitated labour mobility, access to raw material sources, and outlets 
to countrywide and overseas markets,4 recent studies of transport development in 
1 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007 (London 1999, new edition, London, 2006), 
p.107-108 and pp.152-54. 
2 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, (Cambridge, 1997), p.1; CW Munn, 
'The emergence of joint stock banking in the British Isles: a comparative approach', Business 
History, XXX, No.1 (1988), p.69; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 
1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 1983), p.(v); D Tumock, An Historical Geography of Railways in 
Great Britain and Ireland (Aldershot, 1998), p.15. 
3 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.(ix). 
4 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.259; GR Hawke, Railways and Economic 
Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford, 1970), p.366, p.392 and p.402; BR 
Mitchell, 'The coming of the railway and United Kingdom economic growth', Journal of 
Economic History, 1st series, 24 (1964), p.315; W Vamplew, 'Railways and the transformation 
of the Scottish economy', Economic History Review, 2nd series, 24 (1971 ), p.47 and p.54. 
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nineteenth century Scotland as part of this new historiography remain rare.5 Yet the 
contrast drawn by Devine between the Scottish and English experience of economic 
and social change raises the question of whether differences can also be detected in 
the evolution of their systems of transport, and, more specifically, in the development 
of their railway networks that provided new routes of trade and communication. CJA 
Robertson maintained that 'Scottish nineteenth century railways have suffered from 
a degree of neglect by economic historians' ,8 drawing attention to the absence of 
Scottish studies that might parallel the work of Professor Simmons and others that 
concentrate principally on events south of the border.7 The degree of neglect that 
Robertson perceived in 1983 has persisted since. The study of the promotion of the 
Caledonian Railway by J Butt and JT Ward, the work of Wray Vamplew on early 
Scottish railways and their finance, and the debate between Vamplew and TR 
Gourvish and MC Reed concerning finance as a determinant of the nature and 
timing of Scottish railway construction all date from the early 1970s. 8 Just four 
doctoral theses investigate aspects of nineteenth century Scottish railway history, but 
only one was completed during the last two decades.9 Since Robertson's 
authoritative examination of the origins of the Scottish railway system between 1722 
5 A recent example of a study related to northern Scotland is JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to 
Integration: the development of roads in the northern Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' 
(unpublished PhD thesis, Aberdeen University, 2001). 
8 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.(v). 
7 In particular, Robertson cites GR Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and 
Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford, 1970) and TR Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London and North 
Western Railway: a study of management (Leicester, 1972) in addition to J Simmons, The 
Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, vol.1 (Leicester, 1978). 
8 J Butt and JT Ward, 'The promotion of the Caledonian Railway Company', Transport 
History, 3, No.2 (July 1970), 164-92, and 3, No.3 (November, 1970), 225-57; WVamplew, 
'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
17 (1970), 425-40; TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 
1860-a comment', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18 (1971), 209-19; WVamplew, 
'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860- a reply', Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 18 (1971), 221-23. 
9 The four theses are: JA McGregor, 'The West Highland Railway, the politics of railway 
promotion in late nineteenth century Scotland' (unpublished PhD thesis, Open University, 
1998); CJA Robertson, 'The development of the Scottish railway system to 1844' 
, (unpublished PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, 1982); G Channon, 'Pooling agreements 
between railway companies involved in the Anglo-Scottish trade, 1851-67' (unpublished PhD 
thesis, London University, 1975); WVamplew, 'Railways and the transformation of the 
Scottish economy' (unpublished PhD thesis, Edinburgh University, 1969): all four studies 
have resulted in some subsequent publication in book or journal article form. 
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and 1844, academic research into the development of the Scottish railway system is 
sparse. There are many popular histories of individual Scottish railways, but 
analytical studies that transcend the boundaries of single companies are 
uncommon.10 
Simmons maintained that knowledge of the development of a railway system was 
the prerequisite to an understanding of its impact.11 In judging that an investigation 
of the consequences and impact of railways in the United Kingdom was too large, he 
surmised that any similar investigations of the railways of Scotland and Ireland would 
be 'markedly different' from his formative study of England and Wales. A question of 
the significance of regional differences in railway development therefore arises, 
symbolised by Simmons's observation that 'railways might be said to have erected a 
new version of Hadrian's Wall between England and Scotland' because the Anglo-
Scottish border formed 'an important barrier in the development of the British railway 
system'.12 
These dissimilarities perceived by Devine and Simmons suggest an initial hypothesis 
that the development of the Scottish railway system might exhibit different 
characteristics to those that shaped the growth of railways In England. However, the 
problem of scale identified by Simmons in determining the parameters for his 
research and the subsequent caution issued to business historians by Professor 
Channon on the 'grind' of collecting evidence, which he advises 'may mean a 
limitation in chronology or comprehensiveness .. .', 13 justify a revision to this 
hypothesis to focus on a specific area of Scotland and within a defined period. This 
thesis therefore investigates the development of railways in northern Scotland 
10 J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People (Edinburgh, 2005) is 
an example of a recent study that combines academic and popular interest and presents 
referenced research beyond that for a single railway company. Examples of more recent 
company histories of northern railways include: PF Marshall, The Scottish Central Railway 
(Witney, 1998); NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998); N Ferguson, The 
Arbroath and Forfar Railway (Usk, 2000); D Ross, The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005). 
11 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.15. 
12 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.16 and p.67. 
13 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940 (Aldershot, 2001), 
p.299. 
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between 1844 and 1874 because this region offers a particular advantage for 
comparative research over these three decades. Northern Scotland, delineated 
within this study as the substantial area to the north of a north-easterly geographical 
line drawn between Glasgow in the west and Aberdeen on the north-east coast, 14 
was almost devoid of railways in 1844 when new trunk routes were being planned. It 
therefore provides auspicious conditions for an examination of the evolution of its 
railway system in comparison with similar development in both Scotland and 
England that pre-dated it. 
Existing Scottish railways in 1844 were largely confined to the central Forth-Clyde 
valley where sources of coal and iron-ore, the majority of the population and 
expanding manufacturing industries were concentrated. This pattern mirrored the 
development of the contemporary railway network in England similarly stimulated by 
industrialisation. Other than the short, isolated and non-standard gauge local lines 
feeding the north-eastern ports of Dundee and Arbroath, there were no railways to 
the north of Scotland's central valley, although this area comprises the majority of 
the country's land mass.15 Dundee and the well-established mercantile centre of 
Aberdeen further north remained heavily reliant on sea transport. Yet, by 1874, an 
extensive railway network stretched beyond Aberdeen to Inverness and the 
furthermost northern settlements of Thurso and Wick. Many of its lines, however, 
crossed large tracts of country where raw materials were largely absent, population 
was sparse, agriculture and fishing provided the principal means of livelihood and, 
particularly in the far north and west, the semi-feudal nature of the highland clan 
structure survived. CA Whatley identifies a 'dual economy' in Scotland in the 1840s 
in which increasing industrialisation in the central valley contrasted with an 
'increasingly wretched and poverty-stricken population' in the highlands; 16 Devine 
1
" See map 1, chapter 2. 
15 The Dundee and Arbroath Railway (1836), Arbroath and Forfar Railway (1836), and the 
three linked railways of the Newtyle system serving Dundee (1826 and 1835) are detailed in 
table 4 of chapter 2. There were, in addition, two waggonways in the Alloa area and three in 
the Dunfermline area of the county of Fife for the transport of coal from inland collieries to the 
Firth of Forth for onward water transport to Leith; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish 
Railway System 1722-1844, pp.26-30 and maps 2 and 3, p.20. 
16 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution, p.1; CA Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830 
(Manchester, 2000), p.253. 
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describes the northern counties as 'a peasant society' as late as 1846.17 Given 
these highly unpromising characteristics, this study examines how a railway system 
was able to be developed successfully in northern Scotland between 1844 and 1874 
and, more particularly, to what extent the factors that stimulated and sustained this 
growth of railways in a region with no apparent economic advantages might differ 
from those at similar stages of railway evolution to the south in both Scotland and 
England. 
The historiography of railway development in nineteenth century Britain suggests 
that the state largely adopted a detached and reactive stance to railway development 
because of a powerful belief in the ideology of free-market capitalism with the result 
that the railway system evolved in an unplanned way, promoted and managed by 
private enterprise and financed increasingly from a national capital market. Three 
broad questions therefore arise for this study. First, did the state perpetuate this 
detached stance towards the development of railways in northern Scotland? 
Second, was the railway system of northern Scotland also unplanned? Third, how 
did these remote northern railways obtain their capital and remain solvent given the 
unpromising economic conditions of the region? This thesis contends that railway 
development in northern Scotland does not conform to the general pattern observed 
elsewhere in Britain. It shows that a coherent plan devised and authorised by the 
state set out the framework of a Scottish railway network. It argues that the 
establishment of a railway system In the north of Scotland was not only strongly 
influenced by this plan, but that its realisation within three decades was the result of 
cogent strategic planning and strict economy, directed by regional interests and 
increasingly financed locally as the network spread northwards. 
This thesis contributes to the new Scottish historiography by extending the 
examination of Scottish railway development beyond 1844, the concluding point of 
Robertson's seminal study. Through its analysis of the strategic and financial 
governance of the twenty-five railway companies that formed this new northern 
transport system between 1844 and 187 4, the study also has significance for 
11 TM Devine. Exploring the Scottish Past- themes in the history of Scottish society (East 
Linton, 1998), p.172. 
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business historians interested in the wider study of Scotland's economic 
development. 
Strategy, solvency and the state 
The three questions posed above generate the themes of the thesis. This section 
explores the roles of the state, strategic planning, and finance in railway 
development in Britain within the historiography and identifies the more specific 
issues to be pursued. Subsequent sections outline the sources and financial 
methodology used in the research, concluding with an outline of the thesis. Much of 
the existing literature covers the period 1825-54 and concentrates upon the English 
experience because the Scottish system was much slower in evolution.18 
First, the role of the state in company formation and its policy towards competition is 
examined because railway companies and other allied enterprises were bound by 
national legislation. The second part considers the nature and extent of strategic 
planning applied by private enterprise to railway development in the absence of state 
direction. The final part investigates the sources and management of railway 
finance, given the difficulties experienced by many companies in raising sufficient 
capital for construction of their lines and in generating adequate revenue to meet 
liabilities and provide investment returns to shareholders. 
- the state and railway development 
During the nineteenth century, British political and economic governance was 
dominated by the principle of laissez-faire, which emanated from contemporary 
theories of classical economics and championed economic individualism and free 
markets against collectivism and the intervention of the state. Although G Alderman 
18 BR Mitchell, 'The coming of the railway and United Kingdom economic growth', in MC 
Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969), p.14, suggesting 1851 
as the date by which the British network was substantially complete; J Simmons, The Railway 
in England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.49, giving 1854 as the date by which the main lines of 
the English railway system were open. 
19 
presents the perhaps contentious view that no government prior to 1914 had a clear 
railway policy, 19 there is general agreement that the state was reluctant to become 
Involved in any strategic planning or management of a railway system In Britain, and 
that government policy towards railways was usually reactive and often 
contradictory.20 This thesis suggests that this historiographical view is not reflected 
in the development of the railway system of northern Scotland, where the state and 
its executive made a proactive intervention in 1845 by designing and authorising a 
coherent blueprint for railway development to the north of Scotland's central belt and 
its connection into the evolving network to the south. Although the dominant 
influence of laissez-faire capitalism largely shaped economic policy, the state did 
increasingly intervene in national affairs to tackle the consequences arising from 
rapid industrial and social change; the establishment of a Railway Department within 
the Board of Trade in 1840, initially in response to concerns about public safety, was 
symptomatic of this trend.21 Nevertheless, the state's role in the determination of the 
outline of a Scottish railway network was an unusual intervention for this period. 
The emergence of large-scale railway enterprise in the 1840s with its potential for 
market manipulation dragooned the state into intervention that was reactive, 
inconsistent and 'lamentably haphazard'. 22 The size of the new railway companies, 
which Gourvish describes as the 'prime example of large-scale free-enterprise 
capitalism in nineteenth century Britain', dwarfed previous commercial enterprise; 
19 G Alderman, The Railway Interest (Leicester, 1973), p.23. 
20 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States. 1830-1940, p.35; TL Alborn, 
Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England (London, 1998), p.200; CJA 
Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.306; TR Gourvish, 
Railways and the British Economy, 1830-1914 (London, 1980), p.28 and p.55; J Simmons, 
The Railway In England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.25 and p.48; G Alderman, The Railway 
Interest, p.32; H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 
1965), p. 7 and p.26. 
21 H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain, pp.205-206. 
22 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, p.48; TR Gourvish, Railways 
and the British Economy 1830-1914, p.50; TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock 
politics in Victorian England, p.200; G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 
1830-1940, p.35. 
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major railways were amongst the largest companies in Scotland. 23 Three Presidents 
of the Board of Trade attempted to make railway policy between 1844 and 1854 -
Gladstone, Dalhousie and Cardwell - and all failed in the face of growing railway 
influence within the legislature.24 Gourvish points to the contradictions emerging in 
state policy towards railways by 'encouraging competition on one hand and insisting 
on controls on pricing on the other'.25 Gladstone's Railway Regulation Act of 1844, 
for example, challenged the principles of free enterprise by authorising a universal 
state intervention in railway pricing and approving powers for the possible state 
purchase of new railway companies.26 Channon, however, considers that 
Parliament 'was always uneasy about the creation of big government as a 
countervailing force' to the growth of large-scale railway enterprises.27 
Although the historiography illustrates a railway system evolving through the plans of 
private enterprise free from any national coordination, this view is drawn primarily 
from England and Wales. The design of railways in the highlands of Scotland was 
strongly influenced by the experience of railroad development in parts of America, 
where conditions of sparse population and limited traffic were similar.28 In 
acknowledging the work of AD Chandler on the history of American business 
23 TR Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy 1830-1914, p.9; CJA Robertson, The 
Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.306; TR Gourvish, 'The Bank of 
Scotland, 1830-1845', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 16 (1969), 288-305, noting the 
paid up capital of the Bank of Scotland in 1841 to be £1 million: by comparison, the 
incorporation of the Caledonian Railway in 1845 (8&9 Vic. cap.162, 31 July 1845) set share 
capital at £2.1 million with an additional £0.7 million in borrowing powers. 
24 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, pp.52-53; G Alderman, The 
Railway Interest, p.15. 
25 TR Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy 1830-1914, p.28 and p.50. 
26 7&8 Vic. cap. 85, 1844, The Regulation of Railways Act; section 2 stated that the Treasury 
may purchase railways established after 1st January 1845, but that the option was not to be 
exercised for 21 years; section 6 required the running of one cheap train each way daily, 
stopping at every station, at a fare of not more than one penny per mile. 
27 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.33. 
28 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Ufe in the Highlands, vol.II (private publication, 2 
volumes, London, 1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1971), p.181. 
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enterprise,29 Channon suggests that the significance of the state in the development 
of the American railway network has been understated. 30 A question arises, 
therefore, whether a similar conclusion might perhaps be applicable to Scotland. 
Railways in the United States received some assistance from the state in raising 
capital. In Britain, by contrast, the availability of private capital generated from its 
earlier industrialisation allowed the state, strongly influenced by laissez-faire 
ideology, to decline to support Scottish railway development from public funds until 
the 1890s. 
The absence of direct financial assistance, however, can overshadow the 
significance of indirect support for railway development, exemplified by the state's 
1845 blueprint for a Scottish railway network. Professor Casson's recent study of 
the evolution of the British railway system concludes that Members of Parliament 
approved 'far more schemes' than its executive recommended in 1845 because they 
'sacrificed national and regional interests to local populism'.31 Consequently, he 
argues, intense competition produced a national network by 1914 that was 
approximately two-fifths larger than required to obtain the equivalent social benefits. 
Nevertheless, this thesis shows that the legislature accepted its executive's 
recommendations made in 1845 for the development of railways to the north of 
Scotland's central belt and that there was little of the wasteful duplication in northern 
Scotland that Casson identifies as a symptom of the British network. 
The philosophy of laissez-faire in Britain engendered a fear of monopoly, but the 
legislative process for the incorporation of railway companies created what RW 
29 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, pp.3-9; AD Chandler 
Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1977). 
30 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.17 and p.297. 
31 M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914, Economic and Social 
Research Council Report, R000239586 (January 2005), pp.5-7; 
http://www. esrcsocietytoday. ac. uk/ESRCI nfoCentreNiewOutputPage.aspx?data=v9XrjLJ6xh 
Fb1 dXd6rzebSOSdqAiGFiPEzQpS79z3NY 40iVdBa7NERW65wxNoegyLZL8JK4AEzt%2b98 
%2fDG9G7bAnofoif1O04zUm51%2b0eBDy8blskFFc%2bjf4rK4L5ChhlxtyaXTdRXSg%3d&xu 
=&isAwardHolder=&isProfiled=&LikeMinds=&AwardHolderlD=&Sector= (30 March 2007). 
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Kostal characterises as 'private commercial monopolies'.32 This study examines 
how these monopoly powers granted by the state to railway companies were 
exercised in northern Scotland. As early as 1839-40, parliamentary select 
committees questioned the state's reliance on free market competition as an 
effective control over emerging railway monopolies, and three regulatory acts 
followed by 1844. 33 
The term 'monopoly', however, requires qualification. Channon warns that the 
application of nee-classical theories of the firm to railway companies has 'serious 
limitations· because markets Involving transport are 'far removed from the 
hypothetical world of perfect competition'.34 Pure monopoly, where barriers to entry 
protect a sole supplier of a product with no available competitive substitute and with 
its resultant market power exercised to sustain returns above normal profit, is rare.35 
The market structure of railways in the nineteenth century was more akin to oligopoly 
where traditional theory can explain price stability and the use of non-price 
competition and price agreements with other suppliers to regulate the market, 
although this approach retains profit maximisation as the principal motivation of the 
firm.36 
GR Hawke concludes that profit maximization for railways in England and Wales in 
1840-70, at least regionally, was 'not energetic' and that railways adopted the policy 
of a 'profit maximizing discriminating monopoly', seeking opportunities to charge 
32 RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), p.183. 
33 The three regulation acts were: 3&4 Vic. cap.97, 1840, 5&6 Vic. cap.59, 1842 and 7&8 
Vic. cap.86, 1844; J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, pp.33-34 and 
p.36; JS Simmons and G Biddle, The Oxford Companion to British Railway History (Oxford 
1997, re-issued 1999), p.418; H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain, pp.7-9. 
34 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.110 and p.299. 
35 AJ Arnold and S McCartney, 'Rates of return, concentration levels and strategic change in 
the British railway industry, 1830-1912', Journal of Transport History, 3rd series, 26, No.1 
(March 2005), p.44. 
36 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.32 and p.111; P 
Fletcher, 'A model of oligopoly: a note', Economics, X, No.5, (Autumn 1974), pp.299-300. 
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different prices to different consumers for a monopolised service. 37 Hawke also 
contends, however, that railways 'recognised a special responsibility for developing 
the trade of particular regions', an objective that discriminatory pricing could foster. 311 
This thesis suggests that these factors became more significant as the railway 
system extended into the remoter districts of northern Scotland and that the 
oligopolistic powers granted by the state were increasingly exercised benevolently 
for the advantage of the region and its landowners. Scottish railways often held a 
local monopoly as a result of the restrictive geography of much of the territory, the 
potential capital costs of new railways, and the limited demand available to support a 
competitive land-based transport system Throughout the nineteenth century, 
however, sea transport continued to provide effective competition to railway 
companies holding sole control of land-based routes in northern Scotland, although 
oligopolistic price agreements between railway and shipping companies were made 
to secure market share.39 
The inconsistency of state policy towards railways raises the question of whether the 
development of a railway system in northern Scotland was assisted or hindered by it. 
The northern railway companies of 1844-74 were relatively small, but this study 
illustrates that they were able to benefit from consolidation through amalgamation, 
leases and working agreements. Such methods of combination were widely sought 
as the British network expanded and restructured after the railway mania of 1845,"0 
but any arrangement that merged the capital of railway companies required 
parliamentary sanction.41 Alborn points to the 'uncertain stance on amalgamation' 
adopted by Parliament, 'which had a tendency to shift from strident opposition to 
37 GR Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870, p.333. 
38 GR Hawke, 'Pricing policy of railways in England and Wales before 1881', in MC Reed 
{ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy, p.83 and p.110. 
39 CH Lee, 'Some aspects of the coastal shipping trade: the Aberdeen Steam Navigation 
Company, 1835-1880, Journal of Transport History, new series, 111, No.2 (September 1975), 
p.101 and p.105; W Vamplew, 'Railways and the Scottish transport system in the nineteenth 
century'. Journal of Transport History, new series, I, No.3 (February 1972), p.144. 
40 AG Kenwood, 'Railway investment in Britain, 1835-1875', Economica, 32, No.127 (1965), 
p.317; J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.51. 
41 WA Robertson, Combination among Railway Companies (London, 1912), p.8; JS 
Simmons and G Biddle, The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, p.12; 8 Vic. 
cap.20, 1845, The Railway Clauses Act. 
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benign neglect every few years'.42 Amalgamation could yield operating economies 
and greater efficiency, but equally it posed the threat of higher fares and rates arising 
from enhanced market power. Channon suggests that parliamentary hostility 
towards the amalgamation of railway companies may have encouraged the use of 
more covert methods of collusion.43 Nevertheless, Simmons considered that from 
the late 1840s the state began to show less concern over amalgamations of 'end-on' 
railways to form a continuous route because such unions were not perceived as an 
attempt to create a monopoly ... The creation of these 'end-on' continuous routes is 
shown to be fundamental in the development of the northern Scottish network as the 
only viable way of improving transport links into an economically disadvantaged 
region. 
Inconsistency in state policy also arose as a result of discrepancies between English 
and Scots law, which assisted the growth of individual Scottish banks and 
contributed to the earlier development of a Scottish banking system that could 
channel funds between districts to meet the demand for loans.45 The partnerships 
which created the network of provincial banks in Scotland towards the end of the 
eighteenth century were not constrained by an English act of 1709, designed to 
protect the monopoly of the Bank of England, that limited the number of partners 
42 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.200. 
43 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.96. 
-4◄ J Simmons, The Railways of Britain (London, 1961, 2nd edition 1968), p.13; J Simmons, 
The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, p.25 and p.69; E Cleveland-Stevens, English 
Railways: their development and their relationship to the State (London, 1915), p.44: 
Cleveland-Stevens concluded that end-on amalgamations were not favoured by Parliament 
prior to 1843, 'a view almost reversed in later amalgamations'. 
45 CW Munn, 'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', in AJG Cummings and TM 
Devine (eds.), Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700 (Edinburgh, 1994), 
pp.130-31; CW Munn, 'The emergence of joint stock banking in the British Isles: a 
comparative approach', Business History, XXX, No.1 (1988), pp.71-72 and p.80; RH 
Campbell, 'The Law and the Joint Stock Company in Scotland', in PL Payne (ed.), Studies in 
Scottish Business History (London, 1967), pp.140-41 and p.143; SG Checkland, Scottish 
Banking, a History 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975), pp.275-76 and table 1, p.84 and table 8, 
p.240; showing a growth in Scottish bank assets from £329,000 in 1744 to £12,272,000 in 
1802; CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, p.55. 
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forming English country banks to six;48 for example, the Aberdeen Banking 
Company, founded in 1767, had 109 partners to supply its capital and share its 
business risk.•1 This study explores the extent to which this established financial 
network assisted railway development in northern Scotland. 
Railway companies in Scotland held no legal advantage over those in England 
because both were bound by the same national legislation which required a private 
parliamentary act of Incorporation that granted compulsory powers to acquire 
property and authority to raise share capital and loans.48 Since the mid-seventeenth 
century, however, Scottish law had treated the business partnership as a persona, 
which allowed the company to sue and be sued in the name of the firm rather than in 
the names of its individual members, a protection only available to their English 
counterparts through a Royal Charter or a private act of incorporation until company 
law was harmonised in 1856.49 This disparity between Scotland and England 
contributed to the emergence of what CW Munn describes as 'an efficient and price 
competitive banking system' by the end of the eighteenth century and a 'structurally 
homogeneous banking system' by 1845, well in advance of similar development in 
England.50 The provincial banks were gradually replaced by large joint-stock banks 
"'6 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.46 and p.377; CW Munn, The 
Scottish Provincial Banking Companies 1747-1864 (Edinburgh, 1981), p.6, quoting 7 Anne 
cap. 7, clause 61; CW Munn, 'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', p.130. 
47 CW Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies 1747-1864, p.16 and p.41, 
showing also that, of the provincial banks in northern Scotland, the Dundee Banking 
Company of 1763 had 31 partners, the Perth Banking Company of 1787 had 87 partners, 
and the Commercial Bank of Aberdeen of 1788 had 16 partners. 
48 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.180; G 
Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.22. 
49 7 &8 Vic. cap. 11 0, 1844, The Joint Stock Companies Act, which provided limited liability to 
shareholders but only after three years had elapsed from the sale of their shares; 18& 19 Vic. 
cap.133, 1855, The Limited Liability Act. which amended 7&8 Vic. cap.110, 1844 by providing 
immediate limited liability protection on registration of the company, but the legislation was 
not applied to Scotland because of its existing common law protection afforded to business 
partnerships; 19&20 Vic. cap.47, 1856, The Joint Stock Companies Act, consolidated 
previous law and extended the legal provisions for incorporation and limited liability 
nationally; RH Campbell, 'The Law and the Joint Stock Company in Scotland', p.136, quoting 
Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, 1661, VII, 285 and 261, and 1641, V, 497; B Lenman, An 
Economic History of Modem Scotland 1660-1976 (London, 1977), p. 168. 
50 CW Munn, 'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', p.130 and p.132. 
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that could better supply the scale of finance required for new businesses in an era of 
industrialisation.51 The Aberdeen Town and County Bank, established in 1825, was 
the first regional joint-stock bank in Scotland and had 470 partners.62 In 1845, 
nineteen note-issuing joint-stock banks in Scotland operated through regional 
branches and local agents and were able provide greater national financial stability 
than the network of smaller private banks in England.53 
Whatley judges that the Scottish banking system 'was better able to mobilise capital 
and considerably more responsive to the needs of industrialisation'. 54 Devine 
concurs, describing Scottish banks as ·creative and Innovative' particularly In 
pioneering the short-term cash credit or overdraft facility,65 which Munn asserts often 
tended to evolve into long-term lending. 56 Munn also identifies the number of bank 
branches as 'the most glaring difference' between joint-stock banking in Scotland 
and England and shows that the average number of branches per joint-stock bank in 
Scotland in 1850 was 50 but only 5.8 in England and Wales.67 Gourvish and Reed 
demonstrate that the rise of these new Scottish joint-stock banks in the 1830s 
51 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.283, p.305 end pp.306-307: the 
Commercial Bank of Scotland, formed in 1810, was the first large joint-stock bank in Scotland 
with £3 million capital and which had 673 shareholders and 14 branches by 1815. Two 
further large joint-stock banks were formed in 1825: the National Bank of Scotland had 
capital of £5 million and, within a year, 1300 shareholders and 13 branches, while the 
Aberdeen Town and County Bank had capital of £750,000 and 470 shareholders and, by 
1826, four branches. 
52 CW Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies, p. 75. 
53 OM Ross, History of Banking II (London, 1998), vol.1, p.(xix); CW Munn, 'The emergence 
of Edinburgh as a financial centre', pp.132-33; RH Campbell, Scotland since 1707: the rise of 
an industrial society (Oxford, 1971 ), p.69; CW Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking 
Companies, p.98. 
54 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, p.55. 
55 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p. 105 and p.115: the Royal Bank of Scotland 
established the 'cash accompt' as 'the world's first overdraft facility' In 1728. 
56 CW Munn, 'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', p.131: these cash credit 
accounts (overdrafts) set an agreed borrowing limit and interest was charged on a daily 
basis. The account was repayable on demand, 'but in practice these accounts remained in 
operation for many years and became, in effect, long term loans'. 
67 CW Munn, 'The emergence of joint stock banking in the British Isles: a comparative 
approach', pp.78-79. 
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'quickly catered for the pressing needs of embryonic railways', 58 and they suggest 
that the scale of railway company finance gave 'important new dimensions' to this 
innovative overdraft system instigated in Scotland. 
The Scottish branch network was thus able to direct funds to specific branches for 
investment, 'mostly the large urban, industrial offices',59 although Professor Michie 
concludes that Scottish banks regarded lending to railway companies as 'something 
to be done once the needs of all other businesses had been met, and large funds 
remained available'.60 Professor Checkland, however, considers that 'there can be 
no doubt that the banks were 'a very important element in railway finance' ,81 and MC 
Reed illustrates that early Scottish railway acts often specifically identified banks as 
a source of lending.62 The role of Scottish banks in railway development arises 
within all three of the themes examined in this chapter; successive chapters show 
that this well-established banking system provided a fundamental source of finance 
for railway companies in northern Scotland from their conception. 
In summary, this study investigates the role of the state in railway development in 
northern Scotland in 1844-7 4 and to what extent this differed from the detached and 
largely reactive stance that historiography suggests was generally adopted as the 
British railway network evolved.63 It explores how the oligopolistic powers awarded 
58 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.216 and p.217, footnote 8. 
59 CW Munn, 'The emergence of joint stock banking in the British Isles: a comparative 
approach', p. 80: A Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland: 1750-1960 (London, 
1975), p.57. 
80 RC Michie, 'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', Scottish Industrial 
History, 5, No.1 (1982), p.49; RC Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company 
Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1981), p.58. 
81 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.421. 
82 MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844 (London, 1975), pp.229-30, noting 
that the Dundee and Arbroath Railway was empowered in its 1826 act of incorporation to 
raise £10,000 by loan from banks; Reed also notes (p.230, footnote 2) that the Monkland and 
Kirkintilloch (1824), Ballochney (1826) and Slammanan (1835) railways obtained their loan 
capital from banks. 
63 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.35, suggests that 
there was more consistency in parliamentary deliberation from the 1860s, following 'an 
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by the state through company incorporations were exercised and considers the 
state's approach to proposals for amalgamations and agreements between northern 
railway companies in 1844-74. With the earlier development of financial networks in 
Scotland aided by legal disparities, the thesis also examines the significance of the 
contribution of the banking system to the evolution of the northern railway system. 
- strategic planning and direction 
There Is a consensus that the state was reluctant to become Involved In national 
planning and intervention with the result that the railway system of Britain emerged in 
an unplanned way.64 In the absence of state direction, railways were planned, 
constructed and financed by the private sector.85 Indeed, Casson argues that the 
efficiency of the British railway system is, indirectly, 'a judgement on the performance 
of private enterprise'. 66 There has been some historiographical debate about the 
extent to which strategic planning by state or private enterprise influenced the shape 
of the British railway system and the evolution of its constituent companies. This 
thesis maintains that the railway system of northern Scotland was based upon 
judicious strategic planning, devised and directed by entrepreneurs and landowners 
from the two regional centres of Aberdeen and Inverness. The use of the term 
'strategy', however, requires definition. In this study, it implies more than the 
formulation of a development plan; it involves the continual manoeuvring of 
resources, influence and support by its instigators whilst forward plans are devised 
and implemented to try to gain consistently the most favourable position for their 
enterprise. 
element of inconsistency and arbitrariness about separate decisions, especially in the early 
railway age ... '. 
64 O Tumock, An Historical Geography of Railways in Great Britain and Ireland, p.2; G 
Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.32 and p.35; J Simmons, 
The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.48; RJ lrvi~, 'The capitalisation of 
Britain's railways, 1830-1914', Journal of Transport History, 3 series, vol.5, No.1 (March 
1984). p.14. 
85 TR Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy 1830-1914, p.49; G Channon, Railways 
in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.22 and p.32. 
66 M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914, p.2. 
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Although the escalating scale of railway development increased the difficulties of 
coordination and control, historiography suggests that strategic planning and 
management was not universally applied on the early railways. Hawke argues that 
railways in England and Wales in 1840-70 did not exhibit forward planning,67 
although Gourvish demonstrates otherwise in relation to the large London and North 
Western amalgamation.118 The degree of strategic planning exhibited in England 
may therefore have been a function of company size as well as the quality of 
individual officers and directors. Robertson asserts that the main Scottish railway 
companies evolving from the 1845-46 mania were directed by those with 'ability and 
foresight', but who had 'little idea of railway management' .69 The absence of 
research into Scottish railway development in the post-mania period, however, 
precludes detailed comparison, but there are instances where ambition outpaced the 
capacity of a company to plan and manage substantial growth. The financial 
instability of the Caledonian Railway in 1849, for example, arose from its rapid 
exponential expansion and is ascribed by Butt and Ward to the lack of financial 
experience of its directors despite their energy and enthusiasm, 'sterling qualities in 
the era of promotion'.70 
In comparison to the Caledonian, however, railway companies in northern Scotland 
were relatively small in financial terms. Nevertheless, this study contends that 
railway development in this region was based upon a high degree of strategic 
planning, generated not as a consequence of company size but primarily through the 
foresight and commitment of specific individuals and groups. In particular, it shows 
that company development was almost exclusively founded on assiduous planning 
by regional interests, principally the powerful commercial sector of Aberdeen and the 
influential landowners of Inverness and the highlands. Their purpose was to enhance 
67 GR Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870, p.386. 
68 TR Gourvish, Marie Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a study of 
management, p.258 and p.264. 
69 CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
Company', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 1974), p.1. 
70 J Butt and JTWard, 'The promotion of the Caledonian Railway Company', Transport 
History, 3, No.3 (November 1970), p.249. 
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and consolidate the economic importance of their own localities, but it engendered 
competitive conflict between them and resulted in serious financial damage. The 
study thus reflects Casson's conclusion that the intense competition that generated 
the British railway network was rooted in the towns.71 
Without state direction, route development was left to the planning of private 
individual and groups. Although PS Bagwell has described the railway map in Britain 
In 1840 as showing 'the possibility of long distance communication·, 72 a map of 
Scotland at that date contained no authorised cross-border railway route from which 
future northern connections might be made. Yet within three decades, a substantial 
northern system was in operation, although its architects and their motives have 
received little investigation. Existing Scottish studies are largely restricted to the pre-
mania period. Robertson shows that with the development of the Scottish inter-
urban lines in 1837-38 the strategic impetus for railway construction passed from the 
local coal-owners and iron-masters to the merchant sector.73 In the promotion of the 
Caledonian Railway in the 1840s as part of an Anglo-Scottish route, Butt and Ward 
identify the earlier strategic intent of the Grand Junction Railway in England to form a 
consolidated group, 'simultaneously limiting the effect of the east coast promotion 
and monopolising long-distance traffic between the principal urban centres of 
Britain'.74 The subsequent leadership of this group by the amalgamated London and 
North Western Railway and its dynamic manager Mark Huish is recorded in 
Gourvish's comprehensive work.75 In the absence of state participation in railway 
planning, influential railway federations were able to direct and co-ordinate railway 
development in England; the powerful east- and west-coast alliances created were 
significant in shaping the form and operation of much of the early English railway 
71 M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914, p.6. 
72 PS Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, 1842-1922 (London, 
1968), p.20. 
73 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1B44, pp.315-16. 
74 J Butt and JTWard, 'The promotion of the Caledonian Railway Company', Transport 
History. 3, No.2 (July 1970), p.167. 
75 TR Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a study of 
management (Leicester, 1973); TR Gourvish, 'Captain Mark Huish: a pioneer in the 
development of railway management', Business History, XII, No.1 (January 1970), 46-58. 
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network.76 As Huish and the west-coast alliance sought to obtain control of Anglo-
Scottish trade, George Hudson and the east-coast alliance jostled for similar 
influence,n which culminated in the 1856 English and Scottish traffic agreement.78 
Paradoxically, however, this study shows that the strategic planning of these 
English-dominated alliances not only failed to secure control of the trunk route Into 
the north of Scotland, but that their intervention proved to be one of the causes of the 
disintegration of plans to realise it. Furthermore, it Identifies some northern 
strategists who not only showed the ability to realise their independent plans under 
difficult circumstances, but often backed their vision personally with substantial 
resources and at considerable risk. 
A recurring theme in the literature on Victorian railway development is that the 
increasing scale of railway enterprise and the evolution of executive management 
within the companies resulted in a divergence between ownership and control.711 
This study illustrates, however, that this pattern was not reflected in many northern 
railway companies where the shareholder base remained narrow, primarily because 
of difficulties in raising share capital, with the result that ownership and control 
remained substantially unified.80 In principle, the management of British railway 
76 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, pp.53-56 and p.65; TR 
Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a study of management, 
p.107 and p.203; G Channon, 'Railway Pooling in Britain before 1900: the Anglo-Scottish 
traffic', Business History Review, 62, No.1 (Spring 1988), p. 78. 
77 JJ Waterman, The Coming of the Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s (Aberdeen, 1975), 
p.20; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, pp.283-84, 
p.299 and p.317; TR Gourvish, Marl< Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a 
study of management, pp.107-108, p.119 and p.185. 
78 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, pp.112-15, noting that 
the new English and Scotch traffic agreement of 1856 included the division of receipts to and 
from the previously 'disputed' north of Scotland; G Channon, 'Railway pooling in Britain 
before 1900', p.79; TR Gourvish, Marl< Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a 
study of management, p.205 and appendix, section 2, p.297. 
79 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.39; MJ Freeman, 
'Introduction', in MR Freeman and DH Aldcroft (eds.), Transport in Victorian Britain 
(Manchester, 1988), p.8; TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian 
England, p.188; TR Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a 
study of management, p.288. 
80 33&34 Vic. cap.31, 1870, The Duke of Sutherland's Railway: in this extreme example of 
unanimity between ownership and control, which is examined in chapter 9, the Duke was the 
sole shareholder in the company, which was authorised to construct a railway between 
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companies was undertaken by directors and officers on behalf of the owners of the 
company, the shareholders, who could question polices and actions at general 
meetings.81 Alborn shows, however, that as the network of English lines approved in 
1845-46 began to be built and the increasing capitalisation of companies depressed 
dividends, shareholders became increasingly at odds with their directors, arguing 
that their representatives had engaged in expensive competitive conflict rather than 
improving trade, and had issued substantial amounts of guaranteed capital that 
diluted the influence of ordinary shareholders.82 Although similar inter-company 
strife arose north of the border, described by Robertson as 'semi-controlled 
warfare',83 the strategic direction and management within northern railway 
companies in 1844-74 was rarely challenged, primarily because majority 
shareholders dominated company boards. 
The reluctant but increasing intervention of the Victorian state in economic policy 
raises the question of whether the prospect of potential legislation induced changes 
in the strategic planning of railway companies. Channon argues that railways in 
Britain in the last three decades of the nineteenth century began to revise their 
operating policies to include the concept of 'public service' to avoid further 
restrictions on their commercial freedom. 84 Alborn observes that contemporary 
debate over the role of railways as a public institution continued from the 1860s into 
the next century. 85 Alderman, however, identifies the dilemma of free-market 
Golspie and Helmsdale, a distance of 17 ¼ miles, and planned as part of the through far 
north route to Wick and Thurso. 
81 8&9 Vic. cap.20, 1845, The Railway Clauses Act; 31&32 Vic. cap.119, 1868, The 
Regulation of Railways Act. 
82 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.166 and 
pp.204-205. 
83 CJA Robertson. 'Sir James Thompson', in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.). Dictionary of 
Scottish Business Biography 1860-1960, vol.2, p.312: 'Aggression was nothing new in 
Scottish railway politics, where inter-company relations often resembled semi-controlled 
warfare, with occasional truces to allow both sides to recover from severe mutual damage'. 
Thompson was general manager of the Caledonian Railway between 1882 and 1900 and 
chairman from 1901 until 1906. 
84 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.34. 
11
' TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.212 and 
pp.217-18. 
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legislators in judging 'whether it was right to impose upon industries created for 
private profit the duties and obligations of a public utility', concluding that this issue 
was not comprehensively addressed in the nineteenth century.86 This study adds a 
further perspective to this debate by showing that the strategic planning of railway 
routes into the far north and west of Scotland was devised to establish railways that 
could help to integrate a remote and almost subsistence economy into the expanding 
national networks of trade. It explains that these lines were operated close to 
marginal cost with any investment returns expected to accrue indirectly from 
increasing land values arising from improved transport links. 87 While therefore 
providing some Scottish evidence to support Channon's view of the increasing 
significance of public utility in railway policy, it contends that the purpose of its 
adoption in northern Scotland was primarily to meet local economic interests, rather 
than as any reaction to potential restrictive legislation. Indeed, the persistent 
economic difficulties encountered in the north-west of Scotland finally induced some 
financial assistance from the state towards further railway development in the 1890s 
along routes selected specifically for their public benefit.88 
This chapter has already shown that the Scottish banking system was more 
developed than that in England by the early 1800s, and operated an established 
branch network by 1845.8Q Although there Is general agreement that there was a 
close interweaving of railway and bank directorships in Britain,9° Channon asserts 
that 'There is no evidence that financial interests came to play an important, let alone 
dominating, role in shaping the strategies and structure of British railway companies 
86 G Alderman, The Railway Interest, p.32. 
87 W Vamplew, 'Railway Investment in the Scottish Highlands', Transport History, 3, No.2 
(July 1970), p.152, observes that 'Generally, the construction of Highland railways had a long 
term beneficial effect on the land values of the parishes through which they passed', although 
he concludes that railways in the Scottish Highlands had 'no instantaneous effect' on land 
values. 
88 J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People, pp.83-87; D Ross, 
The Highland Railway, p.89 and pp.91-92. 
89 CW Munn, 'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', p.132. 
90 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.175; G 
Channon, Railways in Britain and the Unites States, 1830-1940, pp.37-38. 
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, 91 This study demonstrates that banks provided key support for railway 
development in northern Scotland, but it also cites some evidence that suggests a 
strategic role undertaken by bankers within some northern railway companies. As in 
England, bankers not only could assist Scottish railway boards in securing relatively 
favourable lending terms, but they also provided representation of local Interests In 
trade and commerce. 92 
To summarise, this study investigates the extent to which the new northern railway 
system was the result of resolute strategic planning rather than the unplanned 
expansion that historiography denotes was generally the pattern of railway 
development in Britain. It assesses the respective contributions and motives of the 
influential regional centres, the powerful English alliances and the established 
banking networks, and traces the emergence of the concept of public utility within the 
objectives of northern railway promoters. 
- sources and management of railway finance 
As the English network of trunk lines grew, the scale of capital required escalated 
beyond local supply and was increasingly obtained from a capital market that could 
attract and direct investment funds nationally.93 Indeed, Casson observes that, with 
the failure of the state to control effectively the number of railways authorised in 
Britain, 'the burden of effective rationing fell upon the capital market'.94 The financial 
constraints experienced by railway companies as the network expanded have been 
subject to some investigation, but any comparative study of England and Scotland 
has been largely confined to the period prior to the 1845 railway mania because of 
an absence of Scottish research thereafter. This chapter has already identified that, 
although the economic characteristics of northern Scotland in 1844 offered little 
91 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the Unites States, 1830-1940, p.37. 
92 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.38. 
93 SA Broadbridge, 'Sources of railway share capital', in MC Reed (ed.), Railways in the 
Victorian Economy, p.191; MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.75; G 
Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1914, p.38. 
94 M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914, p.7. 
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apparent prospect of returns to new railway capital, a railway system extended 
across the region by 1874, which prompts the question of who invested in these 
railways and why? The thesis examines the sources and management of the capital 
raised by these northern railway companies and how they were able to sustain their 
business solvency, or survive periods of insolvency, under conditions of limited 
demand. It argues that the successful realisation of this railway system was founded 
upon significant economies achieved in the costs of formation and substantial local 
investment, supplemented repeatedly by advances from the banking sector. It 
shows that the influence of national, and particularly English, capital became 
insignificant as the system expanded northwards and, in particular, it highlights the 
critical role played by temporary credit in the financial structure of northern railway 
companies, a feature that has received little previous investigation. 
The availability of capital as a determinant of the nature and timing of railway 
construction in Scotland was the subject of a largely unresolved debate in 1970-71. 
This study explores the issues of capital supply raised by this debate In the context 
of northern Scotland. Vamplew contends that the slow development of railways in 
Scotland before 1850 was the result of difficulties in raising capital, exacerbated by 
competing demands for available investment funds as Scotland began its sustained 
economic growth.95 As a result, large-scale railway development in Scotland 
required English capital.96 Gourvish and Reed, however, judge that the Scottish 
experience of raising share capital was not markedly different from that elsewhere in 
England.97 In the 1840s, they argue, short-term investors began to be replaced by 
investment holders and the share market widened,98 which supports the general 
95 W Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.426-27 and pp.435-
36. 
96 W Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', pp.430-31 and 
pp.433-34; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, pp.333-
34. 
97 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.213. 
98 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.215. 
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historiographical view that the capital market was becoming more perfect99 and 
'directing funds to the most profitable opportunities regardless of location' .100 
Furthermore, Gourvish and Reed demonstrate the importance of loan capital and the 
use of bank overdrafts in early railway development in Scotland.101 They advance 'a 
strong impression that these institutions were willing to grant overdraft facilities and 
short-term loans to railways whose prospects were not necessarily bright'.102 
Vamplew, however, questions whether Scottish banks were as 'generous' as 
Gourvish and Reed suggest, 103 and argues that 'banks were reluctant to make loans 
to companies that were not in operation'.10-i Nevertheless, the examples 
subsequently quoted by Checkland show that banks lent at least £281,000 to 
Scottish railways in the period 1829-45 prior to the great railway mania.105 In some 
later research, Michie suggests that loans to railway companies in Scotland had a 
lower priority to other business needs.106 This study investigates the place of bank 
lending in the financing of northern railway companies. It contends that the banking 
99 SA Broadbridge, Studies in Railway Expansion and the Capital Market in England, 1825-
1873 (London, 1970), p. 154; GR Hawke and MC Reed, 'Railway capital in the United 
Kingdom in the nineteenth century', Economic History Review, new series, XXII, No.2 (1969), 
pp.277-78. 
100 RJ Irving, 'The capitalization of Britain's railways, 1830-1914', p.1; GR Hawke and MC 
Reed, 'Railway capital In the United Kingdom In the nineteenth century', p.279 and p.266. 
101 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
pp.216-17: 45% of the funds of the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway were held as 
loan capital in 1840. 
102 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.217. 
103 W Vamplew, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a reply', p.222. 
10-i W Vamplew, 'Banks and railway finance: a note on the Scottish experience', Transport 
History, 4, No.2 (July 1971), p.177. 
105 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.421: Checkland notes that 
surviving bank records 'are not systematic in recording advances and almost never report 
debts repaid' and therefore his study of Scottish banks can only record 'some examples from 
a great many bank loans' made to railways (pp.420-21); G Borthwick, 'The financing of 
Scottish Railways in the 1840s' (unpublished MA dissertation, University of York, 2000), p.31, 
states that banks lent £437,000 to local Scottish railways between 1826 and 1840. 
106 RC Michie, 'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', p.49; RC Michie, 
Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in 
Nineteenth Century Scotland, p.58. 
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sector played a very significant role in both the pre- and post-operation phases of 
many, of these companies and often in unpromising circumstances, lending support 
to Gourvish and Reed's 'strong impression' quoted above. Temporary bank loans 
were often recorded in suspense accounts held outside the main company accounts; 
the study identifies the critical function of this 'hidden' debt in the financial structure 
of many of the northern railway companies, a feature which has received scant 
attention in the historiography of Scottish railways. 
'Undoubtedly the major factor determining the cycles of railway construction in 
Scotland was the availability of capital.'107 This conclusion drawn by Michie raises a 
question of cause and effect; did the availability of capital encourage the promotion 
of new lines, or were routes planned and promoted before there was certainty of 
finance? Both aspects were evident in the 1845 railway mania: the cyclical upswing 
in the economy generated wealth at a time when new railway schemes were seeking 
investors, but the increasing supply of capital and the prospect of higher returns to 
investors encouraged the formulation of other railway plans, increasingly variable in 
their economic realism.108 Capital shortfalls arose once funds were called because, 
as Mitchell and Hawke have shown, railway construction was contra-cyclical and 
capital was usually required after the peak of the economic cycle had passed.109 
Nevertheless, Simmons considered that Scotland was less affected by the 1845 
speculation than any other part of Britain.110 Robertson supported the view that the 
great railway mania was essentially 'English-centred'. He noted that most projects 
proposed for Scotland were for 'logical routes with apparently good prospects of 
107 RC Michie, 'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', p.53. 
108 RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875, p.12 and p.56; RC Michie, 
'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', p.52; J Simmons, The Railway in 
England and Wales 1830-1914, p.41; H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-
Century Britain, p.88. 
109 BR Mitchell, 'The coming of the railway and United Kingdom economic growth', in MC 
Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy, p.26; GR Hawke, Railways and Economic 
Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870, p.364 and p.370; HG Lewin, The Railway Mania 
and its Aftermath, 1845-52 (London, 1936, republished Newton Abbot 1968), p.282. 
110 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, p.41, footnote 7. 
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profitability' and that most were ultimately constructed.111 This study considers 
whether capital availability may have encouraged the development of any railways in 
northern Scotland, rather than reactively supplying the means to realise existing 
plans for railways. 
The suggestion that the 1845 railway mania was largely an English phenomenon, 
however, poses two further questions: to what extent did English capital contribute to 
Scottish railway development after 1845, and how far was the supply of funds for 
new railways in the north of Scotland constrained by the high demand for capital for 
established railways to the south? Historians agree that English capital played an 
important part in the financing of the cross-border routes of the 1840s and that some 
Scottish companies faced disadvantages in raising capital because of their small 
scale and remoteness.112 Vamplew conjectures that any dependence on English 
capital 'probably declined' after 1850 once investment funds were generated by 
Scottish economic growth and as lines extended into areas 'less obviously profitable 
to the railway investor'.113 Moreover, he suggests that the Scots invested in local 
lines because of the advantages of cheaper transport and increased land values 
rather than for investment returns alone. 
If the remoteness and small size of some Scottish railway companies placed them at 
a disadvantage in raising share capital in a national market, the degree to which 
capital for the new northern companies was sourced locally requires investigation. 
There has been some examination of this factor in pre-mania railway companies in 
England and Scotland. Broadbridge demonstrates that local interests provided the 
bulk of the capital for the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway in England in its early 
111 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.335; W 
Vamplew, 'Sources of railway share capital before 1860', Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 17 (1970), p.427. 
112 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.334; W 
Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', pp.430-31 and p.434-35 
and p.439; TR Gourvlsh and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a 
comment', p.211 and pp.218-19; W Vamplew, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 
- a reply', p.222. 
113 W Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.435 and p.439. 
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years, 11• while Robertson illustrates that just over half of the subscriptions to the 
1837-38 inter-urban lines in Scotland were local.115 However, Gourvish and Reed 
caution that evidence of firm shareholding is hard to trace because the share 
registers of many early railway companies have not survived.118 Data based upon 
subscription contracts do not necessarily indicate the longer-term holding of railway 
shares. Indeed, Reed considers that the original subscribers in many companies in 
Britain were in a minority within a few years of incorporation.117 However, this study 
shows that, as railway routes were pushed further north, the importance of local 
capital became greater and, moreover, that there was long-term holding of 
investment in these companies. Furthermore, it illustrates that railway companies in 
the highland region were increasingly and substantially financed by a relatively small 
cadre of wealthy landowners. 
The escalating costs of railway development in Britain resulted in companies seeking 
additional finance. Reed argues that borrowing became an alternative rather than 
the expected complementary source of finance for railways in pre-mania Britain due 
to difficulties in raising ordinary share capital.118 As a result, loans assumed a 
greater proportion of total capital raised, especially in the period before lines opened 
and generated revenue. This study examines whether loans continued to be an 
alternative source of capital as railways extended into the north of Scotland. Hawke 
and Reed calculate that from 1847, as the railway system of the United Kingdom 
consolidated, the proportion of paid up capital represented by debentures and loans 
1 u SA Broadbridge, Studies in Railway Expansion and the Capital Market in England, 1825-
1873, p.118. 
115 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 30, pp.156-
57: 57.4% of the number of subscriptions made to the 1837-38 inter-urban lines came from 
local sources, with 63.2% of subscriptions overall from the whole of Scotland and 34.5% from 
England. Of the amounts subscribed for these lines, 48.5% was raised locally, with 53.9% 
overall coming from Scotland and 43.2% from England. 
118 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.210. 
117 MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.105 and p.194. 
118 MC Reed. Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.72, p. 56, table 9 and p.60: 
loans comprised 44% of the total capital raised in 1840, 48% in 1842 and 34% in 1844. 
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did not vary by more than four percent above or below 25 percent,119 but they 
caution that temporary loans are not always recorded. It is this temporary debt 
which is shown to be of great significance for northern railway development. 
Many railway companies, however, resorted to an increased use of preference 
capital from the late 1840s, which tended to reduce the amount of capital obtained 
from borrowing.120 In addition, permissive legislation in 1868 allowed railway 
companies to convert debenture loans into debenture stock to try to avoid the 
consequences of renewing loans when interest rates were high.121 As a result, the 
proportion of capital requiring guaranteed fixed interest payments becomes a more 
significant indicator of a railway company's financial structure. Gourvish notes that 
48 percent of railway capital other than loans required fixed interest payments in the 
United Kingdom in 1870, 122 which provides a benchmark towards the end of the 
period of this study. 
The early development of railways in both England and Scotland encountered 
serious inaccuracies in the estimation of costs. Many companies were forced to 
seek new capital powers or loans, or both, which tended to depress the returns on 
investment.123 The study explores the extent to which similar cost inaccuracies were 
replicated in the later railway development in northern Scotland and the financial 
impact that ensued. Estimated costs usually determined the level of capital 
authorised in the private act of incorporation, with borrowing powers approved to 
1111 GR Hawke and MC Reed, 'Railway capital In the United Kingdom In the nineteenth 
century', p.274 and p.279. 
120 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.194; MC 
Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.69. 
121 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England, p.213 and 
p.215. 
122 TR Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, 1830-1914, p.18; TR Gourvish, 
'Railways 1830-1870: the formative years', in MJ Freeman and DH Aldcroft (eds.), Transport 
in Victorian Britain, p.67. 
123 RJ Irving, 'The capitalization of Britain's railways, 1830-1914', p.6; MC Reed, Investment 
in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.58; RC Michie, 'Investment and railways in nineteenth-
century Scotland', p.52; WVamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', 
p.427. 
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meet immediate difficulties in raising share capital or to cover cost increases. From 
1836, parliamentary standing orders required that borrowing powers contained in 
railway legislation were restricted to one-third of the authorised share capital and, 
furthermore, such powers could not be exercised until half of the share capital had 
been paid up.124 Reed describes railway estimates made in Britain in 1820-44 as 
'hopelessly optimistic' .125 Gourvish attributes these inaccuracies partly to 
inexperience in costing and 'undue optimism', but also to 'lavish ornamentation', 
engineering difficulties and legal costs.126 JR Kellett estimates that railways in Britain 
paid twice the market value for land and that expensive land purchases continued 
until the late 1860s.127 Robertson identified three specific causes of cost inaccuracy 
in Scotland before 1844, albeit in 'uncertain proportions'; legitimate extensions and 
improvements, unforeseen cost increases, and miscalculation or incompetence.128 
Although he described contemporary Scottish cost estimates as 'educated guesses', 
Robertson also advanced the 'unprovable suspicion' of some deliberate 
miscalculation in order to keep estimates low to attract subscribers and perhaps to 
ease Parliamentary approval.129 The study compares the relative costs of the 
railways that formed the northern network and it shows that substantial economies 
were achieved in constructing main line routes. 
This section has largely considered capital finance, but the apparent lack of 
economic advantages in the northern counties of Scotland raises the question of 
how these new railway companies were able to generate sufficient revenue to cover 
their operational costs and also meet guaranteed payments on loan and preference 
capital. As the proportion of capital carrying guaranteed commitments increased, 
124 GR Hawke and MC Reed, 'Railway capital in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth 
century', p.282; J Simmons and G Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway 
History, entry on 'Capital' by MC Reed, p 69. 
125 MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.24. 
126 TR Gourvish, Marl< Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a study of 
management, p.20 and p.22. 
127 JR Kellett, The Impact of Railways on Victorian Cities (London, 1969), p.392 and 
appendix 1, p.428. 
128 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.323. 
129 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.323. 
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railway companies faced greater difficulties in paying returns to ordinary 
shareholders from available revenue. Lower dividends tended to reduce the 
attractiveness of new investment in the company and, moreover, high levels of debt 
could challenge its very survival.130 The study examines the efficacy of financial 
management of northern railway companies, operating under conditions of limited 
demand, and investigates how some were able to survive relatively long periods of 
acute insolvency. 
In summary, this study seeks to determine the extent to which capital supply 
preceded or followed the promotion of railways in northern Scotland, and whether 
the previous experience of inaccurate estimates of costs in Scotland and England 
was repeated, reduced or eliminated in the formation of these new routes. It 
investigates who invested in these northern railway companies and why, and 
explores the degree to which the companies were dependent upon local finance 
because of their size and remoteness: furthermore, it examines the significance of 
loans as a source of finance and the importance of the banking sector in their supply. 
The study also considers how companies sustained their business solvency in a 
region with few economic advantages and limited demand for transport. It shows the 
widespread adoption of cheap railway principles to contain capital costs, but it also 
indicates that the capital difficulties faced by many of the northern Scottish 
companies were often exacerbated not just as a consequence of the proportion of 
authorised capital raised by loans, on which historiography tends to focus, but 
particularly as a result of the burden of hidden temporary debt, which contemporary 
accounting practice did not always reveal to shareholders in published accounts and 
which has remained almost as concealed in the historiography. 
The economy of northern Scotland offered little conspicuous incentive for railway 
investment in 1844, but a railway system extended across much of the region by 
1874. The historiography explored in this chapter suggests that the state, strategic 
planning and finance were influential factors in the development of the earlier railway 
networks in Scotland and England. Successive chapters examine the extent to 
which these factors shaped the growth of railways in the comparatively 
disadvantaged northern counties of Scotland and whether their contributions to that 
130 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.39. 
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development might differ from the experiences of earlier railway evolution to the 
south. 
Sources and financial methodology 
This thesis is based on analysis of the records of twenty-five railway companies 
promoted in the north of Scotland between 1844 and 1874, supplemented by 
contemporary writing of the period. 131 Financial information, more particularly capital 
and revenue data abridged from company records and various financial indicators 
derived from this primary data, is set out for each company in the appendix. 
Research of primary sources has concentrated upon the records of Scottish railway 
companies held in the National Archives of Scotland, but inevitably some potentially 
valuable documents, particularly shareholder records, have not survived. 
Contemporary journals and newspapers, notably Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 
Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, Railway Times, Herapath's Railway Journal and 
Railway News, have provided comment and data on the finances and business 
performance of northern railway companies that has validated, supplemented, or 
challenged information contained in company annals. 
Any financial analysis of railway companies in the nineteenth century is hindered by 
inconsistency in the way accounts were maintained and presented; there was, for 
example, variation in the way companies allocated expenditure between capital and 
revenue accounts. The need for some uniformity in railway accounting, especially 
following the financial crisis of 1866 in which railway securities played a central role, 
resulted in the Regulation of Railways Act in 1868.132 Specific accounts were 
required in a prescribed form half-yearly by the Board of Trade which separated 
131 The appendix contains data of 26 northern railway companies, but the Deeside Extension 
Railway is treated as part of the Deeside Railway because it was managed by the Deeside 
Railway board, reconstituted by the addition of two directorships to represent extension 
interests. 
132 31 &32 Vic. cap. 119, 1868, The Regulation of Railways Act; PL Cottrell, 'Railway finances 
and the crisis of 1866: contractor's bills of exchange and finance companies', Journal of 
Transport History, new series, Ill, No.1 (February 1975), pp.33-35; G Channon, Railways in 
Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.40. 
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capital and revenue expenditure.133 Nevertheless, differences continued in the ways 
companies constructed and reported capital and revenue accounts; 134 Chan non 
advises that published accounts remain an 'imperfect guide' to financial policy and 
comparisons of company performance.135 
A number of indicators are used within the study to evaluate the financial affairs of 
northern railway companies but, given the limitations of financial sources, the data 
are merely figurative and it is the trend that Is of greater significance than the raw 
data themselves. Any gaps in data within company records are indicated in the 
appendix, but where other data have been identified from contemporary sources, 
these are included. In particular, company accounts do not always contain the detail 
of any temporary debt held and, where this is the case, the appendix explains the 
derivation of any estimate of such debt. The consistency of data is strengthened to 
some degree because two of the principal early northern railway companies, the 
Great North of Scotland and the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, provided 
administrative staff and services to their respective satellites; similarities in their 
accounting methodology can therefore be identified across a range of railway 
company accounts. 
A simple indicator of the potential financial stability of a railway company in its early 
years can be drawn from estimates of costs compared with its authorised capital and 
its revenue stream. The widespread inaccuracy of estimates and the resultant 
difficulties of servicing capital debt could curtail the prospect of longer-term economic 
success even if a company showed a rising trend in gross revenue. Data of gross 
revenue are used in the study as a measure of turnover because railway companies 
adopted varying practices to determine net revenue, which make the use of such 
data problematical for any comparative purpose. Some companies, for example, 
133 31&32 Vic. cap.119, 1868, The Regulation of Railways Act, schedule 1 required railway 
companies to submit half-yearly accounts to the Board of the Trade in a prescribed form 
comprising thirteen tables of capital and revenue data, including a general balance sheet 
showing finance 'below the line' of the main accounts, and two additional tables of system 
mileage and train mileage; GA Lee, 'The concept of profit in British accounting, 1760-1900', 
Business History Review, XLIX (1975), p.24. 
134 G Alderman, The Railway Interest, p.31. 
135 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.40. 
45 
moved costs out of revenue to try to maintain a dividend to ordinary shareholders, 
while many established railway companies increasingly raised capital from 
preference shares from the late 1840s, 136 which required additional deductions from 
gross revenue to pay dividends. Dividend data also require great caution and must 
be interpreted alongside the balance on the capital account and any evidence that 
might imply that dividends were paid other than from revenue. Railway companies 
were not alone in seeking to preserve revenue to pay dividends; the North of 
Scotland Bank came close to collapse in 1848 by trying to sustain dividends after 
overextending its lending during the railway boom.137 Share prices can give some 
comparative indication of a company's status in the market, but, as prices were 
primarily driven by dividends and rumour, circumspection is required in their use. 
These indicators, however, tend to show more about trends in the performance of 
the company rather than its long-term stability. Current accountancy practice 
suggests that a company is solvent if its assets exceed its total liabilities, if it can pay 
debts when due and if it can service its borrowing.138 Although contemporary, these 
criteria can serve for the historical analysis in this study, particularly because the 
laws governing insolvency and bankruptcy in England and Scotland differed until 
some rationalisation was effected in 1869.139 The relevance of the first two of these 
present-day criteria, for example, was plain in the momentous collapse of financial 
intermediary Overend-Gurney in 1866.140 
136 GR Hawke and MC Reed, 'Railway capital in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth 
century', p.284, noting a movement from loans and debentures to preference stock as a 
means of raising capital for railways in Scotland until the mid 1880s; TR Gourvish, Railways 
and the British Economy, 1830-1914, p.18. 
137 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.349: in a run on the North of 
Scotland Bank In February 1848, the bank's capital was reduced from £380,000 to £115,550; 
A Keith, The North of Scotland Bank, 1836-1936 (Aberdeen, 1936), pp.50-55 and p.59. 
138 W McKenzie, The Financial Times Guide to Using and Interpreting Company Accounts 
(3rd edition, London, 2003), p.152; M Pendlebury and R Groves, Company Accounts: 
analysis, interpretation and understanding (1994, 6th edition, London 2004), p.288. 
139 VM Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and Company 
Winding-up in Nineteenth-Century England (Oxford, 1995), p.11, p.149 and p.157, quoting 
the new Bankruptcy Act, 32&33 Vic. cap.71, 1869. 
140 PL Cottrell, 'Railway finances and the crisis of 1866: contractor's bills of exchange and 
finance companies', pp.33-34; VM Lester, Victorian Insolvency, p. 75-76. Contemporary 
reference to the collapse of Overend-Gurney and Company is made in chapter 8. 
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Two gearing ratios are derived in the appendix tables. Gearing is defined as the 
proportion of company capital financed by lenders rather than shareholders.141 The 
need for two gearing ratios arises because, as the previous section has Identified, 
railway loans comprised both authorised and temporary borrowing. The first gearing 
ratio shows the proportion of capital raised by borrowing under the powers granted to 
each company by Parliament. Legislation to incorporate railway companies 
generally prescribed that loans could be taken up to one-third of the authorised 
share capital once half of the share capital had been paid up.142 Therefore, if a 
company raised its full share and loan capital, a gearing ratio of authorised 
borrowing to total authorised capital would be 0.25, which was, in effect, the 
maximum gearing ratio approved by the state. This ratio, however, refers to 
authorised capital rather than the amount of capital actually received, so in practice, 
at least in the short-term, a ratio of loans to total capital raised could rise as high as 
0.4 if a company had obtained only its minimum half of share capital but was able 
rapidly to secure loans to the full extent of its borrowing powers.143 Such action 
would, however, put immediate strain on the ability of the company to service the 
debt and indicate a potential weakness in the company's financial structure. 
This chapter has already suggested that temporary borrowing added to the financial 
pressures faced by northern railway companies. Railway companies employed a 
variety of sources to secure short- or medium-term fixed interest advances, which 
included bank loans, the issue of bills of exchange to suppliers, 144 and temporary 
credit from other financial intermediaries and contractors. Significantly, this type of 
debt, if it was reported at all to shareholders, usually appeared 'below the line' in the 
141 M Pendlebury and R Groves, Company Accounts: analysis, interpretation and 
understanding, p.288. 
142 J Simmons and G Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, entry 
on 'Capital' by MC Reed, p.69. 
143 For example, If a company had authorised share capital of £300,000 and borrowing 
powers of £100,000 and it raised only half its share capital (£150,000) but all of its authorised 
loans (£100,000), its loans would comprise 0.4 of its total raised capital (£150,000 in shares 
and £100,000 in loans, totalling £250,000). 
144 See Glossary entry on 'bill of exchange'. 
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general balance sheet of the company and therefore did not present an immediate 
charge on the revenue or capital account. Accounting practice still reflects the 
advantage of this creative methodology. 146 Nevertheless, such 'hidden' debt still 
required servicing and ultimate repayment, despite being recorded outside the main 
accounts.146 A second gearing ratio is therefore used in the study, which expresses 
company turnover, measured by gross revenue, as a proportion of the total of all 
types of identified borrowing that carried a guaranteed payment. This ratio gives an 
indication of the scale of the company's total debt, the prospects of repaying that 
debt from its revenue stream, and thus the longer-term financial stability of a 
company. As the ratio of gross revenue divided by total debt falls, the less likely it 
becomes that revenue can sustain that level of debt and therefore the greater the 
financial instability of the company becomes. In chapter 3, this second gearing ratio 
is derived for the Caledonian Railway, which was insolvent in 1849 and required new 
legislation before it could build its financial recovery. Given that a certain level of 
gearing was evident when the company was insolvent, the Caledonian's debt 
gearing ratio provides a benchmark in the study against which to evaluate the 
financial viability of later railway companies in the north of Scotland. It cannot, of 
course, be taken as an absolute sign of any terminal financial failure, but It Is, 
nevertheless, useful as an indicator. 
Further evidence of financial confidence in a company can be displayed by its ability 
to replace maturing loans with new ones and to raise new capital from existing 
shareholders. However, the willingness of banks In particular to provide advances to 
railway companies, and for how long, cannot provide any reliable indicator of a 
company's financial situation. Indeed, the study illustrates that banks often had little 
choice but to renew loans to avoid significant capital loss on the sums advanced by 
precipitating the bankruptcy of a company, which supports Munn's assertion cited 
145 I Griffiths, Creative Accounting: how to make your profits what you want them to be 
(London, 1968), p.25, states 'By taking advantage of the rather vague rules defining when an 
item is extra-ordinary and disclosed below the line ... a company can boost its earnings quite 
substantially'. 
146 GR Hawke and MC Reed, 'Railway capital in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth 
century', p.274. 
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earlier that short-term credit tended to extend into long-term lending.1"7 
Nevertheless, patterns of bank borrowing can provide some evidence of shortfalls in 
a railway company's finances. 
Whilst the study refers to two gearing ratios, one for authorised borrowing and a 
second for the total debt held by a company, it is essential to re-emphasise that the 
mechanism of gearing is less important than the trend indicated over time. If the 
gross revenue of a company is rising and its debt gearing is improving, the company 
can demonstrate the feasibility of emerging successfully from a deep financial crisis, 
as illustrated by the Great North and Scotland and Highland Railways in 1866-72 
and explained in chapter 8. 
The form of the thesis 
successive chapters adopt a chronological approach to the investigation of the 
development of the railway system in northern Scotland so that the often complex 
activity in progress across a range of companies during specific periods can be 
interpreted. The next chapter establishes the extent of the Scottish railway system in 
1844 in the context of the sharp economic divide between the industrialising central 
belt of Scotland and the semi-feudal structure of the far north. It identifies the 
constraints experienced in railway development in Scotland by that date and 
considers the consequences for new development into northern Scotland. 
Chapter 3 examines the strategic plan for Scottish railway development prepared by 
the executive of the state in 1845, and the consequences of its authorisation by the 
legislature. The intense competition that ensued contributed to the financial 
insolvency of the Caledonian, the largest railway company in Scotland at that time. 
This significant event in Scottish business history provides a financial benchmark 
throughout the study. The following chapter contrasts the strategic planning and 
financial control of the three companies that formed the authorised northern trunk 
route to Aberdeen, opened throughout in 1850, and identifies the English influence 
147 CW Munn, The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', p.131. 
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within them. It also investigates the formation of the Aberdeen railway web, a virtual 
regional monopoly created within the state's company authorisations of 1845-46, and 
the causes and consequences of its collapse in 1848-49. 
The results of this Aberdonian disintegration generated the conditions that assisted 
the formation of a new competitive web of companies based in Inverness. The 
following three chapters explain the interwoven development of the northern trunk 
route between Aberdeen and the highland capital of Inverness, and the railways 
promoted into the surrounding districts, which were based on the strategic plans 
emanating from these two regional centres. Chapter 5 studies the early 
development of the Great North of Scotland Railway between 1845 and 1861, its 
branch line policy and the results and consequences of its monopoly power. The 
chapter also reveals the growing extent of the endemic financial instability contained 
within its allied branch network. Chapter 6 explores the concurrent competitive 
developments promoted from Inverness and probes the sources of finance obtained 
for this new network of lines, initially isolated from the national network but conceived 
as part of a much bolder strategy to secure local control of railway development 
throughout northern Scotland. The complex competitive battles that ensued 
between 1860 and 1865 to capture and defend northern territory are analysed in 
chapter 7. In particular, this chapter outlines the reasons for the rapid collapse of the 
Great North from a dominant monopoly into an isolated rural railway system by 1866. 
The serious financial damage that was incurred by both regional railway monopolies 
as a result of this competition is evaluated in chapter 8. It reveals the depth of the 
financial crises faced by the Great North of Scotland and Highland railway 
companies and appraises the strategies used by both Aberdeen and Inverness to 
extricate themselves from debt. It thus provides a comparative study of the 
successful financial recovery of these companies between 1866 and 1872, which 
contributes to both the railway and business historiography of Scotland. Chapter 9 
then examines the development of the railway system into the far north and west of 
Scotland between 1865 and 1874 where economic circumstances were particularly 
discouraging. It identifies the sources of finance for these companies and the 
motivation of the promoters in operating the lines close to cost, seeking indirect 
returns for their investment, Finally, chapter 10 summarises the roles played by the 
50 
state, strategic planning, and railway finance in the successful development of the 
railway system in northern Scotland between 1844 and 187 4 and reflects on the 
extent to which the Influence of these factors might differ from that evident In earlier 
railway evolution to the south. 
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Chapter 2: Scotland and its railways, 1844 
Map 1: Principal towns to which reference is made in the text 
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This chapter provides the context for the thesis. First, it considers the 'dual 
economy' of Scotland in the 1840s to which reference was made in the last chapter, 1 
1 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, (Cambridge, 1997), p.1. 
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illustrated by the marked divergence between the economic development of the 
industrialising counties of the central Forth-Clyde valley and the semi-feudal counties 
of the far north and north-west, where population clearances continued into the 
1850s. A contrast is then drawn between the extent of the Scottish railway network 
in 1844 and that in England. Scottish railways at that date were almost exclusively 
confined to the Forth-Clyde central belt and no main route had been constructed 
north of a geographic line drawn between Glasgow and Aberdeen, the region which 
is the focus of this study. The chapter then identifies the constraints of capital and 
revenue encountered by established railways on both sides of the border by 1844 
and, given the unpromising economic conditions in the north, considers the 
implications of these for the extension of railways into northern Scotland. 
The north-south divide: the Scottish economy by 1844 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Scottish economy was stimulated 
by a large growth in population, increased home demand, technological change and 
the expansion of inter-regional trade.2 This economic development was shaped not 
just by the supply of natural resources and labour, but by the practicality and 
availability of systems of communication.3 Railways supported rather than caused 
economic growth in both Scotland and England, in particular by facilitating access to 
deposits of raw materials.4 Although the Scottish railway system in 1844 was small 
and disjointed in comparison with the larger and more integrated network developing 
in England, it evolved using local investment primarily to provide a supply of coal for 
2 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007 (London 1999, new edition, London, 2006), 
pp.108-110, pp.154-55 and p.257; RH Campbell, The Rise and Fall of Scottish Industry 
(Edinburgh, 1980), pp.9-10; SGE Lythe and J Butt, An Economic History of Scotland 1100-
1939 (Glasgow, 1975), p.95 and p.102. 
3 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, p.24 and pp.31-34; TM Devine, The 
Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.259; SGE Lythe and J Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, 
p.170. 
4 BR Mitchell, 'The coming of the railway and United Kingdom economic growth', Journal of 
Economic History, 1st series, 24 (1964), p.315; GR Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth 
in England and Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford, 1970), p.366, p.392 and p.402; WVamplew, 
'Railways and the transformation of the Scottish economy', Economic History Review, 2nd 
series, 24 (1971), p.47 and p.54. 
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industrial needs, linking short railways with the sea estuaries and the three major 
canals of the central valley. 
The geography of Scotland contributed to the increasing economic and social 
division between the north and south that was already evident by the end of the 
eighteenth century. To the north of the Forth-Clyde valley, the nature of the terrain 
focussed trade and transport towards the east coast, where the great sea inlets of 
the Forth, Tay and Moray Firths gave strategic importance to the towns of Stirling, 
Perth and Inverness. Coastal shipping provided the principal means of transport and 
remained an important feature of the northern transport system throughout the 
nineteenth century.5 
This economic division between the regions is illustrated by census data (table 1 ), 
which identifies the concentration of employment and consumer demand and thus 
suggests the areas where commercial and Industrial Investment was focussed. The 
population of Scotland rose by 62.9 percent in 1801-41. Growth was rapid in the 
counties of the central Forth-Clyde valley where the pivotal coal and iron industries 
were located; the population of Renfrewshire and Lanarkshire, including the key 
towns of Glasgow and Paisley, grew by 97.5 percent and 189.0 percent respectively 
in these four decades, while Midlothian, with major coal reserves served by the 
Monkland railway system, grew by 83.8 percent. The population of the northern 
counties, lacking raw materials and communications, grew below the national rate, 
indicating their relatively slow economic progress in comparison with counties in the 
central valley. In the north-east, Aberdeenshire with fertile farmland and an 
established mercantile centre grew by 58.9 percent in 1801-41, just below the 
national average, while Inverness-shire, containing some of the wilder geographic 
regions in the north-west. grew by 34.6 percent, approximately half the national 
average. 
5 W Vamplew, 'Railways and the Scottish transport system in 18th century', Journal of 
Transport History, new series, I, No.3 (February 1972), p.144: CH Lee, 'Some aspects of the 
coastal shipping trade: the Aberdeen Steam Navigation Company, 1835-1880', Journal of 
Transport History, new series, Ill, No.2 (September 1975), pp.101-102. 
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Table 1: Census of Scotland: data showing the population by county, 1801-71 
Countv 1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 
Aberdeen 121065 133871 155049 177657 192387 212032 221569 244603 
AnQUS 99053 107187 113355 139606 170453 191264 204425 237567 
Aravll 81277 86541 97316 100973 97371 89298 79724 75679 
Ayr 84207 103839 127299 145055 164356 189858 198971 200809 
Banff 37216 38433 43663 48337 49679 54171 59215 62023 
Berwick 30206 30893 33385 34048 34438 36297 36613 36486 
Bute 11791 12033 13797 14151 15740 16608 16331 16977 
Caithness 22609 23149 29181 34529 36443 38709 41111 39992 
Clackmannan 10858 12010 13263 14729 191 55 22951 21450 23747 
Dumfries 54597 62960 70878 73770 72830 78123 75878 74808 
Dunbarton 20710 24189 27317 33211 44296 45103 52034 58857 
East Lothian 29986 31050 35127 36145 35886 36386 37634 37771 
Fife 93743 101272 114556 128839 140140 153546 154770 160735 
Inverness 72672 77671 89961 94797 97799 96500 88888 87531 
Kincardine 26349 27439 29118 31431 33075 34598 34466 34630 
Kinross 6725 7245 7762 9072 8763 8924 7977 7198 
Kirkcudbright 29211 33684 38903 40590 41119 43121 42495 41859 
Lanark 147692 191291 244387 316819 426972 530169 631566 765339 
Midlothian 122597 148607 191514 219345 225454 259435 273997 328379 
Morav 27760 27967 31398 34498 35012 38959 42695 43612 
Nairn 8322 8496 9268 9354 9217 9956 10065 10225 
Orknev 24445 23238 26979 28847 30507 31455 32395 31274 
Peebles 8735 9935 10046 10578 10499 10738 11408 12330 
Perth 125583 134390 138247 142166 137457 138660 133500 127768 
Renfrew 78501 93172 112175 133433 155072 161091 177561 216947 
Ross and 56318 60853 68762 74820 78685 82707 81406 80955 
Cromartv 
Roxburah 33721 37230 40892 43663 46025 51642 54119 53974 
Selkirk 5388 5889 6637 6833 7990 9809 10449 14005 
StirlinQ 50825 58174 65376 72621 82057 86237 91 926 98218 
Sutherland 23117 23629 23840 25518 24782 25793 25246 24317 
West Lothian 17844 19451 22685 23291 26872 30135 38645 40965 
WIQtown 22918 26891 33240 36258 39195 43389 42095 38830 
Zetland 22379 22915 26145 29392 30558 31078 31670 31608 
(Shetland) 
Scotland 1608420 1805864 2091521 2364386 2620184 2888742 3062294 3360018 
source: National census data, quoted in RH Campbell and JBA Dow (eds.), Source Book of Scottish Economic and 
Social History /Oxford , 1968), o.2 and insert 8. 
The effects of the highland clearances, which included emigration, out-migration and 
the enforced movement of population from highland land to the coast, is illustrated 
by the small increase of 7 .2 percent in the population of Sutherland in 1801-41. The 
interior of Sutherland was described as: 
... extensive tracts of great bog, - broken into mountains, and rocks and wild 
scenery, and interspersed here and there with patches of land, under 
imperfect tillage, near the riverbanks.6 
6 Thomas Sellar, The Sutherland Clearances of 1814, (1883), containing a letter from 
Patrick Sellar to James Loch, Commissioner of the Duke of Sutherland, 1 May 1850, and 
quoted in RH Campbell and JBA Dow (eds.), Source Book of Scottish Economic and Social 
History, p.42. 
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The size of settlements in the north contrasted sharply with the large towns to the 
south. By 1841, the population of Glasgow was 275,000, reaching 420,000 by 1861; 
the population of Edinburgh and Leith in 1841 was 166,000, rising to 203,000 in 
1861. Even by 1861, the northern centres of population were minute in comparison; 
Inverness (16,162), Elgin (11,728), Wick (12,841), Thurso (5,561), Peterhead (9,796) 
and Fraserburgh (4,511)7 were all targets for early railway promotions, but offered 
limited demand and potential revenue. The population of all but one of the northern 
counties had peaked by 1861, just before the railway ventured north of Inverness 
(table 2). 
Table 2: The population of northern counties of Scotland at their peak 
Countv PoDulatlon In 1821 Population at peak Year of peak 
Caithness 29181 41111 1861 
Inverness 89961 97799 1841 
Nairn 9268 10225 1871 
Perth 138247 142166 1831 
Ross and Cromartv 68762 82707 1851 
Sutherland 23840 25518 1851 
source: Census data, quoted in WC Dickinson and GS Pryde, A New History of Scotland, 
vol.2 (Edinburgh 1962), o.232. 
The only towns north of the Forth-Clyde valley of any significant size by 1861 were 
Aberdeen (77,272), Dundee (95,275) and Perth (30,225). 8 It was therefore logical 
that the projection of a trunk railway route to the north of Scotland's central belt 
favoured the Perth-Aberdeen route where trade and population were concentrated. 
Industrial growth centred on the Scottish cotton industry before 1830, followed by 
expansion in the metal industries in 1830-80.9 Scotland had reserves of coal, 
7 J Thomas and D Turnock, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, vol.15, North 
of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1989), data drawn from chapters V and VI, pp.143-264. 
8 J Thomas and D Turnock, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, vol. 15, North 
of Scotland, p.87, p.89, and p.143; SGE Lythe and J Butt, An Economic History of Scotland 
1100-1939, p.96. 
9 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, pp.24-26; TM Devine, The Scottish 
Nation 1700-2007, p.108 and p.257; RH Campbell, The Rise and Fall of Scottish Industry 
1707-1939, p.19; SGE Lythe and J Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, p.161 . 
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limestone and iron-ore needed for industrialisation, but Scottish coal was 
uncompetitive in England due to transport costs and the efficiency of the Durham 
and Northumberland coalfields, which produced one-third of British output in 1800 
compared to just under one-eighth from Scotland.10 Nevertheless, Scottish 
coalfields supplied Edinburgh and Glasgow with over one million tons of coal 
annually by 1830 and exported 5 percent of its output to lreland.11 Demand for coal 
increased as Scottish production of pig iron rose from 5 percent of British output in 
1830 to 26 percent in 1848, principally as a result of the development of Neilson's 
hot-blast process in 1828 and the local discovery of blackband ironstone.12 
Table 3: The working population of Scotland, 1851 
metals Textiles & Other Agriculture Mining Services Total 
clothlnn manufacturlnn and flshlnn 
Workforce (00Os) 60.8 366.4 66.2 347.6 48.1 380.8 1269.9 
% of total 4.8% 28.9% 5.2% 27.4% 3.8% 30.0% 
source: AK Cairncross (ed .), The Scottish Economy(Cambridge 1954), table 36 o.77. 
Scotland's economy retained a strong agricultural sector throughout the nineteenth 
century (table 3). In the north-east. the counties surrounding Aberdeen provided rich 
and improved agricultural land, whereas the old system of 'runrig', the farming of 
strips between a quarter and half an acre each, continued in the highlands until the 
1850s.13 North-east of Inverness in the coastal lands of Easter Ross, many 
10 MW Flinn and D Stoker, The History of the British Coal Industry, vol.2, 1700-1830: The 
Industrial Revolution (Oxford 1984), tables 1.2 and 1.3, p.26. 
11 J Hassan, 'The supply of coal to Edinburgh', Transport History, 5, No.2 (July 1972), 
pp.125-26; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 
(Edinburgh, 1983), p.61; MW Flinn and D Stoker, The History of the British Coal Industry, 
vol.2, table 7.6, p.223. 
12 CA Whatley, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, p.33; TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 
1700-2007, p.257; A Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland: 1750-1960, p.9 and 
pp.120-22; RH Campbell, 'Developments in the Scottish pig iron trade', Joumal of Economic 
History, 1st series, 15, No.3 (1955), p.209; W Vamplew, 'The railways and the iron industry: a 
study of their relationship in Scotland', in MC Reed (ed.) , Railways in the Victorian Economy 
(Newton Abbot, 1969), p.33. 
13 TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands 
(Manchester, 1994), pp.33-34; SGE Lythe and J Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, 
p.111 ; RH Campbell, Scotland since 1707: the rise of an industrial society (Oxford, 1965, 
reprinted 1971 ), p.19. 
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effective and efficient farms were formed largely by new landowners bringing 
external capital, contrasting with the multiple-tenant farms in the west that developed 
from the clan system and the highland clearances. 1• The Highland area retained 
tribal characteristics where '... below the ranks of the chiefs and chieftains stretched 
a hierarch of tenants' .15 The agricultural inefficiency of the feudal clan system 
conflicted with the increased commercialization of agriculture from 1830.16 At the 
time Scotland was competing for new investment to develop industry and to expand 
its embryo railway system, large parts of the north were subject to severe poverty 
and regular famine. 
By the early nineteenth century, sheep had largely replaced traditional black cattle as 
the export of the highlands.17 To create the necessary size of farms for large flocks, 
much of the population was removed from the land.18 James Loch, Commissioner to 
the Duke of Sutherland, defended these highland clearances by arguing that 
demand for wool had resulted in a quadrupling of land rents.19 The capital required 
14 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2001), 
p. 56; IRM Mowat. Easter Ross 1750-1850: the double frontier(Edinburgh, 1981), p.31; CA 
Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830 (Manchester, 2000), p.242; TM Devine, The Scottish 
Nation 1700-2007 (London, 2006), pp.187-88 and pp.417-18. 
15 TC smout, A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830 (London, 1969), p. 337. 
16 TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War: the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands, 
pp.43-44; RH Campbell and TM Devine, 'The Rural Experience', in WH Fraser and RJ Morris 
(eds.), People and Society in Scotland, vol. II (Edinburgh, 1990), p.48; CA Whatley, The 
Industrial Revolution in Scotland, p.1. 
17 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.176: as an example, cattle numbers almost 
halved from 5,140 to 2,906 in the two large parishes of Creich and Assynt in Sutherland in 
1790-1808 while sheep numbers almost trebled from 7,840 to 21,0000 in the same period; 
MGH Pittock, The Invention of Scotland: the Stuart myth and the Scottish identity, 1638 to the 
present day (London, 1991), p.107, notes that there were 250,000 sheep in the Highlands in 
1811 but almost a million in the 1840s; SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-
1973 (Glasgow, 1975), p.227, comments that in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
black cattle were the 'most readily realisable form of wealth' for Highlanders. 
18 TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands, 
p.35, noting that highland population was not only displaced by the establishment of new 
sheep farms but also by the formation of new crofts from the traditional runrig system. 
19 James Loch, An Account of the Improvements on the Estates of the Marquess of Stafford 
in the Counties of Stafford and Sa/op, and on the Estate of Sutherland, with remarks 
(London, 1820}, p.xvii: ' ... the demand for the raw material of wool by the English 
manufacturers enabled the Highland proprietor to let his lands for quadruple the amount they 
ever before produced to him'. 
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for these large farms was beyond the means of the native population.20 In 
Sutherland, attempts were made to move the population, which had not already 
migrated, to the east coast.21 Coastal land was of poor quality, but the increasing 
reliance on the potato as the staple diet allowed a large population to be supported 
by a relatively small area of land of Indifferent quality. Fishing offered a potential 
additional source of food and income, but few had the necessary skills or capital to 
operate commercially. Helmsdale was established by the Duke of Sutherland as an 
east-coast fishing port, with £14,000 expended there in 1814-19; between 1811 and 
1833, £½ million was invested in Sutherland's estates but with limited economic 
impact.22 Land values in parts of the north rose as the population was moved, and 
this was attributed to the prosperity of sheep-farming and new revenue derived from 
letting moors for grouse-shooting.23 Some state assistance was offered through 
loans for land drainage, but with the scope widened to include fencing and roads.24 
The hierarchical clan system traditionally provided a source of troops for the national 
government, but the exodus of an estimated 20,000 people to the United States of 
America in 1803 raised concerns not only about the loss of recruits but also for the 
20 E Richards, A History of the Highland Clearances, vol. 1 (London, 1982), p.288; TM 
Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.175. 
21 TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.177: in 1807-21, between 6,000 and 10,000 
people were moved from Inland Sutherland parishes to crofts on the coast, which Devine 
describes as 'in the most remarkable example of social engineering undertaken in early 
nineteenth-century Britain'; TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transformation of 
the Scottish Highlands, pp.36-37; MGH Pittock, The Invention of Scotland, p.111, records 
that the Countess of Sutherland appropriated 794,000 acres of clan land in 1814-20. 
22 E Richards, The Leviathan of Wealth: the Sutherland Fortune in the Industrial Revolution 
(London, 1973), p.285 and p.286; CA Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830, p.248; TC 
smout, A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830, p.355; B Lenman, An Economic History 
of Modem Scotland, 1660-1976 (London, 1977), p.145. 
23 Inverness Courier, 28 October 1835: • ... many Highland proprietors derive a greater 
revenue from their moors alone, for grouse shooting, than their whole rental amounted to 
sixty years since'; TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transformation of the 
Scottish Highlands, p.78. 
24 9& 1 o Vic. cap.101, 1846, The Land Drainage Act, offering loans at 6½ % with repayment 
over a period of up to 22 years: TM Devine, Exploring the Scottish Past - themes in the 
history of Scottish society (East Linton, 1995), p.167, suggesting that this legislation became 
a method of offering state loans to a distressed region to avoid the 'ideological predilections' 
of the government towards giving direct state aid; TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the 
social transformation of the Scottish Highlands, p.159. 
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supply of labour required by landowners.25 To try to counter the loss of population, 
Thomas Telford was commissioned by the government in 1802 to give advice on 
how the highlands might be opened up and improved. Although prevailing economic 
philosophy shunned state intervention, Telford's report resulted in the injection of 
some state assistance into the northern economy. The government agreed to fund 
the construction of the Caledonian Canal from Fort William via the Great Glen to 
Inverness, ostensibly to provide a route for warships avoiding the treacherous 
northern route around Scotland, but in reality creating employment in the north of 
Scotland. In addition, a Commission of Highland Roads and Bridges was 
established in June 1803 to supervise the building and improving of communications 
in the highlands, with half of the costs to be met by the state. The Commission was 
charged to '... ensure funds were spent economically whilst producing maximum 
benefit to the government and the population'; by 1821, £450,000 had been spent on 
885 miles of roads. 26 
The Caledonian Canal opened in 1822 and cost £905,258, but by 1831 it had 
accumulated a debt of £39,000.27 This new water route was patronised by Queen 
Victoria in 1847, which advertised the attractions of the area to the wider public and 
prompted the first tours to the area by Thomas Cook in 1847-48.28 In February 
1860, the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway made a bid to take control of 
25 J Hunter, The Making of the Crofting Community (Edinburgh, 1976), p.23; TM Devine, 
Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands, pp.91-92. 
26 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', pp.82-83: half the cost of roads was to be met by heritors 
(see Glossary entry on 'heritors'); CA Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830, p.252, notes that 
£450,000 was spent on 885 miles of road by 1821, although J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My 
Life in the Highlands, vol.I, (private publication, 2 volumes, 1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton 
Abbot, 1971), p.31, states that £540,000 was spent on roads by 1821, of which £267,000 
was provided by the government: Mitchell quotes 875 miles of road constructed at an 
average cost of £400 per mile. 
27 J Lindsay, The Canals of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1968), pp.142-43 and p.160. 
28 1 McCrorie, Royal Road to the Isles, 150 years of MacBrayne Shipping, (Gourock, 2001), 
p.5; T Cook, Scottish Tourist Practical Directory (London, 1866), p.1 and p.4. 
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the Canal to secure its northern territory, but the Canal Commissioners decided to 
seek a lease from public advertisement and the bid was not pursued further.29 
These attempts by the government to stimulate the northern economy were 
overtaken by the arrival of potato blight in 1846, which devastated the staple diet of 
the highland population for several years.30 This disaster was further compounded 
by a fall in herring prices of 17 percent in 1848, leaving prices 40 percent below 
those obtained before the loss of trade in salted fish to the West Indies following the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807.31 Thus, many highlanders had within half a 
century lost their land, their homes, their livelihood and their means of sustenance. 
By December 1846, 67 percent of highland districts experienced an entire failure of 
the potato crop with 30 percent of families in Inverness-shire identified as destitute. 32 
The 1846 potato blight placed almost 200,000 highland people at risk and, incited by 
public and press concern, the government organised direct assistance from late 
1846 until the summer of 1847, which supplemented the aid given by many 
landowners to their residents.33 From February 1847, the administration of relief 
was passed to the Central Board of Management for Highland Relief, which also 
29 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, 22 February 
1860, p.99 and 29 February 1860, p.102; see also chapter 6, 'Consolidation of the Inverness 
web'. 
30 TM Devine. The Potato Famine in the Scottish Highlands, 1840-1860 (Report to the 
Economic and Social Science Research Council, March 1985), p.7, notes that potato blight 
continued to have serious effects until 1855; TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, 
pp.413-14; TM Devine, Ctanshlp to Crofters' War. the social transfonnatlon of the Scottish 
Highlands, p.56 and p.200: 'the first optimistic press reports of recovery' were seen in early 
1856. 
31 J Thomson, The Value and Importance of the Scottish Fisheries (1849), pp.135-39, in RH 
Campbell and JBA Dow, Source Book of Scottish Economic History, p.59. The Act 
abolishing the slave trade passed through Parliament in 1807 and became law in May 1808. 
32 TM Devine and WJ Orr, The Great Highland Famine (Edinburgh, 1988), p.35 and p.41. 
33 TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transfonnation of the Scottish Highlands, 
pp.150-51 and p.160; TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, pp. 414-15, contrasts the 
200,000 highlanders at risk as a result of potato blight with the 3 million people affected in 
Ireland; TM Devine, The Potato Famine in the Scottish Highlands, p. 7, assesses that 120,000 
people were directly affected by the potato famine; J Prebble, The Highland Clearances 
(London, 1963, reprinted 1969), P:218, quoting an advertisement in The Times in 1845 
seeking subscriptions for Ross-shire cottagers who had been evicted. 
61 
encouraged local committees to recommend works to open up communication or 
develop district resources such as harbours and roads.s. 
Emigration from the north continued both to the south and overseas. In the summer 
of 1847, the Duke of Sutherland supported 380 of his tenants to emigrate to the 
United States.35 After a violent incident at Greenyards in Ross-shire In 1855 
produced severe press criticism of landowners, forced evictions gave way to ' ... 
mainly invisible pressure on the people to ease them out of the region'.38 A new 
poor law was enacted in 1845, which removed the control of poor relief from local 
heritors37 to parish boards with power to raise funds on rateable value, half from 
owners of property and half from tenants, but for some landowners this change came 
too late to avoid bankruptcy. 38 A major change in the structure of northern society 
was taking place: 
Many of the old, impoverished families were swept away and the places 
taken by men who had made fortunes in trade, the law, banking, industry and 
the professions.39 
3-4 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', p.270: TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War: the social 
transformation of the Scottish Highlands, p. 160, notes that the function of the government 
became 'a great enabling agency which left the direct administration of relief to others'; TH 
Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.415: the Free Church and the relief committees in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow came together in January 1847 to form Central Board for Highland 
Relief, which used 'the superb Intelligence or local ministers· to direct aid where It was most 
needed. 
35 Inverness Courier, 18th February 1848, quoted in J Hunter, The Making of the Crofting 
Community, p. 77; TC Smout, A Century of the Scottish People, 1830-1950, p.63. 
36 E Richards, A History of the Highland Clearances, vol.1, pp.474-75. 
37 See Glossary entry on 'heritors'. 
38 8&9 Vic. cap. 83, 1845, An Act for the Amendment and better Administration of the Laws 
relating to the Relief of the Poor in Scotland; TM Devine, The Potato Famine in the Scottish 
Highlands, 1840-1860, p.8, estimated that~ percent of estates were sold or subjected to 
trustee administration as a result of the famine and that the majority of estate owners 
survived because the bulk of their rentals came from sheep farming. 
39 TM Devine and WJ Orr, The Great Highland Famine, pp.93-94; TM Devine, The Scottish 
Nation 1700-2007, p.417, notes that 'Over three-quarters of all estates in the famine zone 
had been acquired by merchants, bankers, lawyers, financiers and Industrialists by the 
1840s'; TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War: the social transformation of the Scottish 
Highlands, pp.58-59 and p.66. 
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Joseph Mitchell, Superintendent of Highland Roads and Bridges between 1824 and 
1863 and a promoter and engineer of the early Inverness railways, observed this 
fundamental shift in land ownership: 
Scotland, in fact, does not belong to the people of Scotland. They are 
permitted to reside in it . . . One half of their country is owned by seventy 
proprietors, while nine-tenths belongs to seventeen hundred persons.40 
JAR Smith shows that subsidy from government, landowners or both was necessary 
to improve highland prosperity, but '... once the roads were built, the communities 
they linked still suffered from the same Inherent problems as before'. 41 The 
abandonment by the state of its free-market philosophy, initially by investment in 
canals and roads providing employment, and then by providing relief albeit 
temporarily in the face of a publicised national disaster, prompted a further inquiry 
into the condition of the highlands in 1851, which found a population 'apparently 
settling down to live off charitable funds' .42 The conclusion was drawn that previous 
state assistance had not produced lasting improvement and therefore further large 
scale emigration should be encouraged because 'the time had come for Highland 
expenditure to be met from Highland resources'.0 The only source of long-term 
investment for economic progress in these circumstances, therefore, was from the 
new landowners.44 Railways were seen as one method to stimulate economic 
40 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Ufe in the Highlands, vol.II, p.116; TM Devine, The 
Scottish Nation 1700-2007, p.449: the first government survey of Scottish landowning 
conducted in 1872-73 indicated that 659 landowners owned 80 percent of Scotland and 118 
individuals held 50 percent of the land. 
41 JAR Smith: 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', pp.362. 
42 Report of the Board of Supervision by Sir John MacNeill on the Western Highlands and 
Islands, PP 1851, vol.26, quoted in TC Smout, A Century of the Scottish People, p.66. 
43 J Hunter, The Making of the Crofting Community, p. 75; TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 
1700-2007, p.420. 
44 TC smout, 'Scottish landowners and economic growth, 1650-1850', Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 11 (1964), pp.229-30; W Vamplew, 'Railway Investment in the Scottish 
63 
development and it was these landowners that were to play a key strategic role in 
their promotion. Emigration continued; at least 16,000 people left the north-west 
highlands and islands between 1847 and 1857 .46 While the north-east of the country 
had small towns and established trading patterns, the west had nothing comparable. 
The economy of the north of Scotland remained weak and fragile: the population of 
the Highlands and Islands 'sank to the country's lowest material levels' .''8 It was 
against this unpromising backdrop of economic destitution that proposals were 
formulated in 1844-45 for the expansion of the railway system into the north of 
Scotland. 
The Scottish railway system, 1844 
In the early 1820s, the type and pace of railway development in England and 
Scotland was similar.47 England had a widespread system of canals serving 
industrial areas with waggonways linking coal sources to these waterways.48 
Scotland had fewer canals than England, but its short railways were designed 
principally to link coalfields to a water-based system of transport; the first 
waggonway was opened in 1722.49 By 1825, there were 360 lines in England and 
30 in Scotland, but their average length was only 3 miles.50 
highlands', Transport History, 3, No.2, (July 1970), p.147; TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 
1700-2007, pp.451-52. 
45 J Hunter, The Making of the Crofting Community, p. 77: this emigration was to Canada, the 
United States of America and Australia; TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social 
transformation of the Scottish Highlands, p.162; TM Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2007, 
p.419. 
46 JAR Smith: 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', pp.357-58; CA Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830, 
p.254. 
47 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, pp.44-45. 
46 PJG Ransom, The Archaeology of Railways (Tadworth, 1981 ), p.32, noting that 150 miles 
of waggonway were operational by 1800; MJT lewis, Early Wooden Railways (London, 
1970), p.119. 
49 K Brown, 'The Tranent-Cockenzie Wagon-way', Railway Magazine, 82, (1938), p.1, CJA 
Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.6. 
50 RD Baxter, • Stone Blocks and Iron Rails' (Newton Abbot, 1866), table 2.1, p.48. 
64 
Scotland did not require an extensive railway system because industrialisation was 
concentrated in the counties of the central belt, close to the sources of coal and iron-
ore. 61 These early railways In Scotland were promoted by coal and Iron 
entrepreneurs and so there was little incentive to develop longer routes. Available 
local capital was directed into primary enterprises and the expansion of the iron 
industry.52 As a result, these early lines were designed for the transport of raw 
materials and finished goods. The three major canals in Scotland, the Monkland, the 
Forth and Clyde and the Union, were designed to carry coal to Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, but, in contrast to many canals in England, substantial passenger traffic 
developed on them. 53 Early railways were designed to be complementary to these 
canals and not to be in direct opposition to them.54 Railways and canals in Scotland 
continued to form an interlinked system of transport well into the second half of the 
nineteenth century. From 1825, railways in England began to use steam technology 
on its new inter-urban routes, but progress in Scotland remained slow. Of the eight 
Scottish lines authorised in 1824-30, all were short, designed primarily for goods 
traffic using horse haulage and built to a narrow gauge.55 
The pace of railway development in England accelerated in the mid 1830s with 75 
lines authorised in 1835-37, but only 15 railway acts were approved for Scottish 
schemes in the same period.68 Of these, only the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock 
51 RC Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock 
Exchange in Nineteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1981), p.55; TM Devine, The Scottish 
Nation 1700-2007, p.259. 
52 RC Michie, 'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', Scottish Industrial 
History, 5, No.1 (1982), p.48; W Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 
1860', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 17 (1970), p.436; W Vamplew, 'Railways and 
the transformation of the Scottish Economy', Economic History Review, 2nd series, 24 ( 1971 }, 
p.54. 
53 J Lindsay, The Canals of Scotland, p.81 and p.92. 
54 JWF Gardner, Railway Enterprise: the origin and subsequent development of the Railways 
of Scotland (Glasgow, 1934}, p.10. 
s5 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.51 and table 
12, pp.52-54: gauges for these eight lines are shown in table 4 of this chapter. 
56 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.98 and table 
25, pp.101-102; Prospectus of the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr Railway, 1836, 
NAS/BR/PRO(S}/1/8. 
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Railway (22 miles) and the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr Railway (50 miles) 
were of significant length. The 1835-36 railway mania left Scotland relatively 
untouched; by 1838, England had 497 miles of railway; Scotland had Just 49. 67 
Scottish railways comprised a series of short lines in the central belt and three local 
lines centred on the port of Dundee. There was no long distance Scottish equivalent 
to the Liverpool and Manchester Railway for twelve years until the Edinburgh and 
Glasgow Railway opened in 1842, by which time the English system was expanding 
rapidly and challenging the dominance of canals. The first attempt to break the 
monopoly of water transport in Scotland came with the opening of the Garnkirk and 
Glasgow Railway in 1831. Although principally intended to transport coal to 
Glasgow, it was the first Scottish line to plan for passenger traffic but, unlike the 
Liverpool and Manchester Railway in England, it did not link two major centres of 
population.58 Nevertheless, competitive financial returns to investors were available 
in Scotland. 59 When the Liverpool and Manchester was paying a steady 9 percent 
dividend during the 1830s, some of the Scottish mineral lines were paying at least as 
much; the Ballochney line, only five miles long, paid 14 percent in 1838.60 
These early short lines in Scotland, linked to canals, realised the needs of their 
owners. Charles Maclaren, editor of The Scotsman, published plans in 1824 for a 
network of Scottish railway routes, but his visionary views did not attract practical 
support.61 Robert Stephenson proposed a line to Aberdeen via Strathmore in 1827; 
a scheme to connect England and Scotland via an inland route between Newcastle 
and Edinburgh was put forward in 1832 and a national scheme of railways for 
51 RC Michie, 'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', p.50; WVamplew, 
'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.436; MC Reed, Investment in 
Railways in Britain, 1820-1844 (London, 1975), p.222. 
58 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.60. J Simmons, 
The Railway in England and Wales.1830-1914, vol.1 (Leicester, 1978), p.19; CA Whatley, 
The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, p.34. 
59 w vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.426. 
60 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.77: Robertson 
also notes that the Monkland and Kirkintilloch Railway paid over 10 percent in this period 
(p.308). 
61 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, pp.46-47. 
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Scotland was projected again in 1841. 62 All of these unsuccessful proposals pre-
dated the connection of Edinburgh and Glasgow, the two principal centres of 
population, in 1842. The Railway Times observed: 
... in poor Scotland, they are children as to railways . . . Let the line from 
Edinbur~h to Glasgow be finished and an impetus will be given to all 
others.6 
Although the government commissioned a survey of potential railway routes in 
Ireland in 1841 in response to concerns about economic conditions in that province, 
a proposal to the Treasury for a similar survey of Scottish routes presented by the 
magistrates and Town Council of Inverness, also in 1841 and prompted by Joseph 
Mitchell, the superintendent of Highland Roads and Bridges, failed to gain state 
approval.6-4 The government provided 12 percent of the capital in Irish railways in 
1831-52, but no state assistance for railways in Scotland was forthcoming until late 
in the century.65 The state had, however, invested £1.5 million in highland roads 
and the Caledonian Canal and this assistance to Scotland had attracted strong 
criticism: 
62 KG Jones, The Railways of Aberdeen, 150 years of history (Great North of Scotland 
Railway Association, 2000), p.5; WM Acworth, The Railways of Scotland (London, 1890), 
p.29; Correspondence on a National Railway of Scotland, 1841, NAS/BR/HRP(S)/1/1/20. 
63 Railway Times, 15 August 1840, p.657. 
64 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life In the Highlands, vol. II, p.150; Railway Times, 1 O 
April 1841, p.415. 
65 w Vamplew, 'Railway Investment in the Scottish Highlands'. Transport History, 3, No.2, 
(July 1970), p.142; J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People 
(Edinburgh, 2005), pp.39-41; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in the Highlands: The Marquis 
of Breadalbane and the Scottish Grand Junction Railway', in R Mason and N Macdougall 
(eds.), People and Power in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1992), p.211, noting an unsuccessful 
parliamentary attempt in March 1852 to secure state support towards an Oban-Glasgow 
route estimated to cost £500,000 compared to the £973,000 provided from public funds for 
Irish railways. 
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These hill people have been too long accustomed to draw on the public 
treasury for the expenses of all their local improvements - it is now high time 
they should cease praying to Hercules and put their own shoulder to the 
wheel.68 
With no state support in prospect, Joseph Mitchell wrote in 1841 to James Grant, 
later Provost of Elgin, to suggest a line from the port of Lossiemouth to Elgin. The 
route was surveyed by Mitchell and a contractor Identified, but 'the public did not 
seem then to appreciate the advantages of the proposed scheme' .87 Nevertheless, 
both Mitchell and Grant were later to play important roles in the development of the 
railway system of northern Scotland, and the Lossiemouth route provided the first 
railway north of the Glasgow-Aberdeen axis when opened in 1852. 
No new Scottish schemes were proposed in 1838-43, but national economic 
conditions curtailed railway development in this period. Economic recovery in 1842 
produced some English railway dividends of ten percent or more, whilst Scottish 
companies paid between four and five percent, still attractive compared to rates paid 
on government stock.68 By 1843, England had 1,852 miles of railway: Scotland had 
just 227 (table 4).69 The Scottish system remained small and disconnected. 
Strategic gaps in the system persisted; for example, only in 1844 was the one mile 
link made between the Edinburgh-Glasgow main line and the Slamannan railway, 
which allowed coal to reach Edinburgh without the need for trans-shipment to canal. 
68 Railway Times, 10 April 1841. 
67 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Ufe in the Highlands, vol. II, pp.150-51. 
68 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.338. 
89 J Thomas, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, vol. 6 Scotland (the 
Lowlands and Borders), (Newton Abbot, 1984), pp.24-25. 
68 
Table 4: Scottish railways authorised 1824-43 
Date of first Act Gauae Mileaae Cost oer mile (£) 
Monkland and Kirkintilloch 17.05.1824 4'6" 10.78 4058 <actual\ 
Ballochnev 19.05.1826 4'6" 5.00 3614 estimate\ 
Edinburah and Dalkeilh 25.05.1826 4'6" 13.06 15294-17647 (circa\ 
Dundee and Newtvle 26.05.1826 4'6½" 10.50 9525 circa\ 
Glasaow, Garnkirk and Coatbridae 26.05.1826 4'6" 8.18 12044 actual) 
Ardrossan 14.06.1827 4'6" 22.50 4182 estimate) 
Wishaw and Coltness 21 .06.1829 4'6" 11.03 5893 estimate\ 
Polloc and Govan 29.05.1830 1.19 9412 I estimate\ 
Slamannan 03.07.1835 4'6" 12.49 10000 I circa) 
Paislev and Renfrew 21 .07.1835 4'6" 3.00 1 0000 circa) 
NewtvleandCouoarAnaus 21 .07.1835 4'6½" 4.82 2373 <estimate\ 
Newtvle and Glammis 30.07.1835 4'6½" 6.61 2222 estimate) 
Dundee and Arbroath 19.05.1836 5'6" 16.75 9140 actual\ 
Arbroath and Forfar 19.05.1836 5'6" 15.25 8964 actual\ 
Edinburah Leith and Granton 13.08.1836 4'8½" 5.00 62000 actual\ 
Glasaow, Paislev and Greenock 15.07.1837 4'8½" 22.56 41068 /actual : note fj 
Glasgow, Paisley Kilmarnock and 15.07.1837 4'8½" 55.00 21908 (actual: note 1) 
Avr 
Edinbumh and Glasaow 04.07.1838 4'8½" 44.75 22370 (actual: note 2\ 
Wilsontown, Morningside and 21 .06.1841 8.65 9408 ( actual) 
Coltness 
Drumoellar 04.07.1843 0.86 (3) 13622 ( estimate l 
227.98 Total mileage 
source: CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 12, pp.52-54 and table 25, 
pp.101-102. 
(1): The construction costs for the joint Glasgow-Paisley line are divided equally between the Greenock and Ayr 
lines. (2): The Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway received powers on 4 July 1844 to extend from its Haymarket terminus 
eastwards to North Bridge, Edinburgh to make connection with the North British Railway, also authorised on the 
same day to construct a line from Edinburgh to Berwick which linked south to the Newcastle and Berwick Railway. 
/3\ : The Drumoellar Railwav was authorised to build 1.82 miles of line, but onlv 0.86 miles was constructed . 
By the eve of the 1845 railway mania, the English system was well-developed, 
likened by Simmons to a St Andrew's cross intersecting at Birmingham, whereas the 
Scottish system remained embryonic.10 Glasgow was linked to Edinburgh, Ayr, 
Kilmarnock and Greenock by standard gauge lines. Dundee was linked to Arbroath 
and Forfar by two lines built to a wider gauge, but the three lines of the Newtyle 
system, serving the hinterland of Dundee, were built to a narrower gauge. Two of 
these, the short Coupar Angus and Glamis11 branches, were rebuilt during the next 
decade to form part of the new national route to the north. 
70 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, p.29. 
71 The town of Glamis was more usually designated 'Glammis' in the nineteenth century. 
69 
Map 2: Inter-urban railways in Scotland, 1844 
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D&A: Dundee and Arbroath Railway 
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E&G: Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway 
GP&G: Glasgow, Paisley and Greenocl< Railway 
GPK&A: Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmamocl< and Ayr Railway 
NBR: North British Railwav /authorised 1844 and ooened 1846\ 
Scotland was a poorer country than England, but the reasons for requiring a railway 
network were similar, namely national markets, regional economic specialisation and 
the need for a faster, cheaper and comprehensive system of transport to support 
economic growth.72 The contrast between the railway systems of Scotland and 
England in 1844 was, however, stark. It was not just that Scottish lines remained 
unconnected with England; they were still not connected to each other. Three 
gauges were in use and cross-border routes to England awaited the authorisations 
of the east-coast route via the North British Railway in 1844 and the west-coast route 
72 o Turnock, An Historical Geography of Railways in Great Britain and Ireland (Aldershot, 
1998), p.27; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.315. 
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of the Caledonian Railway in 1845.73 Many of the factors that contributed to this 
disparity by 1844 were to be replicated as the railway network advanced northwards 
from the Forth-Clyde valley after 1845. 
Constraints on railway development in Scotland 
Most of the early railway companies produced inaccurate estimates of the costs of 
forming the company and constructing their lines with the result that the capital 
powers granted by Parliament were inadequate. Such inaccuracies were not unique 
to Scotland, but the difficulties experienced in obtaining share capital north of the 
border forced an increasing reliance on fixed interest capital which reduced the 
availability of revenue for dividends, in turn making the companies less attractive to 
investors. By 1851, the comparative costs of construction were £38,258 per mile in 
England and £32,113 per mile in Scotland.74 In Ireland by contrast, costs per mile 
were £16,000 by the mid-1850s, mainly due to cheap labour, but traffic receipts were 
only two-fifths of the English average.75 Cost inaccuracies were also prevalent in 
Ireland: the directors of the Great South and Western Railway acknowledged 'as 
mercantile men ... we must admit in a certain degree to ignorance of an infant 
institution of this kind'.76 Nevertheless, the Irish experience suggested the feasibility 
of constructing routes into sparsely-populated districts, akin to those of northern 
Scotland. 
Some faults in railway estimates were attributable to inaccurate or unrealistic 
mathematics. The 1836 parliamentary estimate of £99,844 for the Dundee and 
73 8&9 Vic. cap.167, 31 July 1845, An Act for making a Railway from Carlisle to Edinburgh 
and Glasgow and the North of Scotland to be called 'The Caledonian Railway': the title of this 
Act specifically identified the objective of connecting the trunk route with the north of 
Scotland. 
74 CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
company', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 1974), p.2. 
75 J Lee, 'The construction costs of Irish railways', Business History, IX, No.2 (July 1967), 
p.95 and p.103: Lee estimates that construction costs in Ireland were £10,000 per mile lower 
than in England due to cheaper labour. 
76 J Lee, 'The construction costs of Irish railways', p.108. 
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Arbroath Railway omitted £36,281 required for parliamentary, legal, plant and station 
costs, which, with other increases, raised the cost to £143,533 by 1841, 44 percent 
above the estimate.77 Escalating costs of railways were often the result of 
unexpected engineering difficulties and a substantial scale of construction. By 1847, 
all the established inter-urban Scottish lines had incurred capital costs well above 
estimate (tables 5 and 6). 
Table 5: Capital costs per mile of Scottish railways 1842-47 
Railway Length Date of Estimate per Actual per % Increase 
lmlles) account mile(£) mile(£) over estimate 
Arbroath and Forfar 15.25 04.1842 4115 8964 117.8 
Dundee and Arbroath 16.75 01 .1842 5241 9140 74.4 
Edinburah, Leith and Granton 5.00 07.1847 20000 61024 205.1 
Glasoow Paislev and Greenock 22.56 01 .1844 17022 41068 141 .3 
Glasaow Paislev Kilmarnock and Avr 55.00 07.1843 11562 21908 89.5 
47.00 01 .1845 18994 36548 92.4 Edinburah and GlaSQOW 
source: CJA Robertson, The Oriains of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 33, o.165. 
11\: CJA Robertson tabulates the increase over estimate for the Edlnburah and Glasaow Rallwav as 89.2%. 
Table 6: Construction and land costs of the three main Scottish Inter-urban lines 
Railway Date of •;. of capital: construction % of capital: Overall 
account and enalneerlna land cost 
Glasaow, Paislev and Greenock 01 .1844 60.0 18.1 (note 1) 78.1% 
Glasaow, Paislev, Kilmarnock and Avr 07.1843 71 .2 12.4 (note 1) 83.6% 
01.1845 71 .6 13.0 84.6% Edinburah and GlaSQOW 
source: CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, tables 41 and 42, p.187 and 
o.189. 
(1\: The land costs for the Greenock and Avr lines exclude the cost of the iointlv ooerated Glasaow-Paislev section. 
By 1849, the twelve largest railway companies in England operating 2,672 route 
miles had cost £85.8 million, of which 69 percent had been spent on construction 
and engineering and 15 percent on land, totalling 84 percent of capital.78 The overall 
costs for the three inter-urban lines in Scotland approved in 1837-38 were not 
significantly different from these English costs, although there was some variation in 
the cost of land. 
77 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 44, p.205: 
in table 45, p.206, Robertson also shows expenditure by 1846 on the neighbouring Arbroath 
and Forfar Railway to be 95.1 % above the 1836 parliamentary estimate. 
78 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, pp.44-45 giving data drawn 
from pp (House of Lords), 1849, XVI and 1850, XV. 
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- the acquisition of land 
The high cost of land attracted the attention of press and public as the early railways 
were under construction. The state endowed incorporated railway companies with 
powers to acquire land by compulsory purchase under the Land Clauses 
Consolidation Act of 1845 if the landowner refused to negotiate, but that same Act 
gave balancing power to landlords by requiring arbitration or a jury to decide the 
level of compensation in cases of dispute.79 The legislation aroused strong criticism: 
Had the wolves sat in judgement upon the lambs, they could not have framed 
a document more calculated to foster extortion and injure the railways, than 
this notable Act does.80 
The process of land acquisition could be very slow and affect severely the progress 
of constructing a railway. To overcome resistance, companies often negotiated 
private agreements with landowners, frequently at considerable expense. The 
Railway Gazette claimed in 1848 that of the £4 million spent on land, £3 million had 
been obtained by '... naked extortion' .81 In England, the London and Birmingham 
Railway paid £537,596 for land valued at £250,000.82 Scotland was not immune 
from this phenomenon: land costs were nearly twice the estimate for the Glasgow, 
79 8 Vic. cap.18, 1845, The Land Clauses Consolidation Act and 8 Vic. cap.19, 1845, The 
Land Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act; RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 
1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), p.152. 
80 Herapath's Railway Journal, 25 March, 1848, p.350. 
s1 Railway Gazette, 5 May 1849, quoted in R Kostall, Law and English Railway Capitalism 
1825-1875, p.172; JR Kellett, The Impact of Railways on Victorian Cities (London, 1969), 
p.392, argues that the impact of railway development caused a marked rise in land prices 
and the most expensive land purchases were not over until the late 1860s; G Channon, 
Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940 (Aldershot, 2001 ), pp.196-97, suggests 
that, while there is validity in the view that some landowners were not in favour of railways 
and that consequent land and promotional costs of railways were high, there were also many 
supportive landowners who were active in railway investment and management and, 
furthermore, agricultural and urban rents and land values were buoyant in the 1850s and 
1860s, which would have driven up the cost of land for railways (p.201 ). 
e2 H Pollins, 'A note on Railway constructional costs', Economics, new series, 19, No.76 
(1952), p.404. 
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Paisley and Greenock Railway.83 Although the Greenock line faced strong 
opposition, its land costs of over £7,234 per mile were significantly greater than for 
the other two 1837-38 inter-urban lines: the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway cost 
£4,761 per mile while the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr line, running 
through rural areas for much of its route, cost £2,511 per mile.... Overall, by 1854, 
Scottish inter-urban land costs varied between 12.1 percent and 19.8 percent of 
capital expenditure.85 
Shareholder inquiries into the financial problems of the Caledonian and Scottish 
Central Railways identified the scale of land costs. By the end of 1849, the 
Caledonian Railway had paid £389,979 for land that had been estimated to cost 
£173,000.86 The Scottish Central inquiry in 1850 identified claims of £236,232 for 
land estimated to cost £80,000.87 However, not all large land claims against railway 
companies were successful. A claim brought by the Glasgow Lunatic Asylum 
against the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway for £44,000 in 1839 (representing over 
£2 million on a 2007 price base88) resulted in an award of just £873, which prompted 
press speculation that the claim had been made by the inmates and not the 
directors.89 In England, some juries considering land cases favoured railways 
83 TR Gourvish, Marie Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a study of 
management (Leicester, 1972), p.93. 
84 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 41, p.187. 
85 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, tables 36-39, 
pp.170-73: land costs as a percentage of capital expenditure by 1845 for inter-urban lines 
comprised 12.1% on the Arbroath and Forfar Railway, 13.0% on the Edinburgh and Glasgow, 
13.2% on the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr Railway, and 19.8% on the Glasgow, 
Paisley and Greenock Railway. 
86 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
company, 1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, and Accounts of the Caledonian Railway Company, 
1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3. 
87 Report of Investigation Committee of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 19 
April 1850, engrossed in minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, NAS/BR/SCC/1/2, p.2 of 
report; Accounts of the Scottish Central Railway, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, published the cost of 
land by July 1851 as £166,211; Appendix, table 19(a). 
88 See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
89 Chambers Edinburgh Journal, 28 December 1839, quoted in CJA Robertson, The Origins 
of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.185. 
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because the lines raised land values and thus increased the parish tax base.90 
Landowners tended to oppose early railways in England whereas many in Scotland 
favoured them; for example, Lord Panmure gave much of the land for the Dundee 
and Arbroath Railway in 1835-36 at a nominal feu duty and remitted even that during 
his lifetime.91 Land costs had to be met from the capital budgets of railway 
companies and inaccurate estimates were one of the important causes of the capital 
constraints on railway development by 1844. 
constraints of capital 
The increasing scale of railways in Scotland exacerbated the problems of raising 
capital. With inaccurate estimates for early Scottish lines, it was inevitable that these 
relatively unknown railway companies would find increasing difficulty in securing new 
sources of finance in competition with other established companies as mounting 
costs exceeded their authorised capital. The growth of the Scottish system was slow 
but steady (table 7). 
Table 7: Scottish railway mileage and capital, 1840-1859 
Scotland Total paid up share capital (£000s) Route 
mlleaae 
1840 1960 137 
1844 3839 282 
1849 19324 872 
1854 22560 1062 
1859 28358 1418 
source: W Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 
1860' c.425. 
In 1836, when the Arbroath and Forfar Railway of only fifteen miles was able to raise 
nine-tenths of its finance locally, major English companies such as the London and 
90 RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1 B25-1 B75, p.156; G Channon, Railways 
in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.33. 
91 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.124: Railway 
Times, 6 April 1844, p.417, reporting landowner support for the proposed Scottish Central 
Railway: 'A few years ago, landowners ... were, generally speaking, in declared hostility to 
railways; now we find one proposed under the auspices of nearly all the great landowners of 
the Counties of Stirling and Perth'; see Glossary entry on 'feu duty'. 
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Birmingham, the Stockton and Darlington and the Eastern Counties were obtaining 
more than half their capital from Lancashire and Cheshire.92 None of the Scottish 
lines authorised in 1824-36 had capital in excess of £140,000, whereas the capital 
for the three major inter-urban lines approved in 1837-38 was considerably larger. 
Table 8: Initial authorised capital of Scottish railways 1824-38 
Length Date of Act Authorised Capital (£) 
lmllasl 
Early Scottish Railways 
Monkland and Kirkintilloch Railway 10.78 17.05.1834 £42 000 in shares and loans 
Dundee and Newtvle Railwav 10.50 26.05.1826 £40,000 in shares and loans 
Garnkirk and Glasaow Railwav 8.18 26.06.1826 £28 497 in shares onlv 
Wishaw and Coltness Railway 11 .03 21 .06.1829 £80 000 in shares and loans 
Newtvle and Couoar AnQus Railway 4.82 21 .07.1835 £20,200 in shares and loans 
Newtvle and Glammis Railway 6.61 30.07.1835 £26 600 in shares and loans 
Dundee and Arbroath Railwav 16.75 19.05.1836 £140 000 in shares and loans 
Arbroath and Forfar Railway 15.25 19.05.1836 £105 000 in shares and loans 
Edinburgh, Leith and Granton 5.00 
Main Inter-urban Rallwaya 
13.08.1836 £140 000 in shares and loans 
Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway 22.56 15.07.1837 £533 333 In sharH and loans 
Glasaow PaisleY. Kilmarnock and Avr Railway 55.00 15.07.1837 £833 300 in shares and loans 
Edinburgh and Glasaow Railwav 44.75 04.07.1838 £ 1 200 000 in shares and loans 
source: CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway Sys"'m 1722-1844, table 12, pp.52-54 and table 
25, oo.101-102. 
Table 8 shows the route length and capital of nine early Scottish railways, all of 
which played a part in the development of the railway network to the north, 
contrasted with the three inter-urban lines of 1837-38. The size of capital required 
for these inter-urban lines, however, was dwarfed by the £2.1 million share capital 
authorised for the Caledonian Railway in 1845.93 Capital requirements for main 
routes had swiftly moved far beyond local sourcing. Nevertheless, economic 
conditions and local circumstances were to retain local financing as a fundamental 
component of railway capital for later development in northern Scotland, illustrated 
particularly in chapters 6 and 9. 
92 SGE Lythe, 'The early days of the Arbroath and Forfar Railway', Railway Magazine, 99 
(1953), pp.56-57; ~ ~erguson, The ~rbroa_th and Forfar Railway (Usk, 2000), p.18; CJA 
Robertson, The Ongms of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.153; TR Gourvish and 
MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', p.214. 
93 8&9 Vic. cap.162, 31 July 1845, An Act for making a Railway from Carlisle to Edinburgh 
and Glasgow and the North of Scotland to be called 'The Caledonian Railway': the act 
authorised capital of £2.1 million in £50 shares and borrowing powers of £700,000. 
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As shareholder records have not survived, the subscription contracts for these three 
inter-urban railways provide the only evidence that English capital was attracted 
north of the border. Subscription contracts can only indicate Immediate Investment 
interest rather than longer-term shareholding, not only because railway companies 
wished to demonstrate a high degree of local support when seeking parliamentary 
approval, but also because this early scrip was often sold when authorisation was 
obtained. Some Scottish supporters of substance occasionally used English 
addresses on the subscription list, giving further difficulty in drawing conclusions on 
the proportions of capital obtained from the two countries. With this caution 
acknowledged, Vamplew indicates that the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway had 280 
subscribers from England and 156 from Scotland; the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock 
and Ayr Railway had 300 Scottish subscribers and 35 English, but the Glasgow, 
Paisley and Greenock list showed just one English subscriber against 423 Scottish.94 
However, Gourvish and Reed demonstrate from company minutes that there was a 
much closer English (and specifically Liverpool) interest in the Greenock company 
from its inception than the subscription list would suggest.95 The Greenock line 
obtained two-fifths of its subscriptions from England, principally from Liverpool, 
whereas the Ayrshire line raised five-sixth of its subscriptions from Scotland.911 
Lancashire capital, accumulated from an economically successful region, played a 
large part in railway investment throughout Britain and its placement was often seen 
as an indicator of potential premiums.97 Lancashire capital was subscribed to all 
three of the 1837-38 inter-urban railways in Scotland,98 but, to give added confidence 
to investors from England, there was an increased use of English engineers to 
94 w Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.429. 
95 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18 (1971), p.210. 
96 MC Reed, 'A note on subscriptions to the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway', 
Transport History, 6, No.3 (November 1973), p.270; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the 
Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.156. 
97 MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844, p.266; SA Broadbridge, Studies 
in Railway Expansion and the Capital Market in England, 1825-1873 (London, 1970), p.164. 
98 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 30, p.156-
57, showing that Lancashire supplied 9.8% of subscription capital to the Ayr line, 29.6% to 
the Greenock line and 42.1 % to the Edinburgh-Glasgow line. 
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oversee Scottish development; for example, George Stephenson was employed on 
the Ayrshire line and Joseph Locke by the Greenock company in preference to the 
Scottish engineers Miller and Grainger.00 The scale of the new cross border lines 
required English capital. England provided 77 .8 percent of the subscriptions in the 
Caledonian and 42.2 percent in the North British.100 Of the £4.3 million offered by 
subscribers providing £2,000 or more to Scottish lines in 1846, £1.6 million came 
from England, but, of this, £680,000 was invested in established lines.101 Scottish 
returns were, however, variable; in 1851, the Railway Times reported that of the 800 
miles of railway in Scotland, only 300 produced a profit.102 
It is not surprising that a significant amount of this new capital was directed to 
established Scottish companies, albeit recently incorporated, because their lines 
formed part of the cross-border chain of railways that offered the prospect of 
attractive returns to investors. With the spread of knowledge about railways and 
investment through specialist weekly journals, blind investment in railways became 
more informed, thus improving the efficiency of the capital market.103 Nevertheless, 
the difficulties that arose in establishing new routes to the north of Scotland's central 
valley in the aftermath of the 1845 railway mania were not solely the result of the 
emergence of a more perfect capital market and the national economic depression of 
the late 1840s, as the next two chapters illustrate. 
99 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.191 and p.194. 
Stephenson was consulting engineer on the Ayr line to which Miller was engineer, but Locke 
replaced Grainger as engineer on the Greenock line where costs escalated; Robertson notes 
that Locke 'already had a reputation for accuracy'. 
100 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.334. 
1°1 w Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', pp.432-33, noting 
that approximately £680,000 was invested in the Caledonian and North British Railways. 
vamplew calculated that, of the £1.6 million English capital offered in 1846 to Scottish 
railways that were built by 1850, £1.3 million was subscribed by railway company directors. 
102 Railway Times, 26 April 1851, p.435: 'Out of 800 miles of railway, there are not 300 which 
produce any profit on the ordinary shares of the corporations that have constructed and that 
work them'. 
1o3 Examples of specials journals include: Bradshaw's Railway Gazette. Railway Times, 
Railway Chronicle, Herapath's Railway Journal and Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, Director 
and Shareholder's Guide and Manual. 
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The previous chapter indicated the importance of bank lending to early Scottish 
railways.104 Banks were able to provide short term liquidity and to ease any sudden 
contraction in credit availability. 106 Scottish banks lent £437,000 to local railways 
between 1826 and 1840, 106 but such loans were confined to short- and medium-term 
debt with limited renewal, 107 which therefore did not resolve any structural instability 
in the finances of a railway company. Bank lending continued after the 1845 
speculation: in 1846, the Caledonian Railway held £151,436 in bank loans and, by 
December 1849, that debt had risen to £168,495.108 Such lending was virtually risk-
free to the banks because railway directors were usually held personally responsible 
for the debt.109 This acceptance of personal responsibility for bank credit was to 
become a cornerstone of the financial strategy adopted in 1854-74 by directors of 
the Inverness railway companies, many of whom were landowners of substance. 
- constraints of revenue 
once capital had been raised by shares and loans, the servicing of the capital 
account required a secure stream of revenue to pay interest on fixed interest debt 
before dividends could be offered to shareholders. Early railways were designed 
primarily for freight haulage, but new inter-urban routes in Britain provided an 
104 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.216. 
1o5 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.347 and p.422; TL Alborn, 
Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England (London, 1998), p.173. 
100 o Borthwick, 'The financing of Scottish Railways in the 1840s' (unpublished MA 
dissertation, University of York, 2000), p.31. 
1o7 w Vamplew, 'Banks and railway finance: a note on the Scottish experience", Transport 
History, 4, No.2 (July 1971 ), pp.168 and p.179. 
108 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.421; Accounts of the 
Caledonian Railway Company, 1845-68, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3. 
109 w vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860 - a reply', Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, 18 (1971 ), p.223; and W Vamplew, 'Banks and railway finance: 
a note on the Scottish experience', p.178. 
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unexpected surge in passenger traffic; 110 passenger revenue provided 69 percent of 
gross receipts in 1842-43, although this had fallen to 57 percent by 1848.111 
Scotland's inter-urban railways showed a similar pattern (table 9). 
Table 9: Passenger and freight revenue on Scotland's inter-urban railways, 1840-44 
Railway Period of data % receipts % receipts % receipts 
oassenoers aoods other 
Arbroath and F orfar 1839-1845 38.2 56.2 5.6 
Dundee and Arbroath 1841-1844 74.4 24.9 0.7 
Edinburah and Glasaow 1842-1845 72.0 24 7 3.3 
Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock 1841-1845 72.1 25.9 2.0 
(excludina the ioint Glasaow-Paislev line) 
Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr 1839-1845 67.3 30.6 2.0 
(excludina the ioint Glasaow-Paislev line\ 
Glasaow and Paislev Joint Line 1840-1845 92.4 5.5 1.1 
source: CJA Robertson, The Oriains of the Scottish Rsilwsv Svstem 1722- 1844, tables 60-65 oo .231 -33. 
(1 ): The percentage figures for the Arbroath and Forfar Railway in table 9 have been recalculated from 
CJA Robertson's data. 
Scotland's railways, however, experienced a much greater demand for third class 
travel than in England, which affected passenger revenue. Many English railway 
companies placed a deliberate emphasis on first class travel and were reluctant to 
provide adequate third class trains at reasonable times, even following the 1844 
Regulation of Railways Act. 112 By 1844, 54.4 percent of journeys on Scotland's inter-
urban railways were third class, compared to 35.6 percent in Britain.113 A typical 
Scottish feature was that many who could pay more chose not to do so: 
110 HJ Dyos and DH Aldcroft, British Transport (3rd edition, Harmondsworth, 197 4 ), p.118, 
describe passenger traffic on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway as 'creating a demand 
that had been thought not to exist'. 
111 BR Mitchell, 'The coming of the railway and United Kingdom economic growth', p.318, 
noting that passengers provided £3.1 millions of the £4.5 millions collected in receipts in 
1842-43 (68.9%) and £5.6 millions out of £9.8 millions collected in receipts in 1848 (57.1%). 
The passenger share of receipts was not overtaken by the freight share until 1852. 
112 7&8 Vic. cap.85, 1844, The Regulation of Railways Act; TR Gourvish, Mark Huish and the 
London and North Western Railway: a study of management, p.36. 
113 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 67, p.238 
showing that over the period 1841-44, 9.6% of passengers on Scottish inter-urban lines 
travelled first class, 36.0% second class and 54.4% third class; also p.239, Select Committee 
on Railways, fifth report, PP 1844 (318) XI, appendix II, which identified that the 'average 
United Kingdom railway' carried 18% of passengers first class, 46.0% second class and 
35.6% third class. These average United Kingdom data contrast with 1642-43 data for 
Britain quoted by D Lardner, Railway Economy (London, 1850), p.273, in which the share of 
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There would be no need for first class carriages if it depended upon 
Glasgow men. The money takers know you as a stranger if you ask for 
a first class ticket ... Three causes, thin population, comparative 
poverty, and more economical habits in the rich, combine to prevent 
passenger railways in Scotland paying so well as the English.114 
High dividends in England in the 1840s were maintained by first class passenger 
traffic and high tariff freight.115 This type of traffic would not have kept the early 
Scottish lines solvent. Virtually all Scottish trains carried third class passengers 
before the 1844 Act and Scottish fares per mile were lower than in England.116 
Scottish passenger traffic was highly responsive to price and had to be built on 
quantity rather than quality: for example, higher first and second class fares 
introduced on the Greenock line in 1844 resulted in a large shift to third class 
travel.117 In addition, the railway passenger duty tended to have a more than 
proportionate effect in Scotland, taking between ten and seventeen percent of 
receipts.118 Most Scottish passenger traffic was second and third class and, as the 
first class travel was stated to be 44.58%, second class 41.83% and third class 13.59% 
(quoted in TR Gourvish, Marie Huish and the London and North Western Railway: a study of 
management, p.36). 
114 Railway Times, 22 October 1842, p.1094. 
115 TR Gourvlsh, 'Railway Enterprise·, In R Church (ed.), The Dynamics of Vlctortan 
Business: Problems and Perspectives to the 1870s (London, 1980), p.129, and quoted in 
CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.310. 
11s CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, pp.239-40. 
111 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.243. 
11s CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.250: 
passenger duty absorbed between 10 and 17% of gross passenger receipts in Scotland in 
the early 1840s, compared to 4. 7% - 5.8% on English main lines; TR Gourvish, Marie Huish 
and the London and North Western Railway: a study of management, p.39, notes an average 
of 14% of passenger receipts taken in duty on smaller railways, 'especially Scottish 
companies .. .'. 
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duty was levied on a rate per mile based on passenger numbers, there was a 
relatively smaller revenue base from which to pay the duty than in England.119 
Although the numbers of passengers travelling on the Ayrshire line rose by 30 
percent in 1841-44 and by 37 percent between Edinburgh and Glasgow in 1842-
44, 120 the large proportion of passengers travelling third class and the need to keep 
fares competitive offered less scope to Scottish railways to secure additional 
revenue from passengers than on many main lines in England. These features of 
revenue were to be compounded in the more remote regions of northern Scotland by 
the distinctly seasonal nature of the traffic, illustrated in chapter 6. 
The consequences for the northern railway network 
This chapter has shown the unpromising characteristics of much of northern 
Scotland for railway investment. Any prospect of returns from a new system of 
railways appeared to be dependent upon traffic from the trading centres of 
Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth and the rich agricultural hinterland of Aberdeenshire. 
Inverness, the capital of the highlands, held a strategic location for regional trade, 
but the serious consequences of the highland clearances had exposed the 
weakness of the northern economy and the destitution of many highlanders. Despite 
the prevailing ideology of laissez-faire, the state had intervened, albeit reactively, to 
try to open up the region and reduce emigration by funding the entire cost of the 
Caledonian Canal and providing financial contributions towards land drainage, roads, 
and bridges. Further state funding for northern Scotland thereafter was considered 
to be unrealistic. However, the chapter has also identified the arrival of a new type 
of northern landowner, bringing wealth earned from industry and commerce into the 
region in the wake of the highland clearances, a group that was to combine with 
long-established proprietors in providing a major source of capital and strategic 
direction for new northern railways, as later chapters will explain. 
11& G Alderman, The Railway Interest (Leicester, 1973), p. 83; G Alderman, 'The politics of 
the railway passenger duty', Transport History, 3, No.1 (March 1970), p.2; CJA Robertson, 
The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 67, p.238 and table 72, p.254. 
12° CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, table 67, p.238. 
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The railway network in Scotland in 1844 remained largely confined to the industrial 
areas of the central belt. The new inter-urban routes of 1837-38 demonstrated the 
increased scale of capital needed for railway development and the financial 
consequences of inaccurate estimates, replicating the English experience of capital 
finance for railways. Although operating in the more densely populated counties of 
Scotland, however, these inter-urban companies found that passenger traffic was 
very responsive to price, a feature of less significance to many of the major English 
companies, which required a focus on service quantity rather than its quality to 
maximise revenue. These signals from earlier Scottish railway development posed 
immediate problems for any railway promotion into the remote northern counties with 
their sparse population and fragile economy.121 
Any new northern railways had to supply relatively cheaper and more efficient 
transport than existing modes by land or sea, and offer the potential of some return 
on capital if they were to attract extra-district investment. However, the burgeoning 
railway network of England was already competing vigorously for the investment 
funds that were available. The cost per mile for construction of Scottish lines by 
1851 was 16 percent below that for England, but traffic and revenue expectations 
were lower for Scottish lines, which removed much of this capital advantage.122 The 
prevailing capital cost of over £30,000 per mlle made It essential that any railway 
companies projecting lines into northern Scotland would need to obtain their land at 
significantly lower cost than established lines had achieved and to construct the 
routes in a more economical way than the 1837-38 inter-urban lines. In addition, 
strict financial control over their enterprise was imperative if there was to be any 
possibility of sustained economic success. Consequently, the principles of the 
'cheap railway', particularly seeking economies in land and construction costs, were 
widely adopted in the north of Scotland; these are examined in chapter 6.123 
121 Table 1 in this chapter identifies the six northern counties of Inverness, Nairn, Moray, 
Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and Caithness. 
122 CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
Company', p.2. 
123 see Glossary entry on the 'cheap railway'. 
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The next chapter investigates a further and fundamental intervention of the state in 
Scotland, which presented a coherent framework for railway extension to the north of 
the Forth-Clyde valley, but without any capital injection from government. 
Thereafter, subsequent chapters will show that the development of the railway 
system of northern Scotland and its burdens of capital acquisition and financial 
control rested upon the principal landowners and some key entrepreneurs and local 
interests, supported both willingly and, at times, unwillingly by the banking sector. 
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Chapter 3: The state and Scottish railways 
Although national economic policy favoured free-market capitalism, the previous 
chapter has shown that the severe economic and social conditions in the northern 
counties of Scotland had induced the state to provide financial assistance. That 
intervention was reactive, but this chapter focuses on an example of strategic 
planning by the state that set out a blueprint for a Scottish railway network, which 
runs counter to the general historiographical view of the detached stance of 
government towards railway development in Britain. The chapter opens with a 
review of the report of the commission established to recommend cross-border 
railway routes in 1839-41, the first prime example of state intervention in the 
development of a Scottish railway system. It then explains the coherence and 
significance of the report of the Railway Board of the Board of Trade on Scottish 
railway bills proposed for the 1845 parliamentary session, which had a far-reaching 
influence on the shape of the future Scottish network. The consequences of the 
acceptance by the legislature of its executive's recommendations are illustrated by 
the serious financial instability of the Caledonian Railway that had sought control of 
the state's authorised route to the north; the Caledonian experience provides a 
financial benchmark for successive chapters of this thesis. Finally, the chapter 
considers the proposals for northern railways in 1845-46, identifying the distinct 
regional interests of Aberdeen and Inverness, which set the parameters for the 
strategic planning of railways in northern Scotland throughout the period of this 
study. 
Early state involvement in Scottish railways 
The opening chapter identified policy conflicts that arose in nineteenth century 
government between the reliance on laissez-faire capitalism to regulate markets and 
the increasing pressure for state intervention to address the consequences of the 
rapid economic and social change that free enterprise had wrought. The state's 
philosophical fear of monopoly power was epitomised by the potential of new large-
scale enterprises, of which railway companies were foremost examples, to frustrate 
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the operation of the price mechanism. An increased concentration of market power 
and territorial control in the hands of fewer companies followed the 1845 railway 
mania through amalgamations, leases and working agreements with the many 
smaller new companies that struggled to prosper independently thereafter. 
The Board of Trade recommended in 1845 that railway amalgamations should only 
be approved if a continuous route was formed. 1 The 1846 Select Committee, 
however, approved the principle of amalgamation provided facilities were Improved 
and expenses reduced, but offered no proposals to control working agreements that 
might act against the public interest.2 In 1853, the Cardwell Committee warned 
against amalgamation unless 'the true and only object of such amalgamation is 
improved economy of management, and consequent advantage to the public' .3 
Cardwell noted that railways had grown up haphazardly 'rather than upon any 
system of well-devised legislation' ,4 but Cardwell's committee simply restated the· law 
-that railway companies could not amalgamate without parliamentary sanction.6 
The opportunities for combination and the vacillation of Parliament provided ideal 
conditions to stimulate growth in the Scottish railway system and, unwittingly, the 
state also provided two Important catalysts that assisted this evolution, the Smith-
Barlow Commission (1839-41) and the Railway Board within the Board of Trade 
(1845). The Smith-Barlow Commission marks the first significant involvement of the 
state in the development of Scottish railways. One of its terms of reference was to 
advise on cross-border routes following an unsuccessful motion in Parliament in 
1 Board of Trade reports on Schemes for extending Railway Communication and on 
Proposed Amalgamations of Railways, 1845, paragraph 19, p.243: 'amalgamations should 
only be allowed ... when two or more lines form continuous portions [of] one great line of 
communication ... '. 
2 Select Committee on Railway and Canal Amalgamation, 8 April 1846, first report, p.4. 
3 Select Committee on Railway and Canal Bills, 1853, 5th report, p.21; Bradshaw's Railway 
A/manack, 1853, p.440. 
• Hansard, 3111 series, Vol.132, Col. 585, 6th April 1854, quoted in PS Bagwell, The Transport 
Revolution 1770-1985, (London 1974, revised 1988), p.164. 
5 WA Robertson, Combination among Railway Companies (London, 1912), p.18. 
86 
1838 for an inquiry to consider the engineering of such lines.8 Earlier schemes 
included a proposal for a line from Edinburgh to Dunbar in 1836 and rival routes from 
Glasgow to Carlisle via Annandale and Nithsdale projected between 1835 and 1839. 
The Commissioners' fourth report of 1841 displayed their frustration with the 
inadequacy of the plans for the sixteen schemes presented for Anglo-Scottish 
routes.7 The mile-and-a-half gap between Gateshead and Newcastle in Robert 
Stephenson's east-coast plan prompted the Commissioners to favour an inland route 
from Gateshead via Hexham to Edinburgh as the 'eastern' option.8 The preferred 
eastern route was therefore not a coastal route at all, a fact overlooked in most 
literature. 
The Commissioners were explicit in their wish to recommend two routes, selecting 
an eastern option before considering a route to Glasgow.9 They may have been 
influenced by the evidence of engineer Joseph Locke, who surveyed the Annandale 
route via Beattock after initially supporting the Nithsdale line. Locke advised the 
Commission that two cross-border routes would ultimately be required because of 
the rising population of Scotland, 10 but, with incomplete data and plans available to 
them, the Commissioners concluded that traffic was unlikely to provide sufficient 
return on the private capital required for both western and eastern routes. That 
conclusion conformed to the prevailing philosophy of laissez-faire and state policy 
& CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 1983), 
pp.275-77 and p.278. 
1 Committee appointed by the Lords of the Treasury respecting Railway Communication 
between London, Dublin, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 4th report by Lt Col Sir Frederick Smith 
and Professor Peter Barlow, 15 March 1841, p.6. 
a committee appointed by the Lords of the Treasury respecting Railway Communication 
between London, Dublin, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 4th report, 15 March 1841, p.17: the 
Commissioners complimented the engineer for selecting a route 'through an exceedingly 
difficult country in a skilful and able manner'. 
e Committee appointed by the Lords of the Treasury respecting Railway Communication 
between London, Dublin, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 4th report, 15 March 1841, p.8. 
1<J Evidence of Joseph Locke to the Smith-Barlow Commission, reproduced in G Graham, 
The Caledonian Railway, account of its origin and completion (Glasgow, 1888), p.47: 'The 
Beattock line is not what, as an engineer, I would call a favourable one, but it is by no means 
impracticable ... My own conviction rather is, however, that two coast lines will be ultimately 
required for the accommodation of the rapidly increasing population of Scotland ... '. 
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that railways should be promoted by those with available capital. 11 A western route 
providing a line to both Glasgow and Edinburgh was seen as the best compromise at 
that time. Historiography has tended to concentrate on perceived ambiguity in the 
recommendation of the Smith-Barlow Commission for the west-coast route and has 
largely ignored the important consequences of the Commission's work.12 In fact, the 
Commissioners presented their recommendations very clearly: the Lancaster-
Carlisle line should be built before, or simultaneously with, the west-coast route from 
Carlisle into Scotland, otherwise: 
. . . should this not be the case, and parties should be found to construct the 
line from Darlington to Edinburgh, then the western route ought to be 
abandoned for the present, and in that event we should award the preference 
to the East Coast route over the Hexham line.13 
The Commissioners' recommendation for the west-coast route was not ambiguous, 
but it was open-ended; it set clear conditions and recommended an alternative 
should these not be met. However, national economic depression caused significant 
delay: the Caledonian route from Carlisle to Edinburgh and Glasgow was not 
authorised until 1845 and the Lancaster-Carlisle Railway was not completed until 
1846.14 Lack of activity resulted In the Railway Times concluding In 1843 that the 
.b d 1s west-coast route was mon un . English east-coast companies seized the 
11 Select Committee on Standing Orders for Railroad Bills, report 1836, PP 1836 (511), XXI, 
which reported • ... it appears decidedly best to leave Railways in Great Britain, like all other 
undertakings, to be decided upon according to the judgement and interest of those who are 
willing to embark capital in them ... ', quoted in CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish 
Railway System 1722-1844, p.277. 
12 os Nock, The Caledonian Railway (London, 2nd edition 1964 ), p. 15; OS Nock, Scottish 
Railways (Edinburgh 1950, reprinted 1961), p.5; J Thomas, The North British Railway, vol.1 
(2 volumes, Newton Abbot, 1969 and 1975), p.18; G Dow, First Railway across the Border 
(LNER, 1946), p.6. 
13 Committee appointed by the Lords of the Treasu~ respecting Railway Communication 
between London, Dublin, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 4 report, 15 March 1841, p.8. 
1• 8&9 Vic. cap.162, 1845, An Act for making a Railway from Carlisle to Edinburgh and 
Glasgow and the North of Scotland to be called 'The Caledonian Railway'. 
15 Railway Times, 2 September 1843, p.968: '" ... we foresaw that the east-coast line of 
communication must be carried. We have always preferred the west-coast route, but all 
efforts to effect it seem now to have ceased'. 
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opportunity caused by west-coast delays and supported the North British Railway 
financially in November 1843 to promote an Edinburgh-Berwick line, which, when 
authorised in 1844, created the first approved cross-border route, one that had not 
reached the final shortlist of the Commission just three years previously.18 
Nevertheless, private capital was now available and the Board of Trade reported in 
1845 that estimates for the proposed cross-border routes 'showed ample return on 
the estimated capital' .17 
The dilatory Caledonian Railway, expecting a monopoly of the Anglo-Scottish route 
as a result of the Smith-Barlow recommendations, held its first provisional committee 
meeting in February 1844 and sought state assurance that the North British Act 
would not prejudice its own bill.18 In response, Gladstone, then President of the 
Board of Trade, confirmed the reliance of the state on competition: ' ... nothing was 
said by the Commissioners to prejudice the formation of more than one line' .19 
Robertson contends that the Commission left 'enough qualifications and loopholes to 
permit continuing debate'.20 The Commission, however, sparked more than debate. 
By recommending the west-coast route with qualifications, the Commissioners 
inadvertently stimulated not only vigorous competition for the subsequent rapid 
expansion of the Scottish network, but also the evolution of strategic planning within 
and between companies for the capture and defence of key railway routes, of which 
18 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.293: George 
Hudson and the York and North Midland Railway offered £50,000 to the promoters of the 
North British Railway in May 1843, who then proposed that their line should meet Hudson's 
proposed Newcastle and Berwick Railway at Berwick; J Thomas, The North British Railway, 
vol.1 (Newton Abbot, 1969), p.18 and p.21; MC Reed, The London and North Western 
Railway (Penryn, 1996), p.28. 
17 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 58-59. 
1s Minutes of the Caledonian Railway, 19 February 1844, NAS/BR/CAU1n, p.1, and 6 
March 1844, p.7. 
19 Railway Times. 20 April 1844. p.465, quoting WE Gladstone, President of the Board of 
Trade, in the House of Commons: ' ... it was admitted [in the Commissioners' report] that 
there ought to be but one line of railway communication with Scotland, and that that should 
be the north west line, but nothing was said by the Commissioners to prejudice the formation 
of more than one line'. 
20 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.278. 
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the trunk route to the north was a prime target. The Commissioners' report 
encouraged more than one cross-border route and promoters were not slow to seek 
an advantage; three Anglo-Scottish routes were open within a decade of the report, 
all funded by private capital.21 
By December 1845, 115 sets of plans for new Scottish railways had been deposited 
with the Board of Trade, fuelled by a rising national expectation of strong returns. 22 
Kostal describes the parliamentary process for railway bills as 'arcane and 
cumbersome', with the investigating select committees sitting for only four or five 
half-days per week for four or five months in each parliamentary year.23 Such a 
complicated system provided rich returns for lawyers. Charles Austin, who led the 
case for the Great North of Scotland Railway in 1846 against the competing scheme 
of the Perth and Inverness Railway, was reported to have earned £40,000 in the 
1847 session.2'4 His partner, James Hope-Scott, bought a Scottish estate worth 
£24,000 in 1855 and re-emerged in the history of northern railway development in 
1863 as a principal promoter of the proposed railway from Fort William to the 
Inverness and Perth line at Newtonmore, thus ironically seeking a link with a railway 
route his practice had earlier condemned.25 
21 These three routes were: the east-coast route via Berwick operated in Scotland by the 
North British Railway, the west-coast route via Annandale and Beattock operated in Scotland 
by the Caledonian Railway, and the Nithsdale route between Glasgow and Carlisle via 
Kilmarnock operated by the Glasgow, Dumfries and Carlisle Railway and the Glasgow, 
Paisley Kilmarnock and Ayr Railway, which amalgamated in 1850 to form the Glasgow and 
South-Western Railway. 
22 w Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 17 (1970}, p.426. 
23 RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), p.118: Kostal 
also notes 'The labyrinthine complexity and critical importance of pre-hearing documentation 
made petitioning private railway bills forbidding to all but the most expert lawyers and 
parliamentary agents', p.115. 
2• RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875, pp. 123-24. 
25 J McGregor, The West Highland Railway; Plans, Politics and People (Edinburgh, 2005), 
Appendix 1, pp.43-44: the Fort William Railway was proposed in October 1863 to join Fort 
William to Newtonmore on the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, which had opened in 
September 1863; see also chapter 7, 'The direct line: the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway'. 
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The state maintained its policy of providing no funding and accepting no 
responsibility for the management of railways. 26 In the aftermath of the 1845 railway 
mania, however, private capital was difficult to attract, especially to new Scottish 
railways where returns were uncertain. Share prices reflected investors' perceptions 
of security and yield. In September 1846, shares in the well-established London and 
Birmingham and Grand Junction companies in England traded at over twice par-
value, well above the premiums shown by the main companies in operation In 
Scotland (table10). 
Table 10: Share prices of Scottish railway companies, September 1846 
Opening Par value of Market price (£) Price as "la of 
dates Share (£) ISeotember 1846) oar value 
Scottish rallwav companies Hn operation) 
Glasaow, Paislev, Kilmarnock and Ayr 1839-40 50 75½ 151 
Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock 1840-41 25 -- --
IAmaloamation oendina with the Ca/edonianl 
Edinburgh and Glasaow 1842 50 72 144 
Edinburah. Leith and Granton 1842-46 20 16¼ IAuausfl 84 
North British 1846 25 38½ 154 
Scottish rallwav comoanles lnewlv lncomorated In 1845) (paidUIJI 
Caledonian 1847-48 50 (20) 16 32 
Edinburah and Northern 1847-48 25 (10) 10 40 
Scottish Central 1848 25 (12½) 20½ 82 
-
Scottish Midland Junction 1848 25 (10) 6½ lAuaustl 26 
Enallsh rallwav comoanles 
Grand Junction 1837 100 224 224 
London and Birmincham 1837-38 100 208 208 
source: Tuck's Railwav Shsreho~r·s Manual, 1847. 
The Railway Board and Scottish railways, 1845 
Following Gladstone's Select Committee, the Railway Department of the Board of 
Trade was re-organised in August 1844 into a Railway Board to provide advice to 
Partiament on whether bills should be passed, postponed or rejected in order to 
manage the increased volume of proposed legislation.27 Previously, any similar 
26 J Simmons, The Railways of Britain (London 1961, 2nd edition, London, 1966), p.7. 
27 H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1965), 
p.61 and p. 71: Parris records that 248 railway bills had been deposited by November 1844. 
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proposal for such direct involvement would have been seen as interference by the 
state in private enterprise and, ultimately, that conviction prevailed and the Board 
survived only until July 1845.28 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine concluded that the 
work of the Railway Board had been impossible: 
.... no body of five men, however intelligent, could by possibility be expected 
to form an accurate judgement upon such an enormous mass of materials 
and conflicting statements ... 29 
Nevertheless, the Railway Board in its brief life had a deeply significant influence on 
the development of the Scottish railway system. The Board's efficacious secretary, 
Samuel Laing, expressed his view in a report to the Board of Trade In 1844 that 
railways in Britain would form between six and eight large systems and, because 
monopoly was therefore seen as inevitable, proper regulation was required.30 
Accordingly, he advocated a system based on through routes. 31 Laing was a 
primary author of the Board's 1845 report on the Scottish railway bills presented to 
Parliament and so these principles are woven within its concise and coherent 
analysis of the proposed schemes. The report not only set out a logical blueprint for 
the formation of a Scottish railway network, predicated on a continuous trunk route to 
the north, but it provided the foundation and stimulus for the subsequent 
development of the railway system of northern Scotland: 
28 M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914, Economic and Social 
Research Council Report, R000239586 (January 2005), pp.7-8; CJA Robertson, The Origins 
of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.296; H Parris, Government and the Railways in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain, p.84: Parris also notes (p.87) that by December 1845, 788 bills 
had been deposited, three times the volume of the previous year, with no parliamentary 
mechanism to replace to Railway Board. 
29 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 'The Railways', 58 (November 1845), p.640. 
30 WE Simnett, Railway Amalgamation in Great Britain (London, 1923), p.8. 
31 WA Robertson, Combination among Railway Companies (London, 1912), p.3, quoting 
Laing's report to the Board of Trade: ' ... where a great line of communication is broken up 
into several links, each in the hands of an independent Company, the through passenger is 
not only exposed to loss o_f t!me and Inconvenience, but frequently pecuniary losses In having 
to stay at some stage of his Journey for several hours, or proceed by a more expensive class'. 
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It is evident that a consideration of these lines raises the whole question of 
deciding on the best permanent system of railway communication for 
Scotland generally. 32 
The Board's statement on monopoly power and the need for continuous routes is 
reflected consistently throughout its systematic consideration of individual Scottish 
bills: 
The term "'monopoly" cannot be applied with any justice to such a 
combination of the different consecutive links of a great line of railway 
communication as tends to ensure the whole being worked as one concern 
for the purposes of the through traffic .. . amalgamation, especially if of a 
permanent nature, ought to be scrutinized with extreme jealousy; but the 
case appears to us to be very different as regards lines which constitute 
portions of what ... must be considered as properly one system. 33 
The Board's report on Scottish bills evaluated the potential contribution of individual 
lines to the strategic development of a Scottish network by continuous routes to the 
south and north of the Forth-Clyde valley, setting a key objective to establish a 'great 
trunk line for the north', a term also adopted by railway promoters. 34 The report 
methodically examined, and recommended or rejected, rival schemes measured 
against its criteria for the achievement of a northern trunk route, taking an over-view 
of the whole network that had been impracticable previously when evidence for each 
individual bill was contested by legal competition before a parliamentary committee 
32 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 8. · 
33 Board of Trade reports on schemes for extending Railway Communications and on 
Amalgamation of Railways, 1845, paragraph 30, specifically applied to consideration of the 
Newcastle and Berwick Railway Bill. 
34 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 15 and 16; Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, 12 March 1844, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, pp.2-3, quoting 'a grand trunk railway' and 'an unbroken chain of Railway 
communication from Scotland to the South'; Prospectus of the Scottish Central Railway 
Company, 1844, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/16; Prospectus of the Caledonian Railway, 1844, 
NAS/BR/PROS{S)/1 /2. 
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of local members.35 Furthermore, the Board advised the legislature that railway 
development in Scotland might be feasible even when economic conditions were 
unpromising. 36 
Table 11: Railway bills presented to Parliament in 1845 relating to Scottish routes 
1845 railway bills relatlna to Scotland Value Em 
Rallwav Board reDOrted In favour of thne schemes 
Newcastle and Berwick 0.700 Continuous trunk route 
Caledonian 1.800 Continuous trunk route 
Scottish Central 1.800 Continuous trunk route 
Aberdeen 1.000 Continuous trunk route 
Clydesdale Junction 0.400 Trunk route access to Glasgow 
Edinburgh and Northern 0.500 Northern route via Fife and ferries 
Glasgow. Barrhead and Neilston 0.125 
Scottish Midland Junction 0.300 Continuous trunk route 
Dundee and Perth 0.250 Link to continuous trunk route 
Extension of Edinbun:ih and Dalkeith to Hawick n/a Through route to Carlisle reiected 
£6.875m 
Rallwav Board reoorted aaalnst these schemes 
Northumber1and (atmospheric principle) 1.000 Altemallve to Newcastle - Berwick 
Glasgow and Ayrshire (Barrhead and Neilston) 0.080 Alternative to Barrhead - Neilston 
Glasgow, Dumfries and Carlisle 1.300 Alternative to Caledonlan 
Extension of Edinbumh and Glasaow to Stirlina n/a Alternative to Scottish Central 
£2.380m 
Rallwav Board did not reDOrt on these schemes In 1845 (Board abolished Julv 18451 
Glasgow Harbour Union 0.015 
Glasgow, Dumbarton and Loch Lomond 0.300 
Inverness and Elgin 0.300 
Great North of Scotland 1.100 Northern extension of trunk route 
Edinburgh and Perth 0.600 Alternative to Edinburgh & Northern 
Perth and Inverness 1.200 Alternative northern extension 
Caledonian Extension Railway 1.500 
Dunblane and Doune 0.080 
West Highland and Forth and Clyde Valley Junction 0.600 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dumbartonshire 0,350 
Stirlina, Dunfermline and Queensferrv 0.400 
£6.4-45m 
£15.700m Total value of schemes oroDOsed 
Source: Board of Trade reoort on Schemes for extendina Railwav Communication in Scotland 1845 oaraaraoh 3. 
Not all of the Scottish bills presented to Parliament in 1845 could be considered by 
the Board before it was abolished, amongst which were the key proposals to connect 
35 H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain, p.21, describes the 
former role of the committee as an 'umpire in a contest between private parties, not as 
guardian of the public interest'. 
36 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 63: 'There are some facts connected with the experience of existing 
railways in Scotland, which would make us hesitate in concluding that railways, if constructed 
with economy, may not be supported even in localities where the existing traffic appears 
insufficient for that purpose'. 
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Inverness with the expanding railway network. The Board did survive sufficiently 
long, however, to report on the trunk route to Aberdeen. 
Map 3: The route to the north recommended by the Railway Board, 1845 
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The principal test applied by the Board in selecting this northern route was the 
strategic importance of Stirling and Perth as the navigable limits of the rivers Forth 
and Tay: The report stressed that: 
. . . the preservation of an entire and unbroken line is a point of vital 
importance ... A line through Fife may give local accommodation to be used 
for a portion of the traffic from Dundee, and the towns on the east coast to 
Edinburgh; but it can never be put In competition with an unbroken Inland line 
by Stirling and Perth, as a trunk line for the connexion of the north of 
Scotland with Edinburgh, Glasgow and England.37 
The Board recommended that the Scottish Central proposals met those conditions 
and its consequent dismissal of the use of ferries on through routes relegated the 
Edinburgh and Northern Railway38 across Fife to a local line, and gave added market 
strength to those companies described in the report as part of the 'Caledonian 
system': 
. . . the Scottish Central line to Perth must be assumed as the basis of a 
system of railway communication for the northern portion of Scotland. 39 
By its unequivocal approval of the Scottish Central, the Board gave this small 
company, with a projected line of only 47 miles from near Falkirk to Perth, a pivotal 
role in the development of the northern trunk route and immediately endowed it with 
a degree of monopoly power, which encouraged lease and amalgamation proposals 
37 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 10, 11, 15 and 16. 
38 The Edinburgh and North Railway was authorised in 1845 as an isolated line across Fife, 
but its attempt to establish a through route to the north was signalled by its amalgamation 
with the Edinburgh, Leith and Granton Railway in 1847, under 10&11 Vic. cap. 239, The 
Edinburgh and North Railway Act. Its route, however, relied on a ferry crossing of the Firth of 
Forth. 
39 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 12, 32, 70 and 83. 
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from other companies even before it was constructed.40 The 1845 report then 
examined in detail the competing schemes to the south that might connect with the 
Scottish Central and concluded that: 
. . . a decided preponderance of advantage to Scotland is afforded by the 
Caledonian scheme in connexion with the Scottish Central, as giving a better 
trunk communication for all the most important streams of traffic ... 41 
The Caledonian Railway, with share capital of £2.1 million and 123 route miles, was 
one of largest undertakings yet authorised in a single Bill.42 With approval of the 
Caledonian proposals, the Railway Board advised against the rival Glasgow, 
Dumfries and Carlisle route because of insufficient traffic.43 Given the decisions in 
favour of the Caledonian and Scottish Central, the Board then recommended the 
Scottish Midland Junction and the Aberdeen Railways to complete a continuous 
route to Aberdeen, commenting: 
... the Aberdeen line is a proper and necessary part of that system .. . The 
Scottish Midland line appears thus to be necessary as an integral portion of 
the northern line of communication ... 44 
"'° Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway Company, 19 April 1844, NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p.36; 
Letter from the Caledonian Railway to the Scottish Central Railway dated 11 April 1844, 
recorded in Scottish Central Railway minutes on 19 April 1844, p.36, but not similarly 
recorded in the Caledonian Railway minutes (NAS/BR/CR/1/7) during that period. 
41 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 52. 
42 8&9 Vic. cap.162, 1845, The Caledonian Railway Act; HG Lewin, The Railway Mania and 
its Aftermath, 1845-52 (London, 1936, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1968), p.461; OS Nock, The 
Caledonian Railway, p.19. 
43 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 27. 
44 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 71 and 80. 
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The Board expressed regret that a through coastal line via Dundee and Arbroath 
was not feasible for geographical reasons and because of discontinuity between 
existing lines in both towns.'45 It therefore favoured the Inland Scottish Midland 
Junction route due to its 'remarkably easy construction', but recommended a 
connecting line from Dundee to Perth to provide a connection with the 'general 
railway system of the Kingdom' ."6 Centres of population and trade were prime 
considerations in the Board's recommendations and, significantly, the report also 
augured the 1846 authorisation of a continuous route to Inverness via Aberdeen: 
The importance of this line [the Aberdeen Railway] is increased by the 
consideration that a cheap and easy line, traversing a district of considerable 
population and local traffic, is stated to have been surveyed between 
Aberdeen and Inverness. Should this be the case, it seems not impossible 
that railway communication to the more northern counties may be extended 
in this direction."7 
Although the plans for the Great North of Scotland Railway and the Perth and 
Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways were deposited in 1845, the Board did 
not survive to report specifically on these rival projects. Nevertheless, the 1845 
report suggested the logic of an extension of the route northwards from Aberdeen, 
which was reflected in the relative share prices when those schemes were 
scrutinized in Parliament in 1846.48 
45 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 76 and 77; M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-
1914, annex 2, table 3, identifies this route vi~ Dundee and Arbroath as the main northern 
trunk route in his counterfactual model of a railway network to meet the requirements of the 
United Kingdom economy. 
A& Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication In Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 79-81. 
1,1 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 72. 
48 Railway Chronicle, 29 March 1845, p.365, reporting the Great North's bill for the proposed 
route to Inverness: 'This line is the result of the Board of Trade's decision in favour of the 
Aberdeen line ... '; see also table 24 showing share prices in the final section of this chapter. 
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The advice of the Railway Board must have been of considerable value to the 
legislature; Parliament accepted over ninety percent of the Board's 
recommendations for proposed railways In Britain."'0 As the Board's report was only 
one factor in the state's decisions, however, its precise influence remains uncertain. 
Yet, in a short and cogent text, the Railway Board as executive of the state indirectly, 
perhaps even intentionally given the known political predilection for laissez-faire, 
presented the legislature with a plan for a Scottish network predicated upon a 
continuous through route from the south to Aberdeen. Identifying the critical location 
of the Scottish Central, it systematically expanded the trunk route north and south 
from that line. The strategic planning in its report effectively steered Parliament into 
acceptance of a set of incorporations which substantially defined the framework of 
the Scottish railway network. 
Competition for control 
Although it existed only briefly, the Railway Board had an Important Influence on 
Scottish railway development in the north which lasted for over a decade after its 
demise. Its 1845 report presented an apparent conformity to the tenets of free 
enterprise and private capital in railway promotion, but the underlying plan for a 
national network in Scotland through linked and trunk routes foreshadowed the need 
for companies to be of sufficient size to develop the system and achieve economies 
of scale, reflecting the principles proposed by Laing in 1844.50 Laing resigned from 
the Board of Trade when the Railway Board was abolished, developed a legal 
practice and served as chairman of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway 
in 1848-55 before becoming Minister of Finance in India. He re-emerged in the 
history of the northern railways of Scotland as a director of the ill-fated Caithness 
Railway while serving as the Liberal Member of Parliament for Wick in 1865-68. 51 
"'
9 H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain, p.83-84. 
50 WE Simnett, Railway Amalgamation in Great Britain, p.8; WA Robertson, Combination 
among Railway Companies, p.3. 
51 Railway News, 7 March 1874, p.336, giving a biography of Samuel laing MP: Laing had 
previously been MP for Wick In 1852-57 and 1859-60; see also chapter 9, 'The Far North 
lines: ownership and control'. 
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The Railway Board report, quoted by promoters of new companies as a means by 
which to justify their schemes, kindled the contest between the west-coast and east-
coast alliances to secure control of the approved northern trunk route to Aberdeen. 
It gave enhanced market value and strategic importance to some small Scottish 
companies and assisted the establishment of territorial control in the northern half of 
Scotland. The effect of this state-endowed market power is exemplified by the early 
history of the Scottish Central Railway, authorised to link the two key towns of 
Stirling and Perth, which was quickly the subject of attractive overtures from larger 
established companies. 52 
Although the Scottish Central Railway was not formed until 1844, its origins began in 
1840 when a provisional committee chaired by the Marquis of Breadalbane 
commissioned a report on routes between Perth and Stirling from JE Errington, the 
assistant of eminent English engineer Joseph Locke. The cost of that early route 
was estimated at £450,000, including land, with an expected return on capital of six 
percent.53 Anticipating the results of the Smith-Barlow Commission, in progress at 
the time, Errington's report identified the strategic importance of the route: 
... it forms another link of the chain of Railway communication extending from 
the Metropolis to the north. From the efforts now making, and the favourable 
report of the Commissioners, it can hardly be doubted that one unbroken line 
of Railway communication will ultimately be formed, joining London and 
Perth, and making at the utmost, a journey of 24 hours.54 
52 Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway Company, 29 August 1845, NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, 
p.93, reporting that Royal Assent to the act of incorporation was granted on 31 July 1845. 
53 Report on the 'Proposed Railway from Perth to Stirling [and] to Edinburgh and Glasgow', 
dated 21 February 1841, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, p.7. 
54 Report on the 'Proposed Railway from Perth to Stirling land] to Edinburgh and Glasgow', 
dated 21 February 1841, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, p.8 (the 4 report of the Smith-Barlow 
Commission was dated 15 March 1841 }. 
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Breadalbane was a wealthy landowner in the district. 55 He wrote to Errington in 1841 
to support the plans and identified the weakness of proposed routes to the north 
passing through Fife because of the need to cross the Firths of Forth and Tay, 
reasons later advanced by the Railway Board. 56 The recommendation of the 
Railway Board in 1845 to reject the use of ferries on through routes reduced the Fife 
lines from trunk to district railways and significantly affected their performance. 57 
The East Coast of Scotland Railway, promoted in 1846 as the 'Great Eastern Trunk 
line' linking the North British, the Edinburgh and Northern, and the Dundee and 
Arbroath railways, was to extend northwards to joint the Aberdeen Railway at 
Stonehaven. However, it launched its prospectus at a time when investors shunned 
railway shares following the mania and the company was wound up in 1849 after 
deposits had been paid on only one-quarter of its shares. 58 The Edinburgh and 
Northern Railway, authorised in 1845, crossed Fife and required ferry crossings of 
the Forth and Tay.59 Its potential impact was weakened by the predatory purchase 
of the Tay ferries by the Scottish Central that same year.60 To reach Edinburgh, the 
Edinburgh and Northern entered into an expensive guarantee with the Edinburgh, 
55 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.I (private publication, 2 volumes, 
London, 1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1971 p.121, indicating Breadalbane's 
annual income of £60,000 circa 1834; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in the Highlands: The 
Marquis of Breadalbane and the Scottish Grand Junction Railway', in R Mason and N 
Macdougall (eds.), People and Power in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1992), pp.190-91: 
Breadalbane spent £42,762 on improvements on his estate between 1834 and 1848 and, by 
1883, the Marquis had become the second most extensive landowner in Scotland with 
438,358 acres, although this estate represented just one-third of the acreage owned by the 
Duke of Sutherland. 
56 Letter of 29 October 1841, written from the Marquis of Breadalbane to JE Errington, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/15: We have heard, certainly, of proposals for Railways being carried 
though the County of Fife, and these have been brought forward as likely to form general 
lines of communication between the south and the north of Scotland. But when it is 
considered that on these Lines two wide arms of the Sea are to be crossed, namely, the Frith 
[sic] of Forth and the Frith of Tay, it must be at once seen that the inconvenience arising from 
the crossing of these two difficult ferries, must form a formidable interruption to a continuous 
and general line of Railway Communication'. The term 'Firth' is now used for 'Frith'. 
s7 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 15. 
58 Railway Chronicle, 25 October 1846, p.17 45, and 17 November 1849, p. 791. 
69 8&9 Vic. cap.158, 1845, The Edinburgh and Northern Railway Act. 
80 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 19 and 26 
September 1845, NAS/BR/SCC/1 /1, p.109. 
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Leith and Granton Railway in 1847.61 Renamed the Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee 
Railway in 1849, the company ran into serious financial difficulties mainly as a 
consequence of the local status conferred by state acceptance of the Railway 
Board's recommendations. With debts of £841,106, including arrears in guaranteed 
payments by 1852, the company had to seek Parliamentary legislation to restructure 
its affairs to regain solvency.62 
The Scottish Central Railway, promoted by the main landowners of Stirlingshire and 
Perthshire, held the key strategic section of the northern trunk route.63 Its share 
capital was twice over-subscribed within a week of publication of Its prospectus In 
March 1844.64 Although only £2.1 Os had been called as deposit on its shares by 
July 1845 when the Scottish Central was incorporated, the market price stood at 
£6.1 Ss; thirty percent of the company's stock was held in England.85 In October 
1845, the Edinburgh and Glasgow offered amalgamation to the Scottish Central on a 
s1 10&11 Vic. cap.239, 1847, The Edinburgh and Northern Railway Act under which the 
Edinburgh and Northern Railway amalgamated with the Edinburgh, Leith and Granton 
Railway. 
a2 Minutes of meetings of shareholders of the Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee Railway, 29 
September 1852, NAS/BR/EPD/1/1, pp.16-19 and pp.34-41; CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap 
Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway Company·, Transport History, 7, 
No.1 (March 1974), p.14; 16&17 Vic. cap.153, 1853, The Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee 
Railway (Arrangements) Act, which stated that the company owed £833,420 on debenture 
loans and interest 'amounts to a very large Sum, and the available Revenue of the Company 
is totally inadequate and insufficient for the payment thereof in full, and there is a large 
Arrears of Interest, Dividend and annual Payments due ... '. Interest on debentures was cut 
to 3½ %, preference guarantees were reduced from 5% to 4%, and preference stock was 
issued for interest arrears at a rate of £30 of stock for £1,000 of debt; additionally, directors 
were appointed specifically to represent the interests of the various holders of guaranteed 
shares and debentures. 
63 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 26 August 1846, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p.261: 'The advantageous position occupied by the railway ... its high 
standing in public estimation ... combine to attach a high value to the Central Railway'. 
64 Prospectus of the Scottish Central Railway, 30 March 1844, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/16; J 
Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol. II, p.153. 
65 8&9 Vic. cap.161, 1845, The Scottish Central Railway Act with authorised capital of 
£850,000 and borrowing powers of £283,333; PF Marshall, The Scottish Central Railway 
(Witney, 1998), p.30; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-
1844, p.334. 
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5.5 percent guarantee.66 Parliament rejected both this proposal and a subsequent 7 
percent offer from the west-coast alliance of Caledonian, Lancaster-Carlisle and 
London and North Western Railways because the railway system was 'not 
sufficiently developed to decide upon the amalgamation most suited to the various 
schemes' .67 However, there was no state rejection of the principle of these early 
proposed amalgamations. 
Vigorous competition between the Edinburgh and Glasgow and the Caledonian 
Railways ensued, resulting in guarantees offered to the Scottish Central reaching 9 
percent.68 The economic unreality of such competitive bids was Identified by 
Herapath's Railway Journal: 
Unhappily, our friends in Scotland have latterly got up wonderfully in their 
estimates of the value of their railway property ... They are all looking forward 
to be leased; and lines which a few months ago it was thought would not pay 
2 percent are now suddenly becoming 1 O percent lines. sa 
This intense competition to extend control contributed to the poor dividends paid by 
the Caledonian and North British Railways in 1850-54, although average Scottish 
returns in 1853 were not much below those of England (tables 12 and 13). ED 
66 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 7 October 1845, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1 /1, p.121. 
s7 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 26 October 1846, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p.281; Minutes of Directors and Committees of the Caledonian Railway, 
14 June 1846, NAS/ BR/CAU1ll, P 337; PF Marshall, The Scottish Central Railway, p.46. 
68 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway Company, special 
meeting of shareholders, 20 July 1847, NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p.368, recording a 9% offer from 
the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway; Reports and accounts of the Caledonian Railway, 
Extra-ordinary General Meeting, 10 November, 1848; NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1.3, pp.3-5, at which 
the Caledonian also offered a 6% guarantee to the Scottish Midland Junction, which held the 
authorisation for the next stage of the northern route to Aberdeen. 
s9 Herapath's Railway Journal, 16 January 1847, p.67; Herapath's Railway Journal, 12 
February 1848, p.161, commenting on dividends of 6, 7 or 8 percent 'when, if the truth were 
told, they could not pay 2' • 
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Chattaway, a shareholder in the North British Railway, concluded in 1855 that poor 
returns had resulted from 'recklessly guaranteeing' other railways. 70 
Table 12: Half-yearly dividends of the main Scottish railway companies, 1850-54 
Year Half Caled~nlan North British Edinburgh and Glasgow and Scottish 
Year Glasgow South-Western Central 
(£) (£) (£) (£) (£) 
Dividends paid half-vearlv on £100 oar value of ordlnarv stock In each comoanv 
1850 Jan 0.0.0 1.0.0 1.10.0 1.5.0 0.0.0 
Julv 0.0.0 0.0.0 1.5.0 1.5.0 0.0.0 
1851 Jan 0.0.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.2.6 1.0.0 
Julv 0.0.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.0.0 0.12.0 
1852 Jan 0.5.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.0.0 1.8.0 
Julv 0.6.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.0.0 1.10.0 
1853 Jan 1.5.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.0.0 2.0.0 
Julv 1.0.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.10.0 2.0.0 
1854 Jan 1.10.0 0.7.6 1.10.0 1.5.0 2.0.0 
Julv 1.10.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 1.15.0 2.0.0 
Source: Railwav Times, 20 Seotember 1862, oo.1399-1402. 
(1 ): Units are aiven in oounds, shillinas and oence and for each half vear. 
Table 13: Half-year data for railways in Scotland and England, June 1853 
MIies of route Construction costs Working expenses Average dividend 
oer mlle (£) as 'Yo of recelots oerannum 
Scotland 943 30000 47 3.0% 
Enaland 5176 39872 
source: Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1853, o.443. 
49 3.3% 
The scramble to obtain influence and control of the new northern trunk route, 
exemplified by the escalating financial inducements offered to the Scottish Central, 
was a direct consequence of the free enterprise doctrine of the state. The wider and 
substantial guarantees offered by the inexperienced management of the Caledonian 
Railway to secure the whole of the Anglo-Scottish route recommended by the 
Railway Board caused severe financial instability within the company by 1849, which 
required state legislation for its resolution. 
70 ED Chattaway, Railways: their capital and dividends with statistics of their working in 
Great Britain and Ireland, (London, 1855-56), pp.24-25, data to 30 June 1853. 
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The 'Caledonian system' 
By the time the Caledonian Railway was incorporated in 1845, the influence of the 
west-coast alliance of English companies operating through the embryo company 
was already apparent. 71 State authorisation of the system of lines forming the 
northern trunk route meant that capital requirements for construction were well 
beyond Scottish sources; three-quarters of subscriptions in the Caledonian, seen as 
the line supported both by government and the major English companies, came from 
England.72 The Railway Times reported: 
The Grand Junction and other Railway Companies on the western route have 
subscribed liberal sums towards the Caledonian . . . This is the Government 
Commissioners' line.73 
os Nock conjectured that the Caledonian network was 'part of a single master plan 
for which the Grand Junction Railway was largely responsible'.7,. Certainly Locke 
had surveyed a route to Glasgow on behalf of the Grand Junction In 1835, but 
Acworth gives greater weight to local influence, concluding that '... the lairds of 
oumfriesshire conceived and carried out the Caledonian Railway', a view that 
minutes of the Caledonian board substantiate.75 Nevertheless, there is evidence of 
11 8&9 Vic. cap. 162, 31 July 1845, An Act for making a Railway from Carlisle to Edinburgh 
and Glasgow and the North of Scotland to be called "The Caledonian Railway'; Report of the 
Investigation Committee of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 19 April 1850, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, p.1, which reported that 'From the time this Company was projected, 
the influence of the Southern Companies was exerted to secure the Scottish Central as a link 
in the long chain for Western traffic from London to Aberdeen'. 
72 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.334, noting that 
77.8% of Caledonian subscriptions came from England; Herapath's Railway Journal, 26 
August 1848 and 4 November 1848, estimated that, by 1848, 90% of Caledonian shares 
were held In England, quoted In W Vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital 
before 1860', p.431. 
73 Railway Times, 16 March 1844, p.330. 
1• OS Nock, The Caledonian Railway, p.41. 
15 WM Acworth, The Railways of Scotland (London, 1890), p.30; Minutes of Directors and 
committees of the Caledonian Railway, 6 March 1844, NAS/BR/CAU1/7, pp.12-14; CJA 
Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.276; MC Reed, The 
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English influence within Scottish companies to try to gain strategic control of key 
Scottish routes almost immediately from their conception, which presages the state's 
network blueprint of 1845. The report of the Smith-Barlow Commission had boosted 
the status of the west-coast companies and their Scottish ally, the Caledonian, 
formed in February 1844. However, the Scottish Central, also formed in February 
1844, demonstrated its independence in April 1844 by appointing James Walker, 
President of the Institution of Civil Engineers, as its engineer because he was • •.. 
wholly unconnected with any of the competing lines to the south .. .'.1e Yet only two 
weeks later, after one of its own executive committee had written without authority to 
the Caledonian inviting them to build the line, which prompted the Caledonian to 
offer to pay parliamentary expenses if the Scottish Central agreed to become the 
'Caledonian Extension',n the Central rescinded their engineer's appointment and 
recruited Locke and Errington, engineers to the Caledonian and west-coast 
companies, on the grounds that they had already surveyed the Stirling-Perth route.78 
The Scottish Central must have recognised the potential power of the west-coast 
companies for their minute refers to '... very great difficulties, nay danger to the 
whole undertaking ... ' unless their decision was reversed.79 
Neither Central nor Caledonian minutes offer further explanation, but Joseph 
Mitchell, superintendent of Highland Roads and Bridges, who re-surveyed the route 
for the Scottish Central's provisional committee and served as resident engineer until 
Locke and Errington's appointment, later wrote that the Central committee 'coolly 
London and North Western Railway: a history (Penryn, 1996), p.49, notes that the London 
and North Western company held approximately 7 percent of Caledonian ordinary share 
capital in 1850. 
76 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 9 April 1844, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, pp.25-26. 
77 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 19 April 1844, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, pp.35-36; Minutes of the Directors and Committees of the Caledonian 
Railway, NAS/BR/CAU1/7. 6 April 1844, pp.23-24. 
1a Report on the 'Proposed Railway from Perth to Stirling [and] to Edinburgh and Glasgow', 
dated 21 February 1841, in accounts of the Scottish Central Railway, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, 
p.7. 
19 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 18 April 1844, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p.31-32; Minutes of Directors and Committees of the Caledonian Railway, 
6 April 1844, NAS/ BR/CAU1/7, p.23-24. 
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dismissed' Walker because of 'agitation' in Stirlingshire by agents of the 
Caledonian.80 Mitchell had initially planned a line between Perth and the Edinburgh 
and Glasgow Railway at Falkirk, but the strategists of the west-coast alliance quickly 
identified the key value of the new Scottish Central in the route to Aberdeen and 
assisted its infant Caledonian ally to try to secure it. Within the year, their 
unsuccessful early attempt was overshadowed by the intense competition for control 
of the northern route that followed its authorisation in 1845. 
The act of incorporation identified the Caledonian's northerly ambitions for 'making a 
Railway from Carlisle to Edinburgh and Glasgow and the North of Scotland .. .'. 81 
The term 'Caledonian system' was quickly appropriated by the Caledonian directors 
to support their vigorous and ambitious policy of acquiring other companies, 
advertising the approval given to their route as ' ... the first section of the National 
lines to Scotland recommended by the Government Commissioners'.82 The 
inaugural meeting of Caledonian shareholders was informed that the Board of Trade 
had 'aptly designated "the Caledonian System" of railway communication within 
Scotland .. .', and that capital was available· ... for extending the Caledonian system 
into every part of Scotland'.83 Shareholders were also advised of a new northern 
ally, 'the Perth and Inverness Railway Company - whose object is to construct a 
direct Line, in continuation of the Caledonian and Scottish Central Lines between the 
above places' .84 
A complicated web of lines, gauges and companies were in the sights of the 
Caledonian in 1845 to secure the route northwards to Aberdeen (table 14). Engineer 
80 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Ufe in the Highlands, vol. II, p.154-55. 
81 8&9 Vic. cap. 162, 31 July 1845, An Act for making a Railway from Carlisle to Edinburgh 
and Glasgow and the North of Scotland to be called 'The Caledonian Railway'. 
82 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraphs 32 and 57; Prospectus of the Caledonian Railway, 1844, 
NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/2; Minutes of the Caledonian Railway, 19 February 1844, 
NAS/BR/CAU1ll, p.1. 
83 Minutes of the first Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 27 August 1845, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, p.1. 
84 Minutes of the first Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 27 August 1845, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, p.3; WM Acworth, The Railways of Scotland, p.36-37. 
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Joseph Locke cautioned the Caledonian board on the 'danger in the Caledonian 
Company appearing to monopolise too many of the lines about it ... ',85 but the 
Caledonian continued its exponential expansion 
Table 14: The 'Caledonian System' to the north 
Route Orialnal company Gauae Note 
Carlisle to Garrionaill Caledonian Standard 1845 Caledonian main route 
Garrionaill to Coatbridae Wishaw and Coltness 4'6" 1845 Caledonian main route 
Coatbridge (Gartsherrie) to Monkland and Kirklntilloch 4'6" 1845 Caledonian main route 
Gamaueen 
Gamaueen to Castlecarv Caledonian Standard 1845 Caledonlan main route 
Castlecarv to Perth Scottish Central Standard Amalaamation in 1865 
Perth to Couoar Ancius (3) Scottish Midland Junction Standard Amalciamation in 1866 
Couoar Ancius to Newtvle m Newtvle and Couoar Anaus 4'6" Purchased bv Scottish Midland 
Newtvle to Glammis (1) Newtvle and Glammis 4'6" Purchased bv Scottish Midland 
Glammis to Forfar Scottish Midland Junction Standard Amalciamation In 1866 
Forfar to Guthrie (2) Arbroath and Forfar 5'6" Amalaamation in 1866 
(3) Aberdeen Railwav Standard Amalaamalion In 1866 Guthrie to Aberdeen 
sources: Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, annual volumes for 1846-51 ; OS Nock, The Ca/edonian Railway, p.19; 
G Graham, The Catedonian Railwav: account of its oriain and comoletion o.87. 
(1): The Scottish Midland Junction purchased the Newtyle and Couper Angus (£13,965) and the Newtyle and 
Glammis (£20,563) as part of its authorised route between Perth and Forfar (Accounts of the Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway. 1850-1856, NAS/BR/SCM/1/1-3). The town of Glammis is now more usually designated as 
Glamis. (2): The Arbroath and Forfar Railway was leased by the A~erdeen Railway in 1848 (N Ferguson, The Arbroath 
and Forfar Railway (Usk, 2000), pp.55-56; Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1848 and 1850, which gives details of 
the lease). (3): The Scottish Midland Junction ~nd Aberdeen Railways a'!lalgamated in 1856 to form the Scottish North-
Eastern Railway (Minutes of the Joint Committee of the Scottish Midland Junction and Aberdeen railways, 25 
Aoril 1856, NAS/BR/SCM/1 /5; 19&20 Vic. cao.134, 1856 The Scottish North-Eastern Railwav Comoanv's Act\. 
strategic intent and financial strain 
Rapid action was needed by the infant Caledonian to obtain control of the 
strategically important Scottish Central for the west-coast companies. With routes in 
Fife demoted to the status of local lines, the Caledonian held an initial advantage in 
the north, but it faced immediate challenges to its southern territory and traffic. 
Therefore, even before the Caledonian line was opened in 1848, it took control of the 
Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway by guaranteed dividend under an Act of 
ss Minutes of Directors and Committees of the Caledonian Railway, 12 February 1846, 
NAS/BR/CAU1/7, p.302, reporting Locke's advice: 'I can ... see much danger in the 
Caledonian Company appearing to monopolise too many of the lines about it and I would 
rather see it standing aloof from a competition just now, than mixing in it by which it will be 
sure to lose largely in popularity before Parliament'. 
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1847, which led to subsequent censure by Caledonian shareholders.86 
Nevertheless, by so doing, it confined the Glasgow and South-Western Railway, 
formed from the Ayr and Dumfries lines in 1850, within a defined territory. 
Acworth quotes twenty parliamentary Acts to show the speed and extent of 
Caledonian appropriation. 87 With the vacuum of state policy on railways, Parliament 
indirectly assisted the predatory and monopolistic expansion of the Caledonian. not 
just to secure territory identified within its 1844 Act but In seeking control of the 
northern route. By 1847, Herapath's Railway Journal was predicting catastrophe: 
Another thing which is calling loudly for the interference of the Government is . 
the system of guarantees now going on. If this is not prevented, ere long 
some of our large Companies will be brought to a standstill ... This Company 
[Caledonian] has been entering into leases, amalgamations and purchases to 
the extent of nearly half the railways of Scotland ... 88 
The extent of the Caledonian's commitment to guaranteed dividends is illustrated in 
tables 15 and 16, showing those paid to secure the route to Glasgow and those 
shared with the west-coast companies for the route to the north. 
86 Minutes of the Caledonian Railway, NAS/BR/CAU1/7, p.23-24; Report of the Committee of 
Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 1849, NAS/ BR/CAU1/98, p.6; 
10&11 Vic. cap.169, 1847, The Caledonian and Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railways 
Amalgamation Act. 
87 WM Acworth, The Railways of Scotland, p.35, quoting specifically the parliamentary 
session 9 & 10 Victoria (1848-49). 
88 Herapath's Railway Journal, 6 May, 1847, p.577 and p.582. 
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Table 15: Guarantees given by the Caledonian Railway, 1849 
Company Miles Company Dividend Amount of guarantee to be 
Caoital 1£l guaranteed oaid bv the Caledonian 1£) 
Clvdesdale Junction 18 450,000 6% 27 000 
Wishaw and Coltness 13 240 000 10½% 25 200 
Glasaow, Gamkirk and Coatbridae 12 156 355 8% 12 508 
Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock 22½ 150,000 6% 29,000 
500 000 4% 
Loan caoital of these four comnanies 250 000 12 500 
65½ 1,746,355 106,208 (oer annum} 
sources: Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonlan Railway, 1849, 
NAS/BR/CALJ1/98; Reports and accounts ofthe Caledonian Railway, 1845-68, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S1/1/3; Bradshaw's Railwav Almanack, 1849 o.51 . 
Table 16: Guarantees of the Caledonian Railway in partnership with west-coast 
companies for the route to the north, 1849 
company MIies Company Guaranteed Dividend Proportion to bo paid 
Capital Dividend to be paid by the Caledonlan 
1£ml l¼l (£) 1£l 
Scottish Central 45 1.020 7% 71400 17850 
Scottish Midland Junction 33 0.500 6% 30000 22500 
Dundee Perth and Aberdeen 47 0.530 8% 42400 31800 
125 2.050 143800 72150 Coer annum\ 
sources: Bradshaw's Railway A/manack, 1849, p.52; Report of the Committee of Investigation to the 
Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98; Reports and accounts of the 
Caledonian Railwav, 1845-68 NAS/BR/RACCS)/1/3. 
(1 ): Bradshaw shows the capital of the Scottish Midland Junction on which the Caledonlan guarantee was made 
as £500,000 (p.82), although its authorised capital under 9&10 Vic. cap.75, 1846, was £600,000. 
(2): Mileages are quoted from Bradshaw's Ra(lway A/mans~. 1849_, p.52. However, H~ Lewin, The Railway 
Manis and its Aftermath, 184fr52, pp.57-58, gives the authonsed mileages for the Scottish Central and Scottish 
Midland Junction lines as 45 and 30¼ respectively, but subsequently states these to be 45½ and 32½ on opening 
in 1848 (pp.388-391), while PF Marshall, The ~cottis~ Central Railway, p.27, quotes the Scottish Central mileage 
to be 47. The Dundee Perth and Aberdeen m1leaae includes the Dundee and Newtvle line leased in 1846. 
The inability of the infant Caledonian to manage this scale and speed of expansion 
proved to be disastrous for the company. The weakness in the Caledonian's policy 
of securing control of companies and routes was symbolised by the 1 O½ percent 
dividend it guaranteed to the Wishaw and Coltness Railway, only eleven miles long 
but forming part of its route to Glasgow; this company had only paid a dividend in 
three half-years during 1838-44 and its gross revenue justified 4 percent at most. 89 
With a further guarantee proposed to gain access to Kilmarnock,90 the Caledonian's 
89 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.77: J Butt and 
JT Ward, 'The promotion of the Caledonian Railway Company', Transport History, 3, No.3 
(November 1970), p.227. 
oo Report of the Committee of lnve~tigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 
1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, pp.4-5, gives the yearly guarantee for the Glasgow, Barrhead and 
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annual commitment of guarantees in 1849 was £194,858.91 Unsurprisingly, no 
ordinary dividend was paid in July 1849. 
A shareholders' inquiry was established in 1849 which estimated an annual loss of 
£66, 164 to capital as a result of the guarantees to the Coltness, Garnkirk, 
Clydesdale, Greenock and Neilston lines in addition to the revenue loss sustained In 
working each of these lines.92 The inquiry discovered that the working agreement 
with the Scottish Central required an annual payment of £71,400, shared with the 
Lancaster and Carlisle and London and North Western companies, but, for the first 
half-year, the Caledonian's proportion of the loss sustained was £14,149, £6,000 
more than the entire traffic receipts from the line.93 
Estimated floating debt of £670,744 and liabilities of £853,762 backed by only 
£510,609 of assets summarised the dire financial state of the Caledonian in 1849.94 
When these debts and liabilities were identified, the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway 
withdrew from negotiations on amalgamation with the Caledonian. The inquiry report 
was blunt: 
Neilston line as £16,500 with 8% on £150,000 of capital and 6% on the remaining £150,000; 
Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1849, p.51. 
111 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 
1849, NAS/BR/CAL/1/98, pp.4-5: the guarantees of £106,208 and £72,150 recorded in tables 
15 and 16 above, coupled with the £16,500 to gain access to Kilmarnock over the Glasgow, 
Barrhead and Neilston Railway, produce the estimated annual total of guarantees of 
£194,858. 
02 Minutes of the Caledonian Railway, 27 September 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /3; Report of 
the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 1849, 
NAS/BR/CAU1/98, pp.6-7. 
93 NAS/BR/CAL/1/98, Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the 
Caledonian Railway, 1849, p.6; see also chapter 4, 'The route to the North'. 
9-4 NAS/BR/CAL/1/98, Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the 
Caledonian Railway, 1849, p.14: li~bilitie~ to banks (£214,668), to other creditors (£166,669), 
on bills (289,406) and for outstanding claims on construction work (£183,018) exceeded 
assets comprising capital not yet receiv~d or raised (£510.609) by £343,152 (shillings and 
pence have been rounded down). Floating debt due to banks, creditors and on bills was 
reported to be £670,744. 
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... the conduct of the Directors indicate a want of judgement and discretion ... 
With a capital barely sufficient for the original undertaking, their over-zeal 
induced them to embark on schemes and speculation in an extent seriously 
compromising the safety of the Company.95 
The overwhelming desire of the Caledonian to secure territorial control, stimulated by 
the state approval of the Scottish system of routes in 1845, had led to its insolvency 
within four years of incorporation. With strong backing from English shareholders, a 
new board of directors was appointed in February 1850 to attempt a rescue of the 
company. One new director was John Duncan, an advocate from Aberdeen, who 
served as chairman of the Caledonian in 1850-52 and was later destined to tackle 
the financial collapse of a northern monopoly, the Great North of Scotland Railway.96 
The Caledonian chairman told shareholders in 1851 that' ... any body of men who 
could keep a company like this afloat must have had some nerve as well as 
energy'.97 
The state approved a complex restructuring of the Caledonian in 1851, which re-
incorporated the leased Greenock, Clydesdale and Wishaw companies.96 Four 
directors were appointed specifically to the Caledonian to safeguard the interests of 
those three companies and the Neilston line until the Caledonian re-established its 
solvency. Previously agreed fixed dividends and guaranteed dividend increases 
were cancelled under the 1851 Act and new, more realistic fixed payments 
es NAS/BR/CAU1/98, Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the 
Caledonian Railway, 1849, p.7 and p.18: ' ... there has been a want of economy in the 
management of the affairs of the Company ... '. 
96 Half yearly report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 28 March 
1851, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, p.2 of printed report, stating the election of John Duncan 'who is 
among the largest holders of [Caledonian] Ordinary Stock in Scotland' as chairman from 
December 1850: reports for ordinary general meetings on 30 September 1851, 13 March 
1852 and 22 September 1852 are signed by Duncan as chairman, but the next report for 22 
March 1853, is signed by William Baird as chairman. See also chapter 8, 'Northern regional 
monopolies and their finances, 1865-74'. 
97 Railway Times, 26 April 1851, p.431. 
96 14&15 Vic. cap.134, 1851, An Act to sanction certain Arrangements entered into between 
the Caledonian Railway Company and the Holders of guaranteed and preferential Interests in 
the company, and to enable the Company to raise a further Sum of Money, The Caledonian 
Railway Company Arrangements Act. 
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substituted. Additional borrowing powers were granted specifically to meet arrears 
of dividend and to reduce outstanding debts and liabilities. By the time the four 
directors representing the subsidiary companies stood down In 1854, fixed Interest 
payments still absorbed two-fifths of revenue.99 
The 1851 Act authorised the Caledonian to continue to hold £142,475 of shares in 
five other companies, including £96, 175 in the Scottish Midland Junction and 
£17,250 in the Scottish Central, but required disposal of £596,872 of shares held In 
four other companies. 100 This previous investment of nearly £¾ million in these nine 
railway companies illustrates the scale of the Caledonian's bid for dominance, but 
the approved revised shareholding ensured that the Caledonian retained a 
significant interest in the Scottish Central and Midland companies on the northern 
route to Aberdeen. The Times reported the complexity of the Caledonian's affairs: 
The Caledonian Railway Company, the work of neither lawyers, nor of old 
women, nor spendthrifts, but of shrewd middle-aged mercantile men, is just 
such a tangle as one might dream of after supping on lobster salad and 
champagne.101 
Attempting to disentangle the financial affairs of the Caledonian continues to present 
similar challenges to modern researchers, not least because the surviving accounts 
make disaggregation of the original Caledonian scheme from the complicated web of 
purchased and leased companies particularly difficult. Nevertheless, the Caledonian 
99 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1855, p.30, reporting that the guarantee representatives 
had left the Caledonian Board in September 1854 and that, for the half-year to December 
1854, £90, 143 was paid on fixed interest debt from revenue of £228,218 (39.5%). 
100 14&15 Vic. cap.134, 7 August 1851, The Caledonian Railway Arrangements Act, 
schedule E, approved a revised Caledonian shareholding of 690 £25 shares (£17,250) in the 
Scottish central Railway and 3847 £25 shares (£96,175) in the Scottish Midland Junction 
Railway. However, these revised shareholdings represented approximately half of the shares 
previously held on 31 December 1849, when £35,198 had been paid by the Caledonian for 
Scottish Central stock and £195,656 for of Scottish Midland stock, representing par values of 
£41,265 and £231,071 respectively (NAS/BR/CAU1 /98, p.8): this par value of Scottish 
Midland shares formed 38.5% of the Scottish Midland Junction's authorised share capital. 
101 The Times, 30 August 1850, quoted in J Butt and JT Ward, 'The promotion of the 
Caledonian Railway Company', Transport History, 3, No.3 (November 1870), p.250. 
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experience provides a benchmark against which to evaluate the financial stability of 
later railway companies in the north of Scotland.102 
- Caledonian finances 
The Caledonian was the largest Scottish railway company In 1849 and its financial 
collapse was a significant milestone in the history of Scottish railways. Land and 
construction costs for the Caledonian Railway were 122 percent and 24 percent 
respectively above the parliamentary estimate, which placed Immediate strain on the 
capital account.103 Inaccurate cost estimates and the high levels of committed 
guarantees undermined the company's financial stability, even though gross revenue 
rose steadily once the line opened throughout in 1848. The 1849 shareholder 
inquiry reported that revenue was insufficient to meet guarantee and preference 
commitments and the liabilities of the company exceeded its assets; the Caledonian 
was therefore insolvent.104 
Although share price data must be treated with caution, the comparative 
performance of Caledonian shares against its main Scottish rival, the North British, 
illustrates that, even with the depressed state of share trading in 1846-48 when the 
Caledonian was expanding rapidly, the market showed concern by marking its 
shares proportionately lower than those in the North British (table 17). 
102 See chapter 1, 'Sources and financial indicators', for details of the derivation of financial 
indicators. 
103 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 
1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, and Accounts of the Caledonian Railway, 1845-68, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /3. 
104 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 
1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, p.7 in which the Committee identify that if all guarantees and 
preferences were sustained, 'the enti_re earnings of the lines will not be sufficient to meet 
them ... '; also p. 14 where the Committee show current liabilities to be £853,762 and assets 
£510,609 and the capital account to be £494,698 in deficit, while amounts still outstanding to 
be paid from capital exceeded the amount of capital still available to be raised by £343, 152; 
Railway Times, 5 September 1868, p. 921, reviewing the financial progress of the Caledonian 
since its insolvency in 1851'; see also chapter 1, 'sources and financial methodology'. 
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Table 17: Weekly share prices during the period of Caledonian expansion, 1846-48 
Caledonian Railwav North British Railway 
Date No of Par Amount Price range In Noof Par Amount Price range In 
shares (£) paid(£) week (£) shares (£) paid week (£) (£) 
10.10.1846 36000 50 25 26 7/8 - 27 1/3 36000 25 25 32 ½ - 33 
26.12.1846 36000 50 30 29-29 5/8 36000 25 25 36 ¼ - 37 3/8 
03.04.1847 36000 50 30 26- 26 ¾ 36000 25 25 33 - 33 1/8 
01 .05.1847 36000 50 30 23 ½-24 ¼ 36000 25 25 31 - 31 ½ 
02.10.1847 36000 50 40 29 ½ - 37 7/8 36000 25 25 25 - 26 ½ 
18.12.1847 36000 50 50 36 ¼- 37 3/8 36000 25 25 26 ¼ - 26 7/8 
29.01 .1848 36000 50 50 35 7/8 -36 1/8 36000 25 25 26¼ - 27¼ 
01 .04.1848 36000 50 50 26-28 ¼ 36000 25 25 20 ½ - 21 ¼ 
24.06.1848 36000 50 50 30- 31 36000 25 25 21 7/8 - 22 
01 .07.1848 36000 50 50 29 - 30 36000 25 25 21 ¼ - 21 ½ 
Source: Herapsth's Rsilwsv Journal, October 1846 - Julv 1848. 
(1): By July 1848, the price of Celedonien shares was 60% of per value, while the North British share price was 
86% of oar value. 
The financial instability of the Caledonian can be shown by the gearing of gross 
revenue to its fixed interest debt, which requires the inclusion of any 'hidden' debt. 
Table 18 identifies the total amount of fixed interest debt comprising authorised 
debenture loans and floating debt set against the annual gross revenue for the 
period 1848-52. The accounts of the Caledonian at 31 December 1849 show 
£696,220 of 'hidden' debt held under the line in the general balance sheet, including 
£168,495 owed to banks, on which interest had to be paid. 106 In December 1849, 
authorised loans represented 24.5 percent of total capital raised by the Caledonian, 
almost identical to the level found by Broadbridge on the Lancashire and Yorkshire 
at that date.106 However, with considerable hidden debt in the Caledonian, the total 
debt requiring interest payments comprised 39.3 percent of total capital raised,107 
which suggests a weakness in the company's financial structure. 
105 Accounts of the Caledonian Railway, 31 December 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /3. 
106 SA Broadbridge, Studies in Railway Expansion and the Capital Market in England, 1825-
1873 (London, 1970), p.71, table 9, showing that, in 1849, 24% of Lancashire and Yorkshire 
capital comprised authorised loans. 
107 Table 18 shows that the total debt of the Caledonian Railway to 31 December 1849 was 
£1,854,404 and cap.ital raised was £4,720,064; debt therefore represented 39.3% of capital 
funds raised. 
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Table 18: Revenue and debt of the Caledonian Railway, 1848-52 
(£) 30.06.1848 31.12.1848 30.06.1849 31.12.1849 
Floatina debt in qeneral balance sheet - includino: (4) 483446 572577 696220 
- Bills outstanding 291269 335432 
- Debts outstandina 451185 162654 192293 
- Claims bv bankers 32261 118654 168495 
Debenture loans 968185 1154877 1158184 
Total debt 1451631 1727454 1854404 
Committee of Inquiry established 2709.1849 
lnaulrv reoort oubllshed 24.12.1849 
Gross revenue for ½ vear (6) 93857 130968 136198 164925 
Cumulative vearlv revenue - 224825 267166 301123 
Total caoital raised 3655838 4307530 4654621 (5) 4720064 
Total share caoital oaid uo 13) 2706532 3339345 3499744 3561880 
Total authorised loans raised 949305 968185 1154877 1158184 
Ratio of authorised loan• to total capital ral•ed 0.225 0.2,a 0.2,5 
Ratio of debt to caoital funds raised 0.337 0.371 0.393 
Ratio of aross revenue to floatina debt 0.465 0.467 0.433 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.155 0.155 0.162 
source: Accounts of the Caledonian Railwav, 1848-52, NAS/BR/RAC(Sl/1/3. 
(1): shillings and pence have been rounded down; totals may not always match precisely the sum of the 
component items. 
(2): the accounting periods vary slightly in length over the period 1849-52. 
(3): share capital data include small sums for transfer fees and receipts from sale of forfeited shares. 
(4): the first general balance sheet was published for the half year ending 31 December 1848. 
(5): to 30 June 1849. capital receipts amounted to £4,654.621 and capital expenditure £5,149,319. a deficit of 
£494,698. 
(6): the line between Carlisle and Beattock opened on 10 September 1847; the remainder of the main line to 
Glasgow opened on 15 February 1848; the connecting line to Castlecary and Greenhill to connect with the 
Scottish Central Railwav ooened on 7 Auaust 1848. 
(£) 30.06.1850 31.12.1850 31.07.1851 31.01.1852 31.07.1852 
Arranaements Act 07.08.1851 
Debt in general balance sheet 594247 636727 611511 502902 70162 
(floalino debt) 
Jncludina: 
Claims against the Co (account 200137 338428 335529 237268 98836 
No.11 
Claims against the Co (account 246954 146788 125437 148296 37137 
No.2) 
Claims bv bankers 147156 151511 150544 117338 - 65809 (crl 
Debenture loans 1292012 1288032 1287182 1651324 1959414 
Total debt 1886259 1924759 1898693 2154226 2029576 
Gross revenue for ½ vear 151225 176361 188781 220062 211763 
Cumulative vearlv revenue 316150 327586 365142 408843 431825 
Ratio of gross revenue to total 0.168 0.170 0.192 0.190 0.213 
debt 
It is the comparison of gross revenue to total debt, however, that presents the 
starkest indication of the Caledonian's desperate financial position. The gearing 
ratio of gross revenue to total debt in December 1849, when the company was 
insolvent, was 0.162. A simple indicative calculation demonstrates that, at that 1849 
level of gross revenue, after deducting a notional figure of 50 percent of gross 
revenue for operating costs, which was commonly applied for working agreements, 
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net revenue would have been insufficient by nearly 30 percent to meet even its 
committed guarantees without any other calls being made on revenue.108 As a result 
of its serious monetary difficulties, the Caledonian had to obtain new legislation that 
restructured its affairs to establish a realistic financial base from which to begin its 
recovery. 109 
The Caledonian debt gearing showed a slow improvement in 1850-52, principally 
due to growth of gross revenue as the traffic on its main trunk route developed. In 
fact, overall debt rose in this period because authorised loans were increased under 
the 1851 Arrangements Act to assist the re-ordering of the company's finances. By 
1851, the Caledonian capital account remained in deficit, with £4.925 million raised 
and £5.218 million spent.110 Its share price was quoted at £11 on a £50 share in July 
1851 when £100 London and North Western shares were trading at £123.111 The 
Caledonian did recover, but only as revenue rose and as its restructuring legislation 
took effect; a small dividend was restored in 1852.112 The state approved the 
necessary legislation for, had it not done so, one of the largest companies in 
Scotland at that time would have failed. Once again, the state had to abandon 
temporarily its adherence to the principles of the free market and approve action for 
the wider benefit of the Scottish economy. 
108 Table 18 shows that the annual revenue of the Caledonian to 31 December 1849 was 
£301,123. Deducting a notional 50% of gross revenue to meet working expenses, the 
£150,562 remaining would be insufficient to meet the £194,858 committed on guarantees to 
other companies (29.4% shortfall) even without any other calls being made on revenue. To 
meet committed guarantees and operational costs, annual gross revenue would have needed 
to yield £345,420 (i.e. £150,562 for operations and £194,858 for guarantees), which is 14.7% 
more than was earned In 1849 (£301,123). Furthermore, even that level of revenue would 
have been insufficient to service its authorised loan capital or provide any ordinary dividend. 
109 14 & 1 s Vic. cap.134, 1851, 'An Act to sanction certain Arrangements entered into 
between the Caledonian Railway Company and the Holders of guaranteed and preferential 
Interests in the Company, and to enable the Company to raise a further Sum of Money', The 
Caledonian Railway Company Arrangements Act. 
110 Accounts of the Caledonian Railway to 31 July 1851, reported to the Ordinary General 
Meeting held on 30 September 1851, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3. 
111 Railway Times, 5 July 1851, p.662: share prices quoted for Thursday 3 July 1851 (The 
Caledonian Railway Arrangements Act was passed in Parliament on 7 August 1851 ). 
112 Railway Times, 20 September 1862, pp.1399-1402: dividend of 5 shillings per share was 
paid in January 1852 and 6 shillings in July 1852. Dividend in January 1853 was £1.5s and 
£1.0s in July 1853. In January and July of 1854 and 1855, dividend was 3%. 
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Any appraisal of a company's financial situation must balance data against the 
broader circumstances faced by that company. Nevertheless, the insolvency of the 
Caledonian suggests that any railway company in the mid-nineteenth century with a 
gearing of gross revenue as a proportion of total debt below the Caledonian's 1849 
level of 0.162, even if its gross revenue was rising, was financially unsound. The 
relatively high proportion of Caledonian funds that required guaranteed payments, 
illustrated by the ratio between its debt and capital raised, also indicates the 
company's financial instability. Furthermore, given the need to obtain new legislation 
in order to survive and restructure, the Caledonian experience implies that any 
company with a weaker debt gearing and without rising levels of revenue would be 
unlikely to recover independently. These indicators, coupled with data showing that 
Caledonian liabilities were greater than its assets and that it was unable to meet its 
guarantees, provide benchmarks against which the performance of later railway 
companies in the north can be evaluated. 
The aftermath of the Railway Board in northern Scotland, 1845-46 
When the Railway Board was abolished in July 1845, a large number of proposed 
railway schemes for Scotland awaited examination in Parliament or were about to be 
deposited, including bills to extend railways north to lnvemess.113 The parliamentary 
timetable prevented the promotion and authorisation of any railway company within 
one session so the schemes recommended by the Railway Board had already been 
in gestation for some time before the onset of the 1845-46 mania. 
Although the Board was purely advisory, Parris considers that its abolition in July 
1845 removed any restraint on speculation; by December 1845, 788 bills awaited 
113 Bills deposited in 1845 included the Great North of Scotland, the Perth and Inverness, the 
Inverness and Elgin and the Aberdeen, Banff and Elgin Railways, all of which intended to 
provide a new route to Inverness; see tables 20(a) and (20(b) in this chapter. 
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parliamentary scrutiny.11 .. Indeed, the ability of Parliament to manage this volume of 
legislation without preliminary investigation was questioned: 
The private business of this country, if conducted on the ancient plan, must 
utterly swamp the consideration of pubic affairs, and the member of 
parliament dwindle into a mere arbiter between hostile surveyors ... We do 
think, therefore, that it is high time for the legislature to interfere ... 116 
Many railway schemes collapsed in the wave of speculation, but, of the estimated 
£701 million capital required for railways proposed by October 1845, just 3.2 percent 
was intended for Scottish schemes; of the £71 million subsequently raised for 
railways that were constructed, only 6.2 percent was directed to Scotland.118 In 
many respects, therefore, the shape of Scottish railway development in 1645-46 was 
influenced more by the Railway Board's report than the speculative railway mania: 
The new railways in Scotland possess all the characteristics and elements of 
bona fide undertakings . . . There may be one or two schemes the prospects 
of which are unfavourable - but it cannot be said even of these that the plans 
were impracticable, or that the promoters are men of little substance or 
character.117 
During the mania, Professor Aytoun described the 'epidemic' of seeking to grow rich 
as 'a disease which infests the nation whenever capital, in consequence of the 
success of trade and prosperous harvests, becomes abundant'.118 A poor harvest, 
m H Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain, p.87: the 788 
railway bills submitted by December 1845 represented three times the level of submission in 
the previous year. 
115 WE Aytoun, 'Railways', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 58 (November 1845), pp.639-
40. 
116 WF Spackman in The Times, 17 November 1845, quoted in J Simmons, The Railway in 
England and Wales, vol.1 (Leicester, 1978), p.41, footnote 7. 
117 Railway Times, 29 November 1845, p.2308. 
11e WE Aytoun, 'Railways', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 58 (November 1845), p.634. 
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the arrival of potato blight and a rise in interest rates prompted a wave of share 
selling. By December 1845, over 500 provisionally registered British railway 
companies had disappeared.119 New legislation was approved to attempt to control 
the purchase and lease of railways, which did arrest the battle for control of the 
Scottish Central, and to allow the dissolution of railway companies. 120 
Many of the schemes for railways into the north of Scotland awaiting parliamentary 
attention soon required that facility of dissolution. Railway promotions to the west 
highlands in 1845-46 encroached upon plans for railways to the highland capital of 
Inverness (table 19), but only the Scottish Grand Junction, the target of Aytoun's 
influential Glenmutchkin lampoon, 121 gained authorisation only to collapse for lack of 
capital. By June 1846, its £25 shares on which £2 1 Os had been paid stood at only 
15s.122 
119 The Times, 9 January 1846, quoted in RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 
1825-1875, pp.40-41. 
120 8&9 Vic. cap. 96, 1845, An Act to restrict the powers of selling or leasing Railways 
contained in certain Acts of Parliament relating to such railways: this Act required the 
proposed purchase or lease of ~~ilways to ~e ap~roved in n~w parliamentary powers; 9& 1 O 
Vic. cap.28, 1846, An Act to fac1htate the dissolution of certain Railway Companies. 
121 WE Aytoun, 'How we got up the Glenmutchkin Railway and how we got out of it', 
8/ackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 58 (November 1845). 453-466. 
122 Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 June 1846, p. 1230. 
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Table 19: Railway plans in the west and north-west highlands of Scotland, 1845-46 
West and North-West Highland comoanles 
Scottish Grand Junction Planned as a line from Stirling to Oban with a branch to connect 
to the Perth and Inverness at Dalwhinnie, but incorporated on 3 
July 1846 as a reduced scheme between Oban and Crlanlarich, 
with a branch to Loch Lomond. The promotion was ultimately 
abandoned in 1852 ,1, . 
Scottish (North) Western A rival scheme to the Scottish Grand Junction for a line from 
Glasgow to Oban. The company agreed to be bought out by the 
Scottish Grand Junction before the bills were considered in 
Parliament 12\. 
Caledonian Canal and Great North and West A line projected to run along the Canal banks, providing 
of Scotland locomotives to assist ships through the canal and either to 
connect at its southern end with the Scottish Grand Junction or to 
run to Glasaow (3\. 
Caledonian Northern Direct A rival scheme to the Scottish Grand Junction for a line from 
Glasaow to Crianlarich (4) . 
Sources: 
(1): Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1850, p.131 and 1852, p.162; J McGregor, Tha Wt1st Highland Railway: 
Plans, Politics and Paople (Edinburgh, 2005), p.3; HG Lewin, The Railway Man/a and Its Aftermath, 1845-52, 
p.228; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in the Highlands: The Marquis of Breadalbane and the Scottish Grand 
Junction Railway', in R Mason and N Macdougall (eds.), Peop/a and Power In Scotland, pp.198-211 . 
(2) : Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 29 October 1845, p.398; HG Lewin, Tha Railway Mania and its Aftermath, 
1845-52, p.229; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in the Highlands: The Marquis of Breadalbane and the Scottish 
Grand Junction Railway', in R Mason and N Macdougall (eds.), Paop/e and Powar In Scotland, p.201 and pp.203-
204. (3): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 3 January 1846, p.1055; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in the Highlands: The 
Marquis of Breadalbane and the Scottish Grand Junction Railway' , in R Mason and N Macdougall (eda.), People 
and Power in Scotland, p.201 . 
(4): J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People, p.3; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in 
the Highlands: The Marquis of Breadalbane and the Scottish Grand Junction Railway', in R Mason and N 
Macdouaall <eds.\ , Peoo/e and Powar in Scotland, o.201 and oo.205-207. 
(1): Capital for the Scottish Grand Junction was initially set _at £1 ,_000,000, and was oversubs,cribed during the 
mania. The Grand Junction formed one of the largest Scottish railway schemes of 1845, but its capital was 
reduced to £350 000 for its truncated Crianlarich-Oban line of 1846. 
Parliament continued the Railway Board's methodology of weighing the balance of 
competing schemes. The Group 4 Select Committee met in March 1846 to consider 
the bills relating to lines in the Aberdeen and Inverness areas, 123 shown emboldened 
in the three tables below; the rival companies listed failed to produce bills by the due 
date. 
123 HG Lewin, The Railway Mania and its Aftermath, 1845-52, pp.226-27. 
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Table 20 (a): Railway plans in the north of Scotland based on Inverness, 1845-46 
Inverness and far north comoanles 
Inverness and Elgin Planned to join the Aberdeen, Banff and Elgln to form an 
Aberdeen-Inverness route, but amalgamated in 1646 with the 
Perth and Inverness to form a direct route to the south C 1 \. 
Perth and Inverness The trunk line promoted from Inverness to the south to connect 
with the Scottish Midland Junction and Scottish Central Railways 
(2). An agreement was made with the Scottish Midland that their 
Dunkeld branch bill would be withdrawn if the Perth-Inverness bill 
was passed, with the Perth and Inverness to pay the Scottish 
Midland's oromotional costs (3\. 
Inverness and Ross A line north of Inverness with capital of £500,000; no bill was 
lodaed 14\. 
Wick and Thurso A local line to connect the two far north towns with proposed 
caoital of £120 OOO· no bill was lodaed 15\. 
Sources: (1): Prospectus of the Inverness and Elgin Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1 . 
(2): Prospectus of the Perth and Inverness Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1 . 
(3): Law papers of the Perth and Inverness Railway, 1645-46, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/2. 
(4): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p.843; 7 January 1646, pp.1090-92. 
(5): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p.643; 7 January 1646, pp.1090-92; D McConnell, Ralls to 
Wick and Thurso (Dornoch, 1990\, o.7. 
Table 20 (b): Railway plans In the north of Scotland based on Aberdeen, 1845-46 
Aberdeen comoanies 
Aberdeen, Banff and Elgin A rival to the Great North of ScoUand, intended to link with the 
Inverness and Elgin, but weakened by the amalgamation of the 
Inverness and Ela in with the Perth and Inverness c 1 \. 
Great North of Scotland Authorised in 1846 as the sole route north to Inverness (2). 
Great North of Scotland (Western Extension) A proposed line from lnverurie on the Great North of Scotland 
route to Banff· its bill was not oresented to Parliament (3\. 
Great North of Scotland (Eastern Routes authorised in 1846 to Peterhead and Fraserburgh, but 
Extension) oowers laosed (4) . 
Oeeslde Authorised in 1846· reincoroorated 1852 15\. 
Alford Valley Authorised in 1846 but powers expired; new powers gained in 
185616). 
Sources: (1): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p.843. 
(2): Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway Company, 7 July 1846, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1 , p.99, reporting that 
Royal Assent was given to the Great North's Act on 26 June 1846. 
(3): Aberdeen Journal, 22 October 1845; K Fenwick, 'Genesis of the Great North', Part 3, Great North Review, 33, 
No.140 (August 1996), p.306. (4): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 8 October 1845, p.10, reporting the prospectus of the Great North of Scotland 
Extension Railway; K Fenwick, Great North of Scotland Railway legislation, Great North of Scotland Railway 
Association abstract No.26 (September 1994). 
(5): K Fenwick, Great North of Scotland Railway legislation, Great North of Scotland Railway Association abstract 
No.26 (September 1994). (6): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p.843; K Fenwick, Great North of Scotland Railway 
leaislation, Great North of Scotland Railwav Association abstract No.26. ISeotember 1994). 
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Table 20 (c): Railway plans in the north of Scotland: Independent companies, 1845-46 
Small lnde=ndent companies 
Morayshlre Authorised in 1846 but the southern section was abandoned by 
warrant of the Railway Commissioners In 1651 leaving the 
Lossiemouth-Elain section extant m. 
Banffshire A rival scheme to the Morayshire with proposed capital of 
£120,000 to build a line from Dufftown north to Port Gordon on 
the Moray Firth. The comoanv was wound uo in 1646 /2\ . 
Direct Northern Proposed line from Coupar Angus on the Scottish Midland line to 
Elgin and Inverness (3). 
Great Northern Central Proposed line from Perth to Elgin with various branches to Moray 
Firth settlements ( 4) . 
Perth and Northern Counties Proposed line from Coupar Angus to Keith on the Great North of 
Scotland Railwav and Rothes on the Moravshire Railwav 15\. 
Strathtay and Breadalbane Approved unopposed in August 1846 to connect Aberfeldy to the 
Perth and Inverness Railway. The Perth and Inverness bill failed 
and a Scottish Midland branch to Dunkeld, proposed In 1646 and 
again in 1852, that offered the prospect of a connection was not 
progressed. The Strathtay was left isolated and no construction 
was beaun (6l. 
Sources: 
(1 ): Minutes of the Morayshire Railway Company, 1846, 5 Septemb~r 1651, NAS/BR/MOR/1 /1 . 
(2): Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p.843; 25 Apnl 1846, p.947; Railway Chronicle. 25 April 
1846, p.417. 
(3): K Fenwick, 'Genesis of the Great North', Part 2, Great North Review, 33, No.129 (May 1996), p.290. 
(4): K Fenwick, 'Genesis of the Great North', Part 2, p.290. 
(5): K Fenwick, 'Genesis of the Great North', Part 2, p.290. 
(6): H Tuck, Railway Shareholder's Manual (1847), p.213, reported that the Strathtay and Breadalbane Act was 
approved on 3 August 1846 with capital powers of £120,000 and borrowing powers of £30,000; Railway 
Chronicle, 31 July 1847, p.727, reported additional capital powers of £150,000 and borrowing powers of £50,000 
granted to the Strathtay and Breadalbane Railway to extend its line to the Scottish Midland Junction Railway at 
Dunkeld; Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 28 December 1852, NAS/BRJSMJ/1/1, p.290; NT 
Sinclair, The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998), p.17; CJA Robertson, 'Railway Mania in the Highlands: The 
Marquis of Breadalbane and the Scottish Grand Junction Railway', in R Mason and N Macdougall (eds.), People 
and Power in Scotland, pp.198-200, notes that the two attempts by the Strathtay and Breadalbane Railway to 
extend its line in 1847 and 1848 were unsuccessful. 
Inverness was the key strategic centre for traffic to and from the highlands and was 
therefore the focus of the main railway promotions to the north in 1845-46. The 
Great North of Scotland Railway proposed an extension to Inverness from the 
Aberdeen Railway, already authorised as the last link in the 1845 national trunk 
route. 12.. Its Aberdeen rival, the Aberdeen, Banff and Elgin Railway, intended to 
extend from Aberdeen via Turriff and Banff to Elgin, there to join the Inverness and 
Elgin Railway to reach tnverness. 125 In competition, the Perth and Inverness 
Railway, planned by Joseph Mitchell and promoted from Inverness, presented a bold 
12
-4 Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1; 8&9 
Vic. cap.153, 1845, The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
12s Report of the provisional committee of the Inverness and Elgin Railway, Railway 
Chronicle, 8 March 1845, p.276: K Fenwick, 'Genesis of the Great North', Part 2, p.284. 
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scheme to leave the Inverness and Elgin line at Nairn and cross the Grampian 
mountains on a direct route to Perth and the south, avoiding the considerable detour 
via Aberdeen (table 21 ).126 
Table 21: Distances given to Parliament for the Great North and Perth and Inverness 
schemes, 1846 
Via the Perth and Inverness llne Via Aberdeen and the Great North llne 
Perth-Inverness 130 miles 197 miles 
Perth-Ela in 138 miles 160 miles 
Perth-Nairn 116 miles 181 miles 
source: Written evidence of Joseph Mitchell to the Parliamentary Select Committee, 1846, 
NAS/BR/PYB/S)/1/477/1 . 
Not surprisingly, support for rival schemes became polarised. The Inverness Courier 
announced: 'It is thus quite apparent that the local feeling is against our Aberdeen 
friends pushing their claims beyond Elgin'.127 The Perth and Inverness and Great 
North made an attempt to avoid an expensive parliamentary contest, but the tone of 
the conference between these rivals at Elgin in October 1845 indicated the depth of 
division. The Perth and Inverness offered 'the most favourable terms' to the Great 
North to use their line to Inverness if that company would stop at Elgin: the Great 
North responded: 
This was wholly out of the question as the Great North of Scotland would on 
no account surrender this part of the Coast line ... 128 
The Great North offered to allow the Perth and Inverness to build their own separate 
stations on their line against the advice of their own engineer. The final response of 
125 Prospectus of the Perth and Inverness Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1. 
127 Inverness Courier quoted in Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 7 January 1846, p.1083. 
12e Conference between the Great North of Scotland and Perth and Inverness Railway 
companies at Elgin, 21 October 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/2. 
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the Perth and Inverness committee, however, clearly set the parameters for future 
relationships between Inverness and Aberdeen: 
The line between Elgin and Inverness fell naturally to be under the 
management of parties interested in the Northern Counties and that the 
assumption of it by parties in Aberdeen was an Act of aggression ... 129 
The population of Inverness wanted control of railways to and from their town and 
defended that strategic principle resolutely throughout the remainder of the century. 
The issue of the validity of data drawn from subscription lists has already been 
raised in connection with early railways in Scotland.130 The surviving subscription 
lists for the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways are subject to the 
same caveats, but they provide a sharp contrast between the locations of scrip 
holders (tables 22 and 23). Mitchell recalled that the full 48,000 shares advertised in 
the Perth and Inverness prospectus were taken within a week of publication, 131 and 
the £1.2 million share capital of the prospectus was amended to £1.4 million in the 
published parliamentary bill.132 
129 Conference between the Great North of Scotland and Perth and Inverness Railway 
companies at Elgin, 21 October 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/2. 
130 w vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 17 (1970}, p.429; TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish 
railways before 1860 - a comment', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18 (1971), pp.213-
16. 
131 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, pp159-60, recorded that the 
first prospectus of the Perth and Inverness Railway was issued on 9 April 1845 and that the 
48 000 shares were subscribed within a week with £120,000 from deposits placed in the 
ba~k. Mitchell also noted (p.159) that 'It was deemed prudent to engage Mr Locke as our 
consulting engineer', which suggests that the promoters aimed to attract English interest 
Prospectus of the Perth and Inverness Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1. ' 
132 session 9&10 Vic., 1846, A Bill for making a Railway from Perth to Inverness with 
branches to Nairn to be called 'The Perth and Inverness Railway', NAS/BR/PYB(S}/1/477/1. 
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Table 22: Capital sources from the subscription list of the Perth and Inverness 
Railway, 1845-46 
£2Sshares Subscribers Proportion of Shares Proportion Avorago Value of 
subscribers allocated of shares shareholdlna shareholdlna 
English 535 38.3% 28754 58.8% 53.7 £1343 
addresses 
Scottish 862 61 .7% 20147 41 .2% 23.4 £ 585 
addresses 
Total 1397 48901 35.0 
Source: Law naners of the Perth and Inverness Railwav, 1845-46, NAS/BR/PYB(Sl/1/477/1 . 
£ 875 
Two-fifths of the Perth and Inverness subscribers had English addresses, but they 
held three-fifths of the shares allocated; the average English shareholding was over 
twice the shareholding of Scottish subscribers. This English proportion was smaller 
than that held in the cross-border railway companies, but the data supports the pre-
mania evidence identified earlier that English capital was attracted to main routes in 
Scotland. 133 Complaints were made in Edinburgh about the 'great amount of shares 
... given to parties in London, Liverpool, and other parts of England'.134 A large 
majority of the English subscribers were from London and its environs, while the 
Scots were principally from Inverness, Edinburgh and Glasgow, with some from 
Perth. The importance of banks in Scottish railway finance prior to 1845 has also 
been identified earlier. 135 One of the Perth and Inverness committee was Charles 
Waterston, appointed manager of the new Caledonian Bank formed in Inverness in 
1838, who subscribed £800 to the Inverness and Elgin and was to play a key role in 
the future Inverness web of railway companies. 136 
133 w vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.430; TR Gourvish 
and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', p.211. 
134 Scottish Railway Gazette, 19th April 1845, reporting dissatisfaction in Edinburgh over the 
allocation of Perth and Inverness shares, quoted in RH Campbell and JBA Dow, Source 
Book of Scottish Economic and Social History, pp.273-74. 
13s TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
p.216-17. 
136 cw Munn, 'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', in AJG Cummings and 
TM Devine (eds.), Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700 (Edinburgh, 1994), 
p.133: the Caledonian Bank, formed!" 1838 in Inverness, was one of the eight provincial 
joint-stock banks in Scotland ab~e to issue notes to a value of £53,000 within the £3,085,000 
note issue allowed for Scotland m 1845: SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-
1973 (Glasgow, 1975), p.349; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Ufe in the Highlands, vol.II, 
p.69: Mitchell was a promoter and director of the Caledonian Bank; Law papers of the 
Inverness and Elgin Railway, 1845-46, NAS/PYB(S)/1/477/3. 
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The subscription list for the allied Inverness and Elgin Railway shows a much more 
localised interest, substantiating the conclusions of Vamplew, Gourvish and Reed 
that Scottish capital financed local feeder lines.137 Nearly half of the subscribers 
lived in Inverness and three-fifths came from the district immediately served by the 
proposed line; just eleven had English addresses. Only fourteen subscribers offered 
£2000 or more, five of which were English - three from London and two from 
Liverpool. 
Table 23: Details of subscribers to the Inverness and Elgin Railway, 1845-46 
Inverness and Elain Railway 
District address of subscribers Shareholders with a Scottish 
address 
Number of subscribers 248 Number of subscribers 248 
Comorising: lncludlna: 
Inverness and Elain area 203 Inverness address 114* 
Other areas of Scotland 34 Elain address 5* 
England 11 Forres address 2* 
Nairn address 24* 
Dinawall address 13 
Beaulv address 2 
Total of all shares allocated £129160 Tain address 4 
Average shareholding: shares 26 shares Perth address 19 
Average shareholding: value £521 Edinburah address 12 
Value of each share £ 20 Prooortion in Inverness 46.0% 
Prooortion living on the route /*\ 58.5°k 
source: Law paoers of the Inverness and Elain Railwav, 1845-46 NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/3. 
This short local railway thus continued the earlier Scottish tradition of securing 
capital from small subscribers living in the immediate district of the proposed line, in 
contrast to the trunk line to the south which attracted over half its subscriptions from 
England. The average shareholding in the Inverness and Elgin was £521 compared 
to £875 in the Perth and Inverness line. 138 The contrast between English and 
Scottish interest in these two Inverness lines revives the question posed by Gourvish 
and Reed - why were the Scots prepared to finance local lines rather than cross-
border and trunk lines? The hypothesis must remain that it was due to the scale of 
137 w vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860- a reply', Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, 18 (1971), p.222; TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of 
Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment' , pp.218-19. 
138 Data from table 22 and table 23. 
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investment required in main routes and the perception of the immediate local 
benefits that each line would provide because, despite the increased interest in all 
railways due to the 1845 speculation, the English proportion of subscriptions in both 
Inverness companies was markedly different.139 This strong local element of capital, 
identified by Vamplew as important in the short, early Scottish lines, 140 remained a 
key feature of the later Inverness lines, as chapters 6 and 9 will show. 
The Great North of Scotland received applications for 75,000 shares even before the 
London and Glasgow lists were opened.141 Drawing upon the experience of its 
parent, the Aberdeen Railway, where there had been a shortfall of payments on 
shares allotted, the Great North's provisional committee allotted 27,776 shares 
instead of the 22,000 advertised in the prospectus 'so that deposits produce the sum 
of money required', but deposits were paid on 27,415 shares.142 The proposed 
share capital in the prospectus of £1.1 million was subsequently raised to £1.5 
million in the act of incorporation, which legitimised the committee's action.143 
Using bank loans for some of the deposits, a portion of stock was held back by the 
promoters for themselves, perhaps as a reserve given the over-allocation but leaving 
scope for speculative gain; Mitchell claimed this amount exceeded £300,000 and 
139 535 (38.3%} of subscribers to the Perth and Inverness Railway gave English addresses 
(table 22), but only 11 subscribers (4.4%} to the Inverness and Elgin Railway gave English 
addresses (table 23). 
140 w vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860' pp.428-30 and p.439. 
w Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1. p.24: 
the prospectus had advertised 22,000 shares at £50 each to raise share capital of £1.1 
million. 
142 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 April 1845 and 4 June 1845, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/1. p.26 and p.27; Aberdeen Journal, 9 April 1845, p.2, reporting that 200,000 
applications had been made for 22,000 Great North shares, quoted in JJ Waterman, The 
Coming of the Railway to Aberdeen In the 1840s, p.28; RC Michie, Money, Mania and 
Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth Century 
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1981), p.95, notes that the Aberdeen, Great North, Deeside and Alford 
Valley Railways were all oversubscribed 'by six or seven times' during the period of 
speculation. 
143 Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1846, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1; 9&10 
Vic. cap.103, 1846, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act, authorising share capital of 
£1,500,000 and borrowing powers of £500,000. 
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that eight directors alone subscribed for £170,000 of stock.1« Five directors and the 
manager of the North of Scotland Bank, who were also both Aberdeen and Great 
North Railway directors, held £82,500 of local railway stock in 1845, but, in the 
financial crisis of 1847-48 when the Bank lost over half its capital, it was discovered 
that bank funds had been drawn for Individual speculatlon without adequate 
security.145 When the share peak passed, these and other speculative holders not 
only were unable to realise any profit, they lacked funds to meet calls on shares and 
could not sell the stock at a price to recoup their outlay. Consequently, the Great 
North could not raise sufficient capital to begin construction until market conditions 
improved. The impact of these events on the development of the railway system to 
the north of Aberdeen is considered in Chapter 5. 
The 1845 Railway Board report had identified the sagacity of extending northwards 
from the Aberdeen Railway, thereby giving early indirect encouragement to 
Aberdeen-based schemes.146 When trading began, shares in the Great North 
showed an early substantial premium. By the time the select committee began 
hearing evidence in March 1846, share prices were lower, reflecting post-mania 
selling. Nevertheless, prices quoted for the Great North almost matched the amount 
already paid whereas shares in the Perth and Inverness were well below (table 24). 
1« Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 June 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1. p.27, 
reporting the allotment ~f ~7 ,776 shares a~d ~aymen~ of the deposit on 27,415 of these 
shares; J Mitchell, Remm,scences of My Life m the Highlands, vol. II, p.168; M Barclay-
Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway {London, 2nd edition 1949, reprinted 
Shepperton, 1998), p.6. 
145 A Keith, The North of Scotland Bank Ltd, 1836-1936 (Aberdeen, 1936), pp.49-51, 
showing £60,000 of local railway stock was held in 1845 in the names of North of Scotland 
bank directors Adam, Anderson, T Blaikie, Jopp and Thompson (all holding both Aberdeen 
and Great North Railway directorships) and £22,500 in the name of Paterson, manager of the 
Bank {also a director of both the Aberdeen and Great North Railways); A Keith, A Thousand 
Years of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, 1972), p.475; see also chapter 4, table 27, showing Aberdeen 
directorships. 
146 Board of Trade report on Schemes for extending Railway Communication in Scotland, 
1845, paragraph 72. 
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Table 24: Share prices quoted for the Great North of Scotland, Perth and Inverness, 
and Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1845-46 
Exchanae Great North of Scotland lnvemeH and Elaln Perth and lnverneH Date 
£50 shares (£2.10s paid] £20 shares 1£1 oaldi £25 shares 1£2 10a oaldl 
27.09.1845 Liveroool £4 Os Od £1 12s Gd n/a 
08.10.1845 Liverpool £4 5s Od £117s 6d n/a 
01 .11 .1845 Liveroool £417s Gd £1 10s Od n/a 
31.12.1845 Liveroool £4 Os Od n/a n/a 
21 .01 .1846 Liverpool £4 Os Od £2 5s Od (£2 now paid) n/a 
Manchester £4 Os Od n/a 
04.02.1846 Liverpool £4 Os Od £2 5s Od n/a 
Manchester £4 Os Od n/a n/a 
Glasaow n/a n/a £1 13s Od 
21.02.1846 Edinburgh £6 4s 6d n/a £1 16s Od 
Glasaow n/a nla £1 15s Gd 
28.03.1846 Liverpool £210s Od £1 10s Od n/a 
Manchester £2 10s Od £1 10s Od n/a 
08.04.1846 Glasaow £2 7s 6d £1 10s Od £1 5s Od 
09.05.1846 Glasgow n/a £1 2s Od £1 11s 6d 
Liveroool £2 7s 6d n/a n/a 
16.05.1846 Edinburgh n/a £1 Os Gd n/a 
Liveroool £2 7s 6d n/a n/a 
source: Bradshaw's Railway Gazette. vol.I, 1845, and vol.II, 1846. 
Early in 1846, the Aberdeen, Banff and Elgin company was weakened by legal 
argument over its finances and the loss of its northern partner following the 
amalgamation of the Inverness and Elgin with the Perth and lnverness.147 Both 
Inverness company bills, however, were rejected by the select committee on 12 May 
1846. The Aberdeen, Banff and Elgin bill was withdrawn the next day after the 
select committee intimated that· ... they could not view it favourably, as it was not a 
through line', whereupon the Great North's bill was approved unopposed.148 That 
decision not only realised the Railway Board's intimation of a continuous railway 
route through Aberdeen to Inverness, but the state, in effect, awarded a new and 
large transport monopoly to Aberdeen, because the Deeside, the Alford Valley, and 
the Great North of Scotland (Eastern Extension) Railways were also authorised in 
the same parliamentary session. This new railway network and its shared web of 
management are examined in the following chapter. 
147 Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 24 January 1846, p.134: Railway Times, 18 April, 1846, 
p.557. 
145 Railway Times, 16 May 1846, p.697; Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 16 May 1846, p.1 054; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 July 1846, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, p.99. 
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The state's decision to approve the Great North's scheme left a highly significant 
legacy that was to have a profound effect on the development of the northern railway 
system over the next two decades. In rejecting the Perth and Inverness bill because 
of 'the severe gradients of considerable length over great altitudes', the Committee 
emphasised that they were not 'giving any opinion against the formation of the Perth 
and Inverness line' should later experience of working railways show its feasibility: 
Neither is it the intention of the Committee in any way to prejudice the 
question - whether if a line be constructed from Aberdeen to Inverness, the 
northern counties of Scotland are not entitled to the benefit of a second line 
from Perth to Nairn.149 
The Inverness companies were wound up; the Perth and Inverness was able to 
repay two-thirds of the deposit paid on shares, although some funds were retained 
from the Inverness and Elgin.160 The state had left open the option of a direct route 
to the highland capital and the Inverness promoters continued to plan to acquire 
control of railways in their district. The sharp division now apparent in aspirations 
and policy between Inverness and Aberdeen was to dominate the future strategic 
planning of railways in the north. 
The foundations of development 
The framework of a Scottish railway system was set by 1846 and this chapter has 
shown that the state, whilst preserving its ideological mantle of free enterprise, 
played an appreciable role in its conception. The 1839-41 Smith-Barlow 
commission triggered the competitive drive that saw three cross-border routes open 
149 Report of the House of Commons Select Committee Group 4, published in Railway 
Times, 16 May 1846, pp.697-98. 
150 Railway Times, 27 July 1846, p.1017; Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 6 
October 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.18, recording the release of 'unappropriated funds of the 
Inverness and Elgin Railway' for the new Inverness and Nairn promotion and agreed by 
Charles Waterston, bank manager of the Caledonian Bank in Inverness, In his capacity as 
one of the two trustees of the funds. 
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within the decade. The Railway Board's 1845 report to Parliament presented the 
blueprint for a Scottish railway network and, by accepting the recommendations of 
that report, Parliament saw competition propel the creation of the substantial network 
of lines that it had approved. 
The intensity of competition and the scale and speed of development, however, 
contributed to the insolvency of the Caledonian Railway in 1849, which required 
state authorisation of its financial restructuring. The Caledonian experience not only 
contributes indicators of the financial structure and performance of a new large-scale 
enterprise, but its accounts confirm the significant involvement of banks in Scottish 
railway finance at this time. Records of the potential Inverness allies of the 
Caledonian in 1845-46 provide evidence of the importance of English capital in trunk 
lines of this period and the reliance on local capital to finance local lines, which lends 
support to the historiographical view of the sources of railway capital for earlier 
Scottish lines outlined in the previous chapter, although subject to the same caution 
concerning the validity of subscription contract data. These records also indicate the 
early emergence of strategic planning in the north to ensure that control of projected 
railway networks was held locally, a policy principle that was to remain paramount 
throughout the century. 
Without the logic and influence of the Railway Board's report, it is unlikely that any 
over-view of an inter-linked Scottish network could have been presented within the 
legislative maelstrom of 1845-46. Parliament had a long and consistent tradition of 
reacting to events, rather than planning for them. The volume of railway legislation 
required some executive guidance to Parliament; it would have been surprising had 
Parliament rejected that advice, even though it represented some interference in free 
enterprise. Nevertheless, as the next chapter shows, the Railway Board's stated 
objective in 1845 of achieving a northern trunk route was accomplished by 1850, but 
with contrasting financial fortunes for the three companies that constructed it and a 
profound disintegration of northern railway alliances in its aftermath. 
To suggest that the legislature provided the impetus for this far-sighted piece of 
strategic railway planning would be untenable, but the state's executive was given 
the very brief opportunity in 1845 to influence the shape of the Scottish railway 
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system. Its officers seized that chance and subsequent events demonstrated the 
impact of their work. Where difficulties arose in enactment of the state's blueprint, it 
reflected a lack of entrepreneurial skill within the companies once they were 
formed151 rather than any strategic weakness in its design. The conclusion is 
therefore drawn that the development of the Scottish railway system was assisted 
fundamentally by this intervention of the state. 
1s1 CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
Company'. p.1; J Butt and JT Ward, 'The promotion of the Caledonian Railway Company', 
Transport History, 3, No.3 (November 1970), p.249. 
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Chapter 4: Aberdeen and the northern trunk route, 1845-56 
The continuous route from the Anglo-Scottish border north to Aberdeen formed the 
centre-piece of the state's plan for a Scottish railway system. This chapter 
investigates the financial difficulties encountered by the three independent 
companies authorised to construct the Stirling-Aberdeen section of this route, which 
was the first stage in the realisation of a northern railway system. 1 The widespread 
inaccuracies in the estimation of costs for railways and the extent of the English 
influence in Scottish main line railways were discussed in the opening chapter; both 
themes run throughout this chapter. The first section focuses on the strategic 
direction and financial management of the Scottish Central and Scottish Midland 
Junction Railways between 1845 and 1856 and, in particular, it shows the sound 
financial structure of the latter which serves as an exemplar in the study. The severe 
financial adversities of the third company on the northern route, the Aberdeen 
Railway, present a stark contrast in the next section of the chapter, which covers the 
period up to its full opening in 1850. This section also reveals the monopoly web of 
railways that the state authorisations of 1845-46 created in the Aberdeen area. The 
significance of the disintegration of this railway web in 1848-49 and the importance 
of the English authority within it, which had long-lasting consequences for the further 
development of a northern railway system, are considered in the following section. 
The final section identifies the burden of debt accumulated by the Aberdeen Railway 
and examines how the company achieved its slow financial recovery between 1849 
and 1856 before its amalgamation with the Scottish Midland Junction. 
The route to the north: the Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction 
Railways 
The west-coast route to the north was extended from a junction with the Caledonian 
Railway at Greenhill, west of Falkirk in the central valley, running over the Scottish 
1 8&9 Vic. cap.161, 1845, The Scottish Central Railway Act; 8&9 Vic. cap.170, 1845, The 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway Act; 8&9 Vic. cap.153, 1845, The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
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Central Railway through Stirling to Perth where an end-on junction was made with 
the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, which took the line north-eastwards to Forfar. 
From Forfar, the route briefly used the line of the Arbroath and Forfar Railway to 
Friockheim, passing there onto the Aberdeen Railway, which also leased the 
Arbroath and Forfar from 1848 and thereby preserved future options for west-coast 
and east-coast outlets from Aberdeen to the south. 2 
Map 4: The northern trunk route to Aberdeen, 1846-50 
Aviemore■ 
SCR 
The route to the North: 
A&F: Arbroath and Forfar Railway 
AR: Aberdeen Railway 
CR: Caledonian Railway 
SCR: Scottish Central Railway 
SMJR: Scottish Midland Junction Railway 
Other railways: 
D&A: Dundee and Arbroath Railway 
E&G: Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway 
E&N: Edinburgh and Northern Railway 
GP&G: Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway 
GPK&A: Glasgow, Paisley and Kilmarnock Railway 
NBR: North British Railwav 
2 N Ferguson, The Arbroath and Forfar Railway (Usk, 2000), p.51. 
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The use by the Aberdeen Railway of the Arbroath and Forfar's route via Friockheim 
and the proposed junction at Forfar prompted the Scottish Midland Junction to seek 
its own parliamentary legislation in 1846 to build a line north through Brechin in 
competition with the Aberdeen Railway, claiming an earlier agreement to follow such 
a route had been broken, but its bill was rejected.3 The Aberdeen chairman 
reassured shareholders: 
The Aberdeen Railway Company are thus left in possession of the whole 
important district of country through which their line passes.4 
The collapse of railway speculation in 1845-46 did not stop the immediate surge of 
competition to secure control of the northern trunk route. Of the three companies, the 
pivotal strategic position of the Scottish Central attracted the Immediate attention of 
larger railway coalitions, as the previous chapter has shown, although the economic 
reality of the operation of these lines soon dissipated the enthusiasm of the larger 
southern companies. The Scottish Railway Gazette noted 'The Scottish railways 
were, like the Scottish moors, becoming a hunting ground for England' .5 
In October 1846, the Central agreed to accept a 7 percent lease plus half of any 
surplus profits from the Caledonian and the west-coast alliance.8 The Edinburgh 
3 Published minute of the subcommittee of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 20 
November 1844, reporting an earlier agreement with the Aberdeen Railway on the route via 
Brechin and stating an intention to apply for parliamentary powers for their own line if the 
Aberdeen Railway implemented an agreement with the Arbroath and Forfar Railway made on 
13 May 1844 to build the connection at Friockheim; Minutes of a meeting of the 
Subcommittee of the Aberdeen Railway, 15 November 1844, NAS/PROS(S)/1 /1, refuting the 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway's claim of a breach of faith; JJ Waterman, The Coming of 
the Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s (Aberdeen, 1975), p.5. 
4 Report of Special General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 May 1846, 
NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/36. 
5 Scottish Railway Gazette, 21 November 1846, quoted in WVamplew, 'Sources of Scottish 
railway share capital before 1860', p.431. 
6 Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, 21 October 1846, NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p.281; 
Statement of the Scottish Central Railway Board to shareholders, 7 April 184 7, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /35. 
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and Glasgow Railway, with a continuous link to the North British Railway and the 
east-coast route, responded in May 1847 with a 9 percent offer, which caused 
fractures within the Central boardroom.7 In July 1847, Scottish Central shareholders 
received 'conflicting opinions of counsel' over the legality of the Caledonian lease 
and, attracted by this higher offer from the Edinburgh and Glasgow, they rejected the 
west-coast agreement 'by the proxies of absent shareholders'.8 While legal 
argument continued, the Scottish Central and the Scottish Midland Junction made a 
working agreement in 1847 whereby the Central would work both lines once opened 
in 1848.9 Parliament rejected the Caledonian lease bill,10 but a working agreement 
with the west-coast companies was finalised in January 1849.11 The Caledonian, 
however, was already descending into financial chaos, as the previous chapter has 
shown, and its shareholders established an inquiry in September 1849.12 The 
investigating committee acknowledged the importance of a northerly alliance, but 
concluded that the agreement had been made without the approval of shareholders 
and was designed to evade the parliamentary act requiring authorisation of such 
arrangements.13 The committee identified that the revenue of the Scottish Central 
7 Report of the Special General Meeting of the Scottish Central Railway, 20 July 184 7, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/1, p. 368, and 20 August 1847, p.426; also report to shareholders to the 
Special General Meeting of the Scottish Central Railway, 20 July 1847, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35. 
8 Report of the Special General Meeting of the Scottish Central Railway, 20 July 1847, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35. 
i Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, 15 September 1847, NAS/BR/SCC/1/1. p.433. 
10 Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, 3 July 1848, NAS/BR/SCC/1/2, p.52, reporting 
rejection of the Caledonian lease bill but a new proposal for a joint lease of the Scottish 
Central by the Caledonian and Edinburgh and Glasgow Railways. 
11 Report of Investigation Committee of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 19 
April 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, p.1, giving the _date of the contra~ for the working 
agreement as 3 January 1849; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian 
Railway, 27 September 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3; Report of the Committee of Investigation 
to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, p.6; Bradshaw's 
Railway Almanack, 1850, p.130; PF Marshall, The Scottish Central Railway (Witney, 1998), 
p.103. 
12 Report of the Committee of l~~estigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 
1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, p.1, giving the date of the establishment of the committee as 27 
September 1849. 
13 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, p.6; 8&9 Vic. cap. 96, 1845, An Act to restrict the 
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was insufficient to cover the costs of the agreement and advised shareholders to 
oppose a new Caledonian lease bill, which included the Edinburgh and Glasgow as 
a partner to remove previous opposition.14 
The Scottish Central resumed operation of its own services from December 1849 
when the working agreement collapsed.15 The Central informed its shareholders of 
'the refusal' of the west-coast alliance companies to fulfil the working agreement of 
January 1849 and sought their response. 18 The Central shareholders set up an 
investigation into the affairs of their own company, which reported that: 
The Southern Companies had been warned that the first fruits of the contract 
would not be abundant, but it would seem as if they had no sooner 
succeeded in their object, than they became dissatisfied.17 
powers of selling or leasing Railways contained in certain Acts of Parliament relating to such 
railways. 
14 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 1849, NAS/BR/CAU1/98, pp.6-7; Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, 3 July 
1848, NAS/BR/SCC/1/2 , p.52, announcing rejection of the previous lease bill in Parliament 
and a new proposal for a joint lease of the Scottish Central by the Caledonlan and the 
Edinburgh and Glasgow Railways; Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1849, p.81, recording the 
proposal for receipts under a lease of the Scottish Central to be shared between the 
Caledonian ( ¾ ) and the Edinburgh and Glasgow ( ¼ ), and 1850, p.130; PF Marshall, The 
Scottish Central Railway, pp.78-79. 
15 PF Marshall, The Scottish Central Railway, p.104: the Caledonian had offered to pay its 
share of traffic receipts to the Scottish Central at £500 per week, but it had been unable to 
fulfill its promise. Furthermore, the southern companies announced that they were to 
withdraw from working Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction services after 30 
November 1849. 
18 Report of the Special General Meeting of the Scottish Central Railway, 22 January 1851, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/2, at which shareholders were asked' ... what measures ought to be adopted 
by this Company i~ consequence of t~e refu~al of the Lo~don and ~orth Western, the 
Lancaster and Carlisle and the Caledonian Railway Companies to continue the working of 
the Scottish Central line, and fulfill the other obligations undertaken in the Working 
Agreement entered into with this Company in January 1849'. 
17 Report of the Investigation Committe~ of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 
19 April 1850, NAS/BR/SCC/1/2, p.2 of inserted report. 
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The investigation revealed the scale of inaccurate estimates. Expenditure and 
liabilities due for the Central's line were £1,494,745, three-quarters more than the 
estimate of £850,000, which suggest a realised capital cost of £31,803 per mile, 
comparable to the average for all Scottish lines, but almost double the parliamentary 
estimate of under £19,000 per mile.18 Costs and liabilities for land of £236,232 
soared above the £80,000 estimate and the committee castigated the company for 
not securing settlements before gaining parliamentary authorisation, a lesson that 
was not lost on later promoters in lnverness.19 Shareholders also criticised the 
award of the construction contract to Thomas Brassey without competition. The 
Central's purchase of the Tay ferries, intended to restrict any eastern competition, 
was judged 'not a wise purchase for a party whose interest could only be remote' 
and a sale at a 'fair price' was recommended.20 The Scottish Central was not, 
however, in the same financial straits as its Caledonian lessee. The investigating 
committee reminded shareholders: 
. . . your central position and influence are strong . . . Connected with four lines 
of Railways, your Line occupies a position in the midst of them; and you have 
the only continuous land approach to the North and East of Scotland.21 
18 Report of the Investigation Committee of the _Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 
19 April 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, pp.3-4 of inserted report, noting Locke and Errington's 
estimate for the line at £800,000 which had been amended in the parliamentary act to 
£850,000, although the 1844 prospectus (NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/16) had suggested capital of 
£700,000 would be required; Appendix, table 19(a): the actual capital cost per mile by 
January 1850 was £31,573, 74.6% above estimate; CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway 
Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway Company', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 
197 4 ), p.2, quoting average costs per mile in 1851 of £32, 113 per mile in Scotland and 
£38,258 per mile in England. 
19 Report of the Investigation Committee of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 
19 April 1850, NAS/BR/SCC/1/2 and NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35: company accounts, however, 
show land costs reaching £166,211 by July 1851, a year after the inquiry report, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35 and Appendix, table 19(a); see chapter 6 'The Inverness web' for 
examples of land negotiation by Inverness promoters. 
20 Report of the Investigation Committee of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway. 
19 April 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, p.12 of inserted report. 
21 Report of the Investigation Committee of the Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 
19 April 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35, p.14 of Inserted report. 
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The Central board was replaced, but out-going directors branded the report an 
'unfair and uncandid statement'. Their reply claimed that the excess of expenditure 
was £337,429, not the £644,745 reported, although this lower figure was still 40 
percent above estimate. 22 
The investigating committee recommended an attempt to resolve the differences 
with the west-coast companies, but the Central's overtures met no success.23 The 
Scottish Central remained an independent company, albeit with a working 
agreement with the Scottish Midland Junction. The withdrawal of the Caledonian 
pushed the Central towards alliance with the Edinburgh and Glasgow, but the larger 
companies were by now much more reluctant to offer guarantees. The east-coast 
alliance offered mileage bonuses to the Edinburgh and Glasgow and Scottish 
Central, principally to secure access to Glasgow to compete with the west-coast 
companies for Anglo-Scottish traffic.24 Traffic for Glasgow and the north of Scotland 
was subsequently included in the 1856 English-Scotch traffic agreement between 
west- and east-coast alliances.25 
The Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction lines opened in 1848, but the 
most northerly section to Aberdeen was not completed until 1850. Until then, traffic 
passing over the route was largely local. Nevertheless, the relative performance of 
both the Central and the Midland Junction companies was stronger than that of the 
Caledonian. The Central maintained a positive balance on its capital account until 
1849 when the account slipped into deficit by 3.4 percent and £60,000 was borrowed 
22 Statement by 'The Members of the late Board of Direction of the Scottish Central Railway 
Company', noted at the Ordinary General Meeting, 26 April 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35. 
23 Report of Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Central Railway, 11 October 1850, 
NAS/BR/SCC/1/2, p.270. 
24 G Channon, 'Railway Pooling in Britain before 1900: The Anglo-Scottish traffic", Business 
History Review, 62, No.1 (Spring 1988), p. 79. 
25 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940 (Aldershot, 2001), 
p.113; PS Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy, 1842-1922 (London, 
1968), pp.251-53 and p.260. The traffic agreement was replaced by an English and Scottish 
rates conference in 1869. 
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from the Perth Banking Company.26 Additional capital powers were granted in 
1851.27 Despite the inaccuracy of the estimates, the Central's land costs by 1851 
were 10.9 percent of capital expenditure, slightly lower than the earlier Scottish inter-
urban tines.28 There is no evidence of any hidden debt in the accounts that survive; 
interest was paid from revenue and, by 1853, debt gearing Indicated a sound 
financial structure.29 
The Scottish Central's revenue account illustrates why the west-coast companies 
were reluctant to continue the working agreement.30 In 1849, the revenue balance 
yielded only two-thirds of the half-year payment due from the west-coast alliance. 11 
Once the Scottish Central resumed operating the services in December 1849, 
working expenditure rose,32 but the company was financially sound with the prospect 
of revenue growth because all northern traffic passed over its route. While early 
operations demonstrated that the traffic did not justify the high guarantees offered, 
the Central restored a dividend in 1850 and produced shareholder returns above 
those of its two larger suitors (table 25). 
2s Appendix, table 19{a); CW Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies 1747-1864 
(Edinburgh, 1981), p.209, notes that the Scottish Central borrowed a further £18,000 from the 
Perth Banking Company in May 1850, both loans secured against debentures. 
27 14 Vic. cap.25, 1851, The Scottish Central Railway Amendment Act, which increased 
authorised share capital by £250,000, which could be by preference stock not exceeding 5%, 
but the Increase In authorised borrowing was limited to £16,000. 
28 Appendix, table 19( a): land costs by 1851 were £166,211, lower than the costs and 
liabilities of £236,232 projected by the Investigation Committee in 1850, although not all 
claims may have been settled by this date; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish 
Railway System 1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 170-73. 
29 Appendix, table 19(c): loans represented 25.3% of capital raised in 1853 and 24.8% in 
1854; debt gearing strengthened from 0.254 in July 1853 to 0.264 in January 1854, well 
above the 1849 Caledonian benchmark of 0.162. 
30 Appendix, table 19(a) note (2) and table 19(b). 
31 Appendix, table 19(b): the net revenue balance for the half-year to 31 July 1849 after 
working expenses and interest were deducted was £23,995, but the half year payment due 
from the west-coast companies was £35,700, a shortfall of 32.8%. 
32 Appendix, table 19(b ), showing working expenses for the half year to 31 January 1850 to 
be £16,980, but £18,182 for the following six months to July 1850, a rise of 7.1%. 
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Table 25: Dividends paid by the Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Rallways, 
1849-56 
Year Half Scottish Central Scottish Midland Edinburgh and Caledonlan Railway 
vear Junction Glaaaow 
Dividends oald half-vearlv on £100 par value of ordinary stock In each comoanv 
1848 Julv Ooened 1848 Opened 1848 3.0.0 Ooened 1848 
1849 Jan 3.10.0 (2) - (3) 3.0.0 1.10.0 
Julv 3.10.0 (2) - (3) 2.0.0 0.0.0 
1850 Jan 0.0.0 - 110.0 0.0.0 
Julv 0.0.0 - 1.5.0 0.0.0. 
1851 Jan 1.0.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 0.0.0 
Julv 0.12.0 0.0.0 1.10.0 0.0.0 
1852 Jan 1.8.0 0.15.0 1.10.0 0.5.0 
July 1.10.0 0.17.6 1.10.0 0.6.0 
1853 Jan 2.0.0 1.2.6 1.10.0 1.5.0 
Julv 2.0.0 1.2.6 1.10.0 1.0.0. 
1854 Jan 2.0.0 1.5.0 1.10.0 1.10.0 
Julv 2.0.0 1.7.6 1.10.0 1.10.0 
1855 Jan 2.10.0 1.10.0 1.10.0 1.10.0 
Julv 2.10.0 1.15.0 1.10.0 1.10.0 
1856 Jan 2.10.0 1.15.0 1.0.0 1.0.0 
Julv 2.10.0 1.15.0 1.0.0 0.10.0. 
Sources: Railway Times, 20 September 1662, pp.1399-1402; Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1858 
edition nn.101-109. 
(1): Units are given in pounds, shillings and pence and for each half year. 
(2): The £3.1 Os payment by the Scottish Central corresponds to the 7% guarantee specified in the 
agreement with the west-coast companies. The workin~ agreement was finalised in January 1849, but 
the arrangement collapsed by the end of the year following the Caledonlan's shareholder inquiry of 
September 1849. 
(3): Although a 6% lease guarantee was approved by the Scottish Midland Junction board on 6 June 
1848, the Caledonian did not begin working services until January 1849. No dividend for the Scottish 
Midland Junction is shown in Railway Times or Bradshaw's Railway Almanack until 1652, which suggests 
a default in the guaranteed payment due for the first half year of 1849. Scottish Midland Junction minute 
books do not survive orior to October 1850 and no dividend is recorded for Januarv and Julv 1851 . 
The Scottish Midland Junction Railway furnished the intermediate section in the tri-
partite link to Aberdeen; its accounts show a financially stable and relatively 
prosperous company. Although it was worked by other companies from the outset, 33 
it produced modest but steady returns. While approximately 30 percent of initial 
subscriptions in the Scottish Central came from England, the Scottish Midland 
Junction, which crossed a rural area where local capital was scarce, attracted 78 
percent, boosted by the offer to English subscribers that deposits would be returned 
if the company's bill was rejected.34 Both companies used Locke and Errington of 
33 Minutes of the Scottish Central Railway, 15 September 1847, NAS/BR/SCC/1/1. p.433, 
recording details of the working agreement between the Scottish Central and Scottish 
Midland Junction railways; Report of the directors to an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the 
Caledonian Railway held to approve the Scottish Central and Scottish Midland working 
agreements, 10 November 1848, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, p.5, which included the proposed 
guarantee of 6% to the Scottish Midland Junction Railway. 
34 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.334; W 
vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', Scottish Journal of Political 
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the west-coast alliance as its engineers, thereby assisting the attraction of blind 
investment capital.35 
The Scottish Midland recognised the potential of the 1846 Perth-Inverness scheme 
and agreed to cede their proposed Dunkeld branch and grant use of the Midland line 
into Perth to the promoters if the bill was successful.36 Although the Perth and 
Inverness bill failed in Parliament, the Scottish Midland planned the Dunkeld branch 
to link with the Strathtay and Breadalbane Railway, authorised in 1846 but left 
isolated by the rejection of the Inverness scheme.37 The directors reported the 
potential of the branch as part of a northern trunk route: 
A very few miles of railway are all that are necessary for uniting the Midland 
Branch with that Line ... and a Local Line extended northwards to Pitlochry, 
Economy, 17 (1970), p.431; RC Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company 
Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1981), p.84: 
quoting contemporary reports of 1 November 1844 and 6 December 1844 in the Dundee 
Advertiser that there was 'scant support in the local area' for the Scottish Midland Junction 
Railway and that 'the assistance of English investors was regarded as the only way of raising 
finance to construct the line'; MC Reed, The London and North Western Railway: a history 
(Penryn, 1996), p.51: The London and North Western Railway held £90,000 of Scottish 
Midland Junction Railway capital in 1848-49 in addition to its commitment to sharing, with the 
Lancaster and Carlisle and Caledonian, the 7 percent guarantee to the Scottish Central 
Railway. 
35 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.194; W 
vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', p.431 noting 'as the mania 
gathered momentum, Scottish lines e~erywhere sought English capital . . . English engineers 
with a reputation for railways were deliberately employed as consultants because English 
investors would have heard of them'. 
36 Report to the 2nd Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 22 
February 1846, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37; 9&10 Vic. cap.75, 1846, The Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway Branches Act, which authorised branches to Dunkeld, Blairgowrie and 
Kirriemuir and raised company capital by £300,000 with additional borrowing powers of 
£100,000: previous capital powers under 8&9 Vic. cap.170 of 1845 had been fixed as 
£300,000 with borrowing powers of £100,000. 
37 Railway Chronicle, 31 July 1847, p.727, reporting a bill promoted by the Strathtay and 
Breadalbane Railway to extend its 1846 authorised line to meet the Scottish Midland Junction 
Railway at Dunkeld with additional capital of £150,000 shares and £50,000 borrowing 
powers. No calls had been made on the original 4800 shares of £50 each 'as proceeding are 
at a stand-still until the bill for an extension, now before Parliament, has passed'; see also 
chapter 3, table 20(c}. 
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. . . which, besides opening up the district, would be a step towards the 
Inverness scheme.38 
That scheme was not progressed but, in 1852, the Midland Junction proposed to 
build three branches to secure wider district traffic, one of which was to Dunkeld. 39 
Land costs were a principal consideration: the eight-mile branch to Dunkeld was 
estimated to cost £6,500 per mile, but the directors informed shareholders that if 
'land cannot be acquired on reasonable terms, then they would not recommend the 
Branches to be made'.40 
In December 1852, the Dunkeld bill was withdrawn because of large demands for 
land compensation.41 However, planning for a Dunkeld line continued in apparent 
harmony with promoters in Inverness who were reviving their scheme for a route 
south. The Scottish Midland Junction was advised of the preferred route to Dunkeld 
'as the best for a through line to the north' .42 The Inverness scheme had to wait 
another eight years, but plans for a Dunkeld branch were implemented by the 
independent Perth and Dunkeld Railway, incorporated in 1854 and worked by the 
Scottish Midland Junction."~ The strategic role of this small company in the future 
direct route to the north is examined in chapter 7. 
Following the collapse of the west-coast lease of the Scottish Central and Scottish 
Midland Junction Railways, a wider local alliance was formed. The Aberdeen 
38 Report to the 3rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 26 
August 1846, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37. 
39 Powers to build these branches to Dunkeld, Blairgowrie and Kirriemuir had been included 
in 9&10 Vic. cap.75, 1846, The Scottish Midland Junction Railway Branches Act, which 
doubled the company's authorised capital to £600,000 with £200,000 borrowing powers. 
40 Report to the half-year Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 
6 September, 1852, NAS/BR/SCM/1/1, pp.250-51, at which the directors reported: 'From the 
peculiar situation of the Midland Line, very little of the Traffic from Dunkeld, Blairgowrie or 
Kirriemuir passes over it, although the traffic was expected to form an important item in the 
Revenue of the Company ... The length of the Dunkeld Line is eight miles ... about £6,500 
per mile'. 
" 1 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 28 December 1852, p.290. 
42 Report by Neil Robson CE received by the Scottish Midland Junction Railway board, 26 
August 1853, NAS/BR/SCM/1/1, p.362. The Inverness plans are examined in chapter 6. 
43 17&18 Vic. cap.148, 1854, The Perth and Dunkeld Railway Ad. 
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Railway opened throughout in 1850 and a working agreement was established from 
February 1851, initially for twelve months, whereby the Scottish Central worked the 
services over the Central, Midland Junction and Aberdeen lines to achieve 
economies for the benefit of all three companies."" By January 1853, amalgamation 
between the Central and Midland Junction was proposed, stimulated by implied 
criticism of the working agreement by a parliamentary select committee.45 A joint 
committee of the two companies recommended a working agreement for 21 years 
under one committee of management."6 Receipts were to be divided with three-
quarters passing to the Central and one-quarter to the Midland Junction, but 
parliamentary approval was not obtained and the joint-purse agreement ceased from 
July 1854.47 
Relations between the Scottish Midland Junction and the Scottish Central became 
strained as the Central formed a closer alliance with the Edinburgh and Glasgow and 
began to direct southern traffic via that company to the detriment of the west-coast 
companies. The Scottish Midland entered a traffic agreement with the Aberdeen 
Railway and the west-coast companies, but the Scottish Central announced that they 
'consider all traffic brought to their line to be their traffic and will dispose of it as they 
please', thus suggesting their intention to divert traffic over the Edinburgh and 
44 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 25 February 1851, NAS/BR/SCM/1 /1. 
p.36, setting out the 23 clauses of the working agreement; Report of Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 18 March 1851, NAS/BR/SCM/1/1, pp.54-
55, and giving a commencement date of 11 February 1851 for the working agreement for one 
year initially. 
45 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 11 January 1853, NAS/BR/SCM/1/1, 
p.292, and 17 March 1853, p.301, reporting criticism of the working agreement contained in 
the appendix of the report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Railway and Canal Bills, 
1853. 
46 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 19 December 1853, NAS/BR/SCM/1/1, 
pp.413-14, recording t~e rec~mmendatio,n of th~ joint co~mittee of the Scottish Central and 
Scottish Midland Junction Railways for ... a B111 to legalise what has been done under the 
present working agreement and_ ta empower the Companies ta enter into an agreement ta 
work together under one Committee of Management for a period not exceeding twenty one 
years and recommend their Companies to put their receipts in to a common purse'. 
47 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 12 September 1854, NAS/BR/SCM/1 /3 
p.36, and report of the Ordinary General Meeting, 13 September 1854, p.48. ' 
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Glasgow.48 The Caledonian and its English allies indicated that they might 'in self 
defence be compelled to injure the Northern Lines' but agreed to meet any losses 
incurred in the impending traffic war.49 A temporary agreement was rapidly made to 
avoid conflict, but with lasting damage to relationships. 50 The Scottish Central gave 
notice that the working agreement would expire in August 1855, prompting the 
Midland Junction and the Aberdeen to investigate joint working of their lines.61 That 
investigation swiftly developed into a proposed amalgamation with a common purse, 
net of expenses, divided in the proportion of 70:30 between the Aberdeen and 
Midland Junction companies. Significantly, each company was to retain 
responsibility for its own debts, a clause that was to have a long-lasting effect 
because the Scottish Midland was able to continue paying dividends to its 
shareholders while the Aberdeen Railway, burdened with large debts, battled to pay 
even guaranteed dividends. 52 
A temporary working arrangement was begun in August 1855 pending legislation.63 
In May 1856, the Scottish Midland Junction agreed formally to amalgamate with the 
Aberdeen as the Scottish North-Eastern Railway.54 The Aberdeen had already 
leased the Arbroath and Forfar Railway in 1848 at 5¼ percent, using part of that line 
48 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 31 January 1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1 /3, 
pp.108-11. 
49 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 31 January 1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1/3, 
pp.108-11. 
50 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 28 February 1855, p.122 and 13 March 
1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1 /3, p.126. 
51 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 14 May 1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1/3, p.149. 
52 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 6 June 1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1/3, p.158. 
63 Report of Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 15 
September, 1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1/3, pp.190-97. 
54 Special General Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 10 May 1856, 
NAS/BR/SMJ/1/3, pp.275-82; Railway Times, 29 September 1855, p.1055, reporting the 
approval of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway to amalgamate with the 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway and noting that the Aberdeen directors held 'one-sixth of 
the whole of the shares' of the Aberdeen Railway; 19&20 Vic. cap.134, 1856, The Scottish 
North-Eastern Railway Company's Act, authorising the amalgamation of the Aberdeen and 
Scottish Midland Junction Railways. 
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for its northern route.55 A proposed Aberdeen lease of the Dundee and Arbroath 
Railway to secure an eastern outlet to Dundee was removed from the amalgamation 
bill when Dundee and Arbroath shareholders rejected their board's advice for 
acceptance, and a union was not finally achieved until 1863. 58 
Aided by an early increase in its capital powers in 1846,57 the Scottish Midland 
Junction maintained a positive balance on its capital account and held no significant 
temporary debt. 53 Only 1. 7 percent of shares remained unissued by August 1849 
with 89.6% of capital paid up.59 Although costs were reported to have exceeded 
estimates in 1849, 80 the excess over authorised capital by 1851 was 7 .1 percent and 
authorised loans therefore formed a low proportion of total capital raised.81 
55 N Ferguson, The Arbroath and Forfar Railway, p.51; Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1850, 
noting the 1848 lease and the option for the Aberdeen Railway to merge with the Arbroath 
and Forfar after five years. 
56 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 6 June 1855, NAS/BR/SCM/1/3. p.158; 
and 21 January 1856, p.232-33; Report of Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway, 31 March 1856, NAS/BR/SCM/1/3. pp.256-62; 26&27 Vic. cap.231, 1863, 
The Scottish North-Eastern Railway Act, which authorised amalgamation of the Scottish 
North-Eastern and Dundee and Arbroath Railways. 
57 Appendix, table 20(a): the company increased its initial £300,000 capital and £100,000 
borrowing powers authorised under 8&9 Vic. cap.170, 1845, The Scottish Midland Junction 
Railway Act within the year to £600,000 with £200,000 borrowing powers under 9&10 Vic. 
cap. 75, 1846, The Scottish Midland Junction Railway Branches Act. This increase was made 
in order to finance a larger system than originally proposed in its 1845 bill, with branches to 
Dunkeld, Blairgowrie and Kirriemuir and a connection to the harbour at Perth now included. 
58 cw Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies 1747-1864, p.209, notes that the 
Scottish Midland held a £10,000 loan for 3 years from the Perth Banking Company on 
security of debentures in the late 1840s: this temporary loan was, however, relatively 
insignificant to this financially sound company. 
59 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 31 
August 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37; all 12,000 of the £25 1845 shares had been issued and 
paid up and 11,588 of the 12,000 £25 1846 shares had paid calls of £22.10s, with arrears on 
all shares totalling £23,010. Thus £537,720 of the £600,000 capital had been paid up 
(89.6%). 
60 Report of the Ordinary General Meetings of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 31 
August 1849 and 27 February 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37: this latter report noted that since 
August 1849, 'all the floating bills had been paid'. 
81 Appendix, table 20(c). 
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The Scottish Midland Junction purchased the two small Newtyle lines to Coupar 
Angus and Glamis in 1846 to form part of its main route, which contributed to a lower 
capital cost per mile of £20,890 by January 1851, two-thirds of the Scottish Central 
cost. 62 Land costs accounted for 11.8 percent of total capital expenditure, below the 
proportion spent by the earlier inter-urban lines, but slightly higher than the 
proportion spent by the Scottish Central. Its authorised loan gearing was within 
statutory limits, only reaching 20 percent by amalgamation in 1856, and its gearing of 
gross revenue to total debt was strong, presenting a marked contrast with the weak 
debt gearing of the Caledonian in the same period 1851-52 (table 26).83 
Table 26: Financial indicators for the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 1851-1855 
Data for half years 07.1851 01.1852 07.1852 01.1853 07.1853 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised 11 .8% 10.7% 10.1% 10.0% 10.4% 
Ratio of cross revenue to total debt 0.349 0.478 0.573 0.575 0.596 
01.1854 07.1854 01.1855 07.1855 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised 13.0% 16.0% 17.8% 18.6% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.510 0.426 0.401 0.417 
source: Appendix, table 20(c). 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for 
debentures/capital and 0.162 for cross revenue/debt (table 18 chaoter 3\ . 
The revenue account illustrates a steadily rising stream of revenue from £27,011 in 
1851 to £56,997 in 1855.64 Dividends, while not large, were also rising from 1½ 
percent in 1852 to 3½ percent in 1855 and paid consistently because of the absence 
of a debt burden. The Midland Junction attributed earlier poor returns to the 
agreement with the Scottish Central 'or rather the representatives of the southern 
companies, who for a time managed the affairs of the Scottish Central ... '.66 Few 
companies promoting lines further north during the next decade could match such 
62 Appendix, table 20(a), note (4); Accounts of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37: the purchase was authorised under 8&9 Vic cap.152, 1845, The 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway Act; PF Marshall, The Scottish Central Railway, p.145. 
63 Appendix, table 20(c); chapter 3, table 18, shows debt gearing for the Caledonian Railway 
in 1849-52 to be 0.162 (December 1849), 0.170 (December 1850), 0.192 (July 1851) and 
0.213 (July 1852). 
64 Appendix, table 20(b): dividend in January 1852 was 1½ % and 3½ % in July 1855. 
65 Reports of the Ordinary General Meetings of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 27 
February 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37. 
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consistent financial performance. This small company therefore provides positive 
financial benchmarks for this study in contrast to those of weakness derived from the 
much larger Caledonian Railway. 
The early years of the Aberdeen Railway 
The third company of the northern triumvirate, the Aberdeen Railway, exhibited 
financial characteristics that were the antithesis of the Scottish Midland Junction 
Railway. The port of Aberdeen already had a strong banking and business sector, 
but its imperfect communications were maintained by sea or by coach, of which 
there were 24 daily by 1838.66 Investors therefore saw good prospects of returns 
from investment in the Aberdeen Railway. The Railway Board's recommendation of 
the Aberdeen route pushed its shares to a premium; £646,000 of its £830,000 share 
capital was reported to be taken by the time the bill was approved, of which 
£270,000 was subscribed locally.67 As with the Scottish Central and Midland 
Junction companies, there was a strong shareholder interest from England. 66 
By the summer of 1846, railways had been authorised linking Aberdeen south to 
Perth, west along Deeside, west to Alford, north-west to Inverness and north through 
Buchan to the north-east coast. These seemingly disparate schemes were part of a 
distinct railway web planned by the lawyers and businessmen of Aberdeen. Analysis 
of the composition of company boards (table 27) shows that these state 
authorisations had created a monopoly web in the district.69 
66 A Keith, A Thousand Years of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, 1936), p.472; SG Checkland, Scottish 
Banking, a History 1695-1~73 (Glasgow, 1975), p.347. 
67 8&9 Vic. cap.153, 1845, The Aberdeen Railway Act, authorising share capital of £830,000 
and borrowing powers of £276,666; Aberdeen Journal, 5 March 1845, p.3 and 18 June 1845, 
p.4, quoted in JJ Waterman, The Cominf} of the Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s 
(Aberdeen, 1975), pp.6-7: Aberdeen Railway shares rose from par to a premium of 15s. 
66 Railway Times, 9 December 1848, pp.1285-86 and 20 January 1849, p.51. 
69 As an example, the prospectus of the Alford Valley Railway, 1845, 
NAS/BR/PROS{S)/1 /17, states that the provisional committee of the railway comprised solely 
the directors of the Aberdeen and Great North of Scotland Railway, without specifying the 
names of any individuals. 
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Table 27: Directors of the Aberdeen railway companies, 1846-47 
Directors (1) Occupation Aberdeen Great Great Alford Deeslde Railway North of North Valley Railway 
Scotland IEasteml Railway 
James Hadden Woollen manufacturer ■ Chairman • • • • Wm Adam Advocate • • • • John Blaikie Advocate • • • • • Alexander Jooo Advocate • • • • • Alexander Pirie Paoer manufacturer • • • • • Clements Lumsden Advocate • • • David Wvllie Banker • • • • • Henrv Paterson Banker • • • • • Isaac Machrav Mail Contractor • • • • • Patrick Davidson Advocate • • • • • Thomas Blaikie Lord Provost /3) ■ Until 1845 • • • • Newell Burnett Advocate 12\ ■ Until 1846 • • • • David Blaikie Merchant • • • • Geor!le Thomoson Shio Owner ■ Until 1848 • • • • Alexander Anderson Advocate • • • • Officers 
Adam and Anderson Solicitors • • • • • WCubitt Engineer in Chief • • • • A Gibb En!lineer • • • • • WLeslie Interim secretarv • • • • • Source■ : Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, volumes for 1846-48; Reports to Ordinary General Meetings of the 
Aberdeen Railway, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 11 September 1846, 
NAS/BR/DEE/1/1 . p.37; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 21 August 1846. 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1 oo.103-106. 
(1): All directors listed gave their address in the Aberdeen_ district. 
(2): Newell Burnett stood down from the Aberdeen board 1n October 1846, but he was the only director in this table 
to survive the multitude of boardroom crises between 1843 and 1874 during the period of this study. 
(3): Thomas Blaikie was chairman of the Great North, the Great North (Eastern Extension), the Alford Valley and the 
Deeside Railways in 1846-47. 
(4): Anderson, Adam, Thompson and Jopp_~re also o~iglnal ~irecto;-1 of the Nori~ of Scotland Bank, founded in 
1836; Paterson was its manager and T Bla1k1e became its chairman 1n 1841 (A Keith, Tht, North of Scotland Bank 
Ltd, 1836-1936, pp.23-24 and o.45). 
The secretary and manager of the Aberdeenshire Canal, Alexander Jopp, held a 
strong board representation across the web; the canal had cost £43,895 and opened 
in 1805, but gave a return on capital of only 2.76 percent in 1844.70 Nevertheless, 
the Great North agreed to the purchase of the canal for £36,000 as a potential 
railway route; Great North chairman Thomas Blaikie argued: 
This might appear a large sum being about 26 years purchase of the 
revenue, but under all circumstances he considered the transaction desirable 
and advantageous for both parties.71 
70 J Lindsay, The Canals of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1968), p.99 and p.109: gross profit in 
1844 was £1,210 on a capital expenditure of £43,895. 
71 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 October 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.43. 
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Map 5: The authorised Aberdeen web of railways, 1846 
The Aberdeen Railway, as the earliest incorporation, served as the host company for 
the web. All directors on the first board of the Aberdeen Railway were also board 
members of the Great North and they held absolute control of all the other web 
companies. Over a year before the Great North was incorporated, its committee 
resolved that it 'may ultimately be considered desirable' to amalgamate with the 
Aberdeen Railway.72 In seeking shareholder approval for an amalgamation with the 
Great North, the Aberdeen Railway chairman reported that 'nearly 200 miles of 
railway, exclusive of projected extensions, will be placed under one management'73 
12 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1 , pp.24-
25. 
73 Railway Chronicle, 20 September 1845, p. 1315. 
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and acclaimed the market strength given as a result of the rejection of the Perth and 
Inverness bill: 
It is very improbable that such a scheme will be again contemplated, and the 
traffic between Perth and Inverness, and of the whole Northern Counties of 
Scotland, will thus be secured to the Aberdeen Railway . . . when the 
proposed amalgamation of this Line with the Great North of Scotland Railway 
is carried into effect, the United Company will have the command of a most 
valuable and extensive field of railway enterprise which cannot fail to realize 
an ample return on the capital invested at no distant day.74 
The Aberdeen web had effectively formed a regional transport monopoly before all 
the legislation had passed through Parliament. The amalgamation bill passed 
without opposition, but Parliament required that amalgamation could not take effect 
until half of the capital in each company had been paid up.75 Thus the web's 
expeditious strategy did not pass so smoothly into execution. By the time the 
Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction Railways opened their sections of the 
northern route in 1848, the Aberdeen Railway had opened just half of its route: 
Table 28: Opening dates for sections of the Aberdeen Railway, 1848-50 
Date Miles Commencement nnlnt Northertv terminus 
1 Seotember 1848 33 Friockheim Montrose 
1 November 1849 26 Montrose Limoet Mill 3 miles north of Stonehaven 
8 December 1849 6½ UmoetMill Portlethen, 6 miles south of Aberdeen 
1 ADril 1850 6¼ Portlethen Aberdeen (Ferrvhill) 
Total mileaae 721/, 
source: Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 24 October 1850, 
NAS/BR/RAC/Sl/1/36. 
14 Report of Special General Meeting of the Shareholders of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 May 
1846, NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/36; Aberdeen Journal, 17 September 1845, p.2, reporting the first 
meeting of Aberdeen Railway shareholders giving 'immediate approval' to amalgamate with 
the Great North of Scotland Railway, quoted in JJ Waterman, The Coming of the Railway to 
Aberdeen in the 1840s, p.8. 
75 The Great North of Scotland and Aberdeen Railways Act, 1 O& 11 Vic. cap.195, 9 July 
184 7; report of the 3ro Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 November 
1847, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36. 
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The reasons for this halting progress re-iterated the earlier Scottish experience -
inaccurate estimates, shortage of capital and boardroom conflict. By May 1846, 
arrears on calls amounted to one-sixth of capital called; three further calls were 
made by October when borrowing powers were released.78 However, the company 
was attempting to raise large sums of capital in a market battered by the aftermath of 
the 1845 railway mania. By December 1847, loans were costing 6 percent.n The 
capital shortage was not unique to Aberdeen; with national economic depression and 
great distrust of railway equity, all railway companies found calls hard to obtain and 
loans increasingly expensive. The Aberdeen, like many other railway companies, 
sought new capital by converting unissued ordinary shares into preference stock on 
which dividend was guaranteed, but state authorisation was required.78 Preference 
stock rose from 4 percent to 66 percent of all British stock issued between 1845 and 
1849 while the average ordinary share dividend of the 17 largest railway companies 
fell from 6.3 percent to 3.3 percent.79 The Aberdeen Railway gained approval in 
1848 for a 6 percent stock, not at 10 percent as originally proposed, and then in 
1850 for a further stock at 7 percent.80 The high interest levels indicate the 
desperation of the Aberdeen to obtain capital. Such a strategy was highly risky, 
because guaranteed dividend absorbed revenue, which reduced the scope to offer 
76 Report of the Special General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 May 1846, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S}/1/36: of the £164,057 capital called, £135,087 had been received and 
arrears (£28,970) represented 17.7% of the capital called; JJ Waterman, The Coming of the 
Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s, pp.8-9. 
77 JJ Waterman, The Coming of the Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s, p.9. 
78 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the Unites States, 1830-1940, p.39; GR Hawke and 
MC Reed, 'Railway capital in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century', Economic 
History Review, new series, XXII, No.2 (1969), p.284; RJ Irving' The capitalisation of Britain's 
railways, 1830-1914', Journal of Transport History, 3rd series, vol.5, No.1 (March 1984), pp.2-
3. 
79 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies.: joint stock politics in Victorian England (London, 1998), 
p.194, noting the proportion of stock rssued as 4% or 5% preference stock in Britain between 
1845 and 1849. 
so Ordinary General Meeting of 30 November 1847, which approved a parliamentary 
application for preference stock, NAS/B~~C(S)/1/36; 11&12 Vic. cap:67, 1848, The 
Aberdeen Railway Act: the resultant legrslatron was reported at the Ordinary General Meeting 
of 29 November 1848, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; H Parris, Government and the Railways in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1965), p.127, states that the Railway Commissioners 
advised against parliamentary approval of the Aberdeen Railway's preference stock at a 
proposed rate of 10 percent; 13& 14 Vic. cap. 78, 1850, The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
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dividend on ordinary shares, thereby making that stock less attractive. Moreover, 
share conversion was often carried out when money was tight and the company 
became locked into guaranteed payments at high rates of interest. 
When, in 1847, expenditure on the Aberdeen Railway was outstripping the inflow of 
capital, two directors were sent to London to seek a £200,000 loan, the Aberdeen 
Town and County Bank was asked to consider a £30,000 loan and the scale of 
construction work was reduced. 111 Shareholders were informed that of £664,000 
called, only £46,000 was in arrears, and new capital powers for £300,000 of 
preference stock were required: 
... the Share Capital of the Company, and the amount authorised to be raised 
on Loan, will both be inadequate to compete the undertaking ... the original 
Estimate of cost will thus be exceeded.82 
Ominously, shareholders were also told 'The Company are now considerably 
indebted to their Bankers' and, consequently, 'it has been found necessary to restrict 
the operations of the Company's Contractors to a very considerable extent, on all 
parts of the Line north of Montrose.83 The Railway Times reported that the Aberdeen 
had borrowed £70,000 for between 3-5 years at 4 and 5 percent interest and quoted 
the chairman's explanation: 
We have been obliged to borrow for temporary purposes at higher rates and 
it may be necessary to do so for some time to come . . . Like others, we have 
been deceived in our estimates. In our calculation as to the value of land, we 
have been most of all astray ... 8-4 
81 Scroll minutes of the Aberdeen Railway Company, 29 September 1847, 12 November 
1847, and 13 November 1847, NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
82 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 November 184 7, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S}/1 /36. 
83 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 November 1847, 
NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/36. 
M Railway Times, 4 December 1847, p.1491, reporting chairman James Hadden's address 
to the 3rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway held on 30 November 1847. 
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The experiences of the 1837-38 inter-urban lines were being repeated in the north. 
By August 1849, expenditure on the Aberdeen line was 68.1 percent above estimate 
and still rising. 85 Land costs were 10.2 percent of expenditure, proportionately lower 
than for earlier inter-urban lines but nearly three times the estimate.86 The company 
accounts suggest an under-funded company struggling in the face of inaccurate 
estimates and a hostile capital market. 
Table 29: Financial indicators for the Aberdeen Railway 1849-50 
I 31.08.1848 31.08.1849 I 31.07.1850 
Ratio of loans to caoital raised I 20.5% 22.3% I 25.2% 
Ratio of Qross revenue to total debt I (line not open) 0.051 I 0.053 
Source: Aooendix, table 1(d). 
(1) : Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for Qross revenue/debt. 
The interpretation of gearing ratios in these early years requires caution because the 
full line did not open until 1850 (table 29). Nevertheless, the railway returned a net 
loss on revenue account in its first two years of operation and, with mounting debt, 
its financial position by 1850 was very precarious.87 The debt gearing indicates 
considerable weakness in comparison to the Caledonian at the same date with a 
slightly lower authorised loan debt but a significant burden of temporary debt.88 
85 Appendix, tables 1(a) and 1(b); 8&9 Vic. cap.153, 1845, The Aberdeen Railway Act 
authorised share capital of £830,000, but engineer Cubitt had estimated a cost of £900,000 in 
a report of 21 September 1844, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/1. 
86 Table 1 (a): by August 1849, land costs comprised £142,192 of the £1,394,864 of capital 
expenditure (10.2%); Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 24 
October 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, noting the original estimate for land to be £57,000. 
87 Appendix, tables 1(c) and 1(d). 
88 Appendix, table 1(d), showing that the total fixed interest debt by July 1850 was £987.335; 
table 18 in chapter 3 shows the Caledonian's ratio of authorised loans to total capital raised 
by 31 December 1849 was 24. 5%, whereas that for the Aberdeen Railway in August 1849 
was22.3%. 
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The paucity of capital supply caused the allied Great North of Scotland, Alford Valley 
and Deeside Railways to delay any commencement of their schemes. Although 
such decisions were made independently, the Aberdeen directors held a majority on 
those boards and deferred construction in the light of their own financial 
predicament. The share market reflected the growing financial difficulties of the 
Aberdeen Railway. Its shareholders experienced a steady fall in the amount they 
could recoup as a proportion of the amount they had paid (table 30). 
Table 30: Market prices quoted for shares in the Aberdeen Railway, 1846-55 
Date Par value Amount paid Price in week Price as a proportion 
(£1 {£1 (£) of share price oaid 
10.10.1846 50 20 24¼-26 104.0 
26.12.1846 50 25 14 ½ 72.5 
03.04.1847 50 30 27½ 91 .7 
01 .05.1847 50 30 24-25 83.3 
18.12.1847 50 45 28½ 63.3 
29.01 .1848 50 50 26½ 53.0 
01 .04.1848 50 50 22-25 50.0 
01 .07.1848 50 50 20-21 41 .2 
06.01.1855 100 100 20 20.0 
07.04.1855 100 100 20½ 20.5 
07.07.1855 100 100 23¼ 23.3 
06.10.1855 100 100 24 24.0 
15.12.1855 100 100 22¼ 22.8 
source: Heraoath's Rai/wav Journal, October 1846 - December 1855. 
The ailing Aberdeen Railway attracted the attention of the west- and east-coast 
alliances, which sensed the opportunity of both a capital and a strategic gain. In 
August 1848, the Aberdeen board approved, although not unanimously, the terms of 
an agreement with the London and North Western Railway and its allies. 89 By 
September, however, the board switched to acceptance of a counter-proposal from 
the Edinburgh and Northern Railway backed by the east-coast alliance. 90 The 
Aberdeen Journal reported: 
89 Scroll minutes of the Aberdeen Railway, 4 July 1845, NAS/BR/ABN/1/5 and 29 August 
1848, NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
90 Scroll minutes of the Aberdeen Railway, 27 September 1848 and 25 October 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
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Competition hotted up towards the end of the year between the vultures 
waiting to seize the dying body of the Aberdeen Railway . .. the Edinburgh 
and Northern backed by the North British and the notorious Hudson made an 
offer in October that topped the London and North Western Railway's earlier 
offer ... 91 
The London and North Western proposed to purchase Aberdeen plant and work the 
line for five years on a mileage payment, but the east-coast alliance offered to 
purchase all 6 percent Aberdeen preference stock authorised In 1848, to complete 
the line to Aberdeen, and to work it at 40 percent of receipts.92 In October 1848, 
Aberdeen directors obtained shareholder acceptance of the Edinburgh and Northern 
offer and reported that the line could be completed for £24,000 per mile, although 
that figure was approximately twice the original estimate.93 However, shareholder 
dissatisfaction emerged at the half-yearly meeting in November, which triggered the 
fragmentation of the Aberdeen web that was to have a major influence on railway 
development in the north over the next two decades.94 
The disintegration of the Aberdeen Web 
The shareholders of the Aberdeen Railway were thrown two lifelines by major 
railway alliances in 1848 to extricate themselves from their financial chaos but, 
despite approval of the east-coast offer in October 1848, the company ultimately 
accepted neither. Surviving scroll minutes of the board reveal the serious split 
between directors over the two rival offers, resulting in a decision to publish a circular 
91 Aberdeen Journal, 4 October 1848, p.6 and 25 October 1848, p.4, quoted in JJ Waterman, 
The Coming of the Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s, p.20. 
92 Railway Times, 4 November 1848, p.1162; 11 & 12 Vic. cap. 67, 1848, The Aberdeen 
Railway Act, authorising the company to create £276,666 of 6% preference stock. 
93 Railway Chronicle, 4 November 1848, p. 782, reporting the Extra-ordinary General 
Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway held on 26 October 1848, the acceptance of the Edinburgh 
and Northern offer and approval of the creation of £276,666 6% preference stock; Railway 
Times. 4 November 1848, p.1162 and 9 December 1848, p.1285; Appendix, table 26. 
9-4 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 29 November 1848, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36. 
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to shareholders and seek proxies.95 At the ordinary general meeting in November, 
representatives of a large group of English shareholders challenged financial probity 
within the company.96 The claim was made that £130,000 of stock had been 
transferred onto the company's books from the personal holdings of some directors 
and that no minute had been made of the decision. Director John Blaikie defended 
the action: 
In 1846, when the Company was in considerable difficulty, various 
gentlemen, having taken shares for the purpose of relieving the Company 
from their temporary embarrassment, had some expectation at the time of the 
Company relieving them from ultimate loss, should these shares become 
depreciated in value.97 
Shareholders were acutely aware that it was not just directors that had suffered 
financial loss and that the company remained in deep financial difficulty. The validity 
of the share qualification of some of the directors was questioned and allegations 
made that Blaikie Brothers, suppliers of ironwork to the railway and whose relatives 
were well represented on Aberdeen web boards, had been paid above market rates 
for their goods. 98 When the directors realised that the London shareholders held 
more proxies than the board, the meeting was adjourned. Sensing their opportunity 
for control of the Aberdeen might slip away, the Edinburgh and Northern and North 
British Railways rapidly paid the first installment of £20,000 for preference shares 
95 Scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 14 November 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
96 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 29 November 1848, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36; Railway Times, 9 December 1848, p.1162. 
97 Railway Times, 9 December 1848, pp.1285-86. 
98 Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13; Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of 
the Aberdeen Railway, 24 October 1850, NAS/BR/ABN/1/18: the report states that an 
investigation had revealed that the Aberdeen Railway had contracted with Blaikie Brothers to 
pay £8.1 Os pe~ ton for iron railway chairs, which ~as £2-£2.Ss more per ton th?n on 
neighbouring Imes and that the signatory for the firm on the contract was the sixteen year-old 
nephew of Thomas Blaikie, then Chairman of the Aberdeen Railway. 
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into the Aberdeen's account and requested an allocation of stock, seeking to finalise 
the agreement made between them, but the Aberdeen refused the payment.99 
Notes from a board meeting held on Christmas Day 1848 indicate a distinct absence 
of seasonal goodwill.100 An immediate challenge was made over the legality of the 
presence of Aberdeenshire landowner Sir James Elphinstone, appointed an 
Aberdeen director in 1847,101 now its deputy chairman,102 and soon to be chairman 
of the Great North of Scotland Railway; the register of shareholders showed he did 
not hold the required qualification.103 A vituperative argument followed over the 
eligibility of other directors. One director was described as 'being obnoxious' and 
one accused another of 'being one of the parties who have been obtaining the votes 
of the Shareholders to turn him out of the Direction' .104 The divisions within the 
board reflected support for the west- or east-coast offers. The depth of rancour 
resulted in the board suspending the authority given to its secretary to issue bills 
under directors' signature, intending to block any advantage to an opponent. In 
reality, the decision froze the ability of the company to run its affairs and this 
perverse decision had to be reversed the following day.105 
99 Scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 19 December 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1 /6; Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13. 
100 Scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 25 December 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
1°1 Report to the 3rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 November 1847, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36. 
102 Report to the 3rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 November 
1847, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13. 
103 scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 25 December 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
104 Scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 25 December 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
1o5 scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 26 December 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
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The ordinary general meeting resumed on 27 December 1848 and lasted seven-and-
a-half hours.106 The board announced that it had already resolved to break off the 
agreement with the east-coast companies. 107 James Spicer, representative of the 
London shareholders, proposed a new board of directors that excluded 
representation from any of the suitor southern companies and retained just three 
directors from the existing board. Spicer extended allegations of financial 
impropriety, challenging a law account of £11,723 to Messrs Adam and Anderson, 
who were law agents to all the web companies and directors of many of them, and 
asserting that of the £150,000 shares taken by directors in 1846, only £40,000 had 
been paid up despite the call of four-fifths of the par value of each £50 share by the 
end of 184 7 .108 Spicer also gave details of the excess paid to Blaikie Brothers: 
... it appeared that, on work done to the amount of £80,000, the amount over 
the process fixed on by Mr. Locke was £18,000, at the rate of 22 percent 
upon the whole. 109 
The board must have sensed that they were about to be swept from office for 
Elphinstone berated the meeting and 'warmly blamed the majority' for reducing the 
company to bankruptcy.110 A shareholder unsuccessfully urged acceptance of one 
of the southern offers, noting that the agreement with the Edinburgh and Northern 
required the provision of four seats at the board: 
106 Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13, reporting details of the adjourned Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway on 27 December 1848. 
107 Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, p.12, reporting the statement to shareholders that a 
board minute of 19 December 1848 had terminated the agreement with the Edinburgh and 
Northern and its allies; Scroll minutes of Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 19 December 
1848, NAS/BR/ABN/1/6. 
106 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 November 1847, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, identifying calls made between November 1845 and December 1847. 
109 Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13. 
110 Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13; Railway Times, 6 January 1849, pp.5-7, 
reporting Sir James Elphinstone's speech to the resumed Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Aberdeen Railway on 27 December 1848: 'He warmly blamed the majority for depriving the 
Company and the public of th~ p~spect of the speed~ opening of the railway, which, he said, 
was "this day bankrupt" ... This railway was now deteriorated to one-third of its original value'. 
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Unless unanimous, they would see their property continue to lie waste, daily 
deteriorated by the frost and the snow, and the company involved in 
irremediable bankruptcy.111 
Spicer's proposed new board was elected without a vote and Elphinstone and his 
allies walked out of the meeting, although still retaining their seats on the Great 
North of Scotland board and other companies. From this point, relationships 
between the two main railway companies in Aberdeen turned aconitic and remained 
so for nearly two decades to the detriment of railway development in the north of 
Scotland. The Railway Times was incredulous: 
How a squabble amongst the Directors .. . should have occasioned so 
disastrous a disruption, we can by no means make clear. The line is 
stopped, and literally "rotting" for want of funds . . . The Company is in the 
most serious difficulties. Indeed, at this moment, we are not aware whether it 
is solvent or not ... 112 
The importance of the London influence in the Aberdeen Railway is demonstrated by 
the holding of regular shareholder meetings in the English capital, the first of which 
congratulated shareholders on abandoning any agreement with the west- or east-
coast companies and urged them to maintain 'an independent position'.113 The new 
directors, the majority of whom were local, commissioned a report on the state of the 
line and company finances and recommended shareholders to purchase the 
preference stock that was to have been taken by the east-coast companies.114 A 
111 Railway Chronicle, 6 January 1849, pp.12-13. 
112 Railway Times, 6 January 1849, p.7. 
113 Railway Times, 20 January 1849, p.51. 
114 Scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen railway, 29 December 1848, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/7; Railway Chronicle, 10 February 1849, p.94, reporting a Special General 
Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, which approved the issue of £276,666 6% preference 
shares with power to raise interest to 7% for those shares not taken at 6%; Report of the 
directors to the Ordinary General ~eeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 24 October 1850, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36: of the 12 directors shown, one gave a London address while seven 
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feature that was to become commonplace in the development of northern railways, 
the personal security of directors for loans, was reported at the new board's second 
meeting.116 Nevertheless, initial signs were encouraging; the new preference shares 
were taken up and 'it was not necessary to issue any of the shares at a higher rate of 
interest than 6 percent'.116 
Six percent interest, however, placed considerable strain on the unstable finances of 
the company. The Aberdeen Railway still faced strong competition from sea 
transport; it had spurned both west- and east-coast alliances and had destroyed the 
Aberdeen monopoly web, creating in the process a new antagonist in the Great 
North of Scotland Railway which held the monopoly route northwards. Within the 
year the new board proposed that the authorised amalgamation with the Great North 
should be abandoned: 
At the time the Act was obtained, the Directors of both Companies were the 
same, with one or two exceptions - the circumstances of both Companies 
were similar, and the arrangement was gone into in the belief that, from the 
intimate connection of the two Lines, it would be for their mutual advantage 
were they carried out, and wrought as one undertaking. The circumstances 
in which the Companies are now placed are very different - nothing has been 
done towards the formation of the Great North Line, while the Aberdeen Line 
is nearly finished . . . it does not appear to your Directors that there are any 
advantages secured to you by the Amalgamation Act, which would not 
equally accrue on the completion of the Great North Line ... 117 
gave addresses in the Aberdeen region. At this meeting, James Spicer declined to serve as 
a director of the company (Railway Times, 26 October 1850, p.1098). 
115 scroll minutes of the Directors of the Aberdeen Railway, 3 January 1849, 
NAS/BR/ABN/1/7: 'The Finance Committee are interposing their personal security for the 
benefit of the Company in order to meet its most pressing engagements .. .'. 
116 Railway Chronicle, 9 June 1849, p.407: the preference shares had been created on 3 
February 1849; Appendix, table 1{a), showing £225,539 of the £276,666 6% preference 
shares taken by 31 July 1849 (81.5%) and £274,412 by 31 July 1850 (99.2%). 
111 Report of the directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 29 
November 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36. 
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The Great North board justified repeal to their shareholders to divorce themselves 
from the financial difficulties of the Aberdeen Railway.118 However, it was the hostile 
disintegration of the Aberdeen web rather than underlying capital difficulties of the 
Aberdeen that prompted the repeal of the amalgamation act. The Great North 
directors had already created their own capital constraints, outlined in Chapter 3. 
With repeal, the immediate prospect of a coherent continuous route to the north via 
Aberdeen was lost.119 The Great North's Act contained the powers to make the 
connection northwards from the Aberdeen Railway, but the bitter division between 
the two companies ensured that the north of Scotland would wait until 1867 to obtain 
a continuous route to the south via Aberdeen. Moreover, this antagonism was to 
assist the latent distrust shown in Inverness towards Aberdeen railway schemes to 
ferment into vigorous and successful competition, which is explored in chapter 6. 
Instability and insolvency in Aberdeen, 1849-56 
When the Aberdeen Railway opened its final section to Ferryhill on the southern 
outskirts of Aberdeen in April 1850, both its capital and revenue accounts were in 
deficit. 120 It had issued a six percent preference stock and had powers to issue 
another at seven percent, highly attractive rates in comparison to bank discount 
rates of 2½-3 percent throughout 1849-51, which reflected improved national 
economic conditions.121 However, the Aberdeen was unable to pay the guaranteed 
11e Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, Special General Meeting, 24 June 1850, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, p.246: ' ... your directors are satisfied that the repeal of this act would 
facilitate the obtaining [of} funds for the construction of the works, and be otherwise 
advantageous for this company ... '. 
119 13&14 Vic. cap.78, 1850, The Aberdeen Railway Act, which repealed 10&11 Vic. 
cap.195, 1847, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act that had authorised amalgamation 
of the Great North and Aberdeen Railway companies. 
12o Appendix, tables 1(b) and 1(c). 
121 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875, appendix 12, p.83, reporting bank discount rates 
1848-75; 11&12 Vic. cap.67, 1848, The Aberdeen Railway Act, authorising the creation of 
£276,666 of 6% preference stock; 13&14 Vic.cap.78, 1850, The Aberdeen Railway Act, 
authorising the creation of £150,000 of 7% preference stock, repealing the 1847 act for an 
amalgamation with the Great North of Scotland Railway, and approving a new terminus for 
the Aberdeen Railway at Guild Street in Aberdeen. 
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dividend on its six percent stock in 1850; directors reported that the cost of the 
railway was £1,647,000, £747,000 above their estimate.122 Earthworks estimated at 
£623,783 had cost £911,597.123 Land costs were reported to be £187,555, over 
three times the estimate of £57,000: 
Land settlements ... had little reference to the real value of the land taken ... 
the ruling object has been, by every means and without reference to value, to 
extort the largest possible sums. 124 
Nevertheless, the Aberdeen line was more economically constructed than some 
earlier Scottish lines; the capital cost per mile of £22,004 in 1850 rose to £25,273 per 
mile in 1855 once the line was extended into Aberdeen, falling mid-way between the 
Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction main line costs of 1850-51.125 
The company saw some prospect of achieving economies by joining the working 
agreement with the Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction in 1851 and 
directors subsequently told shareholders of its satisfactory operation.128 Gross 
revenue rose by 20.3 percent in 1851-52 once the full line was in operation, but 
122 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 24 
October 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, the data given by directors implies the use of engineer 
Cubitt's 1844 estimate of £900,000 for the line, although authorised capital was set at 
£830,000 in 1845. 
123 Herapath's Railway Journal, 19 October 1850; CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway 
Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway Company', p.3. 
124 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 24 
October 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, noting the original estimate for land to be £57,000 
while actual costs were reported as £187,555, just over three times the estimate, but which 
included £40,000 allowed for the Aberdeen terminus. Appendix, table 1 {b), shows actual 
land costs paid by July 1850 to be £152,601, a level which was almost 2.7 times the original 
estimate. 
125 Appendix, tables 1{b), note 6, 19{a), 20(a) and 26: the capital costs per mile for the 
Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction Railways were £31,573 (1850) and £20,890 
(1851) respectively. The Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction Railways 
subsequently obtained powers to build branch lines and so a direct comparison of the costs 
per mile of the three sections of the Stirling-Aberdeen main line in 1855 are not possible; 
Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 26 October 1854, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36, reporting the opening of the Guild Street terminus on 2 August 1854. 
12s Reports of the Directo~s to the Ordinary General Meetings of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 
October 1851, and 20 April 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36. 
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revenue growth was absorbed by the cost of servicing the mounting level of debt.127 
Inaccurate estimates had forced the company to seek additional capital at a time 
when funds were scarce and expensive and deferred warrants were issued routinely 
for preference share dividend.128 Capital costs continued to increase as the 
Aberdeen Railway extended its line towards the centre of Aberdeen and the 
docks.129 The extra cost incurred by the extension was imperative, given the strong 
competition faced from sea transport: 
The traffic of the line is gradually progressing: but the continued competition 
by sea prevents its rapid development, as there is still a large sea-borne 
traffic, carried at rates so low as induces traders to employ that mode of 
conveyance.130 
The interests held by some Aberdeen directors in the rival sea traffic prompted 
controversy about 'divided allegiance': 
... we confess to a confusion of ideas in not being able to make out how any 
director of the Aberdeen can possibly serve two such masters; the interests 
t · t' 131 are an agonIs 1c ... 
127 Appendix, tables 1(c} and 1(d}; gross annual revenue rose from £59,884 in January 1851 
to £72,040 in January 1852, an increase of 20.3% for the full year 1851-52; Report of the 
Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway. 20 April 1852, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S}/1 //36, stating that half yearly goods revenue to 31 January 1851 was 
£10,549 and to 31 January 1852 was £14,673, a rise of 39.1% between those half-years. 
Passenger traffic between January 1851 and January 1852, however, rose only by 2.8% from 
£17,659 to £18,154 in the same half years. 
128 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway. 24 
October 1850, 30 October 1851, 21 October 1852, 28 October 1853, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1//36: 
full dividend on 6% stock was paid in October 1854, although arrears on 7% preference stock 
continued to accumulate until March 1858. 
129 Appendix, table 1(b). 
130 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway. 20 
April 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S}/1//36. 
131 Railway Times, 8 November 1851, p.1123; Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, volumes for 
1846-49, show George Thompson, owner of the White Star Line that traded with Australia, 
re-elected as an Aberdeen director in 1846 but he is not shown on that board by 1848, but he 
retained positions as a director of the Great North, Great North (Eastern Extension), Alford 
Valley, and Deeside Railways. 
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The start of construction of the Great North of Scotland and Deeside Railways in 
1852, albeit as reduced schemes, raised the prospect of increased traffic passing 
onto the Aberdeen Railway.132 The Aberdeen board was keen to tap potential traffic 
from the north, but disputes with the Great North over a connecting through line 
started almost immediately the Aberdeen web disintegrated in 1848-49. The Great 
North dismissed a proposal from the Aberdeen in 1849; the Aberdeen rejected a 
Great North scheme in 1850.133 When the Great North issued a revised prospectus 
in 1852, the Aberdeen board advised its shareholders against investment in it 
because: 
... it was not contemplated to form a junction with your Line, but to have the 
Terminus of the new Railway on the North Side of Aberdeen, leaving a break 
of about two miles between the two Railways.13'4 
The terminus of the Great North's line initially was at Kittybrewster in the northern 
outskirts of Aberdeen, but rather than extend across Aberdeen to provide a 
continuous link into the route south, a short branch was authorised in 1854 along the 
route of the former Aberdeenshire Canal to a new terminus at Waterloo on the north 
side of the docks.135 The Aberdeen Railway opened its new terminus at Guild Street 
in 1854, which left a gap of half-a-mile between the two stations; only a very basic 
connection for goods was eventually provided via a horse-drawn tramway along the 
132 14& 15 Vic. cap. 55, 1851, The Great North of Scotland Amendment Act, which reduced 
the authorised capital limit of the company; 15& 16 Vic. cap.61, 1852, The Deeslde Railway 
Act, which re-incorporated the company to construct and operate a 16 mile line from 
Aberdeen to Banchory. 
133 Scroll minutes of the Aberdeen Railway, 16 June 1850, NAS/BR/ABN/1/10; Railway 
Times, 26 October 1850, p.1098; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, 2 September 1849, p.202, 29 December 1849, p.229, and 20 July 1853, 
p.409 and pp.420-22. 
134 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 20 
April 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway 
Company, revised scheme 1852, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/9. 
135 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 25 
November 1853, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.463; 17&18 Vic. cap.187, 1854, The Great North of 
Scotland Railway Amendment Act; Report ta the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 30 November 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2. p.152. 
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dock quays.136 That short gap epitomised the isolation of the Great North both 
physically and politically, and the resultant discontinuity became an important 
contributor to the subsequent collapse of the Great North's northern monopoly. 
A shareholder's letter in 1851 noted that the Aberdeen Railway's weekly revenue of 
£1,230 was absorbed entirely by annual working costs of £34,000, debenture 
interest of £18,000, and £12,000 rent for the Arbroath and Forfar line: 
I think it very evident that no dividend can be paid regularly on the preference 
shares for a very long time to come. 137 
The directors expressed 'great anxiety' over the increasing arrears of preferential 
dividends and proposed that, once revenue could cover current liabilities, arrears 
should be capitalised to remove the strain on the revenue account, which could then 
offer some prospect of a dividend on ordinary stock.138 Dividend due on the 6 
percent preference stock by May 1851 amounted to £23,741, which represented 
one-third of gross revenue earned in 1851.1311 Because only two-fifths of the new 7 
percent preference stock had been taken, the board took the extreme step of 
mortgaging its rolling stock in trust to creditors who then took 7 percent stock to 
cover a quarter of their claims.140 The grave cash flow position was somewhat 
138 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 26 
October 1854, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; Scroll minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 
22 December 1858, NAS/BR/SNE/1/5, proposing a junction between the Aberdeen and 
Great North Railways' ... by means of a railway across the Harbour and Docks at Aberdeen'. 
137 Railway Times, 22 March 1851, p.310. 
135 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 
October 1851, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36. 
139 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 
October 1851, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; Appendix, table 1 (c): gross revenue for the full year 
1851 was £68,810. 
140 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 30 April 1851, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, stating that 13,000 of the 30,000 new 7% preference shares had been 
taken and that the remainder were to be taken by creditors as part payment of debt and with 
the company's rolling stock assigned in trust as security. 
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understated by the directors: 'It must be confessed that revenue matters are not in a 
condition approaching healthiness.'141 
The company was insolvent, but it had a rising stream of revenue which offered the 
prospect of recovery if the fixed interest burden could be removed from its revenue 
account. In 1852, the board proposed to create a new preference stock in lieu of 
deferred dividend warrants for arrears on both the 6 and 7 percent preference 
stocks, which shareholders approved.142 The annual dividend required on these two 
stocks in 1853 was £27,100 and the board calculated that, with current revenue 
improvement, it would take six years to meet fully annual guaranteed dividends.143 
In January 1853, net revenue registered a surplus, but only of £72.144 Dividend 
arrears totalled £69,376 in October 1853, by when powers had been received for 
conversion of arrears into a 3½ percent stock.145 By the next half-year meeting, the 
company was able to pay 2¼ percent on the 6 percent stock.146 However, the 
preference stock in lieu of arrears was not created until 1858 when the company was 
finally able to meet all annual preference dividends from current revenue; in the 
meantime, the company had continued to issue deferred dividend warrants on 
141 Railway Times, 1 O May 1851, p.476, reporting the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Aberdeen Railway held on 30 April 1851. 
142 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 21 
October 1852 and Report of the Special General Meeting, 3 March 1853, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36. 
143 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 3 
March 1853, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36: the Aberdeen board calculated that if net revenue rose at 
£5,000 per annum, it would not fully meet annual dividends on these preference stocks until 
1859. 
144 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 19 
April 1853, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; Appendix, table 1(c). 
14s Report of Special General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 3 March 1853, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36; 16&17Vic. cap.101, 1853, The Aberdeen Railway Act; Report of the 
Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 28 October 1853, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, recommending that 'in the present state of the Revenue of the 
Company, and while the arrears are still accumulating, it would obviously be premature to 
make the conversion'. 
146 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 15 
March 1854, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36: full dividend on 6% stock was paid in October 1854, 
although 7% stock continued to attract deferred payment until 19 May 1857. 
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preference stock, thereby adding to the debt burden. 147 Financial improvement was 
slow, but the capitalisation of dividend arrears immediately eased the pressure on 
the revenue account and gave the company the chance to extricate itself from its 
serious financial crisis; the stark alternative was bankruptcy. Creditors and 
shareholders realised that there was nothing to be gained from forcing foreclosure 
and rising revenue offered the distant prospect of repayment and investment returns. 
Ironically, its rival in Aberdeen, the Great North, was forced to take similar action two 
decades later. 
The deficit on capital account peaked in 1851 : gross revenue showed a steady 
increase in 1850-56, but the general balance sheet contained considerable hidden 
debt, including the arrears on guaranteed dividends.148 By July 1851, after a year of 
full-line operation, capital expenditure was £1,660,501, double the 1845 
parliamentary estimate. Despite the very large amounts of debt, debt gearing shows 
a slow but steady improvement in 1850-56, but financially the Aberdeen remained 
extremely weak with its 1855 ratio still only half that of the insolvent Caledonian 
Railway in 1849 (table 31). 
Table 31: Financial indicators for the Aberdeen Railway 1850-56 
Data for half years 07.1850 01.1851 07.1851 01.1852 07.1852 01.1853 Accounts com...2_iled for 11 mths Halfvear 
Ratio of loans to capital raised 25.2% 24.5% 23.7% 26.0% 24.3% 24.8% Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.058 0.058 0.062 
Data for half years 07.1853 01.1854 07.1854 01.1855 07.1855 01.1856 Ratio of loans to capital raised 24.9% 25.2% 26.0% 26.7% 26.7% 27.3% Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.064 0.066 0.075 0.079 0.084 0.088 Source: A_l)j)_endix, table 1(d). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for gross revenue/debt. 
147 Report of the Directors to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 19 
March 1858, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, proposing a special meeting to approve conversion of 
arrears into preference stock. By the Ordinary General Meeting held on 23 March 1859, 
£73,174 of arrears of dividend on preference stock had been capitalised. 
148 Appendix, tables 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d): the capital account deficit peaked in January 1851 at 
£189,342, with £202,971 of floating debt held in the general balance sheet at that date. 
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Nevertheless, the Railway Times reported in 1855: 
Further debt is arrested, current obligations are met; and past deficiencies 
are beginning to be made up. There is a general argument in favour of the 
amalgamation with the Scottish Midland, viz. that both lines are 
comparatively short, and, being continuous, can undoubtedly be better 
worked and conducted under a united management.1• 9 
The Aberdeen and Scottish Midland Junction Railways were amalgamated as the 
Scottish North-Eastern Railway in 1856, with seven-tenths of net revenue allocated 
to the Aberdeen and three-tenths to the Scottish Midland Junction.150 The 
amalgamation merged the strong debt gearing of the Scottish Midland Junction with 
the weak gearing of the Aberdeen so that subsequent accounts of the Scottish 
North-Eastern suggest overall financial stability (table 32). 
Table 32: Debt gearing of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway and its constituents, 
1855-62 
Ratio of gross annual revenue to total debt 
31 Julv 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 
Aberdeen Railwav 0.084 0.088 
Scottish Midland Junction Railwav 0.417 0.402 
Scottish North-Eastern Railwav 0.258 0.257 0.255 0.256 0.271 0.266 0.288 
Source: Appendix, table 21(a\. 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway at the shareholder inquiry in 1849-50 were 24.5% 
for debentures/caoital and 0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
Each company within the Scottish North-Eastern, however, held statutory 
responsibility to pay any debts acquired prior to amalgamation; dividends therefore 
were dependent upon a surplus remaining from the constituent company's revenue 
share. Thus the Aberdeen continued to struggle for the next five years while its 
1• 9 Railway Times, 22 September 1855, p. 1021 . 
150 19&20 Vic. cap.134, 1856, The Scottish North-Eastern Railway Company's Act; Report to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen Railway, 19 September 1855, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S}/1/36; Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 6 June 1855, 
NAS/BR/SCM/1 /3, p.158; Herapath's Railway Jou ma I, 18 October 1856, p.1095; Railway 
Times, 19 April 1856, p.478 and p.489. 
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partner was able to pay consistent dividends on its ordinary stock because the 
Scottish Midland had not required loans above its authorised limit and so had 
avoided the interest burden that the Aberdeen's debts of debentures, preference 
stock and temporary loans had incurred. Herapath's Railway Journal noted similar 
patterns in England: 
It is a remarkable and most instructive fact that those lines in England which 
pay remunerative dividends are those whose capital cost is light ... If you well 
attend to the capital account you may leave the revenue to take care of 
itself.151 
The veracity of Herapath's statement is illustrated by the returns paid to Scottish 
North-Eastern shareholders; it took sixteen years from incorporation and five years 
from amalgamation for the Aberdeen to offer its first dividend on ordinary stock, in 
contrast to the steady dividends of the Scottish Midland Junction (tables 33 and 34). 
The longer-term effects of previous debt continued to be reflected in shareholder 
returns until the Scottish North-Eastern amalgamated with the Caledonian in 1866.152 
Table 33: Dividends paid to Aberdeen and Scottish Midland Junction shareholders, 
1856-61 
July Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan 
1856 1857 1857 1858 1858 1859 1859 1860 1860 1861 
Stock: 
Aberdeen 6% 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Aberdeen 7% 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Aberdeen 3½% - - - 3½ 3½ 3½ 3½ 3 ½ 3 ½ 
Aberdeen Ordinarv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 
Scottish Midland 3½ 3¼ 3¼ 4 4 4 4 4 4¼ 4¼ 
Junction Ordinarv 
Sources: Accounts of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 1856-61 , NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36; Minutes of the 
Scottish North-Eastern Rai~ay, 1856-61, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1 ; Railway Times, 15 September 1866, 
oo.1089-92; Bradshaw's Ra,Jwsv Almsnsck, volumes for 1857-62. 
151 Herapath's Railway Journal, 21 April 1855, p.415. 
152 29&30 Vic. cap.350, 1866, The Caledonian and Scottish North-Eastern Railways 
Amalgamation Act. 
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Table 34: Dividends on ordinary stock paid within the Scottish North-Eastern Railway 
1861-66 
July Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan 
1861 1862 1862 1863 1863 1864 1864 1865 1865 1866 
Aberdeen ½ 1½ 1¼ 5/8 7/8 1 1¼ 1 ¼ 2 1/8 2 ¼ 
Scottish Midland 4¼ 5¼ 5 4¼ 4¼ 4 ¼ 4 ¼ 5 5 1/8 5½ 
Junction 
Dundee and Arbroath 7 ½ 7 ½ 7 ½ 7 ¼ 8 ¼ 8 ½ 
(amalgamated 1863; dividend auaranteed) 
sources: Railway Times, 15 September 1866, pp.1089-92; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 
1861-66. NAS/BR/SNE/1/1 -3. 
***** 
Although the state took no part in the realisation of its approved northern railway 
route, its authorisations of 1845-46 not only provided a cross-border route through 
the Scotland's central valley and the important trading towns of Stirling and Perth to 
Aberdeen, but they also created a virtual railway monopoly centred on Aberdeen, 
independently planned by local commercial and legal interests to sustain and 
enhance its economic dominance of the region. The opportunity was available in 
1845-50 to achieve a unified and coherent northern railway system radiating from 
Aberdeen with routes connecting into the southern network and extending 
northwards towards the highlands, but this chapter has shown that the strategic 
plans of the state and Aberdonian entrepreneurs were not so easily realised. Free 
market capitalism induced intense competition, but both the west- and east-coast 
alliances failed to wrest control of the northern route, despite a strong English 
influence in Aberdeen where a key company was bankrupt in all but name, which 
suggests the importance attributed by shareholders to local control of northern 
railways. Moreover, the fragmentation of the Aberdeen railway web, triggered by the 
actions of the English alliances and the financial weaknesses of the Aberdeen 
Railway, delayed the expected continuous railway route across Aberdeen to 
Inverness for two decades. 
English capital was an important component in financing the Aberdeen main line, 
which mirrors its contribution to the linked cross-border routes. Local capital was 
more difficult to raise along the rural sections of the route, although one-third of the 
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Aberdeen Railway's authorised capital was subscribed locally. While all three 
companies along the route used bank finance, the Aberdeen Railway obtained 
temporary credit as an alternative source of finance before its line was opened. Two 
of the companies achieved some reduction in the cost per mile for this trunk route 
compared with costs for the earlier Scottish inter-urban lines, but the inaccuracy of 
estimates experienced earlier in Scotland and England continued, although with 
some diminution in their scale. 
The consequences of these inaccuracies produced a marked contrast in the financial 
performance of the three companies. Although Scottish Central required additional 
capital powers, its pivotal position in the northern route allowed it to generate 
revenue that yielded a steady dividend. The Scottish Midland Junction, the most 
secure of the three financially, benefited from an early amendment to its capital 
powers and so it avoided the potential impact of its inaccurate estimates; it did not 
acquire debt even to its authorised loan limit and, consequently, was able 
consistently to pay dividends.153 The Aberdeen, however, was severely damaged 
by inaccurate estimates and the difficulties of raising new capital, which resulted in 
the raising of capital from preference shares and the acquisition of considerable 
'hidden' debt augmented by arrears of dividend due on its guaranteed capital. It 
provides the first example in this study of a northern railway company increasingly 
burdened by fixed interest debt, but which was able to extricate itself slowly from 
acute insolvency, a pattern that was to be repeated in the late 1860s for its 
adversary, the Great North of Scotland Railway, and explained in chapter 8. 
By 1856, ten years after incorporation and eight years after the bitter rift with its host 
company, the Great North had managed to construct the northern route 54 miles 
153 8&9 Vic. cap. 170, 1845, The Scottish Midland Junction Railway Act authorised capital of 
£300 000 and borrowing powers of £100,000; Appendix, table 20(a) shows capital 
expe~diture by July 1851 to be £642.~4~. which would have resulted in expenditure being 
114.1 % above estimate. However, within a year of the 1845 incorporation, capital powers for 
an enlarged system were approved under 9&10 Vic. cap.75, 1846, The Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway Branches Act, which increased authorised capital to £600,000 with 
borrowing powers of £300,000, not all of which was required for three proposed branches. 
As these branches were not immediately constructed and as the company raised almost its 
full share capital, the Scottish Midland Junction was able to produce a sound financial 
performance between 1846 and 1856. 
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beyond Aberdeen to Keith, just half of the 1846 authorised line to lnverness.154 The 
delay in construction, the inconvenience of trans-shipment at Aberdeen and the 
exercise of monopoly power by the Great North had renewed the resolve in 
Inverness to secure local control of railways in the north and the strategic plans of 
Inverness promoters had already passed into implementation by this date. The next 
two chapters examine these developments of the northern railway system beyond 
Aberdeen towards the highlands. 
154 Report to the 4th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 
November 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, noting the estimate of £470,000 to construct 54 miles 
of single line but with earthworks for double between Aberdeen and Keith as half the distance 
to Inverness; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 10 October 1856, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.424, reporting the approval of the Board of Trade on 8th October to open 
the line to Keith: the line had been open from Aberdeen as far as Huntly (40 miles) since 
September 1854. 
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Chapter 5: The Great North's monopoly, 1846-61 
The previous chapter identified the strategic planning of a railway network centred on 
Aberdeen, but it also showed the impact of capital shortages in completing the 
northern trunk route to Aberdeen and the disintegration of the Aberdeen railway web, 
which threatened the realisation of the continuous railway route from the south 
through Aberdeen to Inverness. This chapter examines the implementation of plans 
for the authorised Aberdeen-Inverness line by the Great North of Scotland Railway in 
the years when it overcame early financial difficulties and began to yield high returns 
to its shareholders, but during which the seeds of its later financial collapse were 
sown. The following chapter investigates railway development in this period from the 
perspective of rival railway strategists in Inverness. 
The first section considers the initial capital problems of the company, which resulted 
in severe delays in construction and its acceptance of railway promotions from 
Inverness to complete the route. The strong financial position built rapidly by the 
Great North from the flow of northern traffic over its monopoly route is demonstrated 
in the following section. The Great North's policy of supporting local branch lines Is 
then assessed, which reveals an escalating burden of debt within the branch 
companies that was to impact severely on the parent company in the 1860s. The 
final section explores the Great North's plans to secure its monopoly position and 
circumvent the barrier that Inverness promoters created by constructing part of the 
Aberdeen-Inverness main line, and considers the effects of the Great North's 
monopoly powers in the region that were to contribute to its later financial crisis. 
Throughout the chapter, the widespread involvement of the banking sector in 
providing an alternative source of railway finance to the Great North and its satellite 
companies is manifest. 
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The early years of the Great North 
The incorporation of the Great North to construct the Aberdeen-Inverness route was 
reported to be 'as a result of the Board of Trade's decision in favour of the Aberdeen 
line';1 branches were to serve Banff, Portsoy, Garrnouth and Burghead on the Moray 
Firth coast to capture traffic from the northern counties of Ross, Cromarty and 
Sutherland.2 A dividend of 7 percent was forecast, reduced from an earlier estimate 
of 1 O percent. 3 The 1846 parliamentary session, which approved the Great North 
scheme and its eastern extension to Peterhead and Fraserburgh on the north-east 
coast, also authorised the independent Morayshire Railway to link Lossiemouth 
harbour on the Moray Firth to Elgin and, by use of the Great North line from Elgin to 
Orton, to extend from Orton to Rothes, providing a northerly outlet from the Spey 
valley to the coast." However, this network in north-east Scotland took two decades 
to materialise and, ultimately, not under the auspices solely of the Great North. 
The aftermath of the 1845 speculative mania made railway shares unattractive to 
investors nationally, but the Great North had exacerbated its difficulties by the over-
issue of shares to try to secure sufficient deposits to meet expenses, as chapter 3 
has shown.5 As a result, the share capital of £1.1 million proposed in the 1845 
1 Railway Chronicle, 29 March 1845, p.365; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
30 March 1845, p.21, quoting the Railway Board report of 1845; 9&10 Vic. cap.103, 1846, 
The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
2 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p. 7; 
See chapter 4, map 5. 
3 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p. 22; 
Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477 /1; Sir M 
Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway (London, 1949, reprinted 
Shepperton, 1998), pp.3-4; HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Newton 
Abbot, 1965), p.14. 
4 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 September 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, 
p.39; 9&10 Vic. cap.135, 1846, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Eastern Extension) Act; 
9& 1 O Vic. cap.178, 1846, The Morayshire Railway Act. 
6 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 April 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.26; Sir 
M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway, pp.5-6; J Mitchell, 
Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II (private publication, 2 volumes, London, 
1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1971), p.168. 
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prospectus was increased in the act of incorporation to £1.5 million.8 At the first 
shareholders' meeting, directors recommended deferring construction 'until the 
works of the Aberdeen Railway, with which it is closely linked, shall have reached a 
more advanced stage'.7 The Aberdeen Railway directors held control of the Great 
North, Great North Eastern Extension, Dee-side, and Alford Valley Railways and, 
acutely aware of the shortage of capital, postponed any work on these related lines 
'until better times than the present'.8 
The capital account of the Great North was in deficit in 1846 by £18,436, principally 
due to the costs of the parliamentary contest and there was no immediate prospect 
of raising significant funds for construction by calls on shares. 9 The lack of progress 
in constructing the Great North prompted the Morayshire Railway to delay its 
authorised line from Rothes to Lossiemouth, but the directors expressed the hope of 
building the section between Elgin and Lossiemouth harbour during 1847.10 The 
Elgin-Lossiemouth section subsequently became the first railway north of Aberdeen, 
but it was not opened until 1852. The leverage that this little company was later able 
to exert on its larger rivals is examined in chapter 7. 
Further postponement 'in consequence of the continued embarrassment of 
mercantile affairs' was agreed by Great North shareholders in 1847, also approving 
an application to take advantage of new parliamentary provisions to extend the time 
allowed to construct railways, introduced because of national economic conditions.11 
cs Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.24; 
9& 1 o Vic. cap.103, 1846, The Great North of Scotland Act. 
7 Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of shareholders of the Great North of 
ScotlandRailway, 21 August 1846, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.103. 
8 Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 December 1847, p.1352. 
9 Appendix, table 10(b). 
10 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Morayshire Railway, 9 September 
1846, NAS/BR/MOR/1/1. 
11 Report to the 2nd Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 
November 1847, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 
November 1847, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.154, and 11 January 1848, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.156, 
reporting an application to extend powers for two years to build the line and purchase land; 
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The economic depression and financial crisis of 1847-48, for example, resulted in the 
collapse of the Aberdeen Banking Company and a serious loss of capital by the 
Aberdeen-based North of Scotland Bank.12 The Great North had agreed in 1845 to 
purchase the Aberdeenshire Canal for £36,000, but had to negotiate deferment of 
the payment due in April 1848 at a cost of 5½ percent annual interest.13 
The state granted a two-year extension to build the line and directors reassured 
shareholders that five years therefore remained for construction.14 Economic 
conditions improved in 1849, illustrated by the fall in bank discount rates to between 
two and three percent throughout 1849-52.15 The Great North directors saw an 
opportunity to begin construction as other lines promoted in the speculation of 1845-
46 were completed: 
... a large amount of the capital, skill, and plant, which had been employed in 
their construction was, or would shortly be, unemployed and that an 
opportunity might then be afforded for the formation of this Line on very 
favourable terms ... 18 
Herapath's Railway Journal, 27 November 1847, p.1334, quoting a report in The Times, 23 
November 184 7, that announced that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had granted two 
years' additional time for completion of railway works; 11 & 12 Vic. cap.3, 1848, The Railways 
(Extension of Time) Act. 
12 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975), p.349: the 
Aberdeen Banking Company found its capital reduced from £300,000 to £7,049 in the 
banking crisis of 1847-48 and merged with the Union bank of Scotland in 1849; the North of 
Scotland Bank faced a severe run In February 1848 which reduced Its capital from £380,000 
to £115,550; A Keith, The North of Scotland Bank Ltd, 1836-1936 (Aberdeen, 1936), pp.51-
55, p.59 and p.65, notes that the Aberdeen Bank collapsed in 1849 after lending £295,000 to 
firms without adequate security, while the North of Scotland Bank incurred a loss of £160,000 
when the two largest textile firms in Aberdeen collapsed. 
13 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 October 1845, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.43, 
agreeing the purchase of the Aberdeenshire Canal; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 4 August 1848, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.159, recording the agreement to defer payment 
for the Aberdeenshire Canal at annual interest of 5½ % on the capital sum of £36,000. 
14 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 August 1848, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.156; 
Report to the shareholders of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 November 1848, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, p.165. 
15 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875, appendix 12, p.83. 
18 Report to shareholders for the 4th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway Company, 28 November 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14. 
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The majority of the Great North's directors had been ejected from the board of the 
Aberdeen Railway in 1848, but had experienced the consequences of unrealistic 
estimates of construction and land costs on that line.17 Sir James Elphinstone, who 
replaced Thomas Blaikie as chairman of the Great North in April 1849, sought the 
agreement of landowners to accept a feu duty or the price in company shares for 
their land to avoid capital expenditure.18 
The capital account of the Great North in 1848-49 appears peculiar, showing an 
apparent halving of receipts caused principally by a payment of £73,350 to their law 
agents to recover shares Issued against a loan negotiated from the North of Scotland 
Bank in 1846.19 Removal of this artificial amount previously included as share 
receipts revealed that only £71,242 had been raised by August 1849; the capital 
account was balanced by a bank overdraft of £21,284 and £36,000 was still owed to 
the Aberdeenshire Canal company, an expensive purchase given that only one-third 
of the canal was used for the railway route due to its severe curvature.20 The 
Aberdeen banking sector therefore already held a significant stake in this company 
before any construction was begun. The total assets of the Great North in March 
17 See chapter 4, 'The disintegration of the Aberdeen web'. 
18 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 April 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.192, 
reporting the appointment of Sir James Elphinston~ as chairman; Report to the 4th Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 November 1849, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; Circular to landowners reported in the minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 30 August 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, pp.202-203, and also a letter from the 
chairman and directors of the Great North to landowners dated 20 February 1850, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; see Glossary entry on 'feu duty'. 
19 Appendix, table 10(b), note (2): £73,350 was lent to the Great North of Scotland Railway 
by the North of Scotland Bank in 1846 via their law agents, Adam and Anderson (both bank 
directors) to meet increased parliamentary costs as a result of the increase of deposit 
required from 5% to 10% (29 September 1845, NAS/.BR/GNS/1/1, p.40) and the Great North 
issued 1630 £50 shares representing £45 paid up per share ( although only £2.1 Os had been 
called at that date) to Adam and Anderson as security (annual accounts to 30 August 1847 in 
minutes of the 2nd Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 
November 1847, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.155). The loan was approved for repayment on 11 
February 1849 (NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, p.177) and the shares returned to the Great North on 24 
February 1849 (NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.181) and cancelled, hence the apparent fall in share 
receipts between August 1848 and March 1849. 
20 Report to the 4th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway. 28 
November 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; Appendix, table 10(b); D Pearson, 'The 
Aberdeenshire Canal', Great North Review, 41, No.162 (September 2004), p.84. 
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1849 exceeded liabilities by £8,275 with no immediate means to repay debts.21 The 
directors decided to commence construction in order to earn revenue and repay 
debt, but the construction tender included the option of building no further than 
Keith.22 By containing costs, the directors expected to open 54 miles of single line to 
Keith for £470,000, representing £8,704 per mile and significantly cheaper than the 
£20,000-30,000 per mile quoted to shareholders as the costs incurred by seven 
other Scottish lines.23 
Before giving possession of their land, landowners sought assurances that the line 
would be completed and banks refused further advances without guarantees of 
construction.24 The Duke of Richmond was the largest landowner; Barclay-Harvey 
asserts that 'it was largely owing to his assistance that the Railway was ever 
made' •25 Richmond agreed to take £15,000 of stock, prompting other landowners to 
provide a further £10,000.26 Shareholders approved proposals to re-structure the 
capital of the company, converting the former £50 shares on which £2 10s deposit 
had been paid into £10 ordinary shares, creating 83,058 new 5 percent preference 
shares and reducing the share capital of the company from £1,500,000 to 
£1,107,440; authorisation was received in 1851.27 The contract for construction was 
21 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 March 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.187. 
22 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 August 1849 and 31 August 1849, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, p.198 and pp.200-201. 
23 Report to the 4th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 
November 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14 and NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.220: engineer Cubltt's 
estimate for 54 miles of single line to Keith with earthworks for double track was £380,000 to 
which was added the £40,000 purchase cost of the Aberdeenshire Canal and £50,000 for 
•other expenses'. Costs quoted per mile for other railways were: Aberdeen £26,000; 
Caledonian £30,000; Dundee and Perth £20,000; Scottish Central £27,000; Edinburgh, Perth 
and Dundee £28,000; Glasgow and Ayr £25,000; Scottish Midland Junction £20,000. 
24 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 September 1849 and 15 March 1850, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.209 and p.240. 
25 Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway, p.11. 
25 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 August 1850, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, 
p.258; Report to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
November 1850, p.270. 
27 Report to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
November 1850, p. 270, detailing the new Bill and the contract for a single line; 14&15 Vic. 
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finally signed in March 1851 with the contractor taking 15,000 shares in part 
payment.28 
The Great North needed new capital, but a proposal to the Great Northern, York and 
North Midland and the North British Railways for £150,000 investment in return for a 
guaranteed dividend and direction of traffic via the east-coast route was 
unsuccessful.29 Despite the antagonism of 1848-49, an approach was made to the 
Aberdeen Railway, which commissioned two of its directors 'to examine into the 
position of the affairs of the Great North of Scotland Railway Company'. 30 The 
Aberdeen was anxious to divert northern traffic onto its own line and therefore 
criticised the Great North's proposal to build only to Keith without providing a cross-
Aberdeen link: 
The want of a junction with the Aberdeen Line would be an entire bar to the 
interchange of traffic, while Keith, as the Northern terminus, would not, by 
any means, secure for the Railway the Traffic from the Northern Counties ... 
it should extend, at the outset, from the junction with the Aberdeen Railway to 
Burghead where, opening upon the sea at a very convenient harbour, it 
would at once secure the large traffic from the extensive coasts on both sides 
of the Moray Frith.31 
The cost of a line to Burghead was estimated as £900,000, but with only £399,000 
available, the Aberdeen advised the Great North not to begin construction with less 
cap.75, 1851, The Great North of Scotl~nd Railway Amendment Act, authorising revised 
share capital of £1,107,440 and borrowing powers of £300,000; Appendix, table 10(a). 
28 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 December 1850, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, 
p.277; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 15 March 1851, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, 
p.288. 
29 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 September 1852, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1 
p. 353; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway, p.14. ' 
30 Report of the Aberdeen Railway directors into the affairs of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway Company, 16 July 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14. 
31 Report of the Aberdeen Railway directors into the affairs of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway Company, 16 July 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; Minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 16 July 1852, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, pp.338-42. 
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than £750,000 capital; any recommendation of financial support from the Aberdeen 
was to be conditional upon acceptance of the larger scheme.32 
The 1846 powers granted to the Great North to build to Inverness, extended for two 
years in 1848, remained valid until 1853. The Great North board approved a new 
prospectus in November 1852 for a line to run from Aberdeen to Elgin at an 
amended cost of £750,000, but reported that capital was available to build only half 
that distance.33 The directors advised shareholders that, while they would wish to 
build to Elgin, resources were sufficient for 'construction of a line from Kittybrewster 
to Huntly with the prospect of a speedy connection to Keith', at a cost per mile not 
greater than £10,000.3-4 The Aberdeen Railway responded in an open letter to the 
press stating that they could not recommend the proposed Great North scheme; the 
breach between the Aberdeen and Great North thus became absolute.35 Chairman 
Elphinstone re-assured Great North shareholders that: 
. . . this is almost the only Railway in Great Britain on which there is a 
monopoly of the traffic of the district through which it passes. We can have 
no sea competition, and must carry the whole of the traffic of the country ... 38 
32 Report of the Aberdeen Railway directors into the affairs of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway Company, 16 July 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14. 
33 Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, amended scheme 1852, 
NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/9, estimating a capital cost per mile of £7,000; Minutes of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 29 November 1852, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.372 and p.375. 
34 Report to the 7th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
November 1852, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1. p.372; Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
29 November 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14: chairman Elphinstone stated that 'The cost we 
anticipate ... will not exceed, inclusive of working plant and the cost of land, £10,000 per mile 
and £25 per mile per week on that, which is the sum drawn by the Aberdeen Line, would give 
us seven percent on our outlay'. 
35 Aberdeen Herald, 2 December 1852, recorded in minutes of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 2 December 1852, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.376. 
36 Report of chairman's statement to shareholders of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
November 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /14. 
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By November 1853, the line to Huntly was almost finished and the directors 
recommended seeking an extension into Aberdeen from Kittybrewster along the line 
of the Aberdeenshire Canal because 'construction of the line through Aberdeen ... 
must take some time to complete'.37 Thus, a trunk route of over one hundred miles 
authorised in 1846 had shrunk to an isolated rural line of some forty miles, but its 
land monopoly remained and served to consolidate and strengthen the company 
once it opened its line to Huntly in September 1854.38 The first guide book for the 
line described the decision to restrict initial construction to Huntly as 'prudential'.39 
The reactions in Inverness, however, were less sympathetic; Joseph Mitchell 
portrayed the Great North's situation as • ... giving little hope to the northern counties 
of obtaining railway communication even by Aberdeen' .40 With the Great North's 
powers to build to Inverness due to expire in 1853 and with only part of the line 
under construction, the Inverness promoters seized the initiative to establish their 
own railway web, as chapter 6 will illustrate. 
The results of monopoly power 
By the time the Great North opened its line to Huntly, promoters In Inverness were 
seeking authorisation for a fifteen mile line from Inverness eastwards to Naim.41 The 
two Inverness newspapers were scathing of the Great North's inability to build the 
full line and demanded local control: 
37 Report to the 8th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 25 
November 1853, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.463; 17&18 Vic cap.187, 1854, The Great North of 
Scotland Railway Amendment Act: Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 July 
1853 and 27 August 1853, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.409 and pp,.420-22, recording that disputes 
between the Great North and Aberdeen over a junction at Aberdeen to provide a through 
route continued in 1853 until the Great North's decision to build the Waterloo branch on 25 
November 1853. 
38 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 8 September 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, 
p.78. 
39 A Ramsay, Guide to the Great North of Scotland Railway (Banff, 1854), p.(v). 
<4() J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.168. 
41 17&18 Vic. cap.176, 1854, The Inverness and Nairn Railway Act. 
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These parties have for eight years had an act for giving the public railway 
accommodation to Inverness. They had not used their powers. They have 
kept others, by pre-occupation, out of the field.42 
They [the Great North] have proved an incubus on social progress in this 
quarter ... They can qualify for no right of interference with the internal 
concerns of the northern counties ... 43 
The Great North's original strategy had been to secure the route to Inverness and, 
via linked lines, to control traffic generated in the districts surrounding the route. 
capital difficulties prevented realisation of that strategy, but the new Incursion from 
Inverness into its perceived territory did not arouse major concern in Aberdeen. The 
Great North made a draft agreement for running rights over, and traffic interchange 
with, the Inverness and Nairn Railway in 1854 in return for withdrawing its opposition 
to the Inverness bill in Parliament.44 Through oversight, intrigue or naivety on both 
sides, that agreement was never formally completed with the result that the Great 
North was denied its own access into Inverness for the rest of the century.45 
Nevertheless, the Nairn line and a projected extension eastwards was intended to 
link to the Great North line and therefore any traffic from the northern counties would 
flow down the Great North to Aberdeen without the Great North being required to 
provide new capital. The Great North agreed an investment of £40,000 in the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, authorised to build the link from Nairn to 
Keith in 1856.46 Great North shareholders were advised: 'This arrangement ... will 
42 Inverness Advertiser, 7 February 1854. 
43 Inverness Courier, 10 February 1854. 
44 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 25 February 1854, pp.83-84; minutes of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 25 February 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.497. 
◄5 HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, p.29 and p.131; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, 
A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway, p.26: Barclay-Harvey asserts that the Great 
North ultimately lost their copy of the unsigned agreement. 
46 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 26 October 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.64; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 14 November 1856, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.2 of printed report; 19&20 Vic, cap.110, 
1856, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
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relieve us of having anything to do with crossing the Spey, a matter of vast 
. rt '1,7 Impo ance .... 
That 'matter of vast importance' was the absence of any resources within the Great 
North for immediate expensive expansion. In May 1854, four months before its line 
opened to Huntly, the company had assets of £434,453 but llabllltles of £573,856.48 
That same month, the North of Scotland Bank made a temporary loan of £64,000 to 
the Great North conditional upon no extension being made beyond Huntly whilst any 
of that loan was outstanding, which provides an example of a bank setting strategic 
parameters for a railway company."9 Just three months later, the Great North sought 
a further loan from the North of Scotland Bank for £50,000, using the company's 
rolling stock as security.50 Great North directors revealed to their shareholders that 
the company would have approved an incursion from Inverness as far as Huntly to 
obviate the need for any further capital expenditure, such were its financial 
constraints in advance of any revenue stream. 51 
In the first year of operation to Huntly in 1854-55, the company produced a 
reassuring revenue surplus of £15,102 and paid 1½ percent dividend.52 The Great 
'-
7 Report to the 10th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
October 1855, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, explaining the £40,000 invested in Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway shares: ' ... The Inverness company had, within the last few days, 
definitively proposed to construct the line to Keith from Inverness, provided the Great North 
company agreed to hold stock to the extent of £40,000 in their undertaking. This 
arrangement ... will relieve us of having anything to do with crossing the Spey, a matter of 
vast importance .. .'. 
-48 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 17 May 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.553. 
"
9 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 18 May 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.2, 
recording that the North of Scotland Bank was to recommend to their board a loan of £64,000 
'provided no advance beyond Huntly is made whilst any of the loan is outstanding without 
Bank consent'. 
50 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 August, 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.48. 
st Report to the 9th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 
November 1854, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, recording that 'Had the gentlemen who were 
proposing the line from Nairn to Elgin given any indication that they would meet the Great 
North Railway at Huntly, the Directors of that line would not have offered the smallest 
opposition to the Inverness company'. 
52 Appendix, table 10( d); Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1855-61, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S}/1/14. 
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North obtained powers in 1855 to extend 12½ miles from Huntly to Keith.53 When 
the Great North opened to Keith in 1856, it had built just half of the main line it was 
originally authorised to construct. The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction line opened 
to Keith in 1858, thus completing the link between Aberdeen and Inverness, twelve 
years after the original authorisation of the route, but the need for trans-shipment at 
Aberdeen remained because of the absence of a connection with the Scottish North-
Eastern Railway. The detour via Aberdeen and the discontinuity of route remained 
important catalysts for further northern railway development promoted from 
Inverness, as chapter 7 will show. 
The Great North opened its Aberdeen terminus at Waterloo Quay in 1855-56.54 With 
only a later goods tramway between the Great North and the Scottish North-
Eastern, 55 much of the northern goods traffic continued to use sea transport and little 
attempt was made by the Great North to divert it south by railway. This primitive 
connection between the two railways was still criticised seven years later for 
'inconvenience and detention in the transmission of through traffic •.. ',58 Indeed, the 
expansion of railways north of Aberdeen provided a stimulus to steam shipping from 
Aberdeen to the south. 57 The Great North also used coastal shipping as a means of 
competing for northern traffic; its goods manager reported 'threatening competition' 
from other railways and steamship companies which prompted the company to 
subsidise steamships of the Inverness and Edinburgh Steam Packet Company to run 
53 18 Vic. cap.28, 1855, The Great North of Scotland Railway Extension Act: the estimated 
cost of the Huntly-Keith section was £80,000, but the legislation did not prescribe new capital 
powers because the parliamentary acts of 1846 and 1851 had approved capital powers for 
construction of the main line between Aberdeen and Inverness. 
54 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 21 March 1856, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2.p.389, 
reporting the approval of the Board to Trade to open the Waterloo branch to passengers on 1 
April 1856; the branch opened to goods traffic on 24 September 1855. The Kittybrewster to 
Waterloo branch was 1 ¾ miles in length. 
55 scroll minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 22 December 1858, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/5, proposing a junction between the Aberdeen and Great North Railways • ... 
by means of a railway across the Harbour and Docks at Aberdeen'. 
56 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 14 March 
1862, NAS/BR/SN E/1 /1, p.653. 
s1 CH Lee, 'Some aspects of the coastal shipping trade: the Aberdeen Steam Navigation 
Company 1835-1880'. Journal of Transport History, new series, 111, No.2 (September 1975), 
p.102. 
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to ports on the south and north coasts of the Moray Firth in 1859-60, but a loss of 
£4,91 O was sustained and the support was withdrawn. 58 Despite continued 
competition from sea transport, northern traffic strengthened the Great North's 
revenue and its capital account moved into surplus.59 Gross revenue of £46,368 in 
1856, when the line opened to Keith, rose to £69,468 in 1859 after the Inverness link 
was completed, a rise of 50 percent, and by 1861, gross revenue reached £89,895, 
a further rise of 30 percent. As a result, dividend rose from 2¼ percent in 1856 to 5 
percent in 1859 and 6¾ percent in 1861.60 
Without sole control of the full route to Inverness, the Great North strategy turned to 
dominance of the district between Aberdeen and Keith by providing support to 
nominally independent branch line companies that were expected to feed traffic to 
the main line.61 The anticipated economic contribution of branch lines to the Great 
North proved to be over-optimistic and added significantly to the weakening of the 
financial position of the company over the next decade. The Railway Times issued 
an early warning in 1855: 
The Great North of Scotland main line is a good prope'Jl, and will remain so 
unless weakened and endangered by hasty extensions. 6 
Shareholders were, however, very content to allow the directors to pursue their 
branch line expansion while dividends remained at such attractive levels. 
58 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 January 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.298; 
Journal and Ledger of the Inverness and Edinburgh Steam Packet Company, 1859-60, 
NAS/BR/GNS/23/57-58, p.86 of Journal showing a loss to the Great North of £4,910 by June 
1860; RH Mellor (ed.), The Railways of Scotland: the papers of Andrew C O'Dell (Aberdeen, 
1984), p.23. 
59 Appendix, tables 10(c) and 10(d). 
60 Appendix, table 10(d). 
61 Appendix, table 10(c), showing the first branch subscriptions given in 1855 to the lnverury 
and Old Meldrum Junction Railway and the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway. 
62 Railway Times, 6 January 1855, p.15. 
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The failure of the Great North to complete the lines authorised in 1846 presents 
difficulties in assessing the validity of estimates and the realised costs of the 
truncated main line. The 1851 Amendment Act reduced the share capital of the 
company for the Aberdeen-Inverness scheme and capital powers were further 
adjusted in 1859: both parliamentary acts introduced 5 percent preference stock into 
the capital structure of the company.63 The revised prospectus of 1852 had 
projected a line from Aberdeen to Elgin at a cost of £750,000, £150,000 less than the 
cost estimated by the Aberdeen Railway directors, but 27½ miles of that route was 
ultimately constructed by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction. The 1849 estimate 
given to shareholders for the Aberdeen-Keith line was £470,000, equivalent to 
£8,704 per mile.64 The Great North line to Keith opened in 1856; by 1857, £846,318 
had been spent, 80.1 percent above the directors' estimate and at a capital cost of 
£15,672 per mile.65 Nevertheless, that cost per mile was just three-quarters of the 
Scottish Midland Junction's cost and only half that of the Scottish Central identified in 
chapter 3.66 Land costs, including the cost of the Aberdeenshire Canal, were 11.8 
percent of capital expenditure in 1857, just below the range of land costs incurred on 
the 1837-38 inter-urban lines.67 The Great North had, however, experienced an 
expensive parliamentary battle to obtain Incorporation; these costs accounted for 
10.6 percent of capital expenditure by 1857.68 
Over the period 1855-61, the debt gearing for the Great North demonstrates that the 
failure to complete the full 1846 railway scheme had not diminished the ability of this 
small rural railway line to establish a sound financial base (table 35). Its financial 
63 14&15 Vic. cap.75, 1851, The Great North of Scotland Amendment Act; 22&23 Vic. cap.8, 
1859, The Great North of Scotland Railway Consolidation Act; Appendix, table 10(a). 
64 Report to the 4th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 
November 1849, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14 and NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.220. 
65 Appendix, table 10(c), note (2): the cost per mile includes the cost of plant and the 
purchase cost of the Aberdeenshire Canal. 
66 Appendix, table 19(a), note (2), table 20 (a), note (3) and table 26. 
67 Appendix, table 10 (c) and table 26; CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway 
System 1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 1983}, pp.170-73. 
68 Appendix, table 10 (c), showing £89,447 spent on preliminary and parliamentary expenses 
of the £846,318 total capital expenditure by 1857 (10.6%). 
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performance presents a marked contrast to that of the Aberdeen Railway, analysed 
in the previous chapter, and doubtless gave considerable satisfaction to the Great 
North directors who had been dismissed from the Aberdeen Railway board in 1848. 
Table 35: Financial indicators for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1855-61 
08.1855 08.1856 08.1857 08.1858 07.1859 07.1860 07.1861 
Ratio of debentures to 11 .2% 29.0% 30.5% 34.7% 36.0% 31 .0% 31 .0% 
capital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue 0.321 0.212 0.227 0.180 0.186 0.204 0.205 
to total debt 
Source: Annendix, table 10(e\. 
1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for cross revenue/debt. 
With the capital account in surplus and a rising revenue stream, a steady 
improvement in debt gearing might be expected, as illustrated by the Scottish 
Midland Junction Railway in chapter 4. However, the capital account of the Great 
North shows increased funding being provided for branch companies from 1858 and 
rising levels of temporary loans, but offset by the strong growth in gross revenue 
which averted any immediate financial instability, a situation that was to change 
rapidly during the 18605.69 
The Great North's branch line strategy 
The collapse of the Aberdeen monopoly web in 1848 followed by the failure to 
complete the full route to Inverness required the Great North to devise new plans to 
subjugate the territory to the north and west of Aberdeen. Powers for the 1846 
Alford Valley Railway had lapsed but the Deeside Railway was re-incorporated in 
1852, independent of the Aberdeen or Great North Railways, 70 and its later influence 
is examined in chapter 7. 
69 Appendix, tables 10(c) and 10(d): the scale of the indebtedness of the Great North to 
bankers is shown in table 10(e). 
70 15 Vic. cap.61, 1852, The Deeside Railway Act. 
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Authorised capital for the Great North had been predicated upon formation of the full 
Aberdeen-Inverness line and branches, but even its revised 1852 proposal to 
construct the Aberdeen-Elgin route had been restricted to the Aberdeen-Keith 
section by the intervention of the new Inverness companies in building from 
Inverness to Keith.71 As already shown, the confinement of the Great North to half 
its projected main line did not affect its profitability and its extensive capital-raising 
powers therefore gave scope to consolidate and protect its territory. This new-found 
investment ability was outlined by chairman Elphinstone in 1857: 
... the promotion of the line beyond Keith by an independent Company had 
left a large reserve of funds in the hands of the Great North, part of which 
they had resolved to apply to the promotion of independent branch lines ... 
the Great North's unexhausted available capital amounted to £500,000 which 
would enable them to fulfill all their engagements and have a considerable 
balance.72 
That statement referred to the £1,407,440 of authorised capital, not to the £816,652 
realised by 1857, nor to the company's ability to raise it.73 Credit was dear; in 
November 1857, bank discount rate reached 10 percent, but fell back to 6 percent by 
January 1858.74 The 1858 capital account was in deficit by £42,077 with an 
additional £50,837 owed to banks.75 However, once the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway opened to Keith in August 1858, northern traffic resulted in a 
71 Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, amended scheme 1852, 
NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/9; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 
December 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, p.118, approving a revised prospectus and a new share 
capital limit for the company of £325,000. 
72 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 7 September 1857, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
pp.43-44. 
13 14& 15 Vic. cap. 75, 1851, the Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act, setting 
authorised share capital at £1,107,440 with £300,000 of borrowing powers; Appendix, table 
10(c): by July 1857, £567,689 had been raised from share capital and £248,963 from 
debenture loans. 
7" Bradshaw's Railway A/manack, 1875, appendix 12, p.83. 
15 capital accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1857-58, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; 
Appendix, table 10(c). 
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marked improvement in the Great North's capital and revenue accounts,76 aided also 
by a period of cheaper credit in 1858-60.n The level of Great North dividend, 
greater than that paid by the Caledonian and North British Railways which operated 
the Anglo-Scottish routes, made the company attractive to investors (table 36). 
Table 36: Average annual dividends for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1855-64 
Annual dividend (to 31 1855 1856 1857 1858 
Julv/Aua each year)(%) 
1859 1880 1861 1862 1883 1884 
Great North (2) 1½ 2¼ 4½ 4½ 5 6½ 6¾ 7¼ 7 5 Caledonian Railwav 3 1½ 3½ 4¼ 3 7/8 4 5/8 5¼ 5¼ 5 5/8 6 3/8 North British Railwav 0 1¼ 2 5/8 2¾ 2 7/8 3 3 1/8 2 1 1 7/8 Bank discount rates 
Bank discount rate 3½ 4½ 5½ 2½ 
(lowest in vearl 
2½ 3 3 2 3 6 
Bank discount rate 7 7 10 6 4½ 6 8 3 8 9 (hiahest in vearl 
Bank discount rate 5¼ 5¾ 7¼ 4¼ 3½ 4½ 5½ 2½ 5½ 7½ (average of highest and 
lowest rate annuallvl 
sources: Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railv,:ay, 1855-1864, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /14; Railway Times, 15 
Seotember 1866, oo.1089-92; Bradshaw's Ra1lwav Almanack, 1875 aooendix 12 o.83. 
(1 ): Dividends were paid half-yearly. The annual dividend shown is the total of the half year dividends paid In January 
and July each year. The Great North declared dividen~s in August until 1859. 
(2): Data tor the Great North is taken from company minute books and accounts. Data shown in Bradshaw's Railway 
Almanack and Railway Times for some half years 1855-59 vary from each other and from those shown In the company 
records. 
The Great North's policy for branch line development was defined in 1855: 
... where the proprietors and other parties in the various districts are unable 
of themselves to develop, by railway, their resources fully, we come forward 
to aid them, thinking that if we could direct their traffic into our own line, we 
would at once be serving them and the shareholders of our line .. . 78 
76 Appendix, tables 10(c) and 10(d): the capital account showed a surplus in the first half 
year of 1860 and revenue rose from £69,468 in 1859 to £84,603 in 1860, a rise of 22%. 
77 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875, appendix 12, p.83, showing that bank discount rate 
varied between 2½ % and 4½ % in the period February 1858 to March 1860. 
78 Report to the 1 oth Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
October 1855, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, recording the statement by chairman Sir James 
Elphinstone. 
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This statement of principle masked company practice for, while the lines were 
promoted principally by local residents often with encouragement from Aberdeen, the 
Great North provided much of the capital and worked the lines, securing in return 
strong or majority representation on the company boards. The Great North operated 
a strict commercial policy for branches; 79 interest was charged on the use of Great 
North plant for working the lines at 5 percent annually and interest charged on loans 
and advances was, if the branch company could not afford to pay, accumulated on 
the branch's general balance sheet.80 Thus, financial difficulties experienced by 
branch companies did not impinge on the Great North's accounts or profitability. The 
nominal independence of the branch companies disguised the absolute control 
exerted by the Great North, strengthened by supplying its own management and 
administration to the branch companies. The Railway Times was unimpressed by 
Great North policy: 
The next duty of the directors, it might be imagined, would have been to 
secure some return to the ordinary shareholders. Instead ... it would appear 
that the board is rather disposed to encourage extension, and to further 
mortgage their own line to such branches as can be Induced to connect 
themselves with it ... 81 
Elphinstone, however, described branch line policy as 'subscribing to aid in this 
construction' and listed the substantial contributions agreed for branch companies 
(table 37): 
711 Herapath's Railway Journal, 5 April 1862, reporting the address of deputy chairman John 
Stewart at the 19th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 
March 1862, pp.364-85: ' ... we determined to charge the branches all deficiencies upon 
borrowed money as a debt against them, until we had three years' experience of their 
working; and if, at the end of that time, they did not pay the interest upon that borrowed 
money, that we would carry it to a suspense account, to be charged against the line when it 
was able to pay it.' 
80 The 5% charged by the Great North is applied as a notional interest rate on hidden debt in 
company and branch accounts, and identified where appropriate in notes in the tables in the 
appendix; Herapath's Railwa~ Journal, 25 May 1861, p.527, reporting the auditor's statement 
to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway held on 1 April 1861 
to confirm that 5% interest was charged on all advances to branch companies. 
81 Railway Times. 25 November 1854, pp.1269-70. 
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Table 37: Subscriptions to other railways from the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
1856 
Renorted to the Ordlnarv General meetlna: 14 November 1856 Great North aubscrlotlon (£) 
lnverurv and Old Meldrum Railwav 2000 
Alford Vallev Railwav 15000 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Railwav 40000 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railwav 5000 
Formartine and Buchan Railwav 50000 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railwav 40000 
Total subscriptions 152000 
New subscriotlons aareed bv the Great North board In December 1856: 
Banff, Portsov and Strathisla Railwav 2000 
Keith and Dufflown Railwav 1000 
sources: Report to the 11"' Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 
November 1856, (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
12 December 1856 NAS/BR/GNS/1/2 o.508. 
By 1861, the Great North worked services on a branch network that comprised lines 
with two main functions. The first were intended to feed local traffic onto the Great 
North main line; the second, also local feeder lines, offered a potential extension 
route for the Great North to compete with the established Inverness line. The true 
cost of securing this traffic, however, was masked while the Great North's monopoly 
brought rising net revenue and increased dividends.82 The strength in the Great 
North's finances emanated from the through traffic to and from the north; the main 
line served ' .. . a predominantly rural area that provided only modest traffic even in a 
monopoly situation'. 83 Capital contributions from the Great North to these branch 
lines varied year by year and included declared subscriptions, temporary advances, 
guarantees for debenture interest and hidden subsidies. There was no standard 
policy for working charges; some lines were worked at cost while others were 
charged a share of gross revenue (table 38). Moreover, not all transaction details 
appeared in company accounts or general balance sheets. Although Great North 
shareholders asked few questions about branch subscriptions, the company's 
contractors who held substantial amounts of company stock raised objections, 
82 Herapath 's Railway Journal, 3 November 1855, p.1118, reporting chairman Sir James 
Elphinstone's statement at the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 29 October 1855. 
83 RH Mellor, The Railways of Scotland: the papers of Andrew C O'Dell, p.5. 
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seeing potentially unproductive investment reducing dividends and share values. 9• 
Nationally, The Economist warned that branches could 'only be nursed into profit by 
a long and tedious process',85 while Herapath's Railway Journal advised that' ... it is 
a mistake to suppose that all the traffic brought to the main line by the branch is 
new' .86 
Table 38: Railways worked by the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1855-61 
Incorporated Lenath Worklna arranoementa 
Feeder branch lines to the Great North svatem with Great North directors on the board 
4½ miles Worked by the Great North at cost and leased in lnverury and Old Meldrum (1) 15.06.1855 
oemetuitv at rent of £650 oer annum from 1858. 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff - 15.06.1855 18 miles Worked by the Great North at cost price for 1 O 
renamed Aberdeen and Turriff years from 1857. 
in 1859 
Alford Valley 23.06.1856 16 miles Wor1<ed by the Great North at cost price for 1 O 
vears from 1859. 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff 27.07.1857 11¼miles Wor1<ed by the Great North at cost price for 1 O 
Extension vears from 1860. 
Forrnartine and Buchan 23.07.1858 54½miles Wor1<ed by the Great North at cost price in perpetuity from the opening of the first section in 
1861 . 
Branch lines with throuah route ootentlal for the Great North and with Great North directors on the board 
10¾ miles Worked by the Great North at cost price from Keith and Dufftown 27.07.1857 
ooenina in 1861 but no formal aoreement made. 
Strathspey (2) 17.05.1861 32½miles Worked by the Great North at 40% of gross 
revenue from opening in 1863 but no formal 
aareement made. 
Branch lines with through route potential for the Great North and without Great North directors on the board 
16.07.1846 21¾miles Worked by the Great North at 45% of revenue Morayshire from 1863 on the ooenina of the Strathsoev. 
Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla - 27.07.1857 19 miles Independent wor1<ing until 1863 when the Great 
North worked the line at 65% of revenue. renamed Banffshire in 1863 
source: Report of the Committee of Investigation to the shareholders of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 April 
1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, oo.346-47, aivinq data drawn from the half-veer accounts to 31 Januarv 1865. 
(1 ): HA Vallance gives the length of the lnverury and Old Meldrum branch as 5¼ miles. The length of 4½ miles in the 
table is taken from the report of the committee of investigation to shareholders of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
1866. (2): The Strathspev covered 33¼ miles after it was extended to loln the Hlahland Rallwav at Boat of Garten In 1866. 
8• Report of the 11 th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 
November 1856, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, at which two contractors, John Brebner and David 
Mitchell, objected to raising the subscription to the Formartine and Buchan Railway from 
£15 000 to £50,000 and increasing the subscription to the Banff, Macduff and Turriff line by 
£5,000; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway. 9 June 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3. 
p.19. 
85 The Economist, 8 December 1860, p.1360, quoted in PL Cottrell, 'Railway Finances and 
the crisis of 1866', Journal of Transport History, new series, 111, No.1 (February 1975), p.21. 
86 Herapath's Railway Journal, 13 July, 1861, p.702. 
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The Great North's developing railway network was depicted by Acworth as 'all 
branches', while Professor O'Dell likened it to 'a tree with the main stem from Keith 
to Aberdeen and branches with facing connections towards Aberdeen, leading traffic 
to the south-east'. 87 
Map 6: Railways in north-east Scotland, 1855-1866 
Great North system lines 
A&TR: Aberdeen and Turriff Railway 
AVR: Alford Valley Railway 
BM&TER: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway 
F&BR: Formartine and Buchan Railway 
GNSR: Great North of Scotland Railway 
l&OMR: lnverury and Old Meldrum Railway 
SR: Strathspey Railway 
Other lines 
A&BR: Aboyne and Braemar Railway 
BP&SR: Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway 
DR: Deeside Railway 
DER: Deeside Extension Railway 
l&AJR: Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
l&PJR: Inverness and Perth Junction Railway 
MR: Morayshire Railway 
SNER: Scottish North-Eastern Railway 
87 Sir WM Acworth, The Railways of Scotland (London, 1890), p.121; AC O'Dell, Railway 
Routes of the North-East (unfinished manuscript on 'The Geography of the Railways of 
Scotland', chapters 18 and 19), in RA Mellor (ed.), The Railways of Scotland: the papers of 
Andrew C O'Dell, p.40. 
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When the economic fortunes of the Great North reversed sharply in 1863-66, the 
extent and impact of branch line investment was revealed, as chapter 8 illustrates. 
The acute financial weakness of the branch lines was inherent from their opening 
and transmitted the seeds of future instability into the finances of the parent 
company. The financial structure of four of the five feeder branch lines is now 
analysed to determine the effect of Great North policy and the extent of their 
economic realism. Company records of the lnverury and Old Meldrum branch have 
not survived, but the Great North maintained its interests in this short branch by a 
£2,000 subscription towards its £22,000 share capital, the nomination of one 
director, and a lease in perpetuity from 1858.88 The Great North's policy for this line 
was explained in 1857: 
We have got no dividend from that undertaking and we do not expect any -
they have given us something like £2,500 in traffic during the last year. 89 
- the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction and Extension Railways 
The Great North exercised full control of the Junction line from Incorporation, 
providing £40,000 in capital and holding seven of the nine directorships.90 The 
authorised share capital of £120,000 assumed an estimated cost of £6,667 per 
mile.91 The line ran northwards from lnveramsay on the Great North to Turriff, with 
plans to extend to Banff and Macduff on the Moray Firth to tap potential traffic from 
es 18& 19 Vic. cap.65, 1855, The lnverury and Old Meldrum Junction Railway Act, with capital 
of £20,000 and borrowing powers of £7,000: the Great North was authorised to subscribe 
£2,000 and work the line; 21&22 Vic cap.45, 1858, The lnverury and Old Meldrum Junction 
Railway Lease Act, authorising the Great North to lease the line at £650 per annum in 
perpetuity. 
89 Railway Times, 21 November 1857, p.1563, reporting the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway held on 13 November 1857. 
90 18 Vic. cap.57, 1855, The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway Act, with capital of 
£120,000 and borrowing powers of £40,000. 
111 Appendix, table 26. 
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the whole district north of the main line, although local interests wished to see the full 
scheme implemented immediately.92 Landowners, including Elphinstone and the 
Earl of Fife, via his commissioner, WJ Tayler (who was also a director of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction company), offered land at a feu duty, but the 
lowest tender for the line was £109,550, which left little margin within the authorised 
capital limit of the company.93 In 1856, the line estimate rose to £138,000; with only 
£124,000 of assets available, a £30,000 loan was obtained from the National Bank of 
Scotland with security provided from company debentures and a £10,000 guarantee 
from the Great North, an early example of the Great North assuring finance for a 
nominally independent company. 94 In just two board meetings, three-quarters of the 
total authorised 5 percent debentures were assigned to the National Bank and the 
Northern Assurance Company for loans.95 With a further £6,000 debenture issued 
as security for an additional loan from the National Bank to complete the line, ninety 
percent of the authorised borrowing powers had been assigned by July 1857 purely 
as security for loans from financial institutions.98 The importance place of banks in 
the finance of northern railway development and prior to the opening of lines is thus 
exemplified. 
The Turriff company also provides an early example in north Scotland of the 
widespread use of guaranteed shares, whereby an individual or institution 
guaranteed the railway company against loss on a number of un-issued ordinary 
shares if the company had not been able to sell those shares at least at par within a 
92 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway, 23 October 1854, 
NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.2. 
93 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway, 23 October 1854, 
NAS/BR/ABT/1 /1, p.1; Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Banff, Macduff and 
Turriff Junction Railway, 14 September 1855. NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p,13. 
94 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 24 October 1856, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, 
p.474, confirming a £10,000 guarantee; Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction 
Railway, 31 October 1855, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.21. 
es Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway, 2 January and 20 March, 1857, 
NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.29 and p.32: the National Bank was assigned £25,000 of debentures in 
two tranches of £15,000 and £10,000, while the Northern Assurance Company was assigned 
£5,000. 
96 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway, 31 July 1857, 
NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.45: the line did not open until September 1857. 
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given period of time; in the case of the Turriff company, that time period was two 
years. 97 Such guarantees were used by railway companies as security for short-
term credit. Lord Fife's trustees gave a 500 share guarantee in 1857, which allowed 
the company to obtain further credit of £5,000 from the National Bank.98 
The allocation of debentures to financial institutions and the use of guaranteed 
shares indicate the deep financial difficulties of this small local line by its opening in 
September 1857. By 1858, only £15,000 had been raised from shares in the area 
for a capital outlay of £145,000 and receipts had been 'the miserable amount of only 
£6,769'.99 The first year of operation produced a small surplus of £200, but the 
revenue account remained in deficit throughout 1859-64. Gross revenue rose only 
slowly during the independent life of the company, but approximately half of it was 
required each year to meet interest charges. 100 In 1861, the directors reported: 
... The traffic strangely enough continued to go down and down from the first 
year of opening. Now, however, it would appear that it had reached so low 
that it could not get lower.101 
The following year, Elphinstone optimistically asserted 'I have no doubt in my own 
mind that these branches will pay ultimately ... .', but the dismal results of this early 
branch company augured the contribution of branches to the later financial collapse 
of the parent Great North company.102 
97 Minutes of the Traffic and Finance Committee of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction 
Railway, 8 December 1857, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.62. 
98 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway, 8 December 1857, 
NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.61. 
99 Railway Times, 20 November 1858, p.1364, reporting deputy chairman John Stewart's 
address to the Great North of Scotland Railway shareholders at the 12111 Ordinary General 
Meeting held on 12 November 1858. 
100 Appendix, table 4{b). 
101 Report to the 7th Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 29 
November 1861, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.165. 
102 Report to the 8th Ordinary General meeting of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 28 
November 1862, NAS/BR/ABT/1, p.181. 
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The capital account returned a consistent deficit between 1856 and 1864.103 With 
3,778 shares in arrears by 1858, the directors obtained an Amendment Act to 
convert forfeited shares into a 5 percent preference stock.104 The act also changed 
the company name to the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway to avoid confusion with a 
new extension company. The Great North had concluded that the branch's financial 
position would not improve until the line was extended to the Moray Firth coast and a 
separate company, the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, was authorised 
In 1857 to build from Turriff to Banff and Macduff.105 As the Great North held tight 
control of the parent Turriff line, it took only two of the six Extension directorships, 
perhaps anticipating the further financial difficulties that followed. 
When powers were obtained for the preference stock, the authority exercised by the 
Great North within the Aberdeen and Turriff was demonstrated. With six directors 
present, four of whom were Great North directors, the Turriff Board was told that the 
Great North would increase its temporary advance to £25,000 at 5 percent interest, 
backed by the new preference stock of £37,220 taken as collateral.108 With little 
possibility of raising funds from preference shares given the company's weak trading 
position, the Great North's offer was accepted and part of the proceeds were used to 
redeem £15,000 of the National Bank loan.107 Branches companies were treated 
almost as a department of the Great North; for example, the working agreement 
103 Appendix, table 4(a). 
104 22 Vic. cap.11, 1859, The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway Amendment Act, 
which included a clause to change the name of the company to the Aberdeen and Turriff 
Railway. 
1o5 20&21 Vic. cap.SO, 1857, The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway Act, with 
authorised share capital of £81,000 and borrowing powers of £27,000. 
100 Minutes of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 29 November 1859, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, 
pp.126-27, recording that 'The Great North of Scotland Railway Company ... were prepared 
to make an additional temporary advance amounting together with the existing advance to 
£25,000 upon security of the Company's Bill to that amount with the collateral security of the 
3722 preference shares .. .'. 
107 Minutes of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 9 December 1859, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, 
pp.128, reporting that £15,000 had been repaid to the National Bank. Company preference 
shares in 1859 would have had little or no market value and the Great North probably 
regarded its allocation as nominal collateral to allow a cash advance; preference stock was 
not shown as issued in Aberdeen and Turriff company accounts until 1865. 
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operated on the Turriff line since opening in 1857 was not submitted for approval to 
Turriff shareholders until 1860. 108 
Table 39: Financial indicators for the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 1858-65 
31 Auaust 1B5B 1B59 1860 1861 1862 1B63 1864 1865 
Ratio of debentures to capital 32 .0% 31 .9% 31 .9% 31 .9% 31 .6% 31 .8% 30.2% 25.0% 
raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to total 0.118 0.132 0.105 0.111 0.124 0.124 0.113 0.133 
debt 
Source: Aooendix, table 4(c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
Capital costs rose almost a quarter above estimates by 1859 at a cost per mile of 
£8,241. 109 The slow growth of gross revenue and the high level of debt produce a 
debt gearing that was consistently below the 1849 insolvency benchmark of the 
Caledonian Railway and little improvement was discernable (table 39). It was the 
continued support of the Great North that allowed the insolvent Aberdeen and Turriff 
company to remain operational, despite its relatively economic construction. 
The financial performance of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway was 
even weaker. The nominated Great North directors refused to join the board due to 
'the present financial position of the Company and seeing the great deficiency in the 
amount of the Subscription List ... '.110 By February 1858, only one-third of the share 
capital had been subscribed.111 The Great North set conditions before it would 
participate, including a refusal to accept any responsibility for the construction 
108 Report to the 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 30 
November 1860, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.145; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
19 November 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, pp.278-79, approving a working agreement with the 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Juncti?n Railway, two years before the branch company 
shareholders formally approved 1t. 
109 Appendix, table 4(a), note (2) and note (3), showing that capital expenditure was 23.6% 
above estimate by 1859 and land costs were 9.1% of capital expenditure. 
110 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 16 January 1858, 
NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.10. 
111 Note of a meeting of 'interested parties' in minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff 
Extension Railway, 9 February 1858, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, pp.20-22, reporting subscriptions of 
f2.7 000 for the £81 .000 capital. 
' 
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contract already signed by other directors unless funds were available to meet it. 112 
An agreement was reached in July 1858 in which three of the six directors were to 
be nominated by the Great North.113 The line opened in June 1860 but, within a 
year, the company had to defer payment of debenture interest. 114 Revenue failed to 
grow between 1861 and 1865, leaving the account consistently in deficit and with 
half of gross revenue absorbed by interest payments. 115 
The capital account, whilst also in deficit from 1860, shows that costs were kept 
within the limits of authorised capital, principally because, for much of its length, the 
line crossed land owned by the Earl of Fife who accepted feu duty and so land costs 
represented only 3.4 percent of capital expenditure. 116 Capital costs per mile by 
1860 were £6,816.117 However, the high levels of debt and static gross revenue 
combined to produce a more unstable financial structure than its related Aberdeen 
and Turriff company (table 40). 
Table 40: Financial indicators for the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 
1861-65 
31 AUQUSt I 1861 l 1862 1863 I 1864 1865 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised I 54.1% l 54.1% 54.1% I 54.1% 54.1% 
Ratio of oross revenue lo total debt I 0.109 I 0.108 0.118 I 0.111 0.106 
source: Aooendix table 5lc\, and notes (1) and (2). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway In 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capita! 
and 0.162 for cross revenue/debt. 
112 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 20 April 1858, 
NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.12. 
113 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 10 July 1858, 
NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.39. 
114 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 31 May 1861, 
NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1 , p.145, and 13 December 1861, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.165. 
115 Appendix, table 5(b}. 
116 Appendix, table 5(a}. 
117 Appendix, table 5(a}, note (3). 
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Some caution must be exercised in deriving gearing for the Extension company 
because the level of temporary loans cannot be identified precisely from the 
accounts. Even making the favourable assumption that all bank advances were 
represented entirely by the data of interest paid and that no debt was held in a 
suspense account, the company was still exceptionally weak financially as the table 
illustrates. Furthermore, with low levels of share capital raised, authorised loans 
formed a high proportion of capital raised. Even by 1865, these two branches 
connecting the Great North with the agricultural northern hinterland and two Moray 
Firth ports could not achieve financial stability or show any sustained economic 
progress without major intervention from another company. 
- the Alford Valley Railway 
construction of the Alford Valley Railway, authorised in 1846, was deferred because 
of shortages of capital.118 By 1851, the Railway Times concluded that the line had 
been abandoned, 119 but plans to tap the agricultural traffic of the district were 
resurrected in 1855. 
Two competing schemes were proposed, one westwards from the Great North main 
line at Kintore and another by a nominally independent company extending north 
from the Oeeside Railway, which had been re-incorporated and opened between 
Aberdeen and Banchory in 1853, with John Duncan, former director and chairman of 
the Caledonian Railway, as chairman.120 Parliament approved the 16 mile scheme 
to join the Great North, which was authorised to subscribe £15,000 of its £85,000 
share capital.121 The Great North held six of the seven directorships, ensuring 
118 9& 1 o Vic. cap.134, 1846, The Alford Valley Railway Act. 
119 Railway Times, 6 December 1851, p.1218, reporting 'Alford Valley shareholders have had 
£2 16s returned on their payments per share and the line may now be held to be abandoned'. 
12° Herapath's Railway Journal, 20 October 1855, p.1081; Report to the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Deeside Railway, 24 Oc!ober 1855, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1, p.343; 15 Vic. cap. 61, 
1852, The Oeeside Railway Act, repealing 9& 10 Vic. cap.158, 1846, The Deeside Railway 
Act. 
121 19&20 Vic. cap.40, 1856, The Alford Valley Railway Act. 
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absolute control. The need for additional investment by the Great North was 
immediately evident from the estimate of costs for a line that terminated 2½ miles 
short of Alford (table 41 ). 
Table 41: Estimate of the costs and capital sources, Alford Valley Railway, 1856 
Estimate of costs (£) (£) 
Preliminarv and partiamentarv exoenses 7000 
Worl<s and stations 63500 
Land 5000 
Sundries law and engineerina 5000 
Total costs (estimate) 80500 
Estimate of capital sources 
Great North shares (authorised 1856 Act) 15000 
Shares held by contractor 12500 
Shares subscribed in the district 7000 
Further funds from the Great North 10000 
Debentures {amount authorised in 1856 Actl 28000 
Capital availability (estimate) 72500 
Capital shortage 8000 
Source: Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 23 September 1856, 
NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.3: the estimate of costs and capital is contained 
in a note added alonaside the minute. 
The Great North supported this branch company both for potential traffic and to 
protect its territory from incursion by an off-shoot of the Deeside Railway, but capital 
was insufficient and less than 10 percent was expected to be subscribed from the 
district served. In 1858, the directors agreed to extend the line into Alford, 
acknowledging a shortfall of £20,000 in estimated capital to meet the new estimate 
of £100,000.122 The company resorted to bank loans on security of debentures and 
Great North preference shares; the Great North also advanced £15,000 to the 
company. 123 The Northern Assurance Company took £5000 of debentures at 4½ 
percent in 1859, which suggests that the Great North was using its Aberdeen 
financial connections, as on the Turriff lines, to obtain loans. 124 
122 Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 16 February 1858, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.23. 
123 Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 28 February, 5 March and 12 March 1858, 
NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.30, p.32 and p.34, showing a £14,000 advance from the North of 
Scotland Bank and a £15,000 advance from the Great North of Scotland Railway. 
124 Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 5 July 1859, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.122; A Keith, The 
North of Scotland Bank Ltd, pp.14-15, noting that the Northern Assurance Company was 
founded by Adam and Anderson, law agents and first directors of the Great North, in 1836 at 
the same time as Anderson founded the North of Scotland Bank. 
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The line opened in March 1859, worked by the Great North at cost price, although 
the working agreement, like that on the Turriff line, was not formally signed until 
1860.125 After five months working, directors declared a 2 percent dividend following 
a £512 revenue surplus, but perversely on the same day asked the Great North for 
an additional advance.126 Gross revenue remained static and the revenue balance in 
deficit throughout 1860-64.127 
The weakness of the capital structure of the company was revealed in 1860 when a 
proposal to increase the number of local directors was rejected by the Great North's 
deputy chairman John Stewart, who pointed out that only £4,000 of shares and 
£4,000 of guarantees had been taken in the district and, of the £44,000 of shares 
taken, £15,000 had come from the Great North and £12,000 from the late 
contractor's trustee.128 Great North secretary Robert Milne informed shareholders 
that the Great North had secured loans at 4½ percent for the Alford company; ' •.. if 
they had borrowed it from any other quarter than the Great North, they would be 
paying at the rate of 7 percent' .129 Stewart told Alford shareholders in 1861: 
125 Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 30 March 1860, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.142-43; Report 
of the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 30 November 1860, 
NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.160. 
128 Minutes of the 4th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 29 November, 
1859, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.130, recording the recommendation for a 2% dividend; Minutes of 
the Alford Valley Railway, 29 November, 1859, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.135, requesting the Great 
North to make an additional advance to make their total loan to the Alford Valley company 
£25,000; Report of the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 30 
November 1860, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.161, which recorded that the Great North had loaned 
£30,000 to the Alford Valley by July 1860 in addition to its investment in £15,000 of ordinary 
stock. 
127 Appendix, table 3{b). 
129 Report to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 30 November 
1860, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.161: deputy chairman Stewart of the Great North also noted that if 
all the Alford Valley shares had been taken, a 3% dividend would have been possible. 
129 Report to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 30 November 
1860, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.161. 
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The history of this line was a marked contrast to every railway with which he 
was acquainted. For the first year, they had a larger revenue than the 
second, and for the second they had a larger revenue than the third. 130 
Stewart had, in fact, used virtually the same words the previous year but during the 
Aberdeen and Turriff annual meeting, 131 which indicated that this trend of static 
revenue and rising debt had become a characteristic of these branch companies. 
The ubiquitous strategy of creating new preference shares from forfeited ordinary 
shares was adopted to meet capital shortages; only 3, 195 of the 8,500 ordinary 
shares in the company had been paid In full by 1861.132 Parliamentary approval was 
obtained to issue preference shares at an expensive 6 percent.133 Elphinstone told 
shareholders 'All we can do is to hope that the railway will improve' .134 
The revenue account shows that the proportion of gross revenue absorbed by 
interest had reached dangerous levels by 1861-63.135 The Great North included 
powers In its own 1862 amendment act to authorise an additional subscription of up 
to £48,000 in Alford Valley preference shares;136 shares were taken up in 1863 to 
130 Report to the 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 29 November 
1861, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.189. 
131 Report of the 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 30 
November 1860, NAS/BR/ABT/1/1, p.145, at which John Stewart commented that 'It was a 
rather singular circumstance that the second year's earnings on this line was less than the 
first year's, and the third year's less than the first. Of course, this was a state of things that 
could not go on ... '. 
132 Accounts of the Alford Valley Railway to 31 August 1861, reported to the Ordinary 
General Meeting on 29 November 1861, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, pp.183-89, showing that £31,950 
had been paid in full on £10 ordinary shares and that £5,871 had been paid on 4,517 
ordinary shares on which there were arrears. 
133 25&26 Vic. cap.87, 1862, The Alford Valley Railway Amendment Act; Extra-ordinary 
General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 19 August 1862, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.205, 
creating £46,060 in £10 preference shares at 6%. 
13-i Report to the 7th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 28 November 
1862, p.216. 
135 Appendix, table 3(b): the proportion of gross revenue absorbed by interest was 68.0% in 
1861 and rose to 75.6% by 1863. 
136 25&26 Vic. cap.62, 1862, The Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act 
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liquidate £39,420 of debt due to the Great North.137 That action also resolved the 
deficit on the capital account.138 
Table 42: Financial indicators for the Alford Valley Railway, 1860-65 
31 Auaust l 1860 I 1861 I 1862 I 1863 I 1864 I 1865 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised I 38.5% I 38.5% I 41 .8% I 26.2% I 24.5% I 22.4% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt I 0.091 I 0.080 I 0.086 I 0.070 I 0.163 I 0.207 
Source: Aooendix, table 3 (cl. 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
Land costs were low due to the acceptance of feu duties by landowners, contributing 
to the relatively low capital cost per mile for the line of £6,310 by 1859.139 However, 
the Alford Valley showed no growth in gross revenue between 1860 and 1865 and 
had accumulated copious amounts of debt, which produced weak debt gearing (table 
42).1-1o The allocation of preference stock to the Great North improved the debt 
gearing in 1864, but only to a level equivalent to the unstable Caledonian in 1849. 
However, this improvement is illusory; no new funds were generated because stock 
was substituted for the substantial debt due to the Great North.141 The financial 
structure of the Alford Valley Railway indicates that it was, like the Turriff lines, 
insolvent with no prospect of repaying its debt from revenue. 
137 Minutes of the Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 19 August 
1862, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1 , p.205: £46,060 of 6% preference stock was created from forfeited 
ordinary shares under powers in 25&26 Vic. cap.87, 1862, The Alford Valley Railway 
Amendment Act; Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 3 July 1863, p.222, recording the issue 
of 3,942 £10 preference shares (85.6%} to the Great North to redeem debt of £39,422 16s. 
138 Appendix, table 3(a}. 
139 Appendix, table 3(a}, note (4}; table 26: land costs were 3.4% of capital expenditure by 
1859. 
140 Appendix, tables 3(b} and 3(c}. 
141 Appendix, table 3(c}, note (2) . 
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- the Formartine and Buchan Railway 
Powers authorised in 1846 for the Great North of Scotland (Eastern Extension) line 
from Dyce to Peterhead and Fraserburgh lapsed following the delays in building the 
Great North main line.142 The Buchan district attracted renewed interest in 1855 
from a proposed Formartine and Buchan company supported by the Great North and 
a rival Aberdeen, Peterhead and Fraserburgh scheme promoted by John Duncan of 
the Oeeside Railway.143 The Great North regarded the Buchan area as 'a district of 
the country which we hold legitimately belongs to us ... '.144 A long contest ensued 
before the Formartine and Buchan bill was approved on its third application to 
Parliament in 1858.145 
The Formartine and Buchan lines to Peterhead and Fraserburgh formed more of a 
mini-system than a branch, 54 miles in length and estimated to cost £280,000.146 
The Great North offered to work the lines at cost and provide £50,000 In capital, but 
with an expectation that £50,000 would be raised from shares and guarantees in the 
district.147 Great North directors took five of the nine seats on the board, 148 which 
resolved not to start construction without additional local subscriptions and planned 
142 9&10 Vic. cap.135, 1846, The Great North of Scotland (Eastern Extension) Railway. 
143 Herapath's Railway Journal, 10 November 1855, p.1157. 
144 Report to the 11 th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 
November 1856, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2. p.490, page 3 of the printed report of the meeting. 
145 21&22 Vic. cap.107, 1858, The Formartine and Buchan Railway Act, with authorised 
share capital of £300,00 and borrowing powers of £100,000; Herapath's Railway Journal, 6 
November 1858, p.1134; Report to the 13th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 12 November 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.260-64 and p.3 of printed report 
of the meeting. 
146 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 7 September 1857, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
p.45. 
141 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 7 September 1857, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
p.43. 
148 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 22 
September 1858, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, p.84. 
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to build only the Dyce-Mintlaw section of 29 miles because of the shortage of 
capital.149 The district was challenged by the Great North: 
Furnish us with £2,000 per mile and we will construct the whole line from end 
to end in its integrity.150 
... we shall not put a spade in the ground until we have obtained liberal and 
satisfactory land settlements.151 , 
By 1858, the Dyce-Mintlaw section alone was estimated to cost £240,000 with the 
shortfall in capital reported to be £25,000.152 The Aberdeen Town and County and 
North of Scotland Banks advanced £50,000 each on security of Buchan and Great 
North shares, thereby providing equivalent loan capital to the full authorised limit as 
the company could not yet issue debentures because half of its share capital had not 
been paid up.153 These loans provide a further example of the significant 
involvement of banks in northern railways prior to opening. 
By March 1859, only half of the twenty-four landowners between Dyce and Mintlaw 
had offered to accept a feu duty.154 The law agents reported 'some show a 
149 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 10 August 1858, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
pp.64-65. 
150 Herapath's RailwayJoumal, 20 November 1858, p.1181, reporting deputy chairman John 
Stewart's statement at the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway 
held on 12 November 1858. 
151 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 12 
November 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.3 of printed report of meeting inserted at p.260; 
Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 10 September 1858, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
pp.65, recording the directors' decision not to start until land settlements 'be effected in 
moderate terms .. .'. 
152 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 10 September 1858, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
pp.67-68. 
153 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 10 September 1858, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
p.68. 
154 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 11 March 1857, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, p.88. 
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disposition to get the highest terms they can ... '.155 In August 1859, just £57,303 had 
been raised of the £300,000 authorised share capital156 and a plan of dubious 
legality was instituted to release borrowing powers using the contractor to pay the 1 O 
percent deposit on 15,648 shares from funds borrowed from the North of Scotland 
Bank, thereby allowing a claim that half the share capital had been paid up. 157 The 
company then added £15,648 to the contract price to allow the contractor later to 
repay the advance and the company to recover the shares. The Great North had 
objected to a similar subterfuge by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway in 
1857, and may therefore have learned a creative financial technique from its rival.158 
The company agreed to extend the line to Peterhead in 1860 after the local railway 
committee guaranteed the £20,000 subscription required.159 The line opened to 
Mintlaw in 1861 and to Peterhead in 1862, when the company offered to build the 
line to Fraserburgh if the district subscribed £45,000.160 Although only £34,000 was 
identified. a new act was obtained in 1863, which also authorised a 5 percent 
preference stock to reduce company debt, while the Great North obtained powers to 
increase its subscription to the line from £50,000 to £100,000.161 
155 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 21 December 1858, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
pp.86-87. 
156 Appendix, table 9(a). 
157 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 28 November, 1859, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
p.128. 
158 See chapter 6, 'Dissention and division between Inverness and Aberdeen'; Minutes of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 17 and 24 July 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.51 and p.53; 
Minutes of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway, 21 July 1857, NAS/IAJ/1/1, p.306 and p.308. 
159 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 19 November 1860, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
p.178. 
160 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 14 October and 4 November 1862, 
NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, pp.326-27 and p.328. 
161 Minutes of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 25 
September 1863, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, pp.383-85: £203,526 of 5% preference shares were 
created from forfeited ordinary shares under powers in 26&27 Vic. cap. 189, 1863, The 
Formartine and Buchan Railway Act, which also authorised the Fraserburgh extension; 
25&26 Vic. cap.62, 1862, The Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act. 
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Two-fifths of gross revenue on the Buchan line was absorbed by interest 
payments.162 The first year of operation to Mintlaw produced net revenue of £1,388 
and a dividend of 1 ¼ percent was declared. The finances of the company scarcely 
justified that decision, but it may have been paid to try to attract new investment in 
the company. The capital account reveals a rising deficit as the extensions to 
Peterhead and Fraserburgh were constructed. 163 Land costs were relatively low, due 
to the company's persistence in seeking land for feu duty but, by 1865, the Buchan 
lines had cost £11,544 per mile, above the costs of other Great North branches but 
less than earlier Scottish lines. 16'4 
Table 43: Financial indicators for the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 1861-65 
31 Auaust 1862 1863 186-4 1865 
Ratio of debentures to total caoital raised 35.6% 35.4% 21 .2% 20.2% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.078 0.089 0.107 0.112 
Source: Appendix. table 9(c). 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital 
and 0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
The improvement in debenture gearing in 1864 (table 43) resulted from allocation of 
new preference stock to the Great North in substitution of temporary loans and 
advances, which, as on the Alford Valley Railway, did not raise new funds but, in 
effect, redistributed the location of debt in the accounts rather than redeemed it. 165 
The debt gearing for the company was weaker than the Caledonian benchmark of 
1849, but some discretion is required in interpretation because the Buchan system 
was not opened fully until 1865 and, unlike most of the other branches, the accounts 
show a rising trend of revenue as extensions were completed to the two principal 
Buchan ports. Therefore, while the company's financial structure was weak, the data 
suggest that this branch system had some capability to improve and repay debt, 
albeit over the long-term. 
162 Appendix, table 9(b). 
163 Appendix, table 9(a). 
164 Appendix, table 9(a) and table 26. 
m Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 2 October 1863, NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, 
p.385-86, recording that £100,000 of preference stock was issued to the Great North as 
payment for advances. 
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With the exception of the Buchan lines, the branches produced little or no growth in 
revenue and debt was increasingly accumulated outside the main accounts. All 
branch companies exhibited greater financial weakness throughout their 
independent existence than the insolvent Caledonian had displayed in 1849. The 
extensive financial support given by the Great North to the branches, initially to 
secure traffic for its main line and subsequently to postpone the impact of the 
weaknesses in their financial structure and performance, increased pressure upon 
the host company that could only be sustained while it retained its share of the 
monopoly of northern traffic. The Great North's branch line strategy was therefore 
increasingly undermined by mounting insolvency within its constituent branch 
companies. 
The fragility of monopoly power 
By 1861, the Great North had consolidated its monopoly in the north-east of 
· Scotland. Through use of its capital raising powers for the main line to Inverness 
projected in 1846,166 the company had been able bring into operation most of the 
branch lines that had been deferred. The strict commercial policy applied to branch 
companies had confined the capital difficulties of those lines to the branches 
themselves and allowed the Great North to declare attractive dividends to 
shareholders: 
... this high rate of dividend does not arise from any great stream of traffic. It 
arises from great economy in the management, particularly the capital 
account.167 
168 9& 1 o Vic. cap. 103, 1846, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act, authorising share 
capital of £1,500,000 and borrowing powers of £500,000;14&15 Vic. cap.75, 1851, The Great 
North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act, revising the 1846 capital powers to a share 
capital of £1,107,440 and loans of £300,000. The Great North's authorisation to construct 
the full main line between Aberdeen and Inverness lapsed in 1853. 
167 Herapath's Railway Journal, 5 April 1862, p.376; Appendix, table 10(d), showing half-year 
dividends of 6½% and 7% in 1861, 7½% and 7% in 1862 and 7% and 7% in 1863. 
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There was no competition by land to the Great North.168 However, the company had 
no significant northern terminus of its own and no direct connection across Aberdeen 
to the national railway route southwards. Consequently, the Great North was an 
isolated, rural system with its profitability dependent upon main line traffic from the 
north; its monopoly power was therefore fragile. Sixty percent of the mileage worked 
in 1861 comprised branches within which financial instability was embedded. 
Table 44: The network of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1861 
Comoanv Route Ooaned Lenath 
Main line Great North of Scotland Aberdeen-Keith October 1856 53¾ 
53¾ 
Branch lnverurv & Old Meldrum Junction lnverurv-Old Meldrum Julv 1856 5¼ 
Branch Aberdeen and Turriff lnveramsav-T urriff Seotember 1857 18 
Branch Alford Vallev Kintore-Alford March 1859 16 
Branch Banff Macduff & Turriff Extension Turriff-Banff June 1860 11¼ 
Branch Forrnartine and Buchan Dvce-Mintlaw Julv 1861 29 
80 
Mileaae of the Great North avatem, 1861 133¾ 
source: HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, appendices 1 and 2, oo.173-79. 
Earlier chapters have suggested that the Scots tended to invest in local lines rather 
than the larger inter-urban routes. 169 For these branch lines, even local capital was 
very hard to raise, with the result that a large proportion of the funds were supplied 
from the Great North and financial institutions (table 45). Banks played a significant 
role in the history of these branches, even before the lines opened to traffic, which 
supports the assertion by Gourvish and Reed of the importance of banks as a source 
of Scottish railway finance and also confirms their impression that banks were willing 
to lend to railways 'whose prospects were not necessarily bright'. 110 
168 J Simmons, The Victorian Railway (London, 1995), pp.261-62. 
159 see particularly chapter 1; TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways 
before 1860- a comment', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18 (1971), p.218; w 
vamplew, 'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860- a reply', Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy, 18 (1971), p.222. 
170 TR Gourvish and MC Reed, 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment', 
pp.216-17. 
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Table 45: Local financial contributions to branch lines feeding the Great North 
Company Date Local Total shares Authorised Local shares as % Shares raised as 
shares raised share capita! of shares raised % of authorised 
{£) (£) (£) shares 
A&TR 1858 15000 84535 120000 17.7% 70.4% 
BM&TER 1858 12000 (1) 24862 81000 48.3% (note 1) 30.7% 
AVR 1860 4000 37291 85000 10.7% 43.9% 
F&BR 12) 1859 "deficient• 159236 300000 n/a 53.1% 
A&TR: Aberdeen and Turriff Railway from 1859, previously the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway 
BM&TER: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway 
AVR: Alford Valley Railway 
Forrnartine and Buchan Railwav F&BR: 
sources: Railway Times, 20 November 1858, p.1364, reporting the Aberdeen and Turriff subscription to 
shareholders at the 13th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway held on 12 
November 1858; Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 12 March 1858, 
NAS/BMEX/1 /1, p.24; Report to the 12th Ordinary General Meeting of the Alford Valley Railway, 30 
November 1869, NAS/BR/ALF/1/1, p.161; Minutes of the Forrnartine and Buchan Railway, 14 June 1859, 
NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, p.111 and p.115; Accounts to 31 August 1859 of the Forrnartlne and Buchan Railway, 
NAS/FBR/1/1 p.129. 
(1): The £12 ,000 local subscription included ~6,500 subscribed by the E~rt of Fife and a further £1,000 from his 
commissioner, WJ Tayler, who was also chairman of the company; the district had therefore subscribed only £4,500 
by 29 March 1858, (NAS/BR/BMEX/1 /1, p.26). 
(2): The Great North had offered a £50,000 subscription to the Forrnartine and Buchan Railway (7 September 1857, 
(NAS/BR/FBR/1/1, p.43), expecting a £50,000 local subscription for shares, but the directors resolved In June 1859 
to build only the Dyce-Mintlaw section for which subscriptions were reported to be ' ... greatly deficient' (14 June 
1859 NAS/BR/FBR/1 /1, o.111 and o.115). 
The Great North's profitable operations, based in the mercantile centre of Aberdeen 
where there were established and closely-knit financial networks, undoubtedly 
assisted the availability of railway credit; for example, Alexander Anderson, a Great 
North director until 1849, who was the Great North's law agent (with partner William 
Adam) and a director of the Old Meldrum branch from 1854, was a 'driving force' 
behind the foundation of the North of Scotland Bank in Aberdeen. 171 
compared to the cost of £32, 113 per mile for earlier Scottish railways by 1851 and 
the £15,672 per mile for the Great North by 1857, significant economies were 
achieved on these branches; costs ranged from £6,310 per mile on the Alford Valley 
171 SG Checkland, Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973, p.343, describing Anderson as 
the 'driving force' in the establishment of the North of Scotland Bank; RC Michie, 'Sir 
Alexander Anderson' in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.), Dictionary of Scottish Business 
Biography 1860-1960, vol.2 (Aberdeen, 1990), p.400, noting that Anderson promoted the 
North of Scotland Bank in 1836 and the bank was the largest in Aberdeen; Minutes of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 March 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1, p.184, reporting that 
Adam and Anderson had stood down as directors of the Great North after a challenge from a 
shareholder over their dual role as directors and law agents; Minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 22 December 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2, p.169, reporting the purchase of 
200 shares in the lnverury and Old Meldrum Junction railway and the nomination of 
Anderson as a director; A Keith, The North of Scotland Bank Ltd, 1836-1936, p.14. 
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in 1859 to £11,544 per mile on the Buchan line by 1865 when the final section to 
Fraserburgh was opened.172 The Great North was also able to demonstrate strong 
growth in traffic achieved with relatively low running costs in comparison with other 
Scottish lines (table 46). 
Table 46: Traffic data and working expenses on the Great North, 1860 
Traffic data Halfvear to 31.01.1859 Half year to 31 .01.1860 Increase T%1 
Passenger numbers 254658 271653 6.7% 
Goods tonnage 67991 78726 15.8% 
Livestock numbers 17833 35213 97.5% 
Worklna expenses Gross (Inc. taxes and duty) Net (exc. taxes and dutv1 
Great North 38% 33% 
Caledonian 45% 41 % 
North British 44¼% 40% 
Scottish North-Eastern 45% 41 ¼% 
source: Report to the 15m Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 April 
1860 NAS/BR/GNS/113 o.2 of orinted report Inserted at oo.464-65. 
Chairman Elphinstone claimed the growth in traffic was 'due very much to the 
development of the branches' .173 The Railway Times praised the Great North: 
The condition and management of this line more than continues a subject for 
congratulation . . . it proves that railway enterprise, if only once placed in an 
accurate groove, must run on without impediment to perennial success. m 
The impediments were, nonetheless, already established. Inverness had blocked 
the Great North's northerly advance in 1858 and, from 1861, the branches placed an 
ever increasing burden on the Great North's finances; 10 percent of Great North 
capital was spent on these five branches in 1861, but this had risen to 20 percent by 
1864 (table 47). 
172 Appendix, table 26; CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St 
Andrews Railway Company', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 1974), p.2. 
173 Herapath's Railway Journal, 21 April 1860, p.397: at the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North held on 2 April 1860, Elphinstone referred to a rise of 7,687 in the number of 
cattle transported in 1859-60, of which 1,686 from the Turriff branch, 2,321 from the Alford 
branch and 500 over the Inverness line. 
174 Railway Times, 30 March 1861, p.409. 
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Table 47: Capital subscriptions and advances to feeder branch lines, Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 1861 and 1864 
Comoanv 31.07.1861 (£) 31.07.1864 (£) lncroaso 1•1.1 
lnverurv and Old Meldrum Junction 2000 2000 00 
Aberdeen and Turriff 40020 74129 85.2 
Alford Vallev 15000 59920 299.5 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension 5085 27065 432.3 
Forrnartine and Buchan 50000 175000 250.0 
Total 112105 33811-4 201.6 
Total of Great North caoital exoenditure 1079546 1669392 54.6 
Proportion of Great North capital spent on these 10.4% 20.3% 
five feeder branches 
Source: Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 31 July 1861 and 31 July 1864, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S\/1 /14. 
(1 ): In addition to the subscriptions and advances to the feeder branch lines shown In table 47, the Great North 
also made subscriptions and advances to lines offering through route potential to the company (Appendix, table 
10(c). At 31 July 1861, £7,406 had been subscribed to the Keith and Dufftown Railway. By 31 July 1864, 
Great North accounts show subscriptions and advances to the Keith and Dufftown (£26,000), the Strathspey 
(£100,000), and the Morayshire (£10,531). In addition, the Great North's general balance sheet to 31 July 
1864 shows temporary advances to the Keith and Dufflown (£30,988), Stralhspey (£43,576) and the 
Moravshire (£12 620\. 
So long as traffic to and from the northern counties by rail had to cross the Great 
North's main line, the company preserved its land-based monopoly, but northern 
traffic remained subject to competition from sea transport. The unsuccessful 
subsidisation of the Inverness and Edinburgh Steam Packet Company in 1859-60 to 
capture northern trade, outlined earlier, did not deter the Great North in 1861 from 
offering a £1,500 subsidy to the rival Northern Steam Company to secure more 
favourable rates for sea traffic after a dispute with the Aberdeen Steam Navigation 
company. 175 The following year, the Great North gave a further subsidy to facilitate 
the amalgamation of two rival steamer companies, the Aberdeen Steam Navigation 
and the London Steam Companies, to provide a twice-weekly service from Aberdeen 
to London.176 With no continuous rail link across Aberdeen until 1867 and with their 
terminus at the docks, the Great North continued to show favour to sea transport for 
175 Report to the 18th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 
September 1861, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, pp.180-81 and page.4 of inserted printed report; also 
Herapath 's Railway Journal, 28 September 1861, pp. 996-97, reporting the same meeting. 
Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway, pp. 70-71, records 
that Great North deputy chairman John Stewart founded the Northern Steam Company, 
having been removed from the board of the Aberdeen Steam Navigation Company. 
176 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 September 1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, 
pp.414-15 and page 1 of inserted printed report, Herapath's Railway Journal, 11 October 
1862, p.1060. 
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goods traffic south of Aberdeen, engendering resentment in southern railway 
companies. 
The Great North recognised the need to protect its market dominance. Its support of 
branches to secure territory was extended to a local 10 mile line running south-
westwards from Keith to Dufftown, which formed part of the earlier abortive 
Banffshire Railway of 1845-46 identified in chapter 3.177 The Keith and Dufftown 
Railway was incorporated in 1857; the Great North subscribed £1,000 and was to 
appoint one of the nine directors, although both Stewart and Jopp of the Great North 
are named on the first board.178 Great difficulty was experienced in raising capital on 
this local line; only a third of that required for the parliamentary submission had been 
subscribed by December 1856.179 By June 1857, £37,920 of the £50,000 share 
capital had been subscribed of which £5,620 came from 181 local shareholders, 
including £1,800 from the directors and £1,000 from the Great North, £7,500 from 
the line's contractors, and £24,800 from the company's Edinburgh law agents.180 
The use of the law agents as nominees ensured sufficient deposits were paid to 
meet parliamentary Standing Orders, but the scale of this nominal involvement 
indicates the severe shortage of capital. By October 1858, construction work had 
been halted and the directors sought further support from the Great North, but 'their 
Directors have hitherto declined to say if they will take up the Line' .181 
Major landowners, including the Duke of Richmond and the Earl of Fife, had given 
verbal support, 'but the Directors have as yet been unable to get any of them to fix 
m HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, p.53; see also chapter 3, table 20(c). 
11e 20&21 Vic. cap.87, 1857, The Keith and Dufftown Railway Act, with authorised share 
capital of £50,000 and borrowing powers of £16,600. 
179 Minutes of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 3 December 1856, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.4. 
180 Report from the Committee for the Keith and Dufftown (No.2) Bill, 11 June 1857, inserted 
as a loose leaf at the back of the minute book of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 
NAS/BR/KDR/1/1. 
181 Report to the 3rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 19 
October 1858, NAS/BR/KDR/1 /1, p.22. 
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definitely to what extent' .182 However, the Great North saw new strategic potential in 
this short branch. The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway had denied the 
Great North access westwards once the Inverness-Keith line via Orton opened in 
1858. An alternative route to Elgin via Rothes had been considered in the 1850s by 
both the Great North and the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction.183 The Morayshire 
Railway, in dispute with Inverness in 1859 over running rights, announced 'a direct 
line through the Glen of Rothes as was originally intended .. .'.1M Its projected line 
gave the Great North an opportunity to reach Elgin if it secured control of the 
neighbouring and ailing Keith and Dufftown.185 The Great North therefore offered to 
complete the Dufftown line and obtained powers to subscribe half its share capital 
and nominate four of the eight directors.188 Thus a proposed feeder branch to the 
Great North became a strategically important 1 O¾ mile link in a potential new route 
to the north. 
The Great North's new interest in the Dufftown line prompted landowners to give 
£10,000 of share guarantees and land via feu duty.187 The Great North then took 
total control of the company by appointing a committee of management 'with all the 
powers of the Board', comprising its four Great North directors and just one local 
182 Report to the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 2 
July1859, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, pp.27-28. 
183 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Morayshire Railway. 30 October 1847, 
NAS/BR/MOR./1/1; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 9 July 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/11, pp.11-20; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 July 1855, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.290. 
184 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 31 August 1859, BR/NAS/MOR/112. 
185 See chapter 7, Western expansion: the Great North and Morayshire Railways'. 
188 23&24 Vic. cap. 63, 1860, The Keith and Dufftown Railway Deviation Act, which included 
authorisation for the Great North to subscribe £25,000; Minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 26 August 1859, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3. p.367 and p.408; Minutes of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 16 October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4. p.4-9, setting out the draft 
agreement between the Great North, Keith and Dufftown and Morayshire Railways; Minutes 
of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 6 June 1860, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.53, reporting the 
reduction in the size of the Keith and Dufftown board from nine directors to eight, with four to 
be Great North representatives. 
187 Report to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 29 
October 1859, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, pp.38-39. 
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director.188 The local directors were required to sign personal guarantees for a 
£25,000 subscription from the Keith and Dufftown company to a new Great North 
protege, the Strathspey, proposed to extend the Great North's system w.estwards 
into the Spey valley and to connect the Keith and Dufftown to the new Morayshire 
line.189 The capital accounts of the Keith and Dufftown are complex and great 
caution is required in their interpretation because the Great North used them to 
record its financing of the early stages of the separate Strathspey Railway. 1110 The 
capital cost per mile by 1862, however, was low at £5,632, although expenditure was 
21.1 percent above estimate. 
The revenue account of the Keith and Dufftown exhibited similar weaknesses to 
other Great North branches: revenue was static and a high proportion of receipts 
were absorbed by interest payments.191 Moreover, not all interest was paid when 
due and any arrears were added to company debt accumulated outside the main 
accounts.192 The Great North exercised the same strict financial policy in charging 
interest on advances and plant, thereby ensuring that the considerable financial 
difficulties appeared in the subsidiary company's accounts and not its own. 
188 Minutes of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 6 June 1860, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.53. 
189 Minutes of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 28 November 1860, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, pp.63-
64, recording that the Keith and Dufftown was to make the Balvenie extension, which was the 
first section of the Strathspey Railway from Dufftown to Craigellachie, 'the proposed 
strathspey Railway Company having no funds available for this purpose', but the outlay was 
to be refunded with 5% interest 'not later than the opening of the latter Company's line'. The 
strategic place of the Strathspey and Morayshire Railways is examined in chapter 7. 
190 Appendix, table 16(a): this table summarises the capital account of the Keith and 
Dufftown Railway, and in which the footnotes indicate the complexity of analysing their 
construction and content. 
191 Appendix, table 16(b); interest payments as a proportion of gross revenue reached 68% 
by 1864. 
192 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 19 August 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, 
p. 186, reporting a resolution that 'any ~eficiencies of interest on advances to the Keith and 
Dufftown' were to be accumulated against that company for three years from the opening of 
the Strathspey Railway. This resolution therefore covered the period between 1863, when 
the Strathspey opened, and 1866, when the Keith and Dufftown and other branches were 
amalgamated with the Great North; Minutes of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 29 July 1864 
and 24 February 1865, NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.131 and p.146; Appendix, table 16(c), note (4). 
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The debt gearing throughout the brief and nominally independent life of the Keith and 
Dufftown company appears as weak as on other branches and well below insolvency 
benchmark of the Caledonian in 1849 (table 48). While the financial structure of this 
small company was therefore insecure, its value to the Great North was not as a 
feeder branch line but as a strategic section of the planned extension of the Great 
North's network towards the highlands. 
Table 48: Financial indicators for the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 1862-65 
31 Auaust I 1862 I 1863 l 1864 I 1865 
Ratio of debentures to total caoital raised I 31 .9% 30.1% I 30.0% I 14.8% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt I Line opened 1862 0.050 I 0.065 I 0.14212\ 
Source: Appendix, table 16(c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for gross revenue/debt. 
(2): The improvement in the 1865 ratio of debenture loans to capital raised was caused by the Great North 
taking up £16,870 of share capital to replace advances and other debt of the Keith and Dufflown, thereby 
releasina some debentures held as securitv. 
Criticisms of the Great North's use of monopoly power, particularly in pricing and 
standards of service, were commonplace. Complaints were received about high 
goods rates immediately the first section of its main line opened in 1854. Carriers 
undercut railway rates and the Great North discovered that it was charging 
comparatively more than the Aberdeen, Deeside, Dundee and Perth, and Dundee 
and Arbroath lines and reduced rates accordingly. 193 Disputes between the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and Great North Railways over traffic rates began 
even before the through line opened in 1858.19" The Great North set equal rates by 
rail or sea between Inverness, Aberdeen and London in conjunction with the 
Aberdeen Steam Navigation Company in 1858 without representatives of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction company being present. 195 The branches were 
193 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 September 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, 
p.82. 
194 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 26 June 1858, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, p.442 and minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 15 April, 1859, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.326, which both report a series of disputes between the companies over 
rates, traffic and operations. 
195 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 13 October 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /3, 
p.249. Just over one year later, the_lnv~rness and Aberdeen Junction Board approved equal 
rates with the Aberdeen Steam Nav19at1on Company for the Aberdeen-London route, 
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not immune from high goods rates; farmers and traders using the newly-opened 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway in 1860 sent a resolution complaining 
that rates were greater than stipulated in the company's legislation and made a 
formal complaint to the Board of Trade.196 The Great North refused to join the 
Railway Clearing House until the increased competitive pressures, outlined in 
chapter 7, forced it to agree rates on all through traffic in 1863.197 Increasingly, the 
exercise of its monopoly power alienated the Great North from its northern and 
southern railway neighbours and its users. Acworth notes the Great North's 
'despotic treatment of passengers', 198 while EL Ahrons describes the price and 
quality of service: 
Its stopping trains could not even be dignified with the title •slow": they set the 
pace of a glacier . . . But one thing the Great North did thoroughly well - it 
charged "express" fares for the privilege of a passa~e on its glaciers; and 
these express fares were of an exceeding magnitude.1 9 
Vallance and Barclay-Harvey both record the allegation that the Great North 
dispatched their service to the north from Aberdeen before passengers could cover 
the half-mile from the Scottish North-Eastern station.200 There is, however, evidence 
that converts this allegation into fact. Seven passengers, including James Merry 
recorded in a minute of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 4 November 1859, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.45. 
196 Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 6 July 1860, 
NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.117 and p.119; also 17 October 1860, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.123. 
197 Herapath's Railway Journal, 1 O October 1863, p.1078, reporting chairman Elphinstone's 
statement to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway held on 25 
September 1863, announcing that the Great North would enter the Railway Clearing House 
for all its traffic in the following month; Report to the 22nd Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.128 and page 2 of 
inserted printed report, indicating the reduction in goods rates that had resulted from joining 
the Railway Clearing House. 
198 Sir WM Acworth, The Railways of Scotland, p.117. 
199 EL Ahrons, Locomotive and Train Working in the later part of the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge, 1952), p.101. 
200 HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, p.34; HA Vallance, The Highland 
Railway (4th edition, Newton Abbot, 1985), p.23; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, p.74. 
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and James Grant, wrote an open letter to the press in August 1858, stating that they 
felt 'ill-treated' by the Great North: 
... all made every possible speed to reach the station of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway . . . The officials at the station seemed predetermined to 
cause disappointment for the moment the Mail Bags were within the portals 
of the establishment and which were carried off with more than usual rapidity, 
the Gates were shut in the faces of the Passengers, who naturally demanded 
immediate admittance. This was refused and delayed until the train had 
started ... and the Clock of the station shewed that the starting time had only 
then arrived . . . So great was the hurry of the officials that the lady and 
luggage of one gentleman were admitted when the husband was shut out. 
Such conduct under such circumstances we believe to be inexcusable. If the 
Proprietors of two main lines of Railway are to keep their Stations a few 
hundred yards apart from factious or party squabbles . . . it is high time that 
the making of a more direct and continuous line of Railway in the North 
should be resolved upon.201 
Their final sentence was momentous. Merry was a wealthy ironmaster who had 
bought the Belladrum estate to the west of Inverness in 1857 and became a Member 
of Parliament and an important investor in, and later director of, Inverness railway 
companies; James Grant was provost of Elgin and chairman of the Morayshire 
Railway.202 Within two years, a new direct line from Inverness to Perth and the south 
was promoted which contributed appreciably to the rapid collapse of the Great 
201 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 6 August 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.218. 
recording a letter written by James Merry and signed by six other passengers on 5 August 
1858, which was published in the 'Free Press' in Aberdeen on 6 August 1858: Merry went on 
in the letter to castigate the Great North for 'fine talk of punctuality ... [for] a line that ends at 
Keith when coaches had to do the rest of the work ... ' (p.219 of minute book). 
2°2 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.21, giving a brief biography 
of James Merry; A Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland: 1750-1960, p.46 and 
p.124: Merry was also a coal master and an investor in the Monkland and Kirkintilloch 
Railway, opened in 1826; Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 9 September 1846, 
NAS/BR/MOR/1/1, show James Grant, Banker of Elgin, was elected the first secretary and 
treasurer of the Morayshire Railway. Grant, now Provost of Elgin, was elected a director on 
31 October 1855 when a new appointment was made as secretary, and he became chairman 
on 12 November 1855 (NAS/BR/MOR/1/1). 
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North's monopoly in 1863-66.203 The indifferent attitude of the monopolist Great 
North was evident from secretary Milne's reply: 
Had the departure of the train been delayed for the rest of the passengers 
from the South Train with their luggage and dogs, the whole of the 
Company's Train arrangements for the day would have been seriously 
interfered with, therebl causing inconvenience to many more than those who 
are now complaining.2 4 
Publicly, the Great North's deputy chairman Stewart denied any risk to its continued 
success,205 but the Great North must have appreciated the fragility of its monopoly. 
The company made a new proposal for a cross-Aberdeen link via the Denburn 
Valley, but infuriated the Scottish North-Eastern because it 'declined to give any 
guarantee as to the route by which they will send Traffic arising South and East of 
Keith', presumably intending to protect its sea trade connections.206 The Scottish 
North-Eastern was then told in October 1861 that the Great North had decided there 
was not sufficient time to prepare a Denburn Valley Scheme for . the next 
parliamentary session 'and therefore decline proceeding .. .'.207 
203 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
30 October 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.185 and page 2 of inserted printed report; Scroll 
minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 10 July 1860, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2. 
204 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 6 August 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, 
pp.219-20. 
205 Herapath's Railway Journal, 28 September 1861, p.1008, reporting deputy chairman 
John Stewart's address to the 18th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway on 20 September 1861: 'The elaborate and able speech of Mr Stewart ... will be 
read with interest, especially that part of it where he mentions the small amount of through 
traffic, and therefore the security of the Company against any great injury from a competing 
line for the through traffic.' 
206 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 5 September 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1 /1, 
p.560. 
201 Minutes of a special meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 6 November 1861, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 16 October 1861, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.584. 
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Within two months, the Great North faced additional opposition from a nominally 
independent line from south of Aberdeen to the north, strongly backed by the 
Scottish North-Eastern, which proposed to by-pass Aberdeen altogether.208 The 
Railway Times despaired: 
The Great North of Scotland have got into a jar with the Scottish North-
Eastern, which will probably have the effect of throwing Aberdeen off the 
direct route to the north. The want of a junction between the termini of these 
lines at Aberdeen has long been a crying annoyance.2011 
The 1845 Railway Board report had intimated the logic of a northerly extension of the 
trunk route to Aberdeen and, in 1846, the state authorised the Great North to 
construct it. That company, part of the erstwhile Aberdeen railway web, was 
founded on a clear strategic plan, conceived and directed by the commercial and 
legal interests of Aberdeen to channel traffic from the whole of northern Scotland 
through Aberdeen to strengthen its economic importance and increase its wealth. 
Much of the railway network to the north and west of Aberdeen that the state 
authorised in 1845-46 was constructed by 1861, but delays and capital shortages 
encountered by the Great North allowed rival railway promoters based in Inverness 
to construct part of the main line and establish a significant territorial boundary at 
Keith in pursuit of their own strategic plans for the control of northern Scottish 
railways. Despite this barrier, the Great North quickly overcame its initial capital 
difficulties once its line opened and used its new financial strength to realise the 
original plans for a branch system, not only to obtain traffic from these districts, but 
also to give scope for future westward expansion that intervention from Inverness 
208 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 13 December 1861, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /4, 
p.222; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 4 December 1861, p.593, resolving 
that the Scottish North-Eastern company was to be a joint promoter of the proposed Scottish 
Northern Junction Railway and subscribe £90,000 to it. 
2oo Railway Times, 5 April 1862, p.477. 
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had blocked. Their objectives were therefore sound, but the financial expectations of 
the Great North proved to be unrealistic. Furthermore, the Great North alienated 
neighbouring railway companies and its own passengers and traders so that, after 
seven years of unchallenged monopoly power, it was threatened in 1861 by a new 
northern route from the highlands and a new line supported by the Scottish North-
Eastern, both marginalising the important commercial centre of Aberdeen; these 
developments are explored in chapter 7. The strategy of Aberdonian economic pre-
eminence was therefore about to be subjected to significant competition. 
The capital of the Great North was oversubscribed in 1846, but, like many other 
companies in the aftermath of the great railway mania, it could not convert declared 
investment intentions into tangible funds. The Great North provides an early 
example of a railway company in northern Scotland using bank lending extensively, 
even before construction was started. There is no firm evidence to show the extent 
of English investment within the company by the late 1840s, although it is likely that 
a similar English interest to its host company, the Aberdeen Railway, remained 
following the collapse of railway share values after the speculation of 1845. It was 
renewed support from landowners, however, that triggered the restructuring of the 
company and the decision to start construction; both its Aberdeen neighbour and the 
east-coast alliance declined to invest in the Great North's revised scheme in 1852. 
The trend of railway companies seeking new capital from guaranteed preference 
stock, identified in the opening chapter, was also adopted by the Great North in its 
new legislation to recapitalise the company, which placed an additional call on its 
future revenue earnings. 
Economies in construction produced a lower capital cost per mile for the Great North 
than for earlier Scottish inter-urban lines. Once opened, the truncated main line 
rapidly produced rising levels of revenue and increased dividends for its 
shareholders. The company's improved capital finances in the late 1850s were used 
to support a network of nominally independent branch companies. Small and 
remote, these branches could not attract national investment and their capital 
difficulties arose more from the inability to raise local share capital than from the 
consequences of inaccurate estimates. All the branches were constructed at 
relatively low costs per mile, but their traffic forecasts were over-optimistic. 
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Consequently, the branches relied upon the extensive use of temporary bank credit 
as an alternative source of finance both before and after the lines were opened. 
Moreover, the conversion of unissued ordinary shares into guaranteed share capital 
was widespread to try to raise new funds or to provide security for further temporary 
credit, which added to the financial chaos into which most of the branches were 
descending. The Great North's policy to keep branch financial problems isolated 
from its own financial affairs became unsustainable, as chapter 8 will show. 
This chapter has concentrated on the Great North's strategic planning and finances 
in 1846-61; the next chapter examines the concurrent establishment of the railway 
web in Inverness and its ambitious response to the Great North's monopoly. 
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Chapter 6: The Inverness web, 1853-62 
Map 7: The Inverness railway web 
Stanley 
Perth 
ToSUrling / 
Inverness web companies and subsidiaries 
l&AJR: Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
l&NR: Inverness and Nairn Railway 
l&PJR: Inverness and Perth Junction Railway 
l&RR: Inverness and Ross-shire Railway 
P&DR: Perth and Dunkeld Railway 
Other railway companies 
GNSR: Great North of Scotland Railway 
K&DR: Keith and Dufftown Railway 
MR: Morayshire Railway 
SNER: Scottish North-Eastern Railway 
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The previous chapter has shown that the inability of the Great North to complete the 
main line between Aberdeen and Inverness by 1853 was primarily due to capital 
constraints, which mirrored earlier experiences of railway development to the south. 
This chapter focuses on the railway system that was progressively extended 
outwards from Inverness in 1853-62. It will show that the initial stages of railway 
promotion, ostensibly to complete the Great North's Aberdeen-lnvemess route 
authorised by the state in 1846, were part of a much broader and judicious strategic 
plan designed by highland regional interests to secure the local control of railways in 
northern Scotland for the wider benefit of the northern economy and its landowners. 
As in the previous chapter, the importance of the banking sector as an alternative 
source of capital for northern railways provides a consistent theme. 
First. the objectives of the Inverness railway strategy and the centrality of the 
powerful local landowners within it are discussed. Given the economic 
disadvantages of the north of Scotland, already outlined in chapter 2, the next 
section examines the principles of the 'cheap railway' that were adopted for these 
northern lines to achieve the essential economies required in the costs of 
construction and operation. The staged realisation of the Inverness web of railways 
and its reliance on local capital is then explained. The following section considers 
the northern extension of the Inverness web as part of the strategic planning for 
defence and control. It investigates the financing of this distant route and identifies 
the early recognition by its promoters that any returns on railway investment in this 
region were likely to accrue indirectly from wider economic improvements in the 
region, introducing the concept of public service into northern railway policy. The 
final section reviews the inter-linking of the Inverness companies as a precursor to 
the formation of one consolidated company. 
The Inverness railway strategy 
The prime objective of Inverness promoters to obtain control of railways In the 
highlands was declared by the provisional committee of the Perth and Inverness 
Railway in 1845: 
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. . . it is of the utmost importance to the community that any line through 
Inverness, Nairn and Morayshire, should be under the control and mainly 
subservient to the interest of the inhabitants of these and the other counties 
to the North ... That while the Inhabitants of the Highlands are alive to the 
advantage of railway communication along the east coast, it is their obvious 
and natural policy to obtain also the benefit of a direct line of communication 
by railway with the central Highlands and the South ... 1 
Inverness, with a population of 11,000 in 1845, was the largest highland town, but 
even by 1861 its population ( 16, 162} was only a fraction of those of Aberdeen 
(77,272} and Edinburgh (203,000}.2 The fragile northern economy was in the grip of 
famine by 1846;3 the highlands did not, therefore, offer the prospect of assured 
returns from railway investment. However, the parliamentary committee that 
recommended rejection of the 1846 scheme for the Perth and Inverness Railway 
specifically left open a future option for a direct line between these two towns.4 
Undeterred by their parliamentary defeat, Inverness promoters developed a strategy 
to provide their own railway system to serve the highland community in which profit 
maximisation was not always paramount, although the constituent companies at all 
times strived to maintain their economic integrity. 5 Scottish railway expansion had 
1 Railway Chronicle, 8 March 1845, p.276, reporting meetings of the provisional committee of 
the Perth and Inverness Railway (also in NAS/BR/HR/4/3/6}; Conference between the Great 
North of Scotland and Perth and Inverness Railway companies at Elgin, 21 October 1845, 
NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/2. 
2 o Ross, The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005), p.13; J Thomas and D Turnock, A Regional 
History of the Railways of Great Britain, vol. 15, North of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1969), 
p.143 and p.216; SGE Lythe and J Butt, An Economic History of Scotland 1100-1939 
(Glasgow, 1975}, p.96. 
3 See chapter 2, 'The north-south divide: the Scottish economy by 1844'. 
4 Report of the House of Commons Select Committee Group 4, published in Railway Times, 
16 May 1846, p.697; see also chapter 3, 'The aftermath of the Railway Board in northern 
Scotland, 1845-46', and tables 20(a} and 20(b}. 
5 Railway Times. 7 November 1868, p.1126, reporting a shareholders' meeting of the 
Highland Railway at which the directors were stated 'not to believe it is the wish of the 
Highland shareholders to secure a large profit for working the Skye line'; Railway Times, 6 
May 1871, p.427, reporting that a similar working arrangement adopted for the Skye line that 
abandoned charging a fixed percentage of receipts was to be applied to the Sutherland 
Railway. 
228 
previously been conceived from the south and pressed northwards, but the 
Inverness strategy was described as' ... pressing forward to meet the southern and 
eastern companies, rather than wait to be met by them' .6 The strong northern 
independence engendered by the Inverness web of companies survived well into the 
following century. 
Supporters of the 1846 Perth-Inverness scheme saw scope to improve the economy 
of the whole of northern Scotland: 
It is not Inverness, or Nairn, or Elgin, which is to be regarded as its terminus. 
The northern terminus . . . is the whole of those vast districts to the north and 
west of the Spey.7 
Transport links from the highlands were rudimentary in the early nineteenth century. 
A weekly service by sea from Inverness to London operated from the 1830s, 
although a voyage from lnvergordon, north of Inverness on the Cromarty Firth, to 
London took nine days in 1850.8 In 1847, there were three daily mail coaches from 
Inverness, south to Perth, east to Aberdeen and north to Tain, but the Perth service 
took 23 hours and the Aberdeen 17 hours.9 From 1817, Inverness held an annual 
sheep and wool market attended by traders from England as well as Scotland and 
unusual in that 'no stock or samples are produced ... the buyers know the stock of 
each farm•.10 It took six weeks, however, to drive sheep south from the highlands to 
the main market at Falkirk. 
e Railway Magazine, 4 (Jan-June, 1899), p.2, interview with TA Wilson, General Manager of 
the Highland Railway. 
7 J Fraser, The Perth and Inverness Railway: its importance as a national and commercial 
enterprise (London, 1846), p.2. 
8 IRM Mowat, Easter Ross 1750-1850: the double frontier(Edinburgh, 1981), p.85. 
9 L Maclean, The Hub of the Highlands - the book of Inverness and district (Edinburgh, 
1975), p.216; IH Anderson. Inverness before Railways (Inverness, 1885), p.30-34; R Merricks 
and J Roake, 'Coaches in connectio~•• Highland Railway Journal, 5, No.78 (Summer 2006), 
p. 7, noting that just prior t? th_e ope~mg of the Inverness and Nairn Railway in 1855, seven 
coaches left Inverness daily, including two south to Perth and one to connect at Huntly with 
the Great North of Scotland Railway. 
10 J Mitchell, Reminiscences _of My Life in the Highlands, vol.I (private publication, 2 volumes, 
London, 1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1971), p.338. 
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When the Great North opened its line between Aberdeen and Huntly in 1854, 
Inverness was over 70 miles from the new railhead and still reliant upon slow and 
hazardous road transport and coastal shlpplng.11 The £1.4 million share capital 
proposed for the Perth and Inverness Railway in 1846 demonstrated the scale of 
investment required for improved transport, 12 but a national shortage of capital for 
railways followed the speculative mania: 'no-one would invest in Highland lines in the 
difficult conditions of the late 1840s' .13 New northern lines therefore required 
substantial local finance and strict economy in construction. 1◄ Large landowners 
were the principal source of local capital because better transport offered the 
potential for increased land values. Herapath's Railway Journal noted: 
We are satisfied that there is not a landed estate traversed by a railway which 
is not greatly enhanced in value by being placed in the course of a great 
public thoroughfare.15 
The sources of capital for northern railways present a contrast between the funds of 
highland landowners and Aberdonian business interests, which K Fenwick has 
likened to the 'old' money of Inverness and the 'new' money of Aberdeen. 16 
Established landowners were well represented on northern railway boards from the 
1850s, often by their commissioners, in particular the Hon TC Bruce for the Earl of 
11 PH Gordon, 'Commercial and Industrial Progress', in L Maclean {ed.), The Hub of the 
Highlands, p.251. 
12 Session 9&10, Vic., 1846, A Bill for making a Railway from Perth to Inverness with 
Branches to Nairn to be called 'The Perth and Inverness Railway', NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1, 
proposing share capital of £1.4 million in 56,000 shares of £25 each and with borrowing 
powers of £466,000. 
13 w Vamplew, 'Railway investment in the Scottish Highlands', Transport History, 3, No.2 
(July 1970), p.147; J Thomas and D Turnock, A Regional History of the Railways of Great 
Britain, vol.15 (North of Scotland), p.215. 
14 Railway Times, 26 November 1853, p. 1237; Railway Times, 17 December 1853, p.1300. 
15 Herapath's Railway Journal, 16 January 1858, p.69. 
18 K Fenwick, 'Genesis of the Great North' Great North Review, 33, No.128 (February 1996), 
p.245. 
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Seafield, WJ Tayler for the Earl of Fife and George Loch for the Duke of Sutherland, 
but not all highland railway investment was 'old' money from aristocratic roots. 
Two noteworthy supporters of highland lines had earned their wealth elsewhere and 
were symbolic of the new type of landowner buying property in the highlands.17 
James Merry, a wealthy lronmaster, has been Identified In chapter 5 through his 
public condemnation of the Great North's monopoly.18 Alexander Matheson, who 
became chairman of the Aberdeen Junction and Ross-shire lines and later chairman 
of the Highland Railway, was the senior partner in the international trading firm of 
Jardine-Matheson from 1842 and a Member of Parliament and a director of the Bank 
of England from 1847.19 He acquired considerable wealth from far-eastern trade and 
bought the Ardross estate near lnvergordon in 1846 and the Lochalsh estate in the 
north-west highlands in 1851. 20 Matheson eventually owned 220,000 acres in Ross-
shire and spent over £1,460,000 on purchase and improvements.21 This investment 
turned Ardross 'from a barren moor within 15 years into cultivated fields, 
homesteads, and plantations' .22 Professor Slaven concludes that, although 
Matheson was chairman of various railways for nearly 30 years, 'there is little 
evidence that he played any significant role in the development of their operations'; 
subsequent chapters suggest that this may be a severe judgement, particularly in 
17 TM Devine and WJ Orr, The Great Highland Famine (Edinburgh, 1988), p.77 and pp.93-
94; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol. I, p.115. 
18 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 6 August 1858, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.218. 
10 A Slaven, 'Sir Alexander Matheson', in A Slaven and S Checkland, Dictionary of Scottish 
Business Biography, 1860-1960 (two volumes, Aberdeen, 1986 and 1990), vol.2, pp.301-302 
Matheson joined the family firm of Jardine-Matheson in the 1830s after taking a degree at 
Edinburgh; Burke's Peerage, Baronetage and Knightage, 107th edition (Delaware USA and 
Stokesley UK. 2003), vol.II, p.2645; B Lanman, An Economic History of Modem Scotland 
1660-1976 (London, 1977), p.178. 
20 TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War. the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands, 
p.82, describes Matheson as 'an individual of colossal wealth who lavished expenditure on 
his estates and in the process helped to subsidise the local economy from the profits of trade 
earned in distant and exotic parts of the world'. 
21 HCG Matthew and B Harrison (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol.37 
(Oxford, 2004), pp.280-81. 
22 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.I, pp.277-78. 
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regard to the promotion of extensions to the north and west of Inverness that ran 
close to Matheson's estates.23 
Ten individuals provided £761,118 for Inverness railway schemes, over £38 million 
on a 2007 price base, 24 ninety-four percent of which came from just five highland 
landowning sources: £355,545 from the Duke of Sutherland and a further £100,000 
from three members of his family, £73,370 from the Earl of Seafield, £73,623 from 
Matheson, £85,000 from Merry and £26,500 from EW Mackintosh, a director on the 
first boards of the Nairn, Ross-shire and Perth Junction lines.25 
The delay in constructing the line from Aberdeen to Inverness raised doubts about 
the Great North's ability to complete it.26 By 1852-53, improved trade and economic 
conditions nationally encouraged the Inverness promoters to make a further attempt 
to take control of railway development in the north.27 In 1853, an Inverness 
delegation was appointed to canvass major English companies, reviving the 1846 
plans for a direct line south via Nairn to Perth, an eastern extension to Elgin and a 
branch to Burghead. 28 Drawing upon data complied for the unsuccessful 1846 
23 A Slaven, 'Sir Alexander Matheson', in A Slaven and S Checkland, Dictionary of Scottish 
Business Biography, 1860-1960, vol.2, p.302; NT Sinclair, 'Boat of Garten in the nineteenth 
century', Great North Review. 12 No.46 (August 1975), pp. 122-23, suggests that Bruce and 
Dougall were responsible for much of Inverness policy matters, especially those with other 
railways, but 'one should not underestimate the importance' of Matheson. 
24 See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
25 Railway Magazine, 4 (January-June, 1899), p.10, recording that £761,118 invested in 
Inverness lines was provided by the Duke of Sutherland (£355,545), Lords Albert and Ronald 
Leverson-Gower (£80,000), the Marquis of Stafford (£20,000), the Earl of Seafield (£73,370), 
Alexander Matheson (£73,623), James Merry (£85,000), fW Mackintosh (£26,500), Sir 
James Falshaw (£29,080), and Lord Tweedmouth (£18,000). 
26 Railway Times, 14 December 1850, p.1271. 
27 H Pollins, 'Aspects of railway accounting before 1868', in MC Reed (ed.), Railways in the 
Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969), p.141: 'Improved trade in the early fifties led to a 
veritable boom in 1852 and 1853, and again in 1856'. 
2a •statement with regard to the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways by 
the deputation appointed at a meeting held in Inverness on 16 December 1852', dated 
February 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1 /15. 
232 
scheme,29 engineer Joseph Mitchell and Inverness solicitor Peter Anderson 
produced a new estimate of £1,735,979 for a single line with land for double.30 
Perhaps recalling Mitchell's earlier experience as engineer to the Scottish Central 
where land costs spiraled above estimates,31 their report emphasised that the 
success of the scheme depended upon landowners 'doing all In their power to bring 
the cost within a reasonable compass': 
... the great majority of them are most favourable, and are disposed to give 
their moor land gratis, the arable land for its bare agricultural value, without 
any allowance for severance and generally, if wished, to commute the price 
into a moderate fixed duty.32 
The delegation met the London and North Western Railway, engineer Locke and 
contractor Brassey; Mitchell recalled that they 'urged us to get the proprietors along 
the line to show practical evidence of their willingness to give the land required on 
advantageous terms'. 33 Meetings were also held with the York, Newcastle and 
29 Law papers for the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Junction Railways, 1845-
46, NAS/BR/PYB(S)/1/477/1-3. 
30 'Statement with regard to the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways by 
the deputation appointed at a meeting held in Inverness on 16 December 1852', dated 
February 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15: Mitchell and Anderson reported some expectation of 
a reduction in the estimate, which was for 156 miles of railway, because 'Having in view the 
greater economy now practised and practicable in the works, and the better feeling that 
exists on the part of landed proprietors, it may be inferred that in a new estimate the above 
stated cost [£1,735,979] may be considerably reduced'. This estimate produces a cost per 
mile of £11,128, compared to the 1846 estimate of £11,554 per mile quoted by authors for 
the Inverness-Perth line that was then expected to cost £1,450,000. 
31 see chapter 4, 'The route to the north: the Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction 
Railways'. 
32 'Statement with regard to the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways by 
the deputation appointed at a meeting held in Inverness on 16 December 1852', dated 
February 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15. 
33 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol. II, p.180: the deputation 
comprised, Mitchell, Anderson and EW Mackintosh; Railway Journal, 14 May 1853, in 
'Miscellaneous memoranda on the history of the Highland Railway', NAS/BR/HR/4/3/11, 
reporting a meeting held in Inverness on 12 April 1853 of the joint committees of the Perth 
and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways. 
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Berwick and Great Northern Railways. 34 Anderson later confirmed the promoters' 
intention to secure landowner agreements in advance of seeking incorporation and 
to pursue the 'utmost practicable economy' in a re-survey of the route,35 but the 
advice of the English companies was that 'the present was not the proper moment to 
bring a great measure of this sort before the public .. .'.36 However, the Inverness 
Advertiser re-iterated the Inverness doctrine to keep the Great North out of the 
highland capital: 
We are glad to hear that the formation of the Aberdeen line proceeds apace; 
but Elgin is its proper and natural terminus ... To run a direct line of railway 
betwixt Inverness and Perth, and thus beget the necessity of an extension 
northwards would be like infusing the breath of new life into the Highlands.37 
A public meeting in Inverness in 1853 supported plans for a direct line to the south. 
Provost Sutherland cautioned the audience about extravagance in railway 
construction, quoting Aytoun's Glenmutchkin parody of 1845 and thus Illustrating its 
continued influence, but he proposed 'The direct line was decidedly the line which 
was most wanted ... '.38 
M Inverness Courier, 14 April 1853 in the file of prospectuses of the Perth and Inverness and 
Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1852-53, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15; Railway Times, 23 April, 
1853, pp. 425-27. 
35 Letter headed 'Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways' to JR Mowat, 
Secretary, Great Northern Railway, London, 14 April 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15, reporting 
the resolution of the committees of the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin 
Railways at their meeting on 12 April 1853 to make 'every effort to get llberal forehand 
arrangements effected for the requisite land' and for Mitchell to re-survey the route 'with a 
view to the utmost practicable economy ... '. 
36 Inverness Courier, 14 April 1853, in the file of prospectuses of the Perth and Inverness 
and Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1852-53, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15. 
37 Inverness Advertiser, 19 April 1853, in the file of prospectuses of the Perth and Inverness 
and Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1852-53, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15. 
36 Railway Journal. 14 May 1853, in 'Miscellaneous memoranda on the history of the 
Highland Railway', NAS/BR/HR/4/3/11, reporting a public meeting held on 30 April 1853 to 
support the Perth and Inverness Railway proposals; WE Aytoun, 'How we got up the 
Glenmutchkin Railway, and how we got out of it', 8/ackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 58 
(October, 1845), 453-66. 
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Planning continued,39 but, without southern capital, the promoters accepted the 
advice against promoting the Perth route immediately.40 Nevertheless, a strategic 
plan for an Inverness web of lines southwards to Perth, eastwards towards the Great 
North, and northwards into the highlands under local and independent control was 
established by the mid-1850s.41 The lapse of the Great North's powers for the 
Aberdeen-Inverness line provided the opportunity for Inverness to convert aspiration 
into action by promoting a short fifteen mile line from Inverness to Nairn, ostensibly 
as a contribution towards a connection with the Great North, but In reality the first 
stage towards securing control of railway development in the highlands and an 
independent route to the south. Inverness railway strategy remained unchanged, but 
the Nairn scheme indicated a revision to its planned implementation: 
. . . it remained for those who were still persuaded of the capabilities of the 
Northern Highlands for railway enterprise to depart from their original design 
as a whole, and to endeavour to get it carried out piecemeal, and from stage 
to stage, as circumstances would permit. For this purpose, and with the view 
of securing the west end of the line next Inverness as a common centre and 
connecting link in the future development of the railway system throughout 
the northern counties, an independent company was formed for the 
construction of a line from Inverness to Nairn ... 4 
The Inverness and Nairn Railway, authorised in 1854, exemplifies the importance of 
local capital and economy in constructing a main line in northern Scotland, using the 
principles of the 'cheap railway' .43 
39 Railway Times, 9 July 1853, p. 69 and 13 August 1853, p. 823. 
40 Railway Times, 26 November 1853, p.1237: 'The sudden stringency of the money-market, 
felt of course most severely at the extremities of the system ... has been discretely avoided 
by deferring what may be called the single portion of the trunk [line] till a more convenient 
season ... '. 
41 Herapath's Railway Journal, 15 December 1855, p.1285, reporting 'a coast line from 
Inverness to Wick is projected'. 
42 G and p Anderson, Handbook to the Inverness and Naim Railway and scenes adjoining it 
(Inverness, 1856), p.29. 
43 17&18 Vic. cap. 176, 1854, The Inverness and Nairn Railway Act, with authorised share 
capital of £80,000 and borrowing powers not exceeding one-third of share capital. 
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The 'cheap railway' in Scotland 
The opening chapter identified the importance of securing reductions in the costs of 
promotion and construction if railways were to be extended successfully into less 
economically prosperous regions. Features of a 'cheap railway' might include a less 
direct route following natural topography, a scale of construction designed to match 
expected traffic, land obtained on lease terms and single line operation.-« 
A Board of Trade report by Samuel Laing to the Select Committee on Railways in 
1844 suggested that British railway costs of £34,000 per mile, which included 
·excess spending' of £8,000 per mile largely attributed to parliamentary and land 
costs, were eight times higher than costs In the United States of America.46 · Land 
costs in France and Belgium were estimated at £2,500 per mile, but between £4,000 
and £8,000 per mile in Britain.46 Irving determines the average cost per mile for 
British lines as £37,402 by 1850, while Robertson estimates the costs per mile in 
1851 to be £38,258 in England and £32, 113 in Scotland.47 Costs of this magnitude 
erased any prospect of competitive returns on railway investment in northern 
Scotland with its sparse population, lack of raw materials and heavy dependence on 
primary industries. Lower land and construction costs were, therefore, pre-requisites 
for the development of northern railways. 
44 CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
company', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 1974), pp.2-4; PF Marshall, Peebles Railways 
(Usk, 2005), pp.20-21 and 23-24; MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844 
(London, 1975), p.13. 
45 RJ Irving, 'The capitalisation of British Railways', 1830-1914, Journal of Transport History, 
3rd series, vol.5, No.1 (March 1984), p.8 and p.16; TR Gourvlsh, Railways and the British 
Economy 1830-1914 (London, 1980, p.16); TR Gourvish, 'Railways 1830-70: the formative 
years', in MJ Freeman and DH Aldcroft (eds.), Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 
1988), p.62. 
46 RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), p.173. 
47 RJ Irving, 'The capitalisation of British Railways, 1830-1914', table 3, p.8, p.9 and p.16, 
CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
Company', p.2. 
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Any comparison of costs per mile quoted in primary and secondary sources requires 
circumspection because not all identify clearly whether data refer to construction 
costs, with or without land, or the full capital costs of the lines: 
These discrepancies between the actual cost of lines and the cost at which 
they are stated to have been opened are explained by the fact that lines are 
almost always opened before they are complete ... Any comparison of the 
cost of a line is therefore necessary fallaclous.48 
These differences are illustrated by the Peebles Railway, an 18¾ mile branch 
connecting Peebles with Dalkeith on the Galashiels-Edinburgh line of the North 
British Railway, acclaimed as an exemplar of a line built on the 'economical single 
line plan' and opened in 1855 at a reported cost of £4,500 per mile.49 Company 
accounts show that by August 1856, one year after opening, land and construction 
costs were £4,772 per mile, but the overall capital cost was £5,655 per mile, in both 
cases more than the reported cost. 50 
'Cheap' principles were also applied on two early northern lines.51 The Morayshire, 
an isolated 5½ mile branch from Elgin to Lossiemouth opened in 1852, had incurred 
48 Railway Times, 12 December 1863, p.1588, contrasting the report of the engineer of the 
Morayshire Railway who stated that the initial 6 miles of route (Elgin-Lossiemouth) had cost 
£5,305 per mile while the later 15 miles (comprising the Rothes-Orton and Craigellachie-Elgin 
lines) had cost £5,027 per mile, giving an overall cost of £5,106 per mile, with Bradshaw's 
Railway Almanack, 1863, that quoted a figure of £6,587 per mile. 
411 Herapath's Rallway Journal, 9 June 1855, p.577, 9 February 1856, p.143 and 2 April 
1864, p.405: Herapath reported a 6% dividend In 1864 and concluded 'unquestionably the 
line is a success in every shape and way'; PF Marshall, Peebles Railways, p.23 and p.46. 
50 Capital account of the Peebles Railway to 31 August 1856 in the report to the 7th Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Peebles Railway, 28 October 1856, NAS/PBR/1/2, p.388: capital 
spent to 31 August 1856, including plant, was £106,043 of which £72,520 was spent on 
construction and £16,956 on land. 
51 Railway Times, 4 Novem~er 1854, p.1198: reporting the results of the Morayshire Railway, 
commented 'Thus do short lines when economically constructed and locally managed, put to 
the blush the extravagant extensions in which some boards are even yet too prone to 
indulge'; Railway Times, 22 October 1859, p.1173, in a leader on the Deeside Railway that 
noted a consistent 5% dividend paid since the line opened in 1853, commented that 'The 
sole secret of this success lies in economy of construction, and a rigid regard to outlay of 
capital'. 
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a capital cost of £7,566 per mile by 1854,52 while the Deeside, opened between 
Aberdeen and Banchory in 1853, returned a capital cost of £8,011 per mile by 
1855. 53 The influence of these two economically-constructed and independent 
companies is examined in chapter 7, but both these lines demonstrated that major 
economies could be achieved in railway promotion in northern Scotland. 
Furthermore, the previous chapter has identified other northern lines that were 
constructed economically in the late 1850s; the Alford Valley and the two Turriff lines 
were built at capital costs of between £6,300 and £8,300 per mile, but these lines 
were branches connected to a main route. The Inverness promoters did not plan 
their local line to Nairn as a branch; it was to become part of a main trunk route with 
consequent implications for construction standards. The Peebles Railway, for 
example, was lightly built and its track required renewal in 1858 after only three 
years' use.54 
For the Inverness lines proposed in 1853, Mitchell advocated the principles of 
economy being applied to railroad development in America and Canada: 
In America in 1851, there were 10,921 miles of railway in operation, and 
7,560 miles in the course of construction, and the average cost of these 
works was £5,500 per mile, including "equipments".55 
Mitchell referred to 'the desert regions of Canada or the western districts of the 
Northern States of America' where the promoters 'have calculated their probable 
traffic and suited their works to that traffic'. 66 He estimated that if the cost of a direct 
52 Appendix, table 17(b}, note (2); J Ross, The Traveller's Joy 1852 (Elgin, 2001), p.21. 
s3 Appendix, table 7(a): the capital cost of the Deeside on opening in 1854 was £6,803 per 
mile, but the large rise to £8,011 per mile after one year of operation illustrates the time 
needed for accounts to be paid to reflect a more accurate assessment of capital expenditure. 
5' pf Marshall, Peebles Railways, p.86. 
55 Railway Times, 23 April 1853, p.426, reporting a meeting in Inverness on 12 April 1853 of 
the 'joint committees' of the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways and 
'other gentlemen favourable to them'. 
56 Inverness Courier, 14 April 1853, in the file of prospectuses of the Perth and Inverness 
and Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1852-53, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15, in which Mitchell quoted 
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line south to Perth using the 'American plan of cheap construction' did not exceed 
£7,000 per mile, a 5 percent dividend was realistic. 57 The Morayshire Railway, which 
paid a 5 percent dividend In 1853, was cited: 
If a little line with a limited traffic like this produces such results, it is not 
unreasonable to assume the concentrated traffic of the northern half of 
Scotland would warrant the construction of a line such as we now 
contemplate. 68 
American lines were constructed at a much lower cost per mile than most British 
lines, but, as in Britain, the scale of capital required rapidly exceeded local supply. 59 
American railroads also mirrored the British experience of escalating costs: for 
example, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad had spent $15 million by December 1852 
on a 379 mile route against an estimate of $5 million for a planned 290 mile route, an 
increase in cost per mile of 130 percent.60 However, it had a stronger traffic potential 
than lines in northern Scotland from which to recoup the cost; the line yielded $2 
million annual revenue in 1853 against an expectation of $750,000 and paid 7 
percent dividend. 
returns ranging from 7% to 9% on nine American lines, all built economically and opened 
between 1835 and 1846. 
57 Railway Journal, 23 April 1853, in 'Miscellaneous memoranda on the history of the 
Highland Railway', NAS/BR/HR/4/3/11: Mitchell allowed for traffic of £14 per week and 
working expenses charged at 50% of receipts in his calculations; Railway Times, 23 April 
1853, p.426, however, quotes Mitchell's estimates of £10,232 per mile if the Inverness-Perth 
line was double-tracked and £8,817 if single, 'But it is to be hoped that considerable saving 
may be effected on this sum'. 
58 Railway Times, 23 April 1853, p.427: Mitchell quoted the cost of the Morayshire as £6,000 
per mile, without signifying whether this figure represented construction or capital costs. 
Appendix, table 17{c), shows that the Morayshire paid a 5% dividend in 1853, although this 
fell to 2½ % in 1854 and 2% in 1855. 
59 AD Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), p.91. 
so JF Stover, History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad {West Lafayette, Indiana, 1987), 
p.75: the original estimate of $5 million for 290 miles produces a cost per mile of $17,241, 
while the actual cost of $15 million for the longer route of 379 miles produces a cost per mile 
of $39,578, an increase of 129.6%. 
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Economical railway construction required inexpensive land. Mitchell warned that 'if 
they [the landowners] obstruct us, or make exorbitant demands, we will be driven 
Into expensive works .. .',61 but, aided by his contacts with many local landowners 
through his work as Superintendent of Highland Roads and Bridges, the Inverness 
promoters obtained advance support from many, including a reluctant Duke of 
Athole: 
... he wishes it to be understood that he does not wish any railway through 
Athole ... but if it is thought the interests of the public require a line, then he 
will not allow his own personal feelings to stand out against it, how much he 
may otherwise regret it.62 
The Railway Times commended the economical ambitions of the Inverness 
promoters: 
... they arrive at the conclusion that it would be profitless to construct a line at 
£35,000 per mile, when one at £5,500 is sufficient ... More inquiry, closer 
investigation, reduced estimates, new allies, avoidance of offence with 
existing interest - these are the means of progress which they use ... 63 
The principles of the 'cheap railway' were adopted for the promotion of the short line 
from Inverness to Nairn, which, in 1853-54, moved the Inverness strategy from 
planning into implementation. This line effectively blocked the western end of the 
Aberdeen-Inverness route from Aberdonian advances and preserved future options 
for extensions of the Inverness web to the east, south and north. 
61 Inverness Courier, 14 April 1853, quoting Mitchell's report to the meeting of the joint 
committees of the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways held on 12 April 
1853, contained in the file of prospectuses of the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and 
Elgin Railways, 1852-53, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15. 
s2 Inverness Courier, 14 April 1853, in the file of prospectuses of the Perth and Inverness 
and Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1852-53, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/15. 
63 Railway Times, 23 April 1853, p.434. 
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The Inverness railway strategy realised 
Without the large capital sources required for a direct line to Perth, Mitchell advised 
the Inverness promoters in September 1853 to phase the implementation of their 
railway strategy and take advantage of the lapse of the Great North's powers for the 
Aberdeen-Inverness line: 
... we should forthwith form a company for making the railway between Nairn 
and Inverness, as part of the Great Scheme of direct communication ... and it 
may be accomplished by means within the locality. 
Of course guarantees should be taken that whenever the means are 
forthcoming for the construction of the through line it should, on a proper 
equivalent, be merged into and form part of that scheme.64 
The principle of early amalgamations between Inverness web companies was 
therefore identified from the outset. Unlike the 1845-46 Aberdeen network, however, 
where the Aberdeen Railway as the first operational company assumed the central 
management role of 'host' company within its web, the Inverness and Nairn was 
introduced to the public as a small, local line which was 'an undertaking in itself,65 
although the prospectus identified the line as 'a step towards the full benefit of 
through Railway communication for the Northern Counties' .88 
The first company minute is headed 'Meeting of Committee for promotion of direct 
line of Railway between Inverness and Perth and Inverness and Elgin',87 thus 
indicating the original intentions of the promoters. Their decision to implement the 
64 
'Meeting of Committee for the promotion of a direct line of railway between Inverness and 
Perth and Inverness and Elgin', first entry in the minute book of the Inverness and Nairn 
Railway, 16 September 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.2: the meeting received the report of 
Joseph Mitchell, dated 15 September 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.4; J Mitchell, Reminiscences 
of My Life in the Highlands, vol. I/, p.182. 
65 Inverness Courier, 8 December 1853, in the minute book of the Inverness and Nairn 
Railway, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.47-48. 
66 Prospectus of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/10. 
67 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 16 September 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.2. 
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Inverness railway strategy in stages resulted in the promotion of the Inverness and 
Nairn Railway, but identified 'as an integral portion of the Main through Line to 
Perth'.68 The promoters suggested that the next priority was to extend eastwards 
from Nairn to Elgin and Huntly to provide a link to Aberdeen, although a northern 
extension to Dingwall and Tain was also anticipated.69 The Inverness Advertiser 
supported this policy of gradual extension: 
A bit by bit advance is the safest and most certain method ... Short lines, a 
resident proprietary, and a local management, are the noticeable elements of 
any plan for giving us railway profits and railway extension ... 70 
- small beginnings: the Inverness and Nairn Railway 
Unappropriated funds held in trust from the 1846 Inverness-Elgin scheme were 
released for use by the new company, indicating that some original resources had 
been retained for future revival of the plans.71 The prospectus for the Nairn line set 
capital at £85,000 and estimated the cost at £5,500 per mile, although authorised 
share capital was set lower at £80,000.72 Yet by September 1857, the actual cost 
had reached £8,003 per mile.73 
68 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 15 and 23 September 1853, 
NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.4 and p.9. 
69 Inverness Advertiser. 6 December 1853, in the minute book of the Inverness and Nairn 
Railway, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.47-48, reporting a public meeting held in Nairn. 
70 Inverness Advertiser, 26 September 1854, in the minute book of the Inverness and Nairn 
Railway, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.147. 
71 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 6 October 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.18, 
reporting that Charles Waterston, manager of the Caledonian bank in Inverness, one of the 
two trustees of Inverness and Elgin Railway funds and also a member of the Inverness and 
Nairn provisional committee, had approved release of the trust funds to the provisional 
committee. 
72 Meeting of the provisional committee of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 16 September 
1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.2: construction costs were estimated at £4,000per mile; Prospectus 
of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/10; 17&18 Vic. cap.176, 
1854, The Inverness and Nairn Railway Act. 
73 See table 55 in this chapter and table 73 in chapter 8; Appendix, table 13(a), note (4): in 
September 1857, the actual cost of £8.003 per mile included expenditure on working plant, 
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Table 49: Allocation of shares in the Inverness and Nairn Railway, January 1854 
Number of Number of entries in Total number Value of shares: 
£10 shares shareholder 11st of shares oar value of £1 0 each (£) 
1 5 5 50 
2 36 72 720 
3 8 24 240 
4 6 24 240 
5 65 325 3250 
6 4 24 240 
10 37 370 3700 
15 4 60 600 
20 8 160 1600 
25 13 325 3250 
30 6 180 1800 
40 2 80 800 
50 11 550 5500 
100 10 1000 10000 
150 1 150 1500 
200 1 200 2000 
400 1 400 4000 
600 1 600 6000 
1000 2 2000 20000 
(note 2) 221 entries on list 6549 65490 
213 individual subscribers 
Subscribers with more than 100 shares at 31 Januarv 1854 
Name Address Number of shares (note 31 
Peter Anderson Inverness 140 <solicitor and interim secretarv) 
Thomas Brassev London 1000 (contractor to the comoanv 
James Falshaw Perth 1000 <contractor to the comoanvl 
Eneas Mackintosh Raicimore Inverness 800 (a first director of the comoanv\ 
Joseoh Mitchell Inverness 250 (enciineer to the comoanvl 
Caotain William Fraser-Tvtler Aldourie Inverness 500 (a first director of the comoanv\ 
source: 'List of shareholders' in minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 30 January 1854, 
NAS/BR/INR/1 /1 oo.68-75. 
(1): Although headed 'list of Shareholders' in the company's minutes, this record is, in reality, a list of 
subscribers prior to the incorporation of the company in July 1854. 
(2): There are 221 entries on the subscriber list, but allocations were made to 213 individuals, 8 appearing 
twice in the subscription list. Secondary sources, however, give varying data on shareholders. 
Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1855, p.112, quotes 182 local shareholders subscribing £48, 71 0 and 
twelve other shareholders subscribing £13,300. The Stephenson Locomotive Society, The Highland 
Railway and its constituents, 1855-1955 (London,1955), p.4, adds to the 194 shareholders reported In 
Bradshaw's volume the names of Brassey, Falshaw and Mitchell who offered over £2,000 each; D Ross, 
The Highland Railway, p.21, gives a total of 210 shareholders. 
(3): No entries are apparent in the data in table 49 for the 800, 500, 250 and 140 shares taken by four of 
the six largest subscribers, because Mackintosh subscribed for 800 shares in two lots of 600 and 200, 
Fraser-Tytler for 500 shares in two lots of 400 and 100, Mitchell for 250 shares In two lots of 150 and 100, 
and Anderson for 140 shares in two lots of 100 and 40. These four shareholders therefore appear twice in 
the shareholders' list, along with a further four double entries for A Forbes (30+50 shares), Mrs J Fraser 
(5+5), A Hepburn (5+5 shares) and A Winchester (2+3 shares), which produces 213 subscribers identified 
from the 221 subscriotion entries. 
although the capital cost per mile without plant was £7,221. From 22 December 1857, the 
Nairn line was worked by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway once the first section 
of that company's Nairn-Keith main line was opened from Nairn to Dalvey. 
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The earlier Scottish experience of raising capital from small subscribers living in the 
immediate district of the proposed local line, identified in chapter 3, was repeated for 
the Nairn railway (table 49). A parliamentary submission asserted that 'people have 
taken shares in it . . . by way of promoting what would be a great advantage to the 
country' .74 Traffic prospects included an early development of railway tourism for 
'the Sea-Bathing and Baths of Nairn' .75 
Contractors Brassey and Falshaw offered to build the line for £65,000, taking 
£20,000 of stock as part-payment.76 Over three-quarters of the share capital was 
subscribed by January 1854, but only six Individuals offered more than £1,000 each 
and all were intimately connected with the company.n These six people, 
representing 2.8 percent of subscribers, held 56.3 percent of the allocated shares; by 
contrast, 19.2 percent of shareholders held only one or two shares each and 56.3 
percent held 5 shares or fewer. Sixty-three percent of shareholders gave Inverness 
or Nairn addresses; only 6.6 percent had English addresses.78 Alexander Matheson 
joined the provisional committee in November 1853, initially subscribing £1,000, but 
by 1857 he was reported to be the largest shareholder.79 Matheson appears to have 
74 Evidence of Edward Ellice MP on behalf of the promoters to the parliamentary committee 
investigating the Inverness and Nairn Railway Bill, 1854, quoted in JE Campbell, The Iron 
Track through the Highlands (Inverness, 1921 ), p.16. 
75 Prospectus of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1853, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/10, which 
announced that '... the Sea-Bathing and Baths of Nairn will form a permanent attraction to 
the inhabitants of Inverness and neighbourhood'. 
76 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 31 October 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.25; 
Brassey's offer made on 28 October 1853 was accepted on 5 December 1853, 'provided 
always that the requisite stock and capital can be raised', NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.34. 
77 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 30 January 1854, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.68-75: 
the share capital of the company in the prospectus was £85,000, but it was set at £80,000 in 
the act of Parliament (17&18 Vic. cap.176, 1854). 
78 14 subscribers gave English address, of which 7 were in London and 2 in Manchester; in 
addition, one subscriber gave a Dublin address (NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.68-75). 
79 Shareholder list in minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 30 January 1854, 
NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.68-75; Herapath's RailwayJoumal, 9 May 1857, p.475, reporting the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Nairn Railway held on 28 April 1857 at which 
chairman Eneas Mackintosh welcomed Matheson's speech because it was given by 'the 
largest shareholder in the Company ... '; however, six months later, minutes of the Special 
General Meeting of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 30 October 1857, in scroll minutes of 
the directors of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, NAS/BR/INR/1/4, show in a recorded vote 
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used his railway investment as a catalyst across the Inverness companies because 
he no longer held any Nairn stock by July 1864, but had invested £1,400 in the 
Aberdeen Junction and £13,500 in the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, recently 
opened north of Inverness and close to his Ardross estate.80 
Table 50: Shareholding in Inverness and Nairn stock, 1854-64 
Ordinary stock subscriptions, January 1854 (1) Nairn 'B' 6% Stock, July 1864, 
Inverness and Nairn Rallwav Inverness & Aberdeen Junction Rallwav 
Number of Number of Total Share Number of Number of 
£10 shares entries Shares Value(£) shares shareholders 
1 5 5 50 1 3 
2 36 72 720 2 13 
3 8 24 240 3 5 
4 6 24 240 4 3 
5 65 325 3250 5 24 
6 4 24 240 6 4 
10 37 370 3700 7 1 
15 4 60 600 8 1 
20 8 160 1600 9 0 
25 13 325 3250 10 26 
30 6 180 1800 11 -20 17 
40 2 80 800 21 -30 10 
50 11 550 5500 31-40 7 
100 10 1000 10000 41 -50 11 
150 1 150 1500 51 -100 12 
200 1 200 2000 101-200 7 
400 1 400 4000 201 -300 1 
600 1 600 6000 301-400 0 
1000 2 2000 20000 401 -500 0 
221 entries 501-1000 2 12\ 
Shareholders 213 147 
Share value £65490 £5924'2 (21 
sources: Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 30 January 1854, NASIBRIINR/1/1, p.68; Register of 
Dividends 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railwav. NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1 . 
(1) : On amalgamation with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway in 1861, Inverness and Nairn 5% 
preference shares were converted into 5% preference 'A' stock, while ordinary Inverness and Nairn shares 
were converted into 6% preference 'B' stock. 
(2) : Inverness and Aberdeen Junction ac?~unts show that £59,242 ex-Nairn ordinary stock remained extant 
on 31 July 1864, although the half-year d1v1dend paid of £1801 .3s.0d would suggest capital of £60,042. The 
two largest shareholders were Thomas Brassey (£9,070) and James Falshaw (£8,080). Engineer Joseph 
Mitchell still held £1,720 of B stock and £3 830 of A stock. 
that Matheson then held £1,500 of Inverness and Nairn Railway shares, although Mackintosh 
held £2,000. 
80 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1: on 31 July 1864, Alexander Matheson is shown as holding £1,400 of 
Aberdeen Junction 4½% preference 'C' stock, £11,000 in ordinary Ross-shire stock and 
£2 500 of Ross-shire Extension stock; Matheson would also have held stock in the Inverness 
and Perth Junction Railway and later in the Dingwall and Skye Railway, but only one dividend 
register for the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway and its constituents has survived. 
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The ordinary stock of the Inverness and Nairn was converted into a 6 percent 
preference stock on amalgamation with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction in 
1861 and can be traced in the only surviving dividend register of Inverness railway 
companies (table 50). There were 31.0 percent fewer shareholders in 1864 than in 
1854, but the quantity of stock had reduced by only 9.5 percent. Of the 1864 Nairn 
shareholders, 32. 7 percent held five shares or less compared to 56. 1 percent in 
1854; 6.8 percent had invested over £1,000 compared to 2.8 percent in 1854. The 
significant support of small investors had therefore continued, but the 1864-65 
records do not show addresses to allow comparison of shareholder residence. 
To remove threatened opposition from the Great North, the Inverness and Nairn 
board resolved: 
They were prepared to give every facility to the Great North Company in the 
use of the Inverness and Nairn Line consistent with the interests of their own 
shareholders ... 81 
A draft agreement was made in 1854, which included a clause granting running 
rights to the Great North over the short and isolated Nairn line.82 The Inverness 
interpretation of shareholder interests, however, was to protect highland railway 
development from Aberdonian incursions. Details of the draft agreement were 
engrossed in both companies' records, but never formally concluded.83 The 
following year, a new company, which was to absorb the Inverness and Nairn and 
become the 'host' company of the Inverness web, the Inverness and Aberdeen 
81 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 10 January 1854, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.59-60. 
82 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 25 February 1854, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.83-
84, setting out the draft agreement between the companies for Great North running powers 
over the Inverness and Nairn and agreement over rates and booking, and recording that, in 
return, the Great North was to withdraw opposition to the Inverness and Nairn bill. The 
Inverness and Nairn board agreed terms on 9 March 1853. 
83 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 25 February 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, 
p.497; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway (London, 
1949, reprinted Shepperton, 1998), p.26; HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway 
(Newton Abbot, 1965), p.29 and p.131; see also chapter 5, 'The results of monopoly power'. 
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Junction Railway, was promoted to construct the link eastwards towards the Great 
North's line, which inserted a barrier between the Great North and its anticipated 
running rights between Nairn and lnverness.84 An extension from Nairn to Elgin as 
the next phase of the Inverness strategy was announced to Inverness and Nairn 
shareholders in September 1854 on the day following the opening of the Great 
North's line to Huntly and a year before the Nairn line itself was opened.85 The 
ultimate objective of the Inverness promoters was re-stated: 
. . . they will of course be careful to do nothing which may embarrass the 
promotion of the Central Line, by way of Perth, to which the Highlands of 
Scotland must look for the full development of their resources ... 88 
Andrew Dougall, Perth stationmaster of the Dundee and Perth Railway, joined the 
Nairn company as general manager in August 1855 and applied 'initiative, 
imagination, commercial acumen, and rare force of character'87 within the Inverness 
railway web over the next four decades. 88 The Nairn line existed as a nominally 
independent company for six years89 and justified financially the staged approach to 
the implementation of the Inverness railway strategy. While politics continued 
84 Meeting of promoters, in minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 14 
June 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.1. 
85 Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 21 
September 1854, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.144. The Inverness and Nairn Railway opened in 
November 1855. 
86 Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 21 
September 1854, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.144: the directors also stated that 'a 'commencement 
has already been made' to the direct Inverness-Perth route as a result of the authorisation of 
the Perth and Dunkeld Railway (17&18 Vic. cap.148, 1854). 
87 JE Campbell, The Iron Track through the Highlands, p.22. 
88 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 11 and 18 August 1855, NAS/BR//INR/1/1, 
p.280, recording Dougall's appointment; NT Sinclair, Highland Railway: People and Places 
(Derby, 2005), p.11: Railway Times, 7 December 1895, p. 726, reporting that Dougall had 
resigned as general manager: he left the service of the Highland Railway in February 1896. 
89 The Inverness and Nairn Railway was amalgamated with the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction in 1861 under 24&25 Vic. cap.8, 1861, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway Act. 
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between Inverness and Aberdeen to establish territorial control, the Nairn company 
produced steady returns for its shareholders. As it was conceived on 'cheap' 
principles and supported by local capital, it was not burdened by heavy temporary 
debt, as experienced on the Great North branches during the same period. 
However, the close liaison between northern railways and local banks, already 
indicated in chapter 5 in relation to Great North branches, was replicated in 
Inverness. The Caledonian Bank in Inverness, of which Mitchell was a promoter and 
first director, offered to take half of the company's debentures in June 1855 before 
the line was completed; Waterston, its manager, joined the Nairn board in 1858. 90 
Annual gross revenue grew steadily from £6,541 in 1856 to £14,329 in 1861 and the 
first dividend of 2 percent in 1856 reached 5 percent in 1860.91 The seasonal nature 
of northern traffic was immediately evident. In January 1856, the average gross 
traffic receipts per week were £120, but 88 percent higher in August at £226 per 
week.92 Similar variations between winter and summer traffic were reflected in the 
accounts of all the Inverness web companies, which required careful operational 
planning to meet the peaks of demand without any waste of scarce resources. 
Moreover, this seasonal trend often resulted In dividends being paid annually rather 
than half-yearly.93 
The economic success of this short, isolated line and its steady dividends was 
attributed to 'careful and energetic management'.94 Nevertheless, the capital cost by 
90 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 12 June 1855, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.249; 
Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 31 May 1858, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.544 and scroll 
minutes of the directors of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 31 May 1858, NAS/BR/INR/1/4, 
item 4; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.69. 
91 Appendix, table 13(b}: revenue grew by 34.2% in 1856-58, but, once the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction opened in 1858 to provide the through route from Inverness to Aberdeen, 
revenue rose by 69.1 % between 1858 and 1860. 
02 Data complied from minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 12, 19 and 26 January, 9 
February, 9 and 20 August, and 6 September 1856, NAS/BR/1 NR/1/1, pages 349, 352, 355, 
357,404,406 and 408. 
93 K Fenwick, The Inverness and Nairn Railway (Highland Railway Society, 2005), p.30. 
94 Railway Times, 7 May 1859, p.525: 'These are the first effects of careful and energetic 
management - careful alike in keeping down expenditure, and in abstaining from exclusive 
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1857 was £8,003 per mile, 50.1 percent above estimate.95 The provisional 
committee had been assured of landowner support by acceptance of feu-duty,98 but, 
despite efforts to obtain land cheaply, land costs by 1857 accounted for 12.4 percent 
of capital expenditure, above the 11.8 percent incurred also by 1857 on the Great 
North's main line to Keith, which Included the purchase of the Aberdeenshire 
canal.97 Land costs for the Nairn line, in fact, fell within the range paid for the 1837-
38 inter-urban lines,98 However, the capital cost per mile was similar to those 
reported for the Morayshire and Deeside, identified earlier as examples of lines built 
on 'cheap railway' principles.99 The cost of the line and the inability to raise its full 
ordinary share capital forced the company to seek powers to issue a new 5 percent 
preference stock and increase its authorised borrowing, which rectified the deficit on 
the capital account.100 
With rising revenue, the debt gearing of this small company strengthened to a level 
similar to that of the successful Scottish Midland Junction Railway, illustrated in 
arrangements, and energetic in so far as speedy completion of works and rapid development 
of local resources can be controlled by directorial supervision'. 
95 Appendix, table 13(a), note (4); see also table 55 of this chapter. 
96 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 2 November 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.25-
26, recording 'All the Proprietors along the Line are favourable, and, in almost every Instance, 
have expressed their readiness to accept a Feu duty, if desired, based on the agricultural 
value of the land required for the works'. 
97 Appendix 13(a), note (3) and note (4); Scroll minutes of the directors of the Inverness and 
Nairn Railway, 9 August 1859, NAS/BR/INR/1/4. item 3, showing that, four years after the line 
opened, £6,240 was held in a bank account principally to meet outstanding land claims; 
Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1857, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, showing 
£99,709 paid for land and the canal and a total capital expenditure of £846,318 by 31 August 
1857 (11.8%). 
98 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 
1983), pp.170-73, showing the range of land costs for the 1837-38 inter-urban lines in 
Scotland by 1845 to be between 12.1% to 19.8% of capital expenditure. 
99 Appendix, tables 7(a) and 17(b): capital costs per mile were £7,566 on the Morayshire 
(1854) and £8,011 on the Deeside (1855). 
100 Appendix, table 13(a); Minutes of an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and 
Nairn Railway, 14 July 1857, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.488; 20&21 Vic. cap. 5, 1857, The 
Inverness and Nairn Railway Act, which increased share capital from £80,000 to £105,000 by 
£25.000 of preference stock and increased borrowing powers proportionally. 
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chapter 4, 101 and well above the Caledonian Railway benchmark of 1849 (table 51). 
The Caledonian's financial weaknesses, however, had been exacerbated by its rapid 
expansion and scale of operation, a path that the Inverness promoters had decided 
not to pursue in 1853. 
Table 51: Financial indicators for the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1855-61 
31 August I 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised I 33.5% 28.6% 30.2% 25.8% 23.1% 22.7% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt I 0.246 0.337 0.257 0.317 0.458 0.454 
Source: Aooendix. Table 13(c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for oross revenue/debt. 
the host company: the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
The Great North's directors must have comprehended the strategic intentions of 
Inverness because company and press reports referred openly to them. The 
expansionist ambitions of Inverness were displayed in the parliamentary notice for its 
proposed eastern extension by a clause proposing running powers over the Great 
North to Aberdeen, which the Great North promptly removed. 102 With their own 
capital difficulties, detailed in the previous chapter, and with their expectation of rail 
access to Inverness over the Nairn line, the Great North saw self-advantage in the 
completion of a link between Nairn and Huntly, if necessary through the intervention 
of an intermediary, to ensure that traffic from the northern counties passed over its 
own line. Just over sixty miles separated these two railheads in 1855, by when 
101 Appendix, table 20(c): the debt gearing of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway was 
0.417 in 1855, just before its amalgamation with the Aberdeen Railway in 1856; see also 
chapter 4: 'The Scottish Central and Scottish Midland Junction Railways'. 
102 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 November 1855, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2, 
p.346; Minutes of the lnvemes~ and Aberdeen Junction_Railway, 12 July 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, pp.26-27, setting out the agreement with the Great North for a Nairn-Elgin-
River Spey line to join a Great North line from Keith to the River Spey, with the Spey bridge to 
be a shared expense. 
250 
capital was becoming increasingly expensive; bank discount rates reached 7 percent 
in October 1855 and peaked at 10 percent in November 1857.103 
The Inverness and Elgin Railway was resurrected under a provisional committee 
before either the Great North or Nairn lines had opened. A deputation comprising its 
deputy chairman and Nairn director, Captain William Fraser-Tytler, EW Mackintosh, 
also a Nairn director, and the Hon TC Bruce, commissioner to the Earl of Seafield, 
sought an agreement with the Great North.104 The Earl of Seafield owned extensive 
timber interests and land in the area to be served by any new link line and was 
therefore a potential key source both of traffic and capital. 
The Great North recognised that a new Nairn-Elgin line (21¾ miles) would leave it 
with heavy expense for a Huntly-Elgin connection (40 miles), including a difficult 
crossing of the River Spey and it sought 'an acceptable division between the two 
companies of the expensive works connected with the Spey crossing'.105 In 
February 1855, the Great North recorded that the Inverness and Elgin ' ... are not in 
a position to carry out their undertaking', but the Great North pressed ahead with 
legislation to extend their line from Huntly to Keith (12½ miles).106 The Great North's 
proposal that the Inverness company should construct beyond Elgin and share the 
cost of the Spey crossing caused a temporary delay, probably to assess the capital 
implications, but it gave an opportunity for the Inverness promoters to push the 
boundary of Aberdeen influence further east. 
The Inverness and Elgin Railway was re-constituted as the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway in 1855; its draft prospectus illustrates the involvement of the key 
landowners or their agents (table 52): 
103 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875, appendix 12, p.83. 
104 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 25 August and 30 November 1854, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.54 and p.149. 
105 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 November 1854, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2, 
p.149. 
106 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 5 February 1855, NAS/BR./GNS/1/2, 
p.194; 18 Vic. cap.28, 1855, The Great North of Scotland Railway Extension Act. 
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Table 52: Provisional committee of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
1855 
Provisional Committee of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
Earl of Seafield Chainnan 
Marquis of Stafford Deputy Chainnan 
Lord Berriedale 
James Duff MP Trustee of the Eart of Fife 
WJTavler Trustee of the Ear1 of Fife 
Hon TC Bruce Commissioner to the Eart of Seafield 
Alexander Matheson MP 
EW Mackintosh Inverness and Nairn Railway representative 
Caotain W Fraser-Tytler Inverness and Nairn Railway representative 
DC Marioribanks MP 
Georne Loch Commissioner to the Duke of Sutherland'"' 
Source: Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 14 June and 
18 July 1855 NAS/IAJ/1/2 o.2 and pp.33-34. 
The prospectus also explained the reason for extending the proposed line beyond 
Elgin at an estimated cost of £8,000 per mile including land: 
. . . it has been thought preferable that the whole line from Keith to Nairn 
should be in the hands of one Company, and accordingly the scheme of last 
year has been extended, so as at once to complete the chain of Railway 
communication from Aberdeen to Inverness ... in order fully to accommodate 
the great counties of Ross, Sutherland and Caithness, it has been considered 
essential to carry a Line to the Harbour at Burghead.108 
The Inverness promoters therefore not only proposed to establish the Inverness-
Aberdeen border well beyond Elgin, but to capture northern coastal trade by 
establishing a railhead at Burghead, previously identified by the Aberdeen Railway 
directors in 1852 as a key objective for the proposed Great North line. 109 On behalf 
107 James Loch, commissioner to the Duke of Sutherland died in 1855 and his son, George, 
succeeded to the post: The Law Journal, XII, 1877, p. 508; The Law Times, LXIII, 1877, 
p.297; E Richards, 'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: Consumption, Investments and 
Returns, 1780-1880', Business History, XXI (1979), p.54: the Marquis of Stafford became the 
3rd Duke of Sutherland in 1861. 
108 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 14 June 1855, NAS/IAJ/1/2, 
p.2. 
109 Report of the Aberdeen Railway directors into the affairs of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway Company, 16 July 1852, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; PT Wheeler, 'The development of 
shipping services to the east coast of Sutherland', Journal of Transport History, VI, No.2 
(November 1963), p.113, notes that Burghead was the northern harbour receiving the 
Sutherland-shire and eastern coast trade from 1809. 
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of the promoters, whom he described as 'a body incomparably more powerful than 
last year', Bruce offered to relieve the Great North of heavy capital expense but 
sought a subscription in return: 
... we propose, instead of meeting at the Spey, to construct the whole line 
from Nairn to Keith, and shall trust that /OU will take stock in our line to the 
extent which you proposed last year ... 11 
The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction committee did, in fact, resolve to build only to 
the Spey near Orton if the Great North preferred to extend from Keith to the southern 
bank of the river, but the Great North decided that Inverness 'shall have the line up 
to Keith' and subscribed £40,000 in return for two seats at the board.111 
The difficulty of the Spey crossing and the associated capital expense had prompted 
investigation of an alternative route from Keith via Rothes to Elgin;112 the Rothes line 
was later constructed to provide competitive access to Elgin, which Is explored In 
chapter 7.113 To halve the cost of the Spey crossing, engineers Locke and Errington 
recommended the use of a steeper gradient than shown in the parliamentary 
plans.114 
110 Letter of Thomas Bruce to Sir James Elphinstone, chairman of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 14 June 1855, in minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway, 18 June 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.6-7: Bruce offered two board seats to the Great 
North in return for a subscription; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 June 
1855, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2, p.280. 
111 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 June 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.8; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 October 1855, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, pp.318-19. See also chapter 5, 'The results of monopoly power'. 
112 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 9 July 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, 
p.22; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 July 1855, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.290. 
113 23&24 Vic. cap.116, 1860, the Morayshire Railway (Junction) Act. 
114 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 12 September 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.50-51, containing a report from engineers Locke and Errington dated 8 
September 1855: the cost of the Spey crossing at a gradient of 1:90 was estimated at 
£98,886, but reduced to £48,104 if a 1 :60 gradient was used. They advised the provisional 
committee: 'The great disappointments which have been experienced in the result of so 
many Railways producing little or no return for the Capital is traceable to the great 
expenditure in original construction, in so many cases unnecessarily so expended'. 
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In 1855, the provisional committee listed anticipated subscriptions, which illustrates 
the heavy reliance on large investment by local landowners (table 53). 
Table 53: Subscriptions anticipated for the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
September 1855 
Subscriber Amount(£) Totals(£) Note 
Brassev and Falshaw (contractors)", 82500 82500 (aooroximately one Quarter of proposed capital\ 
Earl of Seafield 30000 
Earl of Fife trustees 30000 
Duke of Sutherland 20000 80000 
Great North of Scotland Railwav 50000 50000 The level of subscriPlion mooted In 1854 
Alexander Matheson MP 5000 
DC Marioribanks MP 3000 
G Loch 1000 Commissioner to the Duke of Sutherland 
Hon TC Bruce 1500 Commissioner to the Earl of Seafield 
Lord Berridale 1000 
WJ Tavler 1000 Commissioner to the Eart of Fife 
Caotain W Fraser-Tvtler 2000 Inverness and Nairn director 
EW Mackintosh of Raiamore 2000 Inverness and Nairn director 
J Mitchell 1000 Enaineer 
A Smvth 2000 Inverness and Nairn director 
Al Robertson 1000 
H lnalis 1000 Inverness and Nairn director 
T Martin 1000 Parliamentary aaent 
Local subscriotions 15000 37500 Local subscriptions identified in 1854 
250000 
350000 Share caoital orooosed 
source: Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 12 September 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.44, 
recording the subscriptions that 'mav be relied upon'. 
A revised prospectus in December reduced the proposed share capital of the 
company from £350,000 to £325,000.116 The promoters had identified provisionally 
three-quarters of the capital required; a quarter was to come from three aristocratic 
landowners and a further quarter from contractors. Excluding contractors and the 
Great North, 32 percent of capital required was expected to be subscribed by sixteen 
115 The construction contract was awarded to Falshaw for the Nairn-Elgin section, who took 
£40,000 of stock, and to Mitchell and Dean for the Elgin-Keith section, who took £37,000 of 
stock, recorded in minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 13 December 
1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.79. 
116 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 December 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, p.118. 
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individuals, compared to 21 percent by four individuals for the Nairn line.117 By 1856-
57, these expectations had translated into £243,900 of subscriptions, comprising 
£165,900 from 312 local shareholders and £78,000 from eight individuals.1111 Thirty-
two percent of capital for the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction was therefore offered 
by 2.5 percent of subscribers, but the large number of small subscribers 
demonstrates the significant degree of local support and reflects the subscription 
pattern for the earlier Inverness and Nairn. However, in contrast to the unsuccessful 
Inverness schemes of 1846 identified in chapter 3, the Nairn and Aberdeen Junction 
railways, forming part of a trunk route, relied substantially upon local capital and 
lacked any appreciable English investment. 
In October 1857, by when subscriptions had been converted into firm investment, a 
recorded vote called by the Great North against the amalgamation of the Aberdeen 
Junction with the Inverness and Nairn revealed ownership of £194,160 of shares, 
representing approximately 84 percent of issued share capital (table 54).119 Eleven 
shareholdings accounted for over half the authorised share capital and 
approximately three-quarters of issued share capital of the company; fifteen 
individuals who had invested £1,000 or more held a quarter of authorised shares, 
representing almost two-fifths of issued share capital.120 
117 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 30 January 1854, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.68, 
showing subscriptions by Anderson (£1,400), Mackintosh (£8,000), Mitchell (£2,500) and 
Fraser-Tytler (£5,000) of the £80,000 capital (21.1%); Minutes of the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway, 12 September 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.44. 
118 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1857 edition, p.126, giving data for 1856-57 but without 
Identifying the names of the eight Individual shareholders. 
119 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1 April 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, 
pp.251-52, show calls being made on 22,940 £10 shares issued, six months before the 
recorded vote on 31 October 1857, while a minute of 19 May 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.276-
77, records that £95,000 of ordinary stock remained unsold. Therefore, approximately 
£230,000 of share capital had been issued by the time of the recorded vote, of which 
£194, 160 represents 84.4%. 
120 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 31 October 1857, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.341: of the £194,160 of capital recorded in the vote, fifteen individual 
shareholders held £84,600 of shares (26.0% of authorised share capital), contractors or their 
trustees held £67,750 of shares (20.8% of authorised capital) and the Great North held 
£37,900 of shares (11.7% of authorised capital). The remaining £3,910 in the recorded vote 
was held by 15 small shareholders. 
255 
Table 54: Large shareholdings in the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1857 
Shareholdings of £3,000 or more registered in a recorded vote at the Share value (£) 
Ordinary General Meetina held on 31 October 1857 
Great North of Scotland Railway 37900 
Earl of Seafield 30000 (1) 
Earl of Fife's Trustees 28100 (1) 
J Faishaw (contractor) 20000 
T Brassev (contractor) 20000 
D Mitchell (contractor) 9250 
C Brand (contractor) 9250 
C Graham Monro (representinA the trustees of J Brebner contractor) 9250 
A Matheson MP 5000 
Duke of Sutherland 3000 (1) 
DC Marioribanks MP 3000 
Shareholding of 11 indlvlduals or groups(¾ of authorised capltall 174750 (53.5%) 
Authorised share caoital of the company 325000 
Source: Data complied from a recorded vote at the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness 
and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 31 October 1857 NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1 oo.346-47. 
(1 ): Three aristocratic sources (Seafield, Fife and Sutherland) held 18.8% of the company's 
authorised capital of £325,000. 
Competition arose between the northern ports for potential rail-linked traffic. Provost 
Grant of Elgin, chairman of the Morayshire Railway, offered half the cost of a 'good 
and sufficient daily steamer' for five years from Lossiemouth to the north side of the 
Moray Firth if the Burghead branch was withdrawn; the town of Nairn also objected 
to the Burghead branch, fearing a diminution in its sea trade.121 The Inverness 
promoters withdrew the Burghead branch and made a working agreement whereby 
the Morayshire Railway was given running rights over the main Inverness-Aberdeen 
route from Elgin to Orton for their traffic. 122 The Morayshire re-applied for powers to 
construct a line from Orton to Craigellachie, thus completing the route originally 
authorised 1846.123 As an Inverness shareholder, the Great North decided it 'should 
121 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 6 November 1855, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, p.65. 
122 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 12 November 1855, NAS/MOR/1 /1, noting 'this 
amicable arrangement has been carried through by Mr Loch on the part of the Duke of 
Sutherland, and by the other Members of the Provisional Committee of the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway ... '; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 
December 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.108-13, which set out the agreement with the 
Morayshire Railway, giving the right to the Morayshire run their own locomotives and stock 
over the Elgin-Orton section of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway. 
123 19&20 Vic. cap. 56, 1856, The Morayshire Railway Act; Minutes of the Morayshire 
Railway, 5 September 1851, NAS/BR/MOR/1/1, recording the approval of the Railway 
Commissioners on 7 July 1851 to the abandonment of the Orton-Craigellachie section of the 
Morayshire, authorised under 9&10 Vic. cap 178, 1846, The Morayshire Railway Act. 
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not interfere' in the port disputes, but its directors 'expressed their great regret at the 
withdrawal of the Branch' .124 
Map 8: Railway promotions to Moray Firth ports 
Losslemouth 
RiverSpey 
Flndhorn Railway: Kinloss to Flndhorn 
Moray Firth 
Keith 
■ 
Dufftown 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway: Alves to Burghead 
Morayshire Railway: Craigeilachle to Losslemouth 
Banff, Portsoy and Strathlsla Railway: Grange to Banff and Portsoy 
Key to other railways: 
BM& T JR: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway 
BM& TER: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway 
GNSR: Great North of Scotland Railway 
l&AJR: Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
Banff 
The Morayshire agreement presented a potential strategic advantage to Inverness 
by linking the north-south axis of the extended Morayshire line with the east-west 
route of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, presenting a more secure barrier to 
any westward advance from Aberdeen, but the Morayshire proved to be a difficult 
partner and the Burghead branch was subsequently authorised in 1861 as a 
competitive response from Inverness to closer liaison between the Great North and 
h. R .1 12s Morays ire aI ways. 
124 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 October 1855, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, 
p. 320; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 9 November 1855, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2, 
p.340. 
125 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 December 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, 
p.31; 24&25 Vic cap.18, 1861, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction (Branch) Act. The 
strategic role of the Morayshire Railway is examined in chapter 7. 
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The rivalry of northern ports also resulted in the promotion of the independent 
Findhorn Railway, authorised in 1859 to connect Findhorn harbour on the Moray 
Firth with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway three miles distant near 
Kinloss.126 The Aberdeen Junction initially declined to work the line, but did so 
reluctantly from 1862 once Findhorn directors personally guaranteed any costs 
above the receipts obtained from the line; however, the desperate economics of the 
company led to its closure in 1869.127 The detached stance of the Inverness web 
from the financial straits of this independent branch company contrasts sharply with 
the expansive support given by the Great North to branch companies in 1855-66.128 
The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway was incorporated in 1856 to construct 
the line between Nairn and Keith and it opened in August 1858 to the benefit of the 
Great North, as the previous chapter has shown.129 Over a year before opening, the 
Aberdeen Junction proposed joint working with the Inverness and Nairn, which 
developed into a proposal for amalgamation.130 The Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction thereby established its place at the centre of the Inverness railway web and 
subsequent promotions to the north and south included clauses from the outset for 
future amalgamation of the new companies with their host. The Aberdeen Junction 
126 22 Vic. cap.8, 1859, The Findhom Railway Act; IK Dawson, The Findhom Railway 
(Trowbridge, 1983), pp.3-4. 
127 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 3 August 1859, p.8 and 13 
April 1861, p.226; Minutes of the Highland Railway, 5 January 1869, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.465, 
in which the Highland board resolved to withdraw working the Findhorn Railway from 31 
January 1869 because the Findhom directors could no longer guarantee the shortfall 
between the line receipts and the £800 required by the Highland for working the line; I K 
Dawson, The Findhom Railway, p.11 and pp.12-14. 
128 See chapter 5, 'The Great North's branch line strategy'. 
129 19&20 Vic. cap.110, 1856, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act, with 
authorised share capital of £325,000 and borrowing powers of £108,300. 
130 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 14 February, 1857, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.443 
and 17 March 1857, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.458; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway, 19 February 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.240; Minutes of the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway, 16 March 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.244-45. 
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worked the Nairn line from December 1857 when the first section of its own line 
opened and amalgamation was finalised in 1861.131 
Like the Great North, both Inverness companies profited from the traffic passing over 
the through route, in effect receiving part of the monopoly power originally conferred 
on the Great North, although the route was still marred by the absence of a 
connecting line across Aberdeen. Inverness and Aberdeen Junction revenue rose 
steadily from £44,616 in 1860 to £63,607 in 1863, and dividend reached 5 percent 
during 1862.132 The seasonal fluctuations of traffic already noted on the Nairn line 
were repeated on the new line; average gross weekly receipts in August 1862 were 
£1,399, but fell to £884 per week in December 1862.133 
The Aberdeen Junction experienced immediate problems in raising sufficient share 
capital.134 A £15,000 loan from the Scottish Union Insurance Company in October 
1857 was personally guaranteed by eight directors, followed by a loan of £20,000 
from the local Caleclonian Bank in August 1858, guaranteed by five directors and 
Mitchell.135 An additional £10,000 from the Caleclonian Bank was taken in January 
1859.136 Increased costs and capital shortages resulted in the company seeking 
131 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 17 March and 5 June 1857, 
NAS/BR/INR/1/1, p.448 and p.475; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
16 March 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.244-45; Report to the 2nd Ordinary General Meeting of 
the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 29 April 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.268; 24&25 
Vic. cap.8, 1861, The lnvemess and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
132 Appendix, table 12(b): once the Inverness and Perth direct line opened In 1663, gross 
revenue on the Aberdeen Junction rose to £85,957 in 1864. 
133 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 9 September 1862, 9 and 30 
December 1862, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, pages 301,394 and 397, reporting weekly traffic figures in 
August and December 1862. 
134 Appendix, table 12(a). 
135 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 16 October 1857 and 3 August 
1858, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.337 and p.457; Order of Business Book, Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway, 31 October 1857, records two £15,000 loans, one from the Scottish Union 
Insurance Company and another from the Colonial Life Assurance Company backed by 
debentures: shareholders had approved the use of borrowing powers at an Extra-ordinary 
General Meeting held on 18 August 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.313. 
136 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 17 January 1859, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.519. 
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authorisation to increase its capital powers by nearly fifty percent in 1860 through the 
issue of preference shares, which quickly reversed the deficit on the capital account, 
but opened divisions in relations with the Great North which held ordinary stock in 
the company. 137 
Table 55: Comparative costs of the Inverness companies, 1853-60 
Cost per mlle Capital cost Actual Actual ¾ above Land costs as 
(estimated) capital cost capita! cost estimate 'lo of capital 
(£) (with Dlantl (without Dlantl exnendlturo 
Inverness & Nairn 
- 1853 prospectus 5500 
- 1854 Act 5333 
- 1857 actual costs 8003 50.1% 12.4% 
7221 (2) 35.4% 
Inverness& 
Aberdeen Junction-
- draft prospectus 8000 (1) 
- 1855 Act 8176 
- 1860 actual costs 13395 (2) 63.8% 7.2% 
11704 43.2% 
sources: Appendix, table 26; Rai/Wav Times, 4 November 1865, p, 1407. 
(1): The estimated capital cost in the prospectus of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction included the branch to 
Burghead, subsequently withdrawn. 
(2): At the first shareholders' meeting of the Highland Railway on 27 October 1865, chairman Matheson reported 
that the Nairn line had cost £118,000 and the Aberdeen Junction £578,000, which Increases the capital costs per 
mile to £7,867 for the Nairn line (without plant, as the Nairn line was worked by the Aberdeen Junction) and to 
£14,541 for the Aberdeen Junction line (with plant) bv 1865 (Rai/Wav Times, 4 November 1865 o.1407\. 
The 1859 financial statement showed that the cost of the line was already £80, 126 
over estimate and a committee was established to investigate the causes, although 
company accounts show that construction costs and plant were the main items of 
capital growth.138 The proportion of capital spent on land by 1860 (7.2 percent) was 
less than that spent on the Nairn line due to the acceptance of feu duties by large 
landowners, but the capital cost per mile in 1860 was £13,395, two-thirds above the 
137 Appendix, table 12(a); 23&24 Vic. cap.9, 1860, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway Act, which raised authorised share capital from £325,000 to £475,000 by £150,000 
of preference shares with an additional £50,000 in borrowing powers. 
138 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 25 June 1859, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.564; Accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway to 29 
February 1859 and 31 August 1859, reported to the Ordinary General Meeting held on 29 
October 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, pp.40-42, inserted printed report, which shows that capital 
expenditure on construction had risen in the half-year from £314,000 to £358,022 and 
expenditure on plant from £54,717 to £64,091 . 
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estimate (table 55).139 Matheson was later to report that the line cost £578,000, 
three-quarters above estimate, the consequences of which were inherited by the 
Highland Railway in 1865.140 Nevertheless, this cost per mile and the £8,003 per 
mile for its amalgamated partner were significantly below the levels incurred on the 
earlier Scottish inter-urban lines. 
The heavy reliance on investment by large shareholders continued between 1855 
and 1865 (table 56}. In 1864, seven shareholders held one-third of the £339,857 
ordinary stock registered; these included the Duke of Sutherland (£15,000}, the Earl 
of Seafield (£10,000}, Brassey (£20,000} and Falshaw (£16, 700). 1,.1 
Table 56: Shareholder investment held in Inverness and Aberdeen Junction stock, 
1864 
Investment in l&AJR £10 shares held at 31.07.1864 Number of shareholders 
£10 88 
£20 51 
£21-50 68 
£51-100 34 
£101-500 140 
£501-1000 76 
£1001 -2000 34 
£2001 -5000 11 (1) 
£5001 -9999 1 (1) 
£10000+ 7 (1) 
Total 510 
source: Data complied for 31 July 1864 from the Register of Dividends, 1864-65, 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railwav. NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1 . 
(1): Nineteen shareholders, each with shareholdings of £2,500 or more, held 
£158 750 of the issued £339,857 of ordinary share capital at 31 Julv 1864 (46. 7%). 
Nineteen individuals or institutions, all with holdings of £2,500 or more, held 47 
percent of the issued ordinary stock and were paid dividend in July 1864. Twenty-
139 Appendix, table 12(a), note (4) and table 26. 
140 Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407: the reported cost of £578,000 was £253,000 
above the estimate of £325,000 (77.8%); see chapter 8, 'The legacy of the Inverness web: 
the Highland Railway'. 
141 Data compiled for 31 July 1864 from the Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1; of the large shareholders, the register shows 
that £27,410 was held in Aberdeen Junction stock by two lawyers (£16,000 and £11,410), 
most likely in trust for clients, while the National Bank of Scotland held £24, 190 of stock, 
probably as security for loans, but on which dividend was paid. 
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seven percent of shareholders held 2 shares or less, 142 which suggests that the high 
degree of local support was maintained as on the Nairn Railway, although the 
significance of a few large shareholders remained greater in the Aberdeen Junction 
company. Five banks held ten percent of the issued stock in 1864, most probably as 
security for loans.143 The £5,000 of Aberdeen stock held by Matheson in 1857 had, 
by 1864, been substantially transferred into investment in the new Ross-shire 
lines.1" 
The financial records of the Inverness companies prior to 1865 do not provide the 
same degree of detail as those of the Great North; information on debt held outside 
the main accounts was rarely provided to Inverness shareholders other than by a 
general one-line statement of 'sundries'. Sundries, nowadays defined as items that 
do not need to be specified, amounted to £47,487 in 1862, approximately £2.4 
million on a 2007 price base, 145 and comprised interest-bearing loans and bills of 
exchange.146 Some debt interest was paid from its capital account, which allowed 
the retention of revenue to pay dividends, a practice which continued into the early 
years of the Highland Railway. 147 
142 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1: data to 31 July 1864 indicate that 17.2% of shareholders held just one 
share, 27.1% held one or two shares, and 47.1% held ten or less shares. 
143 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1: £34,800 in ordinary shares was held by five banks on 31 July 1864 on 
which dividend was paid and, of this sum, £24, 190 was held by the National Bank of 
Scotland. 
144 Data complied for Ross-shire stock shareholders from the Register of Dividends, 1864-
65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1: Matheson held £1,400 of 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 4½ % preference stock on 31 July 1864. 
145 See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
146 Appendix, table 12(a). 
147 Appendix, table 12 (a), note (5); Railway Times, 5 May 1866, p.515, reporting the half-
yearly meeting of the Highland Railway on 27 April 1866 when deputy chairman Bruce 
informed shareholders that one-third of interest paid had been charged to capital and, 
furthermore, that this practice had been followed 'since the early days on the Inverness and 
Nairn Railway 15 or 16 years ago'. 
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Table 57: Financial indicators for the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
1860-63 
31 Auaust I 1860 I 1861 I 1862 I 1883 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised I 22.4% I 27.6% I 28.4% I 23.7% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt I 0.174 I 0.191 I 0.161 I 0.217 
Source: Aooendix, table 12lcl. 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for 
debentures/capital and 0.162 for gross revenue/debt. 
(2): The temporary weakening of debt gearing in 1862 was due principally to a revision in the total of 
debenture stock followina the amalaamation with the Inverness and Nairn comoanv in 1861 . 
The early years of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction produced a trend of rising 
revenue and a slow improvement in debt gearing (table 57), 148 but the company 
displayed only a marginal financial strength over the 1849 Caledonian benchmark 
until the revenue earned from working the new Perth-Inverness route, opened in 
1863 and examined in the next chapter, began to impact on its finances. 
dissention and division between Inverness and Aberdeen 
The company's manipulation of its finances brought it into conflict with the Great 
North through its two representatives on the Inverness board.149 Matheson, 
chairman of the Aberdeen Junction, informed the directors in May 1857 that a further 
£70,000 was needed to complete the line and, as the company could not yet access 
its borrowing powers, it was proposed to seek powers to issue a preference stock, 
using bank loans as a short-term measure against the personal guarantees of 
directors.150 Aberdeen Junction minutes record some director dissention to giving 
personal guarantees, but it is Great North records that provide details of the 
148 Appendix, table 12(b) and table 12(c). 
149 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 October 1855, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /2, 
pp.318-19; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 16 November 1855, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, p.343, nominating Sir James Elphinstone and John Blaikie as the Great 
North representatives on the board. 
150 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 19 May 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, 
pp.276-77; Matheson was appointed as chairman and Bruce as deputy chairman on 16 
August 1856, NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, p.186. 
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Aberdeen Junction's assets and liabilities in May 1857 .151 Only £80,828 of the 
£325,000 share capital had been raised by calls; liabilities were £203,420 with only 
£135,543 of assets.152 As large shareholders, the Great North and contractor David 
Mitchell objected to the issue of preference shares as ' ... disastrous in the highest 
degree to the interests of the present shareholders and particularly unjust to the 
t ct , 153 con ra ors .... 
Great North chairman Elphinstone, in a carefully argued letter to the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction board, suggested that £70,000 of new stock would be insufficient 
and that 'more and more preference stock will be Issued until the original shares are 
worthless'.154 This letter, which contained a further suggestion that the Great North 
might work the line to Elgin 'until the Traffic shall be developed when it will be much 
more easy to issue the remaining stock', received no response from lnvemess.155 
Relationships worsened when the Aberdeen Junction board proposed in July 1857 to 
exercise borrowing powers. The shareholder's meeting was adjourned when 
questions were raised over the validity of the company claim that half Its share 
capital had been paid up.156 The Great North discovered that general manager 
151 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 25 May 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, 
p.282: George Loch called this meeting to express concern and the decision that directors 
accepted personal liability for funds raised, made on 19 May 1857, was rescinded. 
152 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 June 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, pp.12-
13, reporting a meeting of the directors of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held 
on 25 May 1857. 
153 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 June 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.15; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 9 June 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.19. 
154 Letter from Sir James Elphinstone to Alexander Matheson, 8 June 1857, in minutes of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 12 June 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.28. 
155 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 19 June 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.35, 
recording the concern of the board that no response had been received to Elphinstone's 
letter. 
156 Minutes of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway, 21 July 1857, NAS/IAJ/1/1, p.306; a minute of 12 July 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.304, 
records that the secretary reported arrangements with their Edinburgh law agents to ensure 
that half of the company capital was paid up by the time of the ordinary general meeting on 
31 October 1857; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 24 July 1857, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.53, recording that the Great North had stopped the Sheriff signing the 
264 
Dougall had, under an 'arrangement', subscribed for 9,546 company shares, but that 
Matheson and Bruce had each provided £25,000 to meet the deposit and calls due 
on those shares; Dougall was holding the shares in trust for 'Directors and others, 
who had given an undertaking that calls on the shares would be paid'.157 By 
releasing borrowing powers, funds would become available to repay the money 
advanced and the shares could be recovered. This dubious financial practice was 
unsuccessfully opposed by the Great North, although Great North directors 
subsequently applied a similar technique in 1859 on the Formartine and Buchan 
Railway, as the previous chapter has illustrated.158 Great North minutes record 
Matheson's assertion that the Great North 'wished to grasp at the management of 
the line'.159 Matheson restated to his shareholders the Inverness policy for local 
control of railways: 
It was for the interest of this part of the country that the management of the 
line to Keith should remain in the hands of the Inverness board, and as long 
as he was a member of that board, he would oppose any amalgamation that 
would have the effect of taking away our Interest in lt.160 
In 1859, a further dispute between the companies arose when the Aberdeen 
Junction reported it had exceeded its authorised capital and proposed to seek new 
certificate stating that half the capital of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction had been 
subscribed and a hearing had been called. 
157 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 August 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.63; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 21 August 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.70. 
158 Minutes of the Formartine and Buchan Railway, 28 November, 1859, NAS/BR/FBR/1 /1, 
p.128. 
159 Minutes of the adjourned Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway, 18 August 1857, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.313; Minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 21 August 1857, NAS/BR/GNS/1/13, p.70. 
160 Herapath ·s Railway Journal, 14 November 1857, p.1180, reporting the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 31 October 1857, at which 
borrowing powers were approved and Matheson commented that there would be 'no 
mystery, no secrecy'_ if the nominated Great North representatives attended Aberdeen 
Junction board meetings. 
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powers for preference stock.161 Without any prospect of gaining concessions from 
Inverness to extend westwards, the Great North offered to sell its £40,000 of stock 
back to the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and withdraw from the board; 
Matheson and Bruce recognised the advantage in acceptance: 
. . . after careful consideration of all the circumstances, and in particular the 
importance to this Company of being relieved from all future obstructions and 
interference ... and also taking into account the steady increase in the traffic 
of the Company, they had resolved to submit a proposal to the Great North 
for the purchase of their shares.162 
In January 1860, the Great North agreed to sell its shares at par163 and the board 
reassured its shareholders that the £40,000 could now yield 5 percent to their 
company, rather than the 3½ percent paid by lnverness.184 Despite the public 
161 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
28 October 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, pp.40-42 and page 2 of inserted printed report; Appendix, 
table 12(a}, which shows capital expenditure to 31 August 1859 of £501,421, although the 
authorised share and loan capital of the company was £433,500; Minutes of an Extra-
ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 20 December 
1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.66, at which the company was authorised to seek new powers to 
raise capital and approved under 23 Vic. cap.9, 1860, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway Act, that raised authorised capital from £325,000 to £475,000 by £150,000 of 
preference stock with borrowing powers adjusted to raise an additional £50,000 of loan 
capital. 
162 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 25 January 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, p. 75: Matheson told the board that 'after the last general meeting of the 
Company at Inverness, a suggestion had been thrown out upon the part of the Great North of 
Scotland Company that they would not be indisposed to part with their interest in this 
Company - Conferences had subsequently take place between the Hon Mr Bruce and Mr 
Stewart and Mr Anderson, in which the view of the Great North were definitely ascertained'. 
163 Letter of law agents Adam and Anderson to R Milne, secretary of the Great North, in the 
minutes of the Traffic and Finance Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 17 
January 1860. NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.425: the Great North board agreed to payment of the 
£40,000 by two bills of £20,000, the first due in one year on 1 January 1861 and the second 
in two years on 1 January 1862, and the shares were transferred on 3 February 1860 and 
reported to the Traffic and Finance Committee, 7 February 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.432; 
Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 25 January 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, 
p. 76, recording that the interest payabl~ on th~ two bills was to be at the level of the dividend 
paid on Inverness and Aberdeen Junction ordinary shares (Appendix, table 12(b) shows this 
rate to be an average of 4% in 1860 and 1861). 
164 Report of the deputy chairman, John Stewart, to the 15th Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 April 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.451 and page 3 of 
printed report of the meeting, stating that the transaction was profitable 'seeing that the 
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disagreement, the Inverness and Aberdeen companies shared a profitable monopoly 
over the line between Inverness and Aberdeen, but a clear territorial border had 
been established at Keith. At this time, the Great North was consolidating its territory 
by supporting the development of branch lines, but the dissent with Inverness 
prompted an exploration of new competitive routes to the north and west, which are 
examined in the following chapter. 
The very difficult relations which ensued between Inverness and Aberdeen can 
obscure evidence of the continuation of both official and unofficial lines of 
communication, assisted by several Inverness directors who were also directors of 
companies associated with the Great North: WJ Tayler was chairman of the Banff, 
Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway,165 a branch supported by the Great North, and 
Thomas Bruce was chairman of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 166 which 
was worked by the Great North from 1863. Bruce was also deputy chairman of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and, ostensibly to try to remove Great North 
opposition to the Aberdeen Junction's bill for preference stock, suggested to the 
Great North in December 1859 that Inverness might contribute £20,000 towards a 
Great North scheme to make a connection across Aberdeen to the Scottish North-
Eastern, thereby removing the discontinuity in the northern trunk route.167 These 
discussions took place at the time the share resale was being negotiated, when 
outward relations between the companies were antagonistic, but contact continued 
after the withdrawal of the Great North from the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Board.168 Although the Inverness railway strategy was predicated on a direct line 
Inverness Company were only paying three and a half percent, while this Company will be 
able to make five per cent out of the £40,000'. 
165 Minutes of the Banff. Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 24 September 1857, 
NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.2. 
166 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 24 September 1857, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, p.1. 
167 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 December 1859, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, 
p.418. 
168 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 December 1859, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, 
p.418; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 April 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, 
p.465, recording correspondence between Bruce and Great North secretary Milne over plans 
for a cross-Aberdeen line via the Denburn Valley. 
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from Inverness to Perth to remove the detour via Aberdeen, the heavy capital costs 
of such a scheme might have encouraged this exploration of establishing a 
continuous route southwards via Aberdeen. The Great North considered meeting 
the Scottish North-Eastern and Aberdeen Junction companies 'for the purposes of 
ascertaining what amount of pecuniary support these parties would give and under 
what conditions' but no progress resulted.169 In the following year, the monopoly of 
the Great North came under direct threat from both the Scottish North-Eastern and 
Inverness companies, dissatisfied with isolationist stance of the Great North. 
Consolidation of the Inverness web 
In contrast to the Great North's strategy to consolidate its territory by a network of 
branches, the Inverness promoters planned main lines south and west of Inverness 
to secure their control of highland railway routes. Other than the direct route over 
the Grampian Mountains to Perth surveyed by Mitchell for the 1846 scheme, the only 
other southern access to Inverness was via the Great Glen, already traversed by the 
Caledonian Canal. With a view to securing this route, deputy chairman Bruce 
informed the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction directors in 1860 'that the 
Government were most anxious to be relieved of the annual expense attendant on 
keeping up and working the Canal ... ' and suggested a lease of the Canal 'provided 
that no expense or liability was incurred beyond wear and tear' .170 The directors 
decided that any lease should also include the Crinan Canal, which was an integral 
part of the sea route to Glasgow.171 Although the Commissioners 'generally 
169 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 April 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.465 
and p.468; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 19 May 1860, pp.292-93, 
recording a meeting between Stirling of the Scottish North-Eastern, Milne of the Great North 
and Bruce of the Aberdeen Junction 'in regard to the formation of a Locomotive Junction 
between the Railways at Aberdeen' and agreeing that the matter would be raised at each 
Board. Discussions were therefore continuing only two months before the provisional 
committee of the Perth Junction minuted arrangements for the sale of shares In the new 
direct line in July 1861; see also chapter 7, 'Defence and collapse of the Aberdeen 
monopoly'. 
11o Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 17 February 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.91. 
171 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 22 February 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/112, p.101. 
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approved' of the Aberdeen Junction proposals, they decided to advertise a lease.172 
Both canals were heavily in debt and the Caledonian Canal was losing £1,000 per 
year by 1863.173 The Inverness directors concluded that the direct line to Perth 
retained its priority in their strategy for northern railways and the subsequent 1861 
promotion southwards is considered in the next chapter. 
- west and north: the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway 
Once the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction line had protected Inverness from the 
east by 1858, the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway was promoted as an extension 
of the railway web to the west and north of Inverness. The mountainous nature of 
the north-west highlands concentrated the population towards the eastern 
coastlands, but the deep indentations of the Moray, Cromarty and Domoch Firths 
necessitated any substantial railway route via the east coast to be of some length. 
This area had aroused earlier interest from railway promoters in 1845 for an 
'Inverness and Ross' line, but no bill was submitted.174 The eastern seaboard of 
Ross-shire contained many farms that were 'textbook models of improvement 
agriculture', 175 financed largely by new landowners who had earned their wealth 
elsewhere,176 among whom was Alexander Matheson, chairman of the Inverness 
and Aberdeen Junction Railway. 
Mitchell presented details of a proposed extension to Dingwall to the Aberdeen 
Junction board in November 1858 and a meeting 'to consider the practicality and 
expediency of constructing a Railway from Inverness to Dingwall by Beauly' was 
172 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 29 February 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, p.102. 
173 J Lindsay, The Canals of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1968), p.129 and p.171. 
174 Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p. 843; 7 January 1846, pp.1090-92. 
175 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD thesis, Aberdeen University, 2001), 
p.56. 
176 IRM Mowat, Easter Ross 1750-1850: the double frontier, p.31. 
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held in January 1859.177 Eleven of the eighteen people present were directors or 
officers of the Inverness companies and so, unsurprisingly, the line was described as 
an extension of the Inverness and Nairn and Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
companies and on which 'the utmost economy would require to be practised ... '; the 
meeting also produced 'a good deal of eagerness to know what prospect there was 
of accomplishing the work without any hope of a dividend' .178 The public was urged 
to consider: 
... estimating their profit on investments, not more by the actual dividend to 
be realised, than by the comfort, public advantage, and improved commercial 
and agricultural position, which a railway cannot fail to produce.179 
MJ Freeman argues that the development of managerial capitalism on the railways 
resulted in ownership by the shareholders becoming divorced from control and, 
consequently, railways were not always operated to earn maximum profits.180 The 
record of this Ross-shire meeting provides an early example of the intention to 
construct highland railways where profit and investor returns were not the sole 
objectives of the promoters. The dominant investment of large landowners in 
northern railways, intended principally to open their highland estates to economic 
development and national trade, ensured that ownership and control were not 
separated in any of the Inverness companies. Moreover, there was no opposition to 
railway development in this region because it was isolated from the rest of the 
country.181 Inverness and Aberdeen Junction shareholders were advised: 
177 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 2 November 1858, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.495; Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 18 January 1859, 
NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, p.1. 
178 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 18 January 1859, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, 
p.1. 
119 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 18 January 1859, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, 
pp.2-4, inserted press report of the meeting. 
180 MJ Freeman, 'Introduction', in MJ Freeman and DH Aldcroft (eds.), Transport in Victorian 
Britain, pp.8-9. 
181 Railway Times, 28 April 1860, p.461; C Heap and J Riemsdijk, The Pre-grouping 
Railways, part 3 (London 1985), p.73. 
270 
While retaining their objections to holding Stock in Branch Lines, your 
Directors regard the Extension to the North as exceptional and are disposed 
to recommend to you to take an adequate interest in what is, practically, a 
continuation of the Main Line into a new and wealthy district ... 182 
Matheson later justified this western extension as an essential part of the Inverness 
strategic plan although, as a principal landowner in the district served by the new 
line, he recognised the potential economic benefits and became the largest 
shareholder in the Ross-shire company: 183 
... a line from Inverness to Keith occupied by no means a safe position ... the 
next step taken by the Directors was to promote the Inverness and Ross-
shire line as far as lnvergordon and ultimately on to the confines of 
Sutherland at Bonar Bridge, thus completely securing the traffic of the whole 
country north of Inverness to the Junction line, and greatly strengthening the 
position of the Company. Without the extension to Bonar Bridge, we would 
not have succeeded in driving the steamers from the Moray Firth and the 
coast of Sutherland.184 
Like the short Inverness-Nairn line before, the Ross-shire line to Dingwall was not 
seen as a branch but part of a future main route into the far north. Subscriptions 
from Inverness companies were made conditional upon 'the undertaking being 
182 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
28 October 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.40 and page 2 of printed report. 
183 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1, in which Matheson is shown as holding £11,000 of the £58,318 of ordinary 
stock of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway raised by subscription and recorded in the 
register for 31 July 1864, which represents 18. 9% of the issued stock on which dividend was 
paid; Appendix, table 15(a). 
184 Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217, reporting Matheson's address to 
the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 28 October 1865; Railway 
Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407, reporting Bruce's agreement with Matheson's argument at 
the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 28 October 1865: 'Had we 
not pushed into Ross-shire we would have been liable, at any moment to the threat, if not the 
performance, of a line which would render our property comparatively valueless ... But 
having these lines north, we have command of the traffic that concentrates at this town, and 
no other company can pass over it beyond Inverness; therefore they cannot touch the main 
source of our traffic'. 
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extended as far as Alness to capture 'the greater part of the Sutherlandshire and 
Easter Ross traffic'.185 Alness was, perhaps coincidentally, very close to Matheson's 
estates at Ardross. The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction confirmed that the 
company would work the Ross-shire for 50 percent of receipts and subscribe 
£15,000 for two seats on the board, but required that £55,000 was raised by local 
subscription exclusive of any railway contractor or railway company subscriptions 
and that amalgamation should be sought within three years of the opening of the 
Ross-shire line.188 
The Ross-shire minutes omitted the Inverness conditions for local subscriptions and 
amalgamation, but the purpose of the Ross-shire as forming the western arm of the 
Inverness web was explicit.187 The Inverness and Nairn Railway, already negotiating 
an amalgamation with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, advised its 
shareholders that the Ross-shire 'cannot fail, when opened, to throw additional traffic 
on your Line' and offered £10,000 on the same terms as the Aberdeen Junction.188 
The Ross-shire agreed to extend the line from Dingwall to lnvergordon, two miles 
beyond Alness, and guaranteed an additional £6,000 capital. 189 The complete 
interweaving of the Inverness companies is illustrated by the minute of the Aberdeen 
185 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 22 October 1859, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, 
p.36; Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 27 October 1859, NAS/BR/INR/1/2, p.48; 
Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 27 October 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, 
p.38. 
186 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 2 September 1859 and 27 
October 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.17 and p.39; also scroll minutes of the directors of the 
Inverness and Nairn Railway, 27 October 1859, NAS/BR/INR/1/4, item 2, which repeat the 
conditions set by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction board. 
187 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 27 October 1859, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, 
p.39, recording the minutes of the Inverness and Nairn and Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railways, both dated 27 October 1859. 
186 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 28 October 
1858, NAS/BR/INR/1/2, p.50; Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 27 October 1859, 
NAS/BR/INR/1/2, p.48. 
189 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 4 November 1859, NAS/1 RR/1 /2, 
pp.42-44, recording the guarantee of subscribers to provide an additional £6,000 to extend 
the line to the west end of lnvergordon; Scroll minutes of the directors of the Inverness and 
Nairn Railway, 7 November 1859, NAS/BR/INR/1/4, item 2, recording that the Ross-shire 
promoters had agreed that £6,000 was to be raised locally for the lnvergordon section, 
'independent of what may be subscribed for the line to Dingwall and Alness'. 
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Junction board, of which Matheson was chairman, recording 'their gratification' to the 
Ross-shire for agreeing to extend their line; the Ross-shire sub-committee that 
agreed to do so was also chaired by Matheson, and Matheson was subsequently 
appointed the first chairman of the Ross-shire board in 1860.190 
In December 1859, Mitchell estimated the revised cost of the extended line at 
£214,418191 and, in the following June, advised the cost per mile would be £6,852.192 
Authorised capital of the company was set at £215,000, giving a projected capital 
cost per mile of £6,880.193 The Inverness Courier was enthusiastic: 
This line . . . is the next great step in the progress of railway communication 
northwards ... favourable arrangements have been made with landowners, 
the contract price is moderate, and the shareholders are san~uine that this 
will be one of the best paying railway undertakings in the North. 94 
Even with the application of 'cheap railway' principles, however, financial difficulties 
were immediately encountered. The directors endeavoured to keep tight control of 
costs and pressed for an early opening to generate revenue: 
190 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 4 November 1859, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.45; Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 8 January 1859, 
NAS/BR/IRR/1/12, p.5, recording Matheson's appointment as chairman of the sub-
committee; Minutes of the lnvern~ss ~nd Ro~s-shire Railw~y, 23 July 1860, f- 106, recording 
the appointment of Matheson as interim chairman and confirmed after the 1 Ordinary 
General Meeting on 31 August 1860, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, p.119 and p.126. 
191 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 31 December 1859, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, 
p.60. 
192 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 23 June 1860, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, p.101: 
the lnvemess-lnvergordon line was 31¼ miles in length which produces a capital cost per 
mile of £6,861 based on Mitchell's estimate of £214,418 rather than the £6,852 quoted in the 
company's minutes. 
193 23&24 Vic. cap.131, 1860, The Inverness and Ross-shire Railway Act, with authorised 
capital of £215,000 and borrowing powers of £71,600: the act also authorised subscriptions 
of £15,000 from the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway and £10,000 from the 
Inverness and Naim Railway. 
194 tnvemess Courier, 20 September 1860, contained in the minute book of the Inverness 
and Ross-shire Railway, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2, p. 126. 
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The Board being desirous of ensuring the strictest economy in the 
construction of the Line and being strongly of opinion that the ultimate 
success of the lines in the North, where the Country is thinly populated and 
great competition for the traffic exists by sea, depend very much on the 
amount of the original cost, it was resolved that . . . no deviation from Plans or 
Contracts involving extra expenditure of money, however small, be entered 
into without obtaining the express sanction of the Board by a minute ... 195 
Detailed capital accounts for the Ross-shire have not survived but the accounts of 
the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction for August 1862 show that £129,751 of Ross-
shire stock had been issued, representing 60 percent of authorised capital, but an 
unspecified proportion of this sum had been issued as security for loans; 198 for 
example, the Caledonian Bank had granted a £20,000 loan against security of 
company stock and the personal guarantee of the directors in May 1861.197 
Matheson informed the Board in April 1861 that £150,000 was required to complete 
the line and that Parliament would not agree to the conversion of unissued ordinary 
stock as preference stock unless 'the Company refrained from exercising their 
borrowing powers' .198 The Ross-shire board obtained shareholder approval to take 
195 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 11 March 1861, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2 (NB: 
numbered pages in the minute book cease after August 1860): the minute also recorded that 
'all the stations on the line to be constructed of timber and in the most economical manner'. 
196 Appendix, table 15(a), note (4). Some indication of the scale of loans secured on Ross-
shire stock can be deduced from 1864 data; 3½ % dividend was paid on £58,318 of Ross-
shire stock for the half year to 31 July 1864 (in Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR./IAJ/1/2), but £136,671 of stock Is shown In Aberdeen 
Junction accounts as issued share capital, which suggests that £78,353 (57.3% of issued 
share capital) was held as bank security against loans. However, after amalgamation in June 
1862, Ross-shire stock was used by the Aberdeen Junction to raise loans for the wider use of 
Inverness web companies (in minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 2 
January 1864, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.521) and so the level of lending secured on Ross-shire 
stock cannot be attributed solely to the capital cost of the Ross-shire line to lnvergordon. 
197 Accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway reported to the Ordinary 
General Meeting, 28 October 1862, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.375, publishing the capital account to 
31 August 1862: the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway was amalgamated with the Inverness 
and Aberdeen Junction Railway on 30 June 1862; Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire 
Railway, 28 May 1861, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2. 
198 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 29 April 1861, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2. 
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borrowing powers in October 1861,199 which implied that £107,500 of capital had 
been paid up, but the Aberdeen Junction records show that only £83,000 was 
subscribed by that date and so it must be assumed that the previous creative 
financial techniques of the host company were applied to secure this result.200 Also 
in October 1861, the Ross-shire approved an amalgamation with the Aberdeen 
Junction in return for two seats on the board and a modest guaranteed dividend on 
the stock, even though the line was yet to open.201 The release of borrowing powers 
produced a rapid stream of debenture loans; within four months, £62,770 of the 
authorised £71,600 had been raised at 4½ percent interest.202 The Ross-shire found 
itself holding £25,000 cash in the Caledonian Bank at 2 percent interest and 
chairman Matheson reported that the Aberdeen Junction 'would take the temporary 
use of any sum that this Company could conveniently spare'; £20,000 was 
transferred to the Aberdeen Junction at a rate of interest to be agreed.203 
The Inverness and Ross-shire opened to Dingwall in June 1862 and was 
amalgamated with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction that month, although the 
199 Resolution of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Ross-shire Railway, 29 October 1861, 
NAS/BR/IRR/1/2. 
200 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 16 October 1861, minute 3, 
NAS/BR/IRR/1/2; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 16 October 
1861, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.274, recording that £83,000 of the £245,000 Ross-shire capital had 
been subscribed. The dividend register for 1864-65 (NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1), shows that £58,318 of 
ordinary Ross-shire stock was still extant on 31 July 1864 on which dividend was paid and, 
as the Inverness and Nairn and Inverness and Aberdeen Junction had subscribed £25,000 to 
the Ross-shire before all three companies were amalgamated, these data produces a total of 
Ross-shire stock of £83,318, which corresponds almost exactly to the total quoted as 
subscribed in 1861 in Inverness and Aberdeen Junction company minutes. Thus, half the 
share capital of the Ross-shire could not have been paid up by the date borrowing powers 
were released. 
201 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 16 October 1861, minute 12, 
NAS/BR/IRR/1/2; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 16 October 
1861, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.274: guaranteed dividend on ordinary Ross-shire stock was fixed at 
3%, rising by½ % per year until it reach the dividend level of the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction stock, when the two stocks would be merged. 
202 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 8, 14 and 23 November 1861, 27 and 
28 December 1861, 17 and 31 January 1862, and 18 February 1862, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2 (bank 
discount rates were 3% in November 1861 and 2½ % in January 1862). 
203 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 18 February 1862, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2; 
Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 February 1862, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.308. 
275 
extension to lnvergordon did not open until March 1863.2°'4 The Inverness directors 
had intended that lnvergordon would be the northern terminus of the web,205 but the 
Ross-shire extension was promoted to Bonar Bridge in 1862,206 following the 
proffered investment of the Duke of Sutherland, anxious to connect his vast northern 
estates with the railway network.207 As no revenue flowed until after amalgamation, 
the comparative financial stability of this constituent company of the Inverness web 
cannot be determined. However, the pattern of Ross-shire shareholdings in 1864 
matches those identified earlier for the Nairn and Aberdeen Junction companies and 
suggests many small local subscriptions and the dominance of a few large investors 
(table 58).208 By 1864, £58,318 of original stock remained extant: 13.1 percent of 
shareholders held just one share and 62.1 percent held five shares or fewer. The 
largest shareholders were Matheson (£11,000) and the Duke of Sutherland (£5,000), 
holding 27 .4 percent of the stock between them, although the National Bank of 
Scotland held £6,000, probably as security for loans; fourteen shareholders (6.8 
percent) held £40,360 (69.2 percent) of issued stock on which dividend was paid.209 
204 25&26 Vic. cap. 113, 1862, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
205 Inverness Courier, 15 August 1903, reproducing an article on reminiscences of the 
opening of the Highland line on 9 September 1863 by DM of Inverness, and contained in 
'Miscellaneous memoranda on the history of the Highland Railway', NAS/BR/HR/4/3/2. 
206 The Ross-shire extension is examined in chapter 9, 'The far north lines: ownership and 
control'; 26&27 Vic. cap.32, 1863, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway (Bonar 
Bridge Extension) Act 1863, with authorised capital of £160,000 and borrowing powers of 
£53,000. 
207 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 March 1862, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.314, reporting a subscription list of £50,000 for an extension from 
lnvergordon to Bonar Bridge, of which £30,000 had been offered by the Duke of Sutherland; 
Herapath 's Railway Journal, 22 November 1862, p. 1208, reporting Matheson's address to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 28 
October 1862, advising that 'once they got in connection with the southern lines at Perth and 
had reached Bonar-bridge in the north, they ought to pause': J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My 
Ufe in the Highlands, vol.II, p.91, recording that, by 1838, the Duke of Sutherland owned 1.2 
million acres of the 1.84 million acres comprising the county of Sutherland. 
208 Data complied for Ross-shire stock shareholders at 31 July 1864 from the Register of 
Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1; Appendix, 
table 15. 
209 Data to 31 July 1864 for Ross-shire stock shareholders holding £1,000 or more in 
ordinary shares, complied from the Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1. 
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Table 58: Shareholder investment held in Inverness and Ross-shire stock, 1864 
Amount invested{£): 31 July 1864 Number of shareholders 
£10 shares 
£10 27 
£20 27 
£30 24 
£40 7 
£50 43 
£60 3 
£70 2 
£80 2 
£90 0 
£100 24 
£101-200 21 
£201-300 4 
£301-400 0 
£401 -500 5 
£501-1000 7 
£1001 -2000 4 
£2001 -3000 3 
£3001-4000 0 
£4001 -5000 1 Duke of Sutherland {£5 000\ 
£5001 -10000 1 National Bank (£6,000) 
£10000+ 1 Alexander Matheson (£11 000\ 
Total 206 
Total paid UD {31 July 1864): £58,318 
Source: Data complied for Ross-shire stock shareholders at 31 July 1864 from the Register of 
Dividends 1864-65 Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1 . 
the unified company 
By 1862, the management of the web companies had been consolidated. From an 
initial position of little overt overlap across the boards of the first two Inverness 
companies, the 'host' Inverness and Aberdeen Junction gradually extended its 
influence and control and provided the core direction for the Inverness web. 
Matheson and Bruce appear as the principal board strategists, loyally supported 
throughout by directors Fraser-Tytler and Mackintosh and joined by Loch, 
representative of the Duke of Sutherland, as the railway web was extended, and 
aided by secretary Dougall, engineer Mitchell and banker Waterston. Although the 
final constituent of the Inverness railway web, the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway, is examined in the following chapter, its relationship with the host company 
is included in table 59 to illustrate the significant aristocratic influence on its board. 
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Table 59: First directors named in parliamentary bills for Inverness web companies, 
1854-1861 
Inverness and Nairn Inverness and Inverness and Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Ross-shire Perth Junction 
Act of Incorporation 1854 1856 1860 1861 
Amalgamation 1861 Host company 1862 1865 
Ewen MacPherson of Cluny ■ (First chairman) 1" board 
Eneas W Mackintosh ■ (Chairman 1857) (2) (1865) • • 
Lt Col A Findlay ■ 
Capt W Fraser Tytler ■ (Deputy) ■ ■ ■ 
Henry W White • 
Charles Stewart ■ 
John Dunbar ■ 
Alexander Forbes ■ 
Colin Lyon Mackenzie ■ ■ 
Robert Fraser • 
Alexander Smvth ■ ■ 
Lt Col Hui:ih lni;ilis ■ 1■1 
Hon Lewis A Grant ■ 
Mart1uis of Stafford • 
William James Tayler ■ 
Alexander Matheson ■ (Chairman) ■ (Chairman) ■ (Deoutv) 
DC Martoribanks ■ 
Hon TC Bruce ■ /Deoutv) ■ ■ (Chairman) 
Georae Loch ■ ■ 
Alexander lm:1lis Robertson • l■l 
James C Brodie • 
Edward Mortimer ■ 
Sir James EH Elphlnstone ■ (Great North) 
John Blaikie ■ (Great North) 
Sir AP Gordon-Cumming ■ (from 1859) ■ ■ 
Hon Simon Fraser of Lovat (2) ■ (Deputy) 1"' board 
Sir James Matheson • 
Sir Kenneth S Mackenzie • 1"' board 
Keith WS Mackenzie ■ 
R B Aeneas Macleod (2) • 
AC Mackenzie ■ 
Duke of Athole ■ 
Duke of Sutherland (2) ■ 
Marauis of Breadalbane • 
Earl of Seafield (2) ■ 
Sir R Menzies ■ 
Maior C Cummina-Bruce • 
Evan Baillie I■] 
Sources: Acts of Parliament relating to constituent companies of the Highland Railway, NAS/BR/AP(S)/1 /123; Scroll 
minutes of the 1•1 Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 19 September 
1861, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2. 
(1): The symbol[■] in the column for the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway indicates directors named in the 
legislation who were not put forward for election at the first ordinary general meeting of the Company; those not 
named in the act but elected at the ordinary general meeting are indicated as '1 ' t board'. 
(2): Individuals marked as (2) had joined the Aberdeen Junction board by October 1862 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.375) , 
indicatina the strengthening of the cross-web reoresentalion on the board of the host company. 
Although the state had rejected proposals in 1846 for a direct line from Inverness to 
the south in favour of the Great North's Aberdeen-Inverness route, this chapter has 
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shown that the declared intent of Inverness strategists in 1845 to secure the control 
of railways serving the northern counties of Scotland had been translated into a 
sagacious plan that only shortage of capital prevented from being launched in full in 
1853. The implementation of this plan was therefore staged between 1853 and 
1862, initially to block the Great North and its Aberdonian influence in the east at 
Keith and then to secure the west and north of the highlands by an extension into the 
agricultural seaboard of Easter Ross. The immediate consequence of the 
progressive realisation of the Inverness railway strategy was to isolate its rival, the 
Great North, which was denied access to Inverness and still lacked a continuous 
southern route across Aberdeen. 
The ultimate objective of a direct line from Inverness to connect with the southern 
railway system and open the highlands to national networks of trade was made 
explicit by the Inverness promoters from the outset. The Inverness companies were 
nominally independent, but the intent to consolidate them into one was equally 
apparent and facilitated by the inter-weaving of directors across the boards. The 
amalgamations of these Inverness companies, which provided end-on routes across 
the northern counties, were approved by the state without dissent, which lends 
support to Simmons's assertion that the state showed less concern over railway 
amalgamations along a continuous route. The chapter has identified the influential 
individuals that designed and developed the Inverness railway web. New wealthy 
landowners, such as Alexander Matheson, joined with established proprietors, 
exemplified by the Duke of Sutherland and the Earl of Seafield with their 
commissioners, George Loch and Thomas Bruce, to promote railways that would 
improve transport links with their extensive estates and seek thereby to increase 
land values and regional trade, and from which wider economic and social benefits 
might accrue to the northern counties. 
The widespread and successful application of the principles of the 'cheap railway' to 
these remote main lines not only produced capital costs per mile that were 
significantly below those of the earlier inter-urban Scottish lines and the 1845 trunk 
route to Aberdeen, but also yielded sufficient revenue, distinctly seasonal in its 
pattern, that allowed the companies to provide modest dividends to shareholders. 
The Inverness railway web was financed almost exclusively from local capital. 
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English investment in these companies was insignificant, which corroborates the 
argument that the relative size and remoteness of northern lines were unattractive 
features in a national capital market. All three Inverness companies relied heavily 
upon substantial capital injection from landowners, supplemented by small individual 
subscriptions from large numbers of local residents, and the longer-term holding of 
these local subscriptions has been illustrated. 
The dominance of local landowners in capital supply retained a unity of ownership 
and control within the Inverness railway web as it expanded. However, share capital 
for the Inverness companies was difficult to raise and even the large Investment of 
local landowners was insufficient to meet the capital costs of these lines. Mirroring 
the experience of the Great North and its constituents outlined in the previous 
chapter, the Inverness web companies turned to the banking sector for an alternative 
source of capital. The contacts between railway directors and banks assisted the 
availability of credit, bolstered by the personal guarantees of some wealthy directors, 
which made such bank lending virtually risk-free. The chapter suggests, however, 
that the problems of capital supply became more acute as the network was extended 
north of Inverness, an issue that is explored further in chapter 9, although the offer of 
capital from the Duke of Sutherland prompted the Ross-shire extension to Bonar 
Bridge, an example of capital supply inducing railway development. 
The Inverness web had demonstrated that railways could be constructed and 
operated successfully in northern Scotland, although, like the Great North, the 
longer-term consequences of its accumulating capital debt were yet to impact, which 
chapter 8 will explore. Only the ultimate objective of an independent main line 
southwards to Perth remained for the Inverness strategists to accomplish. By 1860, 
the widespread dissatisfaction with the Great North's monopoly over the Aberdeen-
Keith main line and the discontinuity of route across Aberdeen prompted new and 
vigorous competition not just from Inverness, but also from the south. These 
competitive developments, strongly influenced by several small independent 
companies, reduced the Great North to the status of an isolated rural branch line 
system within five years and form the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Strategy and competition, 1860-65 
The outline of a northern railway system had emerged by 1860, but it was focused 
on an elongated main line running from Perth to Inverness via Aberdeen. The route 
north of Aberdeen remained disconnected from the national railway network because 
of the failure to construct the cross-Aberdeen link authorised by the state in 1846. 
The Great North of Scotland and the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railways had 
each established a regional land-based monopoly. They were inter-dependent by 
virtue of their reliance on northern traffic crossing the joint main line, but both 
companies were actively planning to extend their operational compass at the 
expense of the other. This point, mid-way in the three decades covered by this 
study, provides an opportunity to review the factors that had influenced the early 
development of railways in northern Scotland. 
Three broad questions concerning the role of state, the contribution of strategic 
planning, and the sources and management of finance to realise this new railway 
system were posed in the opening chapter. Subsequent chapters have shown the 
importance of the state blueprint for a Scottish railway network, from which the 
legislature authorised the first Anglo-Scottish trunk route to the north, and the 
significance of the strategic planning applied by private enterprise to develop the two 
northern railway webs centred on Aberdeen and Inverness, each designed to 
enhance the economic pre-eminence of their region. The study has Identified a 
diminution in the capital costs of railways as lines were extended north of Aberdeen, 
particularly through the adoption of 'cheap railway' principles. Capital constraints 
arose primarily because of the almost universal difficulty in raising share capital 
rather than from any consequences of inaccuracies in the estimation of costs. The 
previous chapter has highlighted the fundamental role of local capital in financing the 
Inverness railway companies and the insignificance of English investment within 
them at a time when railways were increasingly relying on a national capital market, 
which suggests that the uncertain returns and the remote nature of these relatively 
small companies were major barriers in attracting nationwide investment. The 
widespread and substantial involvement of the banking sector in providing funds for 
the development of northern railways substantiates the historiographical argument 
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that loans became an alternative rather than a complementary source of railway 
finance. 1 
Map 9: New railways projected in the north of Scotland, 1860-65 
New competitive and defensive promotions 
Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla (Independent) 
Burghead branch (Inverness web) 
Fochabers and Garmouth (Inverness web) 
Glen of Rothes (Morayshire and Great North of 
Scotland): the existing Morayshire line ran from 
Lossiemouth via Elgin, Orton, and Rothes to 
Craigellachie 
Inverness and Perth Junction (Inverness web) 
Morayshire and Perthshire Direct (Morayshire) 
Scottish Northern Junction (Scottish North-Eastern) 
Strathsoev (Great North of Scotland) 
Otherllnes 
AVR Alford Valley Railway 
BM&TER: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway 
DR: Deeside Railway 
DER: Deeslde Extension Railway 
F&BR: Formartine and Buchan Railway 
GNSR: Great North of Scotland Railway 
l&AJR: Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
l&OMR: lnverury and Old Meldrum Railway 
SNER: Scottish North-Eastern Railway 
This chapter investigates the complex pattern of lines that were promoted in 1860-65 
as Aberdeen and Inverness strove to maintain and extend their control over northern 
1 MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844 (London, 1975), p.72. 
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traffic. The severe financial consequences for both companies arising from their 
difficulties in raising capital for earlier routes and compounded as a result of these 
competitive conflicts is analysed in the following chapter. The first section considers 
the westward expansion of the Great North, instigated in 1859-60 to circumvent the 
Inverness-Aberdeen boundary established at Keith. In response, the Inverness web 
brought forward its promotion of the direct Inverness-Perth line in 1860 as the final 
strand of its web strategy by which Aberdonian influence was to be excluded from 
the highlands; this major milestone in the evolution of the northern railway system is 
examined in the second section. A contemporary development in the south is 
explored in the following section, whereby the Scottish North-Eastern challenged the 
Great North's monopoly through its support for a new nominally independent railway 
to by-pass the long-standing discontinuity of route across Aberdeen. The final 
section reviews the Great North's rearguard defence mounted in 1861-63, in which 
its protege, the Strathspey Railway, proved to be counter-productive to its own 
financial interests. 
Four small independent companies operating in the north by 1860 each held a 
prospective piece of the future network jigsaw. Two of these companies, the 
Oeeside and Morayshire, were cited in chapter 6 as early examples of railways 
constructed on 'cheap' principles; both presented potential barriers to competitive 
expansion. The Morayshire, opened in 1852, had made an agreement in 1855 with 
the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction for the use of part of its main line to connect 
the Spey valley to Lossiemouth harbour on the Moray Firth, which reinforced the 
check on any north-westerly expansion by the Great North towards Elgin.2 Also in 
1852, the Deeside had opened a line running westwards along the Dee valley from 
Aberdeen, which presented a possible obstacle to any new northerly incursions in 
the east of the region. The two other small companies operated established lines 
along strategically important routes. In the south, the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 
opened in 1856, offered a connection to the southern railway network for a direct line 
2 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 12 November 1855, NAS/MOR/1/1 (NB: Morayshire 
minute books have no page numbering until volume 3, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, 1861-67); Minutes 
of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 December 1855, NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /1, 
pp.108-13. 
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from lnvemess.3 In the north, the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, opened in 
1859 from Grange on the Great North main line to the Moray Firth ports of Banff and 
Portsoy, gave scope to develop a coastal route by which the Great North might 
reach Elgin." The significance of each company is explained within the appropriate 
sections of this chapter. 
Western expansion: the Great North and Morayshire Railway 
The running rights granted by Inverness to the Morayshire could not be exercised 
until the Morayshire's Orton-Rothes branch and the Aberdeen Junction's main line 
opened in 1858, when disagreements immediately arose.6 The Inverness board had 
to instruct the Morayshire not to use the line before Board of Trade approval and 
complaints about Morayshire operations quickly followed. 8 Only weeks after 
opening, Inverness barred Morayshire rolling stock from the main line.7 Inverness 
shareholders approved a new working agreement in October 1858, but Morayshire 
shareholders sought improved terms and relationships continued to deteriorate.8 In 
3 See Chapter 4; 17&18 Vic. cap.148, 1854, The Perth and Dunkeld Railway Act; Herapath's 
Railway Journal, 19 and 26 April 1856, p.390 and p.439; Railway Times, 5 April 1856, p.446, 
reporting the opening of the Perth and Dunkeld line on 7 April 1856. 
4 20&21 Vic. cap.53, 1857, The Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway Act, with authorised 
capital of £90,000 and borrowing powers of £30,000; the act included powers for a working 
agreement with the Great North of Scotland Railway, but an agreement was not made and 
implemented until 1863. 
5 19&20 Vic. cap.86, 1856, The Morayshire Railway (Extension) Act, authorising construction 
of the Orton to Craigellachie section, previously abandoned under warrant of the Railway 
commissioners on 7 July 1851, reported in minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 5 September 
1851, NAS/BR/MOR/1 /1. 
8 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 10 June 1858, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, 
p.435; Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 9 and 21 September 1858, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.470 and p.472, recording 'Trains of the Morayshire Railway Company, 
while running over this Company's main line between Elgin and Orton, are very frequently out 
of time owing to the inefficiency of their plant'. 
7 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 21 September 1858, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, pp.472-73, noting the need for plant to be 'sufficient for the work' and 
resolving that ' ... until the Morays hire Company are able to procure such plant, management 
will be made for conveying their traffic between Elgin and Orton by this Company's trains'. 
8 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 20 
October 1858, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1, p.489; Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the 
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August 1859, Inverness minuted the 'continued attempts of the Morayshire Company 
to abstract and divert legitimate traffic of this Company by carriers and by sea'.1~ The 
Morayshlre responded by promoting a direct line from Rothes to Elgin to obviate the 
need to use the Aberdeen Junction main line.10 The Railway Times urged that there 
should be 'no waste of capital in forcing a useless line into the district', 11 but the 
Morayshire saw financial advantage in building its own line to Elgin to avoid disputes 
over traffic rates paid to lnverness.12 This new Morayshire route, which represented 
the first significant example of duplication in the northern network, 13 also offered a 
strategic opportunity to the Great North for westerly expansion, which prompted its 
renewed financial support for the moribund Keith and Dufftown Railway, outlined in 
chapter 5.14 
Morayshire Railway, 30 October 1858, NAS/BR/MOR/1/2 and minutes of the Morayshire 
Railway, 13 April 1859, NAS/BR/MOR/1/2; Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 9 November 
1858, NAS/BR/MOR/1/2, resolving that 'a desire existed somewhere on the part of the 
Junction Company to cause disappointment and consequent loss to this Company'. 
9 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 3 August 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, 
p.8; Order of Business Book, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 3 August 1858, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/5, item 5, recording that the Morayshire Railway had 'unhinged the agreement 
between the Companies .. .'. 
10 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 31 August 1859, and resolution of a Special General 
Meeting of the Morayshire Railway, 31 October 1859, NAS/BR/MOR/1 /2; Minutes of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 13 June 1859, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.62. This route 
had been considered in 1855 for the Inverness-Keith main line: see also chapter 6, 'The host 
company: the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction railway'. 
11 Railway Times, 12 November 1859, p.1245, reporting that 'The dispute between these two 
small and remote companies is conducted as fiercely as was the battle of the gauges ..• we 
gather that the Morayshire is decidedly at fault' and urged that 'there will be no foray through 
the Glen of Rothes, no waste of capital in forcing a useless line into the district'. 
12 Appendix, tables 17(c); Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 30 August 1858, 13 April 1859 
and 7 June 1859, NAS/BR/MOR/1/2; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway (London, 1949, reprinted Shepperton, 1998), p.33; J Roske, 'The 
Morayshire connection', The Highland Railway Journal, 1, No.7 (Winter, 1988), p.7. 
13 M Casson, The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914, Economic and Social 
Research Council Report, R000239586 (January 2005), pp.6-7, identifies significant 
duplication in the British railway network following 'Parliament's failure to heed the advice of 
the Board of Trade ... ' in 1845. 
14 23&24 Vic. cap. 63, 1860, The Keith and Dufftown Railway Deviation Act; Minutes of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 August 1859, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3. p.367 and p.408. 
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The Morayshire therefore attracted the competitive attention of both Aberdeen and 
Inverness. With authorisation granted for the Morayshire line in July 1860, 15 the 
Great North produced a draft agreement In October to work the Keith and Dufftown 
and Morayshire companies, thereby giving access to Elgin and the port of 
Lossiemouth and circumventing the Inverness barrier established at Keith.18 
Inverness, which announced proposals in July to connect Inverness with Perth via a 
new direct line from Forres to Dunkeld,17 immediately countered by offering a 4½ 
percent guaranteed lease to the Morayshire provided the Rothes-Elgin route was 
withdrawn.18 Inverness also published notices for a branch from its main line to 
Burghead, supported by an offer of £10,000 from the Duke of Sutherland, to 
establish its own independent route to a Moray Firth port, included in its original 
promotion but withdrawn primarily because of pressure from the Morayshire.19 
15 23&24 Vic. cap.116, 1860, the Morayshire Railway (Junction) Act, with increased capital 
powers of 'not more than £40,000' which could be issued as preference stock at a rate not 
exceeding 5%. 
16 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 16 October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, pp.4-
9; Minutes of the Special General Meeting of the Morayshire Railway, 31 October 1860, 
NAS/BR/MOR/1/2, recording that the Great North would work the Morayshire's lines at 45% 
of gross receipts, but rising to 55% once revenue was sufficient to pay a 5% dividend: the 
Great North was also to subscribe £20,000 towards a junction line over the River Spey 
between the Morayshire and Strathspey Railways. This junction line was authorised in 1861 
under 24 Vic. cap.30, 1861, The Morayshire Railway Act. 
17 Herapath's Railway Journal, 1 July 1860, p.679; Scroll minutes of the Inverness and Perth 
Junction Railway, 10 July 1860, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of 
the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 30 October 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.181; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 13 July 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, pp.500, 
reporting the proposed line from Forres to Dunkeld and an extension of the Keith and 
Oufftown line to Grantown. 
18 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 October 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.182; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 16 October 1860, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /4, p.12, reporting a lease offer made by the I nvemess and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway to the Morayshire Railway on 25 October 1860; Minutes of the Morayshire 
Railway, 25 October 1860, NAS/BR/MOR/1/2, resolving to circulate the Great North 
agreement and Inverness lease proposal to shareholders. 
19 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 15 and 18 October 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2. p.181 and pp.182-83; 24&25 Vic. cap.18, 1861, The Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction (Branch) Act. authorising a branch to Burghead; Minutes of the 
Morayshire Railway, 12 November 1855, NAS/BR/MOR/1/1, recording the agreement made 
with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway to withdraw the Aberdeen Junction's 
proposed branch to Burghead; D Ross, The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005), p.26, notes 
that Burghead had been the connecting port for the Sutherland estates since 1809. 
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Morayshire shareholders accepted the Great North agreement, which created the 
through route to Elgin controlled by Aberdeen.20 The Morayshire's Rothes-Elgin line 
was likened to Aytoun's satirical Glenmutchkin scheme.21 The Glenmutchkin 
analogy, however, was more applicable to a concurrent Morayshire proposal for an 
ambitious main line, in competition to the Inverness-Perth promotion, to run from its 
terminus at Craigellachie to Blairgowrie, served by the Scottish North-Eastern 
system.22 Surveys revealed the engineering difficulties of the line, for which the 
proposed share capital was £636,000, five times that of the existing company. 23 The 
scale of the promotion was beyond the capacity of the Morayshire, which 
acknowledged that 'the position of the Company's affairs require them to practice 
economy in every possible way'.24 The Morayshire relied on local capital: four-fifths 
of its shareholders lived in the immediate locality.25 Capital expenditure was already 
28.5 percent above its revised estimate and it had resorted to temporary loans from 
banks.28 The Morayshire sought support for the Blairgowrie line from other 
20 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Morayshire Railway, 31 October 1860, 
NAS/BR/MOR/1 /2; Herapath 's Railway Journal, 17 November 1860, pp.1164-65. 
21 Railway Times, 1 O November 1860, p.1262; WE Aytoun, 'How we got up the 
Glenmutchkin Railway and how we got out of it', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 58 
(November 1845), 453-466. 
22 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 5 October 1860, NAS/BR/MOR/1 /1; Prospectus of the 
Morayshire and Perthshire Direct Junction Railway, 1860, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/22, for a 
Craigellachie-Blairgowrie line with branches to Grantown and Ballindalloch. The 5 mile 
Blairgowrie branch of the Scottish North-Eastern connected into its main line between Perth 
and Aberdeen. 
23 Engineer's report on the proposed Morayshire and Perthshire Direct Junction Railway, 1 
September 1860, NAS/BR/PROS(S}/1 /22; Report to a Special General Meeting of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 17 July 1860, p.502, in which Great North engineer Gibb advised 
that the summit tunnel on the Morayshire's projected line from Elgin to Blairgowrie would 
have to be 'not less than six miles', which contrasted with the Morayshire's estimate of a 
tunnel of two miles; Appendix, table 17(a}. 
24 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 15 August 1860, NAS/BR/MOR/1/2. 
25 Shareholder list for the Morayshire Railway, 1869, NAS/BR/MOR/2/1, which shows 79.3% 
of shareholders living in the lossiemouth-Elgin-Rothes area, 12.1% living elsewhere in 
Scotland, 7.4% living in England and 1.2% in Ireland or abroad. 
28 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 22 November 1859, approving a £5,000 loan from the 
commercial Bank, with security of £5,000 preference shares and with an 'understanding' that 
it was renewable for three years; Appendix, table 17(a) and 17(b): capital expenditure in 1859 
was £70,330 with authorised share capital of £54,700, set in 1856. 
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companies, quoting the value of Anglo-Scottish traffic, but without success.27 The 
Railway Times ridiculed the proposed Morayshire scheme as 'all but impracticable' .2'' 
but also, surprisingly, dismissed any threat to Aberdeen from the proposed Inverness 
direct line.29 
Difficulties in raising capital for the Morayshire line to Elgin and the short junction line 
needed to connect it to the Great North system sent the Morayshire's capital account 
into deficit and the debts of the company steadily lncreased.30 By July 1862, the 
Great North held £21,000 of fixed-interest Morayshire stock in return for cash 
advances in addition to £10,000 of ordinary shares.31 Morayshire dividend ceased 
after 1862 and, by 1864, interest absorbed three-fifths of gross revenue.32 
Revenue dipped once the Inverness-Perth direct line opened in 1863 and grew only 
slowly thereafter because the Morayshire route was nearly ten miles longer than the 
original Elgin-Keith main line. 33 The debt gearing of the Morayshire deteriorated 
once the capital costs of its new lines impacted and, from 1863 to 1874, the 
company remained as structurally weak as the branches allied to the Great North 
27 Copy of a circular letter from James Grant to railway companies (unspecified) seeking 
support for the Morayshire and Perthshire Direct Junction Railway as a competitor to the 
direct line from Inverness, 1860, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/22. 
28 Railway Times, 7 July 1860, p.773: 'To those who know the respective districts this 
scheme is all but impracticable, passing as it would through a desolate country ... with the 
gradients and other engineering works of a most costly character •.• We cannot believe that 
the Morayshire can be serious in producing such a scheme ... '. 
29 Railway Times, 1 December 1860, p.1364: We refuse to entertain the idea that the 
Inverness and Perth can inflict the remotest injury on the Great North of Scotland .. .'. 
30 Appendix, tables 17(b) and 17(d); Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 20 February 1861, 
NAS/BR/MOR/1 /2; 24&25 Vic. cap.30, 1861, The Morayshire Railway Act, in which the Great 
North was authorised to subscribe not more than £20,000 and to work the line once the 
Strathspey line opened. 
31 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 2 July 1862, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, p.86. 
32 Appendix, table 17(c): 2½% dividend was paid on ordinary shares in 1862. 
33 HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Newton Abbot, 1965), p.45. 
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(table 60).M The Railway Times hoped 'that its misfortune may become a warning in 
all time to come'. 35 
Table 60: Revenue and financial indicators for the Morayshire Railway, 1862-74 
30 Seotember 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 
Gross annual revenue (£) 8166 8595 6486 7602 8137 8225 
Ratio of debentures to total caoital raised 24.2% 26.2% 24.6% 25.6% 25.0% 25.1% 
Ratio of cross revenue to total debt 0.177 0.097 0.078 0.090 0.091 0.113 
1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Gross annual revenue (£) 8085 8010 8327 8567 8961 8982 9262 
Ratio of debentures to total 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.0% 
caoital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.112 0.110 0.114 0.114 0.113 0.113 0.118 
total debt 
Source: Appendix, tables 17(c and 17(d . 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
The value of the Morayshire to the Great North, however, was as a through route to 
Elgin, 38 but both the Morayshire and Keith and Dufftown companies that comprised it 
were financially insecure and required significant support from Aberdeen. The Great 
North was warned of 'a faltering Morayshire on one side, and an imperative 
extension through Strathspey on the other', which had the potential to 'convert 
misfortune into calamity'. 37 In 1866, the two companies failed to agree terms for 
amalgamation because of Morayshire debt and operational disputes.38 An approach 
34 Appendix, table 17(d). 
35 Railway Times, 16 June 1860, p.685. 
36 Inverness Courier, 8 November 1860, quoted in Herapath's Railway Journal, 17 
November, 1860, pp.1164-65. 
37 Railway Times, 1 December 1860, p.1363. 
36 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 25 September 1866, NAS/BR/MOR/1 /3, p.409, 
recording the closure of the Morayshire's Rothes-Orton line by the Great North 'without the 
sanction of this Company or intimation being made to them that such was to be done'; 
Minutes of the Morayshire Railway 12 and 18 November 1866, NAS/BR/MOR/1 /3, pp.418-19 
and p.421 ; Appendix, tables 17 (c) and 17(d); 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 1866, The Great North of 
Scotland Railway (Amalgamation) Act, section 52, which granted general powers for lease of, 
or amalgamation with, the Morayshire Railway; 29&30 Vic. cap.20, 1866, The Morayshire 
Railway Act, including powers to amalgamate with the Great North, but 'terms to be agreed 
upon'. 
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by the Morayshire to the Highland Railway in 1867 for amalgamation was rejected 
once Inverness realised the scale of Morayshire liabilities. 39 For a brief period in the 
early 1860s, the Morayshire held a strong bargaining position with the two regional 
monopolies, but it failed to capitalise upon its potential power. The company was 
finally absorbed by the Great North in 1880.40 The Great North had, nevertheless, 
succeeded in using the Morayshire to establish a new inter-company boundary at 
Elgin, although Keith remained the principal point of exchange for northern traffic 
until the turn of the century.41 
The final link of the Inverness web: the central highlands route 
In rejecting the 1846 Perth and Inverness Railway bill, the parliamentary committee 
left open an option for a future direct line from the highlands.42 The subsequent 
staged implementation of the Inverness strategy to obtain control of northern railway 
development has been outlined in the previous chapter.43 
39 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 11 January 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.258, 5 April 1867, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.275 and 10 May 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.298; Minutes of the Morayshire 
Railway, 31 January 1867, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, p.438, 26 March 1867, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, 
pp.443-44, and 9 April 1867, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, p.448. 
40 Agreement between the Morayshire and the Great North of Scotland Railways, 18 January 
1881, in minutes of the Morayshire Railway, NAS/BR/MOR/1/4, pp.467-68: the date of 
amalgamation was set retrospectively at 1 October 1880 and confirmed under 44&45 Vic. 
cap.201, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
41 O Ross, The Highland Railway, p.83, 93 and p.112: the resolve of successive Inverness 
boards to maintain Keith as the point of traffic transfer reduced the Great North's Elgin route 
to the status of a local line and resulted in a long-running conflict stretching beyond the time 
period covered by this thesis. A short-lived agreement in 1883 was followed by further 
disputes and an eventual reference to the Railway and Canal Commissioners in 1896, whose 
determination assigned an equal number of trains to Keith and Elgin for traffic exchange. 
42 Report of the House of Commons Select Committee Group 4, published in Railway Times, 
16 May 1846, p.697; Railway Times, 16 May 1846, p.697; see chapter 3, 'The aftermath of 
the Railway Board in northern Scotland, 1845-46'. 
43 Minutes of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 8 December 1853, NAS/BR/INR/1/1, pp.47-
48; G and P Anderson, Handbook to the Inverness and Nairn Railway and scenes adjoining it 
(Inverness, 1856), p.29. 
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1860 was a catalytic year for railway development in northern Scotland. In January, 
the Great North withdrew from the board of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, 
acknowledging that Inverness intended Keith to remain the territorial boundary.44 
Instead, the Great North executed its westward expansion via the Keith and 
Oufftown and Morayshire Railways and began working this alternative route to Elgin 
from 1863.45 The strained relationships between Inverness and the Great North and 
Morayshire alliance, which now presented the threat of renewed competition for 
northern traffic, stimulated the launch of the direct Inverness-Perth line. 
A most important scheme for connecting Inverness and the North, by a direct 
line, with Perth and the general Railway System of the kingdom ... will be 
presented to Parliament in the ensuing session . . . It will secure a free and 
unfettered outlet to the South for the Traffic of the Northern railways ... there 
is every reason to believe that it will be made at the cost of £6,000 per mile 
46 
The promoters of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway clearly envisaged the 
adoption of 'cheap railway' principles, but applied to a main trunk line of over 100 
miles from Forres on the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction line to Dunkeld, where a 
connection was to be made with the Perth and Dunkeld Railway. A standing 
committee, including the web principals of Matheson, Bruce, Mackintosh and Fraser-
Tytler with Inverness banker Waterston, was appointed to negotiate with landowners 
and to seek capital from southern railway companies.47 It later transpired that the 
" See chapter 6.'Dissention and division between Inverness and Aberdeen': Minutes of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 25 January 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.75 and 6 
February 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.79; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 17 
January 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.425, and 7 February 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.432, 
recording the transfer of its shares in the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction company, 
45 Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 27 December 1862, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, p.32, reporting 
that the Glen of Rothes line would open on 1 January 1862; Minutes of the Morayshire 
Railway, 20 October 1863, NAS/BR/MOR/1/3, p.268, reporting that the working agreement 
with the Great North commenced on 1 July 1863 with a working charge of 45% of receipts. 
46 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
30 October 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.185; Railway Times, 10 November 1860, p.1262. 
47 Scroll minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 20 September 1860 and 6 
October 1860, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2: in October, George Loch was included on the committee 
appointed 'to confer with the Southern railway Companies in reference to subscriptions of 
stock'. 
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direct line to Perth was brought forward sooner than had been anticipated by the 
Inverness promoters 'in consequence of the obstructive policy of the Great North of 
Scotland .. .' and for territorial defence, 'because the lines already made were far 
from safe so long as another Company could push into the north from the south ... '. 48 
- southern network access: the Perth and Dunkeld Railway 
For its southerly network connection, the Inverness promoters planned to use the 
route of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, incorporated in 1854 after two earlier 
proposals that identified the potential value of the route as part of a northern trunk 
railway to Inverness were not progressed.49 By the time the Inverness-Perth line 
was launched in 1860, the Perth and Dunkeld was well-established as a successful 
local 8¼ mile line from Dunkeld to Stanley on the Scottish-North Eastern main line 
from Perth to Aberdeen. 
This first railway into the central highlands received strong support from Perth; all 
eighteen shareholders present at the first general meeting were local Scots and 
thirteen gave Perth addresses.50 These individuals held 55 percent of the £29,200 
capital raised by July 1854.51 The Perth Banking Company and the Central Bank 
48 Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217, quoting from the address by 
Alexander Matheson, chairman, to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway 
held on 27 October 1865: Matheson also stated that 'they found that it was impossible to 
develop the traffic on the lines constructed along the coast, with the great detour via 
Aberdeen .. .'. 
49 17&18 Vic. cap.148, 1854, The Perth and Dunkeld Railway Act, with authorised capital of 
£80,000 and borrowing powers of £20,000 to build a line from Stanley Junction on the 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway to Dunkeld, and to be worked by the Scottish Midland 
Junction company; Report to the 3111 Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway, 26 August 1846, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37; Minutes of the Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway, 28 December 1852, p.290. 
50 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 9 August 
1854, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1, pp.8-10; NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998), p.17 
and p.28. 
51 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 7 July 1854, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1, p.3: 1168 £25 
shares had been taken by this date, representing £29,200, of which the eighteen 
shareholders at the 1st Ordinary General Meeting held on 9 August 1854 (pp.8-10) held 638 
shares (£15,950), which represented 54.6% of the share capital raised. 
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offered funding, backed by future calls, at 5½ percent interest, only ½ percent above 
prevailing bank discount rates.52 A working agreement was concluded with the 
Scottish Midland Junction in 1855, whereby the Dunkeld company was 'relieved of 
the whole expense of maintaining an outdoor working establishment ... '.53 However, 
disputes over operations and services with the Scottish Midland, amalgamated into 
the Scottish North-Eastern from 1856, were frequent. 54 
The strategic value of the line re-emerged in 1860 when publication of the Inverness 
proposals for the Perth direct line prompted the Scottish North-Eastern to offer to 
purchase the Ounkeld company with a guaranteed dividend of 5 percent, provided 
the Inverness line connected at Ounkeld so that northern traffic would pass over its 
route to Perth.55 The Duke of Athole reported, however, that the Scottish North-
Eastern 'had started a line in opposition to the Inverness scheme from Birnam to 
Aberfeldy and were surveying the land between these points even against the 
52 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 18 December 1854, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1 (NB: no 
page numbers are given after 20 November 1854 in the minute book): the minutes record the 
offer of the Perth Banking Company and the Central Bank of Scotland to advance to the 
Perth and Dunkeld 'whatever sums they may require from time to time to meet the expenses 
of the undertaking in anticipation of the Calls on the Stock of the Company . .', at interest of 
5½ percent; Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83, quotes the 
bank discount rate at 5% between August 1854 and April 1855. 
53 Report to the 3n:t Ordinary General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 26 
September 1855; Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 
20 December 1855, at which the working agreement was approved, setting charges at a 
maximum of 50% of receipts 'but not lower than 45 percent' if traffic improved; Railway 
Times, 6 October 1855, p.1068; Herapath's Railway Journal, 27 October 1855, p.1093. 
54 Examples of complaints include: Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 11 April 1856, 
reporting that the Scottish Midland Junction had commenced operations on 9 April 1856 but 
found the unfinished state of the line an 'impediment to the traffic'; Minutes of the Perth and 
Dunkeld Railway, 3 July 1856, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1, recording 'certain irregularities ... the want 
of men at some of the stations ... the want of proper advertising'; Minutes of the Perth and 
Dunkeld Railway, 14 March 1860, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1, recording a complaint to the Scottish 
North-Eastern Railway about 'the disgraceful carriages on the Perth and Dunkeld line'; NT 
Sinclair, The Highland Main Line, p.19; The Scottish Midland Junction and the Aberdeen 
railway were amalgamated under 19&20 Vic. cap.134, 29 July 1856, The Scottish North-
Eastern Railway Company's Act 
55 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
30 October 1860, NAS/BR/IAJ/ 1 /2, p.185; Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 23 
October 1860, NAS/BR/POR/1/1; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 19 October 
1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.364. 
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wishes of some of the proprietors'.66 The Scottish North-Eastern was seeking to 
protect its interests by securing the southern part of the Inverness-Perth route. It 
withdrew its proposed leasing bill for the Perth and Dunkeld after opening 
negotiations directly with the Inverness promoters to provide the use of its line from 
Stanley into Perth. 67 
The Inverness and Perth Junction Bill included running powers over the Perth and 
Ounkeld,58 which was authorised to subscribe £15,000 although that power was 
never exercised.59 The Dunkeld company, however, experienced little difficulty in 
raising capital. Eighty-two percent of its share capital had been issued by August 
1856 with 92 percent of calls paid.60 All debentures had been issued by 1859, 
although the capital account records a separate 'assignation' made with the Central 
Bank in 1860-62 for £3,000 to settle contractor claims and so the company 
technically exceeded its authorised loan limit.61 The only temporary loan taken was 
58 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 1 O November 1860, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1; Minutes 
of the Locomotive Committee of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 5 November 1860, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.367, recording instructions to prepare a parliamentary bill for a line from 
Birnam to Aberfeldy. 
57 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 23 January 1861, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1; 
Chairman's notes, Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 23 January 1861, NAS/BR/PDR1/5, minute 3; 
Chairman's notes, Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 13 February 1861, NAS/BR/PDR1/5, minute 
2; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 19 October 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.364; 
Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 7 February 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.397 
and p.400; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 21 February 1861, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.407, recording the agreement of the Perth Junction to pay three-quarters 
of the cost of the Scottish North-Eastern's Dunkeld leasing bill once the Perth Junction bill 
was passed by Parliament: the agreement between the Scottish North-Eastern and the Perth 
Junction was signed on 8 March 1861 (p.419). 
58 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 30 March 
1861, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1. 
59 Minutes of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 30 March 
1861, and of the Special General Meeting, 20 April 1861, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1; 24&25 Vic. 
cap.186, 1861, The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway Act. 
60 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 16 August 1856, NAS/BR/PDR/1 /1, recording 
that 2,648 of the 3,200 authorised £25 shares had been issued with £59,580 called and 
£54,642 received (91.7% of calls paid). 
61 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway,12 November 1858, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1, 
recording a loan of £4,000 from the Central Bank of Scotland with 250 shares as a guarantee 
plus personal guarantees from several directors: also 7 May 1862, NAS/BR/PDR/1 /1, 
recording repayment of the loan; Chairman's notes, Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 14 March 
1860, NAS/BR/PDR/1/5, minute 4, recording an 'assignation' for £3,000 with the Central 
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for £4,000 from the Central Bank in 1858-62, which was not recorded in the 
published accounts. The company became embroiled in disputes over the value of 
land, the cause of the withdrawal of the proposed Dunkeld branch in 1852.62 
Although the capital account was maintained close to balance, capital costs rose 
10.3 percent above estimate by 1859, principally as the result of high land costs 
which comprised 17.9 percent of capital expenditure.63 After long legal arguments, 
that proportion had risen to 20.3% by the time the line was leased by the Inverness 
and Perth Junction Railway in 1863. 
Table 61: Revenue and financial indicators for the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 1859-63 
31 July 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 
Gross annual revenue /£) 6444 6646 6974 8345 8496 
Dividend - half vear to 31 January 2 2 2½ 3 4 
Dividend - half vear to 31 July 2 2½ 2 4 4½ 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 23.6% 22.5% 22.4% 20.9% 20.8% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.269 0.246 0.258 0.363 0.425 
Source: Appendix, tables 18(b) and 18(c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital 
and 0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
Gross revenue rose steadily and, with little temporary debt, the company was able to 
pay dividends consistently; its debt gearing strengthened to rival those of its first 
working partner, the Scottish Midland Junction (table 61 ).64 When, in 1861, the 
Inverness and Perth Junction opened discussions with the Dunkeld company to gain 
Bank whereby the bank paid outstanding claims due to the contractor; Minutes of the Perth 
and Dunkeld Railway, 26 September 1862, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1, reporting the discharge of the 
£3,000 debt due to the Central Bank of Scotland. 
62 Minutes of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 28 December 1852, p.290. 
63 Appendix, table 18(a), note (2); Data from minutes and accounts of the Perth and Dunkeld 
Railway, 1853-64, NAS/BR/PDR/1-2. 
64 Appendix, table 20 (c); the debt gearing for the Scottish Midland Junction in July 1855, just 
before its amalgamation into the Scottish North-Eastern, was 0.417: Appendix, table 21 : the 
debt gearing for the successor Scottish North-Eastern Railway ranged from 0.274 in 1856 to 
0.288 in 1862. 
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access over its line to Stanley, this small company was able to negotiate from a 
position of strength.65 Shareholders were advised by their chairman: 
... not to be in too great a hurry in making an agreement with the Inverness, 
as he thought it would eventually be found that the Dunkeld was never more 
valuable than at the present moment, or that the Inverness supposed it to 
be.66 
That value was reflected by the sale of 263 unissued shares at par value in 1862.e7 
In 1863, the Board advised Inverness of its terms; 'that an amalgamation should take 
place . . . [and] that the Perth and Dunkeld Railway Company should receive a 
preferential dividend of six percent .. .'.68 Following a lease from June 1863,611 
Dunkeld ordinary stock was translated into a 6 percent preference stock and 
amalgamation was finalised in February 1864.70 
65 Herapath's Railway Journal, 12 October 1861, p.1045, reporting the announcement of the 
chairman of the Perth and Dunkeld company that negotiations were in progress with the 
Inverness and Perth Junction over purchase of the line, a year before a formal entry was 
made in Inverness and Perth company minutes; Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway, 4 and 23 October 1862, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.66 and p.70; Report to the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 28 October 1862, 
NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p. 72, Informing shareholders that negotiations were In progress with the 
Perth and Dunkeld 'with the view of fixing terms for effecting an Amalgamation of Companies 
I 
66 Railway Times, 5 October 1861, p.1256, reporting the Earl of Mansfield's advice to Perth 
and Dunkeld shareholders at the Ordinary General Meeting held on 27 September 1861. 
67 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 26 September 
1862, NAS/BR/PDR/1 /1, recording the sale of 263 shares at par value of £25 during the 
previous six months, the proceeds of which had settled some land compensation claims and 
discharged the £3,000 'assignation' to the Central Bank. 
66 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 12 February 1863, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1. 
811 The Dunkeld-Pitlochry section of the Inverness and Perth Railway opened on 1 June 1863 
and the full line to Inverness opened on 9 September 1863. 
70 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 30 September 
1863 reporting amalgamation was to take place either on 31 August 1863 or 28 February 
1864 once the through line had opened: a rent of £380 per month was paid from June 1863 
until amalgamation in February 1864; 26&27 Vic. cap.58, 1863, The Inverness and Perth 
Junction and Perth and Dunkeld Railways Amalgamation Act; Accounts of the Inverness and 
Perth Junction Railway to 31 July 1864, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, showing expenditure on 'Purchase 
of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway' for £96,000, offset by the creation of £76,000 6% Perth 
and Dunkeld preference stock to replace Dunkeld ordinary stock and an additional £20,000 of 
debentures to replace Dunkeld debentures, which allowed the winding-up of the Perth and 
Dunkeld Railway, authorised by the company board on 10 June 1863 (10 June 1863, 
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The Perth and Dunkeld exemplifies a small northern railway company that paid 
modest but consistent returns to its shareholders because it had accommodated cost 
increases within its borrowing powers and not acquired large temporary debt. It had 
an advantage over some branch companies further north in that it was able to raise 
much of its share capital relatively easily and locally. The value of the company was, 
however, enhanced by its location in the Tay valley at the southern extremity of the 
Inverness-Perth route where there was little scope for an alternative route. It was 
therefore able to exercise its market power to secure a favourable financial 
settlement for its shareholders. 
• the direct line: the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway 
The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, also described as the Great Highland 
Central Railway, was promoted as 'the last section of the great central line from 
London' which would 'enable a passenger to travel without change of carriage from 
London to Inverness in 16 hours'.71 The prospectus justified the promotion of a 
southern trunk route to avoid the detour via Aberdeen, 72 but it produced a 
complacent monopolist's response from the Great North's deputy chairman: 
Where the inducements are to make a new line I cannot see. That, however, 
is not our business, and we do not need to inquire.73 
NAS/BR/PDR/1 /1 ). The amalgamation was, in essence, a take-over of the company as no 
Perth and Dunkeld directors joined the Inverness board. 
71 Prospectus of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 1860, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/18. 
72 Prospectus of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 1860, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/18: 
'The additional mileage involved in going round by Aberdeen has been found to neutralize, In 
a great measure, the advantages of railway communication in respect of through traffic both 
in passengers and goods ... Perth at the one extremity and Inverness at the other, may, 
therefore, be regarded as two great termini, between which the population and traffic of a 
very large proportion of Scotland must inevitably pass'. 
73 Report of deputy chairman John Stewart to the 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 1 October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.548. 
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Great North shareholders were advised to 'have no interest in the projected line from 
Forres to Dunkeld'.74 Instead, the Great North sponsored a new nominally 
independent company, the Strathspey Railway, to extend its system south-
westwards from the new Elgin route down the Spey valley, rejecting both requested 
support for the Morayshire's ambitious southerly line to Blairgowrie and a Morayshire 
proposal of amalgamation.75 This defensive promotion of the Great North is 
examined in the final section of this chapter. Wrt:h both Aberdeen and Inverness 
embarked on schemes of competitive and costly expansion in 1860, the only truce 
drawn was that the promoters agreed not to oppose each other's bills in Parliament 
to avoid extra expense.76 
The Inverness-Perth line differed from the 1846 scheme by re-locating its northerly 
junction from Nairn further east to Forres, which Sinclair concludes had three 
purposes; to gain traffic from the counties of Moray and Banff, to serve the Important 
town of Grantown, and to secure the timber traffic from the Earl of Seafield's estates 
in Strathspey.n Seafield joined the first board of the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway and his commissioner, Thomas Bruce, became its chairman with Alexander 
Matheson, chairman of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, as deputy chairman.78 
74 Report of engineer Gibb to a Special General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 17 July 1860, BR/NAS/GNS/1/3, pp.501-502. 
75 Minutes of the Special General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 17 July 
1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/13, p.502; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 24 July and 
25 September 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.505 and p.531; Report of the 16th Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.548; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 12 October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.3, 
recording the decision of the Great North board that the name of the new company was to be 
the Strathspey Railway. 
78 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 27 November 1860 and 18 and 20 
December 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, pages 21, 24, 27, and 31; Minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 22 March 1861, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.75, reporting a memorandum of 
agreement between the Great North, the Inverness and Perth Junction, the Morayshire and 
Strathspey Railways to withdraw mutual opposition to each others' parliamentary bills; Scroll 
minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 7 December 1860, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2. 
77 NT Sinclair, 'Boat of Garten in the nineteenth century', Great North Review, 12, No.46 
(August 1975), p.122. 
78 Scroll minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 31 August, 1861, 
NAS/IPJ/1/2, recording the election of Thomas Bruce as chairman and Alexander Matheson 
as deputy chairman (a reversal of their roles in the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
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The Railway Times reported that the line was •supported by all the leading 
proprietors whose property will be traversed by it; indeed the provisional committee 
comprises most of their names .. .'.79 Parliament, satisfied that technological 
advances now overcame the reservations expressed in 1846, authorised the 
company in 1861. 80 Its first elected board included four peers, three baronets and 
two members of parliament; moreover, three-fifths of the board held directorships of 
other Inverness web companies.81 A quarter of the new direct route passed over 
land belonging to the Duke of Athole, who abandoned his initial reluctance for a 
through line and urged support for the promoters.82 
The parliamentary estimate for the line was only £5,813 per mile, exceptionally low 
for a main trunk route crossing the Grampian mountains, albeit over a single line.83 
Nevertheless, the eventual cost was to exceed this figure by approximately £3,000 
Railway); Report of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway, 19 September 1861, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2, recording the election of directors. 
79 Railway Times, 7 July 1860, p. 773; see chapter 6, table 59, giving details of Inverness 
directors; NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line, p.22, notes that all fifteen of the first 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway board were highland landowners or commissioners to 
landowners. 
80 24&25 Vic. cap.186, 1861, The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway Act, authorising 
share capital of £654,000 with borrowing powers of £218,000. 
81 Scroll minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway, 19 September 1861, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2; see chapter 6, table 59. 
82 Herapath's Railway Journal, 24 November 1860, p.1172, quoting the Duke of Athole at a 
public meeting in Dunkeld: 'I am now convinced as to the great advantage that a line of 
railway to the north would be to the north country ... We all ought to put our shoulders to the 
wheel and help the promoters of this railway as much as we can'; Railway Times, 24 
November 1860, p.1339, carried a report of the same meeting, at which the Duke remarked 'I 
can make sacrifices for a through line, which I believe will be a great national benefit, as well 
as a benefit to the districts locally affected .. .'; Railway Times, 24 November 1860, p.1316-
17, records that 'a fourth part' of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway was to cross land 
owned by the Duke of Athole. 
83 Appendix, table 14{a): the planned system comprised the Forres-Dunkeld main line {103¼ 
miles) and the Aberfeldy branch {8¾ miles) with running rights southwards over the Perth and 
Dunkeld Railway to Stanley and then over the Scottish North-Eastern into Perth, for which 
share capital of £654,000 was authorised; Prospectus of the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway, 1860, NAS/BR/PROS{S)/1/18: the prospectus gave an estimated capital cost of 
£6,000 per mile, including land. 
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per mile.B-4 The promoters agreed to ask the Edinburgh and Glasgow and Scottish 
Central Railways to subscribe £200,000 and work the southern half of the line,85 
although the Act. authorised subscriptions from six railway companies comprising 51 
percent of the total share capital.88 The southern companies did not invest, however, 
with the result that shortage of capital became a critical factor Immediately. The 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, in the process of amalgamation with the 
Inverness and Nairn, had agreed that the combined company would subscribe 
£50,000 and work the Perth line at 50 percent of receipts, but specified that an 
amalgamation was to be sought within three years of the line opening, thus declaring 
the intended consolidation of the Inverness railway web. 87 By December 1860, 
subscriptions amounted to £148,000, just 22.6 percent of authorised share capital, 
and £37,000 was borrowed from the Commercial Bank towards the parliamentary 
deposit, secured on the personal guarantee of provisional committee members.88 
Bruce was placed in charge of arrangements for 'careful supervision of details and 
84 Appendix, table 14(a), note (4) and note (5); see chapter 8, table 73, for the actual costs of 
Inverness railway companies given by chairman Alexander Matheson to the first Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865 and reported in Herapath's 
RailwayJoumal, 4 November 1865, p.1218 and Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407. 
85 Scroll Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 15 October 1860, 
NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 29 November 1860, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.378, reporting a meeting of the company with the Scottish Central, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow and Caledonian Railways over 'the proposed Inverness and Perth 
direct line'. 
86 24&25 Vic. cap.186, 1861, The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway Act, which 
authorised subscriptions of £35,000 from the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
£15,000 from the Inverness and Nairn Railway, £30,000 from the Inverness and Ross-shire 
Railway, £15,000 from the Perth and Dunkeld Railway and not more than £120,000 from 
each of the Scottish Central and Edinburgh and Glasgow Railways. 
87 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 13 December 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, pp.199-200; confirmation of the agreement was made on 3 December 1861, 
p.290, reporting that' ... the works having been commenced at both ends of the line'; 
Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 3 December 1861, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, 
p.11; Scroll minutes of the directors of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 15 December 1860, 
NAS/BR/INR/1/4, item 7, approving the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction board's decision of 
13 December 1860 requiring future amalgamation as a condition of subscription to the 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway. 
88 Scroll minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 28 December 1860, 
NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2: the guarantors were Matheson, Bruce, Fraser-Tytler, Mackintosh, Seafield, 
Gordon-Cumming, and Inglis. 
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strict economy of expenditure .. .' at a salary of £500 per annum,89 and confirmed in 
1863 as 'Managing Director of all the Company's lines .. .' on the same salary.90 
Capital problems intensified. In April 1862, Bruce reported that £100,000 above 
company powers would be required to complete the line and loans were to be 
arranged from the Commercial, National and Caledonian Banks for that amount. 91 
An advertisement was placed for debenture loans at 4½ percent in July 1862 in 
anticipation of the release of borrowing powers at the shareholders' meeting in 
October.92 With bank discount rates at 3 percent, three-quarters of authorised loan 
capital was received by 1 December 1862; only 7.8 percent of funds and 2.5 percent 
of lenders were English.93 By mid-January 1863, 93 percent of debentures had been 
issued and the inflow of funds moved the capital account into surplus.94 However, 
only 35 percent of share capital had been subscribed by February 1863 and, by 
August, £171,441 was owed to bankers to balance the capital account.95 Although 
89 Scroll minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 26 March 1861, 
NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2, recording the appointment of Bruce from 1 January 1861. 
90 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 27 October 1863, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /2, p.490. 
91 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 23 April 1862, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, 
p.34: Matheson and Bruce were charged to arrange the loans. 
92 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway,10 July 1862, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.51, 
and Special General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 28 October 1862, 
pp.75-76, approving the exercise of borrowing powers and the working agreement with the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway. 
93 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 6 and 17 November and 1 
December, 1862, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, pp.80-84, p.85 and p.87, recording £165,690 of 
debentures issued to 242 individuals of whom 59 provided £1,000 or more each; Bradshaw's 
Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83, showing bank discount rates. 
9-4 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 10 January 1863, NAS/IPJ/1/1, 
p.p.98-99: to that date £202,678 of debentures had been issued in 299 lots (recorded on 6 
and 17 November, 1862, 1, 15 and 30 December 1862 and 10 January 1863, pp.80-99) and 
no further details of debenture loans are given in subsequent minutes; Appendix, table 14(a), 
showing a capital account surplus of £20.271 in February 1863. 
95 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 27 October 1863, NAS/IPJ/1/1, 
p.167, reporting the accounts to August 1863 which showed a deficit in the capital account of 
£173,883 and £171,441 owed to bankers held below the line in the general balance sheet as 
temporary debt; Appendix, table 14(a); with total capital raised of £432,534 in February 1863 
and £202,678 of debentures recorded in the minutes as issued by 10 January 1863, share 
capital (not separately identified in the accounts) comprised approximately £229,856 of the 
£654,000 authorised share capital (35.1%). 
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shareholder records have not survived, the earlier pattern of investment in Inverness 
web companies, whereby large landowners provided the majority of funds, was 
almost certainly repeated, especially as these individuals dominated the board. The 
shortage of capital resulted in the company converting £254,000 of unissued 
ordinary shares, comprising two-fifths of authorised share capital, into 4½ percent 
preference stock.96 Therefore, six months before the full line opened in September 
1863, 54.1 percent of authorised capital committed the company to fixed interest 
payments.97 
Interest paid from revenue and capital in the year to August 1863 was £19,533, 
which implies that the company also held approximately £200,000 of temporary 
debt.98 In August 1863, the Commercial and National Banks In Edinburgh each 
agreed to lend £50,000 to the company for two years.99 In January 1864, the 
National Bank advanced a further £50,000100 and the Commercial Bank gave an 
'occasional overdraft' of £45,000 in March 1864.101 These two latter advances alone 
96 Special General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 27 October 1863, 
NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.169. 
97 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Railway, 27 October 
1863, p.164, recording opening dates: Dunkeld to Pitlochry, 1 June 1863; Forres to 
Aviemore, 3 August 1863; the full line opened on 9 September 1863; 24&25 Vic. cap 186, 
1861, The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway Act authorised share capital of £654,000 
and borrowing powers of £218,000: however, with £254,000 of authorised ordinary shares 
converted to preference stock and £218,000 of authorised debenture loans, £472,000 of the 
authorised share and loan capital of £872,000 required fixed interest payments (54.1 %). 
98 Appendix, table 14(a): accounts to 31 August 1863 show that interest paid from capital 
was £19, 133 and a further £400 from revenue for debenture interest; therefore, assuming 
that £223,000 of debentures were issued (which is the first published figure given in the 
accounts, but for the following year, 1864) at an overall interest rate of 4 ½ %, interest paid of 
£19,513 would imply a total debt of £433,622, leaving £210,622 as an estimate of temporary 
debt. 
99 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 25 August 1863, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, 
p.149: these loans were offered at 4½% interest. 
100 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 2 January 1864, p.181, recording a 
£50,000 loan from the National Bank with £50,000 Perth Junction preference stock held as a 
guarantee: the National Bank also made a £25,000 loan to the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction as part of the same negotiations, for which £25,000 Ross-shire stock was provided 
as security. 
101 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 30 March 1864, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, 
p.195, recording an overdraft of £45,000, but with £49,500 of preference stock as security. 
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demanded £99,500 of preference stock as guarantees, comprising 96.4 percent of 
the preference stock issued by July 1864. 102 The company was therefore heavily 
dependent upon the support of the banking sector from its inception, no doubt 
assisted by Matheson's close financial connections as a director of the Bank of 
England. 
The line was constructed in only twenty-three months.103 Strict economy was 
exercised; stations were constructed of wood and contractors huts used initially to 
house railway staff.104 By March 1865, 'a considerable sum' for land remained 
outstanding.105 In October, Matheson reported that the Inverness-Perth line had cost 
£1,056,000, three-fifths above its parliamentary estimate, and land 'estimated to cost 
£50,000 ... has actually cost nearly three times that sum' .106 Mitchell gave the cost 
of the 104 miles between Forres and Dunkeld as £8,860 per mile for construction, 
land, law and engineering.107 The capital expenditure reported by Matheson, 
however, produces a cost of £9,387 per mile for the Dunkeld-Forres and Aberfeldy 
lines, significantly above the optimistic estimate of £6,000 in the prospectus, but 
remarkably inexpensive compared to other trunk lines.108 Revised plans contributed 
102 Appendix, table 14(a), showing that £103,236 of 4½ % preference stock had been issued 
by July 1864. 
103 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II (private publication, 2 
volumes, London, 1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1971 ), p.197, giving 17 October 
1861 as the date of cutting the first sod and 9 September 1863 as the date the line was 
approved by the Board of Trade for opening. 
104 NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line, p. 28, quoting the Illustrated London News dated 19 
September 1863. 
105 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 28 
March 1865, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.260. 
106 Railway Times, 4 November, 1865, p.1407, reporting the address of chairman Alexander 
Matheson to the first Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865 on 
the cost of the Inverness lines: from the data presented by Matheson, land estimates for the 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway were £50,000 (7.6% of original authorised capital) 
whereas by 1865 land costs were approximately £150,000 (14.2% of the actual capital 
expenditure reported to shareholders). 
107 J Mitchell, The Construction and Worlcs of the Highland Railway, a paper read to the 
British Association in Dundee, British Association records (September 1867), p.159, 
NAS/BR/HR/4/100. 
108 Appendix, table 26 and table 14(a), note (5): the capital cost per mile of £9,387 is 
calculated on Matheson's statement of expenditure of £1,056,000 and based on the 112½ 
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to some increase in costs; 109 furthermore, the company acquired its southern outlet 
by amalgamation, whereas its plans had envisaged a working agreement over the 
Perth and Dunkeld that would have been a charge to revenue.110 
The inaccuracy of estimates and the difficulties in raising ordinary share capital for 
the Perth Junction resulted in a reliance upon preference stock and bank loans. 
Bank advances to Inverness web companies were backed by considerable personal 
guarantees given by directors, as chapter 8 will illustrate. Inverness practice was to 
charge only a part of the interest due on bank loans to revenue, equivalent to the 
dividends that would have been payable on ordinary and preference stock to the 
value of the advance and, because bank interest was invariably higher than 
dividends, charging any interest above that level to capital as part of the costs of 
constructing the lines.111 By so doing, some dividend for ordinary shareholders could 
be preserved, but the convention transferred financial pressures from the revenue to 
miles of the Forres-Dunkeld and Aberfeldy lines. If, however, Matheson's estimate of 
expenditure included the £96,000 capital cost of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, originally 
planned to be subject to a working agreement paid from revenue, the capital cost for the 
Forres-Stanley and Aberfeldy lines comprising 120¾ miles falls to £8,745 per mile. Primary 
sources do not record any details of the items included in the overall expenditure reported by 
Matheson. 
109 26&27 Vic. cap.61, 1863, The Inverness and Perth Junction (Deviations) Act. 
110 Accounts of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway to 31 July 1864, reported to the 
Ordinary General Meeting held on 28 September 1864, NAS/IPJ/1/1, inserted printed report 
at p.233, showing £96,000 nominal expenditure within the capital account during the previous 
half-year as 'Purchase of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway', offset by the creation of £76,000 
Perth and Dunkeld 6% preference stock and an additional £20,000 of debentures; Accounts 
of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway to 31 July 1863, reported to the Ordinary General Meeting 
held on 30 September 1863, NAS/BR/PDR/1/2, showing that £76,000 of share capital and 
£20,000 of debenture capital had been raised by that date; 26&27 Vic. cap.58, 1863, The 
Inverness and Perth Junction and Perth and Dunkeld Railways Amalgamation Act, which 
merged the capital powers of the two companies. 
111 Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217, reporting the Inverness practice 
of charging bank loan interest to revenue equivalent to the dividend that would have been 
payable on stock to the amount of bank advances and 'to carry the excess to capital as part 
of the cost of the undertaking'; Railway Times, 5 May 1866, p.515, reporting a statement by 
Bruce to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 23 April 1866 in 
which he stated that 'about £60,000 of interest' had been charged to capital 'since the early 
days on the Inverness and Nairn Railway'. 
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the capital account. On the Perth Junction, maintenance of dividends may have 
been calculated to try to attract new investment into the company. 112 
The Inverness web adhered to its policy of declining to subscribe to branch railways. 
The Perth Junction gave only verbal support to a proposed railway from Fort William 
to connect with its line at Newtonmore,113 although the Aberdeen Junction offered to 
work the Fort William line on the same terms as it worked the Perth Junction at 50 
percent of receipts.11" The £250,000 capital cost of the Fort William scheme 
deterred progress,115 and, within the year, Inverness shareholders were informed of 
a proposed line from Dingwall to the west coast opposite Skye, nominally 
independent of the Inverness web but intended as a means of opening up western 
estates and securing traffic which might otherwise be diverted either to a prospective 
Fort William line or to the Callander and Oban protege of the Caledonian Railway, 
authorised in 1865.118 This development is examined in chapter 9. 
The Perth Junction. anxious to confirm its southerly network connection, hurriedly 
accepted Scottish North-Eastern terms in 1861 for running rights into Perth from 
112 Appendix, table 14(b), showing a 3% dividend paid to January 1864, 3½% to July 1864 
and 4% to January 1865. 
113 Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 27 October 1863 and 21 March 
1864, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.160 and p.197; Railway Times, 24 November 1860, p.1317 and 9 
April 1864, p.521; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.210, noted 
that a proposed Fort William line was to run to Kingussie; Matheson also identified Kingussie 
as the potential junction (Herapath's Railway Journal, 7 November 1863, p.1181). However, 
J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People (Edinburgh, 2005), 
pp.43-44, reproduces the notes of a meeting held on 6 October 1863 establishing a 
provisional committee for a Fort-William - Newtonmore line. Kingussie is 2¾ miles further 
north than Newtonmore. 
114 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 27 October 1863, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.489. 
115 J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People, p.5, p.25 and pp.43-
44. 
116 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
28 September 1864, p.44 and page 2 of printed report to shareholders; 28&29 Vic. cap.266, 
1865, The Callander and Oban Railway Act; CEJ Fryer, The Callander and Oban Railway 
(Headington, 1989), p.15. 
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Stanley, 117 which proved to be expensive immediately the line opened and gave rise 
to later disputes.118 The company paid a three percent dividend for the first five 
months of operation119 and shareholders were told that 'the Directors consider the 
success of the undertaking placed beyond all doubt .. .'.120 The direct line relied 
almost exclusively on through traffic for its revenue and the seasonal nature of the 
traffic, already apparent on earlier Inverness lines, featured strongly. Average 
weekly gross revenue between January and March 1864 was £1,043 whereas the 
average for the period July to September 1864 was £2,574, with a peak of £3,029 in 
mid-August.121 The company secured a seven-year northern mail contract in June 
1864, not just for Inverness-shire and counties north but also for Nairn, Moray and 
Banff, that Inverness directors predicted would add 1 ½ percent annually to ordinary 
dividend and which, significantly, also removed guaranteed traffic from the rival 
Great North line via Aberdeen.122 Mail revenue remained a staple component of 
railway revenue for the Inverness web throughout the century. The impact of the 
direct line on the Great North was immediate: 
It very speedily showed that it was to act very detrimentally to the interest of 
this Company. In the first place, we have had the mails taken off, which is 
117 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 7 February 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
pp.397-98 and p.400, reporting that Perth Junction terms were refused by the Scottish North-
Eastern on 7 February 1861, but that Scottish North-Eastern terms were then accepted on 
the same day by the Perth Junction: the agreement was signed on 18 March 1861, 
NAS.BR/SNE/1/1, p.419. 
118 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 4 August 1863. NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, p.55, 
reporting a refusal to amend agreed tolls with the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway; and 
5 November 1863, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, pp.142-43, recording that a further request from the 
Perth Junction to amend tolls was also refused. 
119 Appendix, table 14{b); Minutes of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 14 March 
1864, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.191. 
120 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 30 
March 1864, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.201. 
121 Data compiled from the weekly traffic receipts recorded in minutes of the Inverness and 
Perth Junction Railway, 10 January - 27 March 1864, and 3 July - 18 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, pages 186-205 and 218-29. 
122 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 30 
March 1864, p.201. 
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equal to £95 per week; then we have lost the through traffic amounting to 
something like £300 per week. 123 
Amalgamation of the Inverness and Perth and Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railways was authorised in June 1865 and so the Perth Junction was in existence 
for only two years as an independent concern.124 Therefore financial indicators for 
the company require caution, not least because the level of temporary debt, as with 
all Inverness companies, is not explicit in the accounts. Nevertheless, its debt 
gearing for 1863-64 appears slightly stronger than the weak Caledonian benchmark 
of 1849.125 The line had only recently been opened and was already producing a 
strong growth in revenue, which indicated the potential of the new company 
ultimately to repay its debts.126 This factor, coupled with the personal guarantees of 
directors, ensured the backing of the banking sector. However, the Perth Junction 
and its working partner, the Aberdeen Junction, had accumulated a substantial 
amount of temporary debt by the time they coalesced as the Highland Railway in 
1865 and the impact of that debt is analysed in the following chapter. 
Following a decade of careful planning and landowner negotiation, the high cost of 
land assumed an unexpected significance in the large excess of capital expenditure 
over estimate for the Perth Junction.127 These data suggest validity in Robertson's 
123 Report to the 24th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 
September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/15, pp.224-25, page 2 of printed report of the meeting. 
124 28&29 Vic. cap.168, 1865, The Highland Railway Act, authorising the amalgamation of 
the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and the Inverness and Perth Junction Railways. 
125 Appendix, table 14 ( c), showing a gearing of gross revenue to total debt of 0.189 in 1864, 
but caution is required in the interpretation of such an indicator for this company because it 
had been in operation for only one year and it was about to from part of the new Highland 
Railway. The December 1849 debt gearing for the Caledonian Railway was 0.162 (chapter 
3, table 18). 
126 Appendix, table 14(b). 
127 Appendix, table 14(a): taking the Highland Railway chairman's estimate of final land costs 
as £150,000 and a capital expenditure of £1,056,000 (Railway Times, 4 November, 1865, 
p.1407), land costs comprised 14.2% of capital expenditure, therefore falling within the range 
of land costs for the three 1837-38 inter-urban lines (12.4% to 18.1%, 1843-45, chapter 2, 
table 6 and appendix, table 26). Capital expenditure rose 61.5% above the parliamentary 
estimate of £654,000. 
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suspicion that estimates for some Scottish lines may have been deliberately kept 
low.128 Even so, the capital cost of circa £9,000 per mile for this main trunk route 
was singularly economical and represents a prime example of the successful 
application of 'cheap railway' principles.129 The opening of the direct line in 1863 
marked the culmination of the Inverness strategy for the control of northern railways, 
confirming the prediction of the Railway Times: 'the territory, though large, will be 
thoroughly secure' .130 
Competition from the south: the Aberdeen link 
No progress had been made to bridge the gap in the through route across Aberdeen 
since the fracture of the Aberdeen railway web in 1848. Two decades later, Thomas 
Cook was warning tourists: 
... the Great North of Scotland line has an independent station, denominated 
the Waterloo, at a distance of half-a-mile or more from the Guild Street 
Station; and this is the only positive disconnection of rails between Penzance, 
in Cornwall, and Inverness, a distance little short of 900 miles.131 
Earlier unsuccessful attempts to provide a continuous route were outlined in chapter 
4,132 while chapter 5 showed that the Great North, operating the Aberdeen-Keith 
128 CJA Robertson. The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 
1983), p.323. 
129 Appendix, table 14(a). note (4) and note (5). 
130 Railway Times, 2 November 1861, p.1349, predicting consolidation of the Inverness 
companies on completion of the Inverness and Perth Railway. 
131 T Cook, Scottish Tourist Practical Directory (London, 1866), p.59; AC O'Dell, 'Railway 
Routes of the North-East', Geography of the Railways of Scot/and (unfinished manuscript, 
chapter 18 and chapter 19), in REH Mellor {ed.), The Railways of Scotland: the papers of 
Andrew C O'Dell (Aberdeen, 1984), p.41: O'Dell described the discontinuity at Aberdeen 
thus: 'At the time of the opening of the Canal line there were 700 yards separating Guild 
Street Station and Waterloo Station and no locomotives were allowed on the quays'. 
132 Scroll minutes of the Aberdeen Railway, 16 June 1850, NAS/BR/ABN/1/10; Railway 
Times, 26 October 1850, p.1098; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
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section of the northern main line, made widespread use of sea transport to forward 
traffic south of Aberdeen. 133 Sporadic attempts were made to achieve a link, 134 but 
even with the announcement in 1860 of the proposed direct line from Inverness to 
Perth, the Great North and Scottish North-Eastern failed to agree plans to construct 
it.135 Projected costs were high given the urban environment; an 1861 estimate for 
the 1¾ mile line through the Denburn Valley amounted to £227,410, but the Great 
North directors considered 'there was not sufficient time to mature so important an 
undertaking for the ensuing session of Parliament' .136 Although the Great North 
proposed that the 1861 scheme should be submitted to the following parliamentary 
session, the Scottish North-Eastern replied that it remained 'uncommitted' and 
resolved to stop all expenditure on the scheme.137 The Scottish North-Eastern was 
already exploring alterative plans to isolate the Great North, but faced a potential 
barrier presented by the Deeside Railway, which ran westwards from Aberdeen to 
Aboyne. 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, 2 September 1849, p.202, 29 December 1849, p.229, 20 July 1853, 
p.409, and 27 August 1853, pp.420-22. 
133 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 September 1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, 
page 1 of printed report between pp.414-15, Herapath's Railway Journal, 11 October 1862, 
p.1060. 
1
~ Railway Times, 22 November 1856, p.1203; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 23 December 1859, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.418. 
135 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 19 May 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1 /1, pp.292-
93, recording a meeting between the Scottish North-Eastern, Great North and Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railways concerning a cross-Aberdeen link; Minutes of the Scottish 
North-Eastern Railway, 5 September 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.560; Minutes of a special 
meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 6 November 1861, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14; 
Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 16 October 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.578. 
136 Special meeting of the board of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 6 November 1861, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14 reporting estimates ranging from £147,032 to £159,000 with an 
additional £80,378 for approach work; HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, 
p. 70, giving the length of the Den bum Valley route across Aberdeen as 1 ¼ miles. 
137 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 16 October 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p.584. 
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- the Deeside railway system 
The Deeside Railway, originally authorised in 1846, was re-incorporated in 1852 to 
build a line from Aberdeen to Banchory.138 Two key individuals joined the Deeside 
from the outset. John Duncan, a director of the post-insolvent Caledonian and later 
its chairman, became Deeside chairman in 1851.139 William Ferguson was 
appointed secretary in 1853 with a salary supplemented by an early example of a 
performance bonus.140 Both assumed similar posts in the Great North following its 
financial collapse in 1865-66 and were central in its subsequent recovery. 141 
138 15 Vic. cap.61, 1852, The Deeside Railway Act, authorising construction of a 16 mile line 
between Aberdeen and Banchory with share capital of £106,250 and borrowing powers of 
£35,400. 
139 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 28 March 1850, in 
accounts and director reports of the Caledonian Railway, 1845-68, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, 
showing John Duncan elected as a director of the new Caledonlan board on 20 March 1850 
and serving as chairman from December 1850 until after the Ordinary General Meeting of 
September 1852; Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 9 September 1851, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1, 
pp.74-75, showing John Duncan elected to the board; Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 26 
November 1851, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1, p.92, recording that John Duncan was elected as 
chairman. 
140 Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 1 March 1853, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1, p.178, recording the 
appointment of William Ferguson as secretary to the company at a salary of £150 per annum 
with an unspecified bonus once dividend reached 4%; Minutes of the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Deeside Railway, 24 October 1854, p.257, recording that William Ferguson's 
salary as secretary had been adjusted to £250 per annum plus £50 for every ½% dividend 
above 5%, presumably amended because dividend had already reached 5%. 
141 Report to the 23rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 
March 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.128 and page 2 of inserted printed report, detailing the 
appointment of John Duncan, advocate, to the board of the Great North; Minutes of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 28 September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.226, recording 
Duncan's election as deputy chairman in place of John Stewart, and 12 February 1867, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.216, recording Duncan's election as chairman of the re-constituted 
board of the Great North; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway for the Deeside 
Arrangement Committee, 26 October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.110, recording the 
recommendation that the duties of Robert Milne, secretary and general manager of the Great 
North, should be split and that William Ferguson should become secretary (to include 
finance) of the whole Great North and Deeside system and Milne should act as general 
manager for the whole Great North and Deeside system. 
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As only 56.4 percent of Deeside share capital had been issued by March 1853, 
Duncan took an additional 23.5 percent and other directors a further 8.5 percent. 142 
Once opened in 1854, strong dividends made the company attractive. The Deeside 
quickly established itself as an exemplar of a financially secure branch railway built 
on 'cheap railway' principles and it returned a steady increase in gross revenue 
without the burden of large temporary debt.143 Consequently, the Deeside produced 
one of the strongest debt gearing ratios in the north and paid high dividends 
consistently (table 62). 
Table 62: Revenue and financial indicators for the Deeside Railway, 1854-66 
31 August 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 
Gross annual revenue (£) 8836 10808 12392 12834 13072 14296 14569 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 33.2% 31.6% 29.3% 28.1% 28.1% 27.3% 27.0% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.238 0.250 0.254 0.31'4 0.297 0.323 0.330 
Dividend (%) 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 
1861 1862 1863 186" 1865 1866 
Gross annual revenue (£) 15102 15458 15398 16763 19792 18638 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 25.9% 25.0% 23.6% 23.6% 23.3% 26.2% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.318 0 .304 0.431 0.471 0.481 0.393 
Dividend (%) 6 7¼ 7 7 7 7 
Source: Appendix, tables 7(b) and 7(c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 0.162 
for qross revenue/debt. 
Despite high land costs, which comprised 13.8 percent of capital expenditure by 
1855, 144 the line attracted commendation: 
142 Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 21 March 1853, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1. p.131, recording 
5,988 shares issued to 103 shareholders, with an extra 2,500 then taken by John Duncan 
and a further 900 by directors, making a total of 9,388 £10 shares issued (88.4%). 
143 Railway Times, 22 October 1859, p.1173: a leading article on the Deeside noted that 'The 
sole secret of this success lies in economy of construction, and a rigid regard to outlay of 
capital' ; Appendix, tables 7{a} and 7{b}, showing the capital cost per mile by 1854 to be 
£6,803 by 1854, only 2.5% above estimate, but £8,011 per mile by 1855, 20.6% above 
estimate, although one-quarter of this increase was due to the purchase of additional plant to 
work the increasing traffic. 
144 Appendix, table 7{a}. 
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There is, indeed, much to be proud of in the construction, management, and 
development of the Deeside. It is the first practical success in the economic 
system. Abating the unexpected extortion of some of the landowners ... 
everything else is worthy of approbation ... 145 
When approached for support for a line projected from the Deeside to Alford in 1855 
in competition to the Alford Valley Railway, 146 outlined in chapter 5, the board made 
an important statement of policy that under-pinned the financial stability of the 
Deeside: 
The Directors have deemed it the wisest policy to avoid all guarantees and 
subscriptions to branch lines, as a Company, and have resolved to keep 
each undertaking separate and distinct ... 147 
A westward extension to Aboyne was promoted in October 1856 for which the 
parliamentary authorisation specifically required the shareholder lists of the two 
concerns to be separated until dividends were equivalent.148 The Deeside board 
agreed to act as the nominal promoter provided 'that no part of the Revenue or 
Capital of the Deeside Railway proper shall be applicable to the purpose of the 
Extension or be in any way burdened by it' .149 Nevertheless, the Deeside subscribed 
£5,000, worked the line and managed extension affairs through its board with the 
addition of two extension directors; company accounts were, however, distinctly 
divided.150 By 1860, capital expenditure on the extension was a quarter above 
145 Railway Times, 28 October 1854, p.1173: this leader article noted that the Deeside 
Railway earned only £10 per mile per week in revenue, but it paid a 5% dividend. 
146 Herapath 's Railway Journal, 20 October 1855, p.1081. 
147 Minutes of the Oeeside Railway, 24 October 1855, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1. p.343; Herapath's 
Railway Joumal, 24 October 1855, p.1090. 
148 20&21 Vic. cap.49, 1857, The Deeside Railway Extension Act, authorising an extension 
from Banchory to Aboyne with share capital of £80,000 and borrowing powers of £26,000. 
149 Minutes of the Oeeside Railway, 5 November 1856, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1, pp.446-47. 
150 Minutes of an Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of the Deeside Railway, 17 November 
1856, NAS/BR/DEE/1/1. pp.454-57; Minutes of the 6th Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Oeeside Railway, 27 October 1857, NAS/DEE/1/2, pp.50-58, setting out the working 
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estimates, although the capital cost was contained at £6,529 per mile and land costs 
comprised just 8.2 percent of capital expenditure.151 Extension capital was difficult to 
raise. To meet parliamentary Standing Orders, Duncan signed for more shares than 
he intended to purchase, but the board declined his request to limit calls on these 
shares to £4,000. 152 The capital account for the extension slipped into deficit in 1659 
and the company resorted to temporary loans until 1862, when, as a defensive 
measure, the Great North bought all unallocated stock to secure the route.163 
Table 63: Revenue and financial indicators for the Deeside Extension Railway, 1860-66 
31 AuQust 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 
Gross annual revenue (£) 3383 5327 5569 5657 5777 6003 6724 
(8 months) 
Dividend (%) 1¼ 0 1 2 2 2 2¼ 
Ratio of debentures to 31.9% 33.3% 23.4% 22.5% 23.4% 23.4% 23.2% 
caoital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to - 0.116 0.150 0.230 0.238 0.247 0.269 
total debt 
Source: Aooendix, table 7(e and 7/0. 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 0.162 
for gross revenue/debt. 
(2): The Deeside Extension Railway opened in December 1859. 
The Deeside extension was much less secure financially than its parent company 
(table 63). It served a more sparsely populated district and its gross revenue rose 
only slowly, but it paid a small dividend, which increased once its capital difficulties 
were resolved by Great North. 154 That Great North intervention in 1862 was 
agreement for the extension railway; Appendix, table 7(a), showing the Deeside subscription 
of £5,000 to the extension company. 
151 Appendix, table 7(d), note (2), and table 26: in 1860, capital expenditure was £101,192, 
26.5% above estimate. 
152 Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 20 July 1858, NAS/BR/DEE/1/2, p.117; Minutes of the 
Oeeside Railway, 28 July 1858, NAS/BR/DEE/1/2, p.121 . 
153 Appendix, table 7(d), showing 'sundries' in the general balance sheet of £30,699 against 
capital by 1861; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 February, 1862, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /4, pp.259-60; Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 18 February 1862, 
NAS/BR/DEE/1/3, pp.100-101 . 
154 Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 25 February 1862, NAS/BR/DEE/1/3, p.108, recording 
that the Great North had bought all unallocated Deeside extension shares (a Scottish North-
Eastern minute of 7 February 1862 records this amount as £31,272, NAS/BR/SNE/1 /1, 
pp.623-24) and, from the proceeds, £29,830 had been used by the Deeside to pay off its debt 
at the Commercial Bank of Scotland. 
313 
reflected in the improved debt gearing of the company by 1863. A lease of the 
Deeside and its extension by the Great North from 1866 ensured guaranteed 
dividends until amalgamation in 1876.165 
In addition to its exemplary financial performance, the Deeside is also noteworthy as 
an example of a company foregoing profit by providing a revenue subsidy to a new 
railway company, authorised in 1865 to link the Aboyne terminus of the Deeside 
Extension with Braemar to the west.156 The western limit of the Aboyne and 
Braemar Railway was fixed further east, however, due to royal resistance to a 
railway near Balmoral Castle,157 although Queen Victoria provided an indirect 
subscription to the railway and used the Deeside route.158 Despite the Deeside 
policy not to subscribe to branch lines, £10,000 was invested.159 Moreover, the 
Deeside agreed to make no revenue charge for working the Braemar line for ten 
155 Report to the 1511t Ordinary General Meeting of the Deeside Railway, 24 October 1866, 
NAS/BR/DEE/1/3, pp.308-10, reporting the lease of the Great North on 30 July 1866 under 
29&30 Vic. cap 288, 1866, the Great North of Scotland (Amalgamation) Act, with a 
guaranteed dividend of 7½ % on the Deeside and 3% rising to 3½ % in the second year on 
the Oeeside Extension, and with any excess of gross revenue over £27,000 per annum to be 
divided in the proportions of 17 /32 to the Deeside and 15/32 to the Extension shareholders 
(see Appendix, table 7(b) for dividends 1866-74). Amalgamation of the Deeside and Deeside 
Extension Railways with the Great North was implemented from 31 August 1875 and 
authorised retrospectively under 39&40 Vic. cap.124, 1876, The Great North of Scotland 
(Further Powers) Act. 
156 28&29 Vic. cap.279, 1865, The Aboyne and Braemar Railway Act, with authorised capital 
of £66,000 and borrowing powers of £22,000. 
157 Herapath's Journal also reported on 24 June 1865, p.687 that 'Her Majesty was opposed 
to the construction of a railway as far as Braemar'; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, p.59; W Ferguson, The Great North of Scotland Railway-
A Guide (Edinburgh, 1881), section IX; J Simmons, 'Railways, Hotels and Tourism in Great 
Britain, 1839-1814', Journal of Contemporary History, 19, No.2 (April 1984), p.211. 
158 Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway, pp, 165-67, 
recording that two royal journeys were made each year over the line from 1862; Minutes of 
the Aboyne and Braemar Railway, 11 July 1865, NAS/BR/ABR/1/1, p.9, which records 'it was 
in [company chairman] Col Farquharson's power to have got a considerably larger sum than 
he has done from Her Majesty if he would have given his consent to the line terminating at 
Ballater and the Tramway commencing there instead of at Bridge of Gairn'; The line was built 
only to Ballater under an agreement with the Queen's representatives, agreement (3), 11 July 
1865, NAS/ABR/1/1, p.1. 
159 Minutes of the Oeeside Railway, 28 September 1866, NAS/BR/DEE/1/3, p.301: the 
£10,000 subscription represented 15.2% of the authorised share capital of the Aboyne and 
Braemar Railway. 
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years following its opening in October 1866 or until dividend reached 4½ percent. 160 
While the marginal cost of providing a service over the eleven miles from Aboyne to 
Ballater would have been relatively low, royal patronage may have prompted this 
entrepreneurial benevolence as, without a subsidy, revenue would have been 
insufficient to meet working expenses and interest and the Braemar company would 
have become bankrupt. 161 Perversely, the line paid a small dividend from 1869 
because working charges were never applied before amalgamation into the Great 
North in 1876.162 The capital account of the Braemar company remained in deficit 
from 1866 to 187 4,163 its trend of gross revenue was almost static and it exhibited 
similar weak debt gearing characterised by most other northern branch lines, despite 
its generous subsidy (table 64). 
Table 64: Revenue and financial indicators for the Aboyne and Braemar Railway, 
1867-74 
31 Julv 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Gross annual revenue (£) 1852 3269 3159 3113 3369 3562 3524 3780 
Dividend (% ) 0 0 2 2 2 3 2½ 2¼ 
Ratio of debentures to 35.4% 35.4% 36.5% 36.5% 36.5% 36.5% 36.5% 36.5% 
caoital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.072 0.102 0.097 0.103 0.119 0.126 0.123 0.132 
total debt 
Source: Appendix, tables 21 b) and 2{CI. 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
The Deeside system provides a contrast between the strong financial returns of the 
parent Deeside Railway, unburdened by debt, and the economic deficiencies of the 
isolated Aboyne and Braemar which, without subsidy, would have failed to survive. 
Nevertheless, the Deeside lines formed a potential shield to any northerly advances 
160 Statement in report and accounts to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Aboyne and 
Braemar Railway, 27 March 1868, p.137; Herapath 's Railway Journal, 24 June 1865, p.687, 
reporting the Extra-Ordinary General Meeting of the Deeside Railway on 16 June 1865 at 
which the working of the Aboyne and Braemar without charge for ten years was approved 
with one objection. 
181 Appendix, table 2(b) and 2 (c), note (3). 
162 39&40 Vic. cap.124, 1876, The Great North of Scotland (Further Powers) Act, under 
which the Aboyne and Braemar Railway was amalgamated with the Great North from 31 
January 1876. 
163 Appendix, table 2(a). 
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that might seek to by-pass the Great North's monopoly of northern traffic routed via 
Aberdeen. 
- competitive leverage: the Scottish Northern Junction Railway 
By 1861, the Scottish North-Eastern was producing a healthy surplus on its revenue 
account, but its capital account remained in deficit.1a. A cross-Aberdeen link to 
access northern traffic remained a principal objective for the company despite the 
possibility of significant capital outlay.165 The line was seen, however, as a Great 
North responsibility because its original 1846 powers had included an end-on 
junction with the southern network.166 The Great North had a positive balance on its 
capital account in 1861 and dividend reached 7 percent; it therefore felt little 
pressure to embark on an expensive link that was expected to transfer existing traffic 
rather than increase it.167 The Scottish North-Eastern acknowledged the future 
impact of the direct Inverness-Perth line on its traffic, 161 but the Great North 
1a. Appendix, table 21(a): in July 1861, the revenue balance for the Scottish North-Eastern 
Railway was £106,240 before dividend payments, but the capital account was in deficit by 
£74,039. 
16
, Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 24 
September 1858, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36, in which directors anticipated the extra traffic from 
the north with the opening of the through line between Inverness and Aberdeen in August 
1858. 
166 Herapath 's Railway Journal, 15 March 1862, p.291, quoting the report to shareholders for 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway held on 14 March 1862 
in which directors reminded shareholders that ' ... the Great North of Scotland Railway was 
originally intended to form a junction with the Scottish North Eastern by the Valley of the 
Oen burn, and that powers were conferred upon that Company for that purpose ... they 
decline to complete this section of their original design. Hence the break at Aberdeen, which 
is the only interruption in the through line of railway between London and Inverness.'; 13&14 
Vic. cap.78, 1850, the Aberdeen Railway Act, included a clause requiring the Aberdeen 
Railway to grant facilities to assist the Great North to make a junction with the Aberdeen 
Railway. 
167 Appendix, table 1 0(c), showing the capital account surplus for the Great North of Scotland 
Railway in the first half of 1861 to be £72,261; and table 10( d): first half-year dividend in 1861 
was 6½ % and second half-year dividend was 7%; Herapath's Railway Journal, 27 
September 1862, p.1022. 
168 Herapath's Railway Journal, 16 March 1861, p.301, reporting a statement by John 
Stirling, chairman of the Scottish North-Eastern, who predicted that ' ... the Inverness line will 
affect us to a certain extent in our passenger traffic. Our goods traffic received very little 
benefit from that quarter'. 
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appeared unconcerned by the potential threat from Inverness, which may have 
encouraged their vacillation over the cross-Aberdeen link. Deputy chairman Stewart 
told shareholders that the maximum traffic the Great North could lose annually as a 
result of the opening of 'the Highland line' was £4,302.169 The traits of a complacent 
monopolist were further illustrated in the following year when Stewart claimed that 
the Great North gained little benefit from through traffic with the Scottish North-
Eastern, although it had offered half the cost of the Aberdeen connection: 
We don't owe such a debt of gratitude to parties as to put our hands into our 
pockets for the advantage of the city of Aberdeen and of through passengers 
170 
Although suggesting that 'it is essential to the city of Aberdeen that there should be 
through communication',171 the Great North issued a veiled threat to Aberdonian 
commerce by identifying the proposed Strathspey Railway as an alternative route for 
northern traffic: 
Our wish is to bring it by Aberdeen; but if we cannot get facilities here, we are 
under no obligation to do so.172 
The widespread use of sea transport by the Great North undoubtedly contributed to 
its perception of the lack of benefit to be derived from a continuous route. The low 
rates charged by shipping companies and the consequent loss of traffic caused 
serious concern to the Scottish North-Eastern and in 1859 it had offered a one-year 
169 Statement by John Stewart, deputy chairman, to the 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /3, p. 548: '... supposing 
the worst comes to the worst; suppose the Highland line to be opened and in full operation, 
that is the outside that could be taken from us'. Stewart had made this estimate from Railway 
Clearing House data of traffic between stations on the proposed Inverness-Perth line and 
Edinburgh and Glasgow. 
170 Herapath's Railway Journal, 28 September 1861, pp.996-97, reporting the 18th Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 September, 1861. 
171 Report to the 18th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 
September 1861, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.171 and page 3 of printed report. 
172 Herapath's Railway Journal, 28 September 1861, pp.996-97. 
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contribution to the Great North towards a subsidised shipping service to the Moray 
Firth.173 
In 1860, the dissatisfaction of the Scottish North-Eastern prompted an approach to 
Inverness to explore a diversion of the proposed Forres-Dunkeld line.174 Instead of a 
junction at Dunkeld and a southerly route via the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, the 
Scottish North-Eastern suggested a connection with their Perth-Aberdeen main via 
the Blairgowrie branch,175 although the Scottish North-Eastern was also concurrently 
protecting its interests by exploring a lease with the Perth and Dunkeld and a 
northerly extension, as indicated earlier.178 The Scottish North-Eastern refused any 
support for the rival Morayshire line from Craigellachie to Blairgowrie, 177 but, with 
Inverness unwilling to divert its planned connection with the Perth and Dunkeld, an 
alternative proposal was made for a line from the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
at Keith to join the Scottish North-Eastern at Aberdeen, thereby removing the Great 
North as an obstacle altogether.178 The prime objective for Inverness, however, was 
to eradicate the detour via Aberdeen and the scale of the direct Perth line confined 
their resources to that route. The Scottish North-Eastern therefore made an 
agreement with the promoters of the Inverness and Perth Junction in February 1861 
173 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 20 
October 1859, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /36; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 13 
September 1859, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.124: the Scottish North-Eastern offered the Great 
North a contribution of 20% of the extra traffic generated by a steamer service between the 
Moray Firth and Granton, although the Great North had requested 50%. See chapter 5, 'The 
results of monopoly power': the Great North subsidised a steamer service north from 
Aberdeen in 1859-60, but withdrew following losses. 
174 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 19 October 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p.364. 
175 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 25 September 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p.352, commissioning a report on 'having the Railway which is projected to run from Forres to 
Dunkeld diverted so as to join this Company's line at Blairgowrie'. 
178 Minutes of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 10 November 1860, NAS/BR/PDR/1/1; 
Minutes of the Locomotive Committee of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 5 November 
1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.368, recording instructions to prepare a parliamentary bill for a line 
from Birnam to Aberfeldy. 
m Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 25 September 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p.352. 
178 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 25 September 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p.353, and 19 October 1860, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.364. 
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that provided running powers from Stanley into Perth to ensure northern traffic 
passed onto its main line.179 
A line avoiding Aberdeen was then promoted in December 1861 as the Scottish 
Northern Junction Railway to connect Limpet Mill, three miles north of Stonehaven 
on the main Perth-Aberdeen line, to Kintore on the Great North's line to Keith. The 
perceived independence of the Scottish Northern Junction was purely nominal 
because the Scottish North-Eastern agreed to be joint promoter of the new company, 
to supply three-fifths of its capital, 180 to pay its parliamentary expenses, and to work 
the line, paying an immediate 4½ percent guarantee on stock 'provided the Gross 
Revenue of the Line is sufficient for that purpose'.181 This new 22 mile line crossed 
the Oeeside Railway and therefore the Scottish North-Eastern sought an agreement 
to lease the Deeside lines, offering ultimate guarantees of 8 percent on Deeside 
shares and 4 percent on Deeside extension shares in addition to the purchase of all 
unissued Deeside extension stock, outbidding a Great North offer of 6 percent on 
Oeeside shares.182 In a defensive move, the Great North purchased all 
179 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 7 February 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1.1, 
pp.397-98; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 21 February 1861, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.407, recording the agreement of the Inverness and Perth Junction to pay 
three-quarters of the cost of the Scottish North-Eastern's Dunkeld leasing bill once the Perth 
Junction bill was passed by Parliament: the agreement between the Scottish North-Eastern 
and the Perth Junction was signed on 8 March 1861, p.419; Scroll minutes of the Inverness 
and Perth Junction Railway, 3 December, 1861, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2, confirming the agreement 
of 8 March 1861 with the Scottish North-Eastern Railway to pay three-quarters of the cost of 
the Scottish North-Eastern's bill for lease of the Perth and Dunkeld, since withdrawn. 
180 25&28 Vic. cap.79, 1862, the Scottish Northern Junction Act, authorised the Scottish 
North-Eastern to subscribe £90,000 of the £150,000 share capital; 25&26 Vic. cap.64, 1862, 
the Scottish North-Eastern Railway Amendment Act, authorising an additional £350,000 
share capital at a preference not exceeding 5% and borrowing powers of £50,000, to be 
released in two tranches as shares were paid up, from which the capital subscription to the 
Scottish Northern Junction was to be paid. 
181 Minutes of the Scottish North Eastern Railway, 4 December 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p.593: the 4½ % guarantee was for the first two years of operation, rising thereafter to 4¾ % 
if revenue was sufficient. 
182 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 7 February 1862, NAS/BR/SNE/1 /1, 
pp.623-24; Deeside shares were to be guaranteed 7% for the first two years, backdated to 
September 1861, 7½ % in the third year and 8% thereafter, whilst Deeside extension shares 
were to be guaranteed 2% in the first year, also backdated to September 1861, rising by½% 
per year until the level reached 4%; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 
January 1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.250. Both Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great 
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unappropriated Deeside stock within two weeks of the Scottish North-Eastern 
offer, 183 aided by John Duncan who used his casting vote as chairman at the 
Deeside Board to secure acceptance of the Great North's terms. 184 A bitter legal 
wrangle ensued over the Deeside's decision in favour of the Great North, which 
resulted in the issue of interdicts by both Deeside shareholders and the Scottish 
North-Eastern that prevented the transfer of the Deeside to the Great North 'under 
the colours of a working agreement' and delayed the lease of the Deeside by the 
Great North until 1866.185 
The Scottish Northern Junction promotion may have been conceived as a lever to 
force action from the Great North to provide the Aberdeen link, but the Deeside 
dispute resulted in the involvement of the state. The Northern Junction bill was 
provisionally approved in June 1862,186 but, after the Great North offered to construct 
North of Scotland Railway, p.78, and HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, 
p.68, give the length of the proposed Scottish North Junction line as 22 miles. 
183 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 February 1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /4, 
pp.259-60 and p,.262, resolving to purchase all unappropriated Deeside stock at par, and 21 
February 1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.263, reporting the completion of the purchase of 
Deeside stock; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 7 February 1862, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, pp.623-24, recording an offer 'to take off at par the whole unallocated 
shares of the Extension Line, amounting in value to £31,272 ... '. 
184 Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 18 February 1862, NAS/BR/DEE/1/2, p.107, showing 
Duncan held two-fifths of the Deeside Railway stock and p.105, recording that three directors 
voted for the Scottish North-Eastern offer and three for the Great North, with John Duncan as 
chairman using his casting vote in favour of the Great North; Minutes of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 9 November 1863, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.42, recording Great North board 
agreement to purchase Deeside shares from John Duncan and Patrick Davidson, directors of 
the Deeside, ' ... giving a majority of votes in the Deeside Railway, thereby enabling them to 
secure and protect their property'. 
185 Herapath's Railway Journal, 13 September 1862, p.980; Report to the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 12 September 1862, NAS/BR/SNE/1 /1, 
p. 738, recording two interdicts against the Great North's lease of the Deeside Railway; 
Report to the 15111 Ordinary General Meeting of the Deeside Railway, 24 October 1866, 
NAS/BR/DEE/1/3, pp.308-10, reporting the lease of the Deeside by the Great North had been 
authorised on 30 July 1866 under 29&30 Vic. cap 288, 1866, The Great North of Scotland 
(Amalgamation) Act. 
186 28&29 Vic. cap.79, 1862, The Scottish Northern Junction Railway Act, with authorised 
share capital of £150,000 and borrowing powers of £50,000; the Scottish North-Eastern was 
empowered to subscribe £90,000 and to work the line. However, no construction was to be 
undertaken before 1 January 1863 and, if the Great North had submitted a bill by that date, 
then the Scottish North Junction Railway Act was to be further suspended until the Great 
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the cross-Aberdeen line during the scrutiny of the bill, a clause was inserted by 
Parliament delaying its implementation for a year to allow time for the Great North to 
submit its own bill and, if subsequently approved, powers for the Northern Junction 
were to be rescinded.187 Thus, the state gave the Great North the opportunity to 
create the through route approved sixteen years earlier in its act of incorporation. 
In September 1862, the Great North and Scottish North-Eastern briefly considered 
proposals for a joint-purse agreement and an ultimate amalgamation, 188 but terms 
were not agreed.189 Conflict was resumed in October when the Great North 
announced its abandonment of the direct Denburn Valley route for the cross-
Aberdeen link and selected a line around the west side of Aberdeen with a reversed 
junction, which attracted the title of the 'Circumbendibus' and aroused vigorous 
opposition.190 An offer by the Scottish North-Eastern of £30,000 to re-instate a direct 
line was rejected by the Great North, but a parliamentary application by the Scottish 
North-Eastern to release powers to construct the Scottish Northern Junction route 
was refused.191 The Railway Times despaired: 
North's bill was passed, rejected or withdrawn. If the bill was passed before 1 September 
1863, then the powers conferred by the Scottish Northern Junction Act were to be withdrawn. 
187 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 12 
September 1862, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p. 738. 
188 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 15 August, 2 September and 12 
September, 1862, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, pages 726, 727 and 733. 
189 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 13 September 1861 and 7 October 1862, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, p.760 and p.766. 
190 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 23 October 1862, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1. 
p.769, recording a letter from the Great North of Scotland Railway dated 21 October 1862 
and expressing the board's regret at the Great North decision 'to abandon the Denburn line 
and to make a circuitous junction via Albyn Place ... "; J Leckie, 'The Circumbendibus', Great 
North Review, 4, No.14 (August 1967), 45-49: HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland 
Railway, p. 70; Herapath's Railway Journal, 14 March 1863, p.277, noting the printed report of 
directors circulated for the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway 
held on 17 March 1863, when shareholders were informed that the 'scheme of the Great 
North is to carry the junction line around the City, thereby increasing the distance nearly a 
mile and a half and preventing the formation of a direct through station ... '. 
191 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 5 November 1862, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1, 
p. 772, recording the 'disadvantages' of the Great North proposals and resolving to write to 
the Great North 'with the view of inducing them to adopt the route by the Valley of the 
Denburn', offering £30,000 towards the scheme; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of 
the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 17 March 1863, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, p.8. 
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... the directors of the two boards can neither arrange an amalgamation of 
their companies, nor can they live at peace ... The two lines are connected 
merely by a tramway along the quay. 192 
Faced by further delay and with strong local resistance to the Great North's 
'circumbendibus' route, Parliament emasculated the Great North's bill submitted in 
1863 for the western suburban route by inserting clauses that granted powers to the 
Scottish North-Eastern not only to select the route but to construct the line.193 As a 
result, the legislature postponed the Great North bill for a further year to allow time 
for the Scottish North-Eastern to bring in its own bill for a direct connection via the 
Oenburn Valley, which, if submitted, was to bind the Great North to subscribe 
£125,000.194 Thus, nearly two decades of recalcitrance in Aberdeen resulted in a 
rare example of state direction of regional railway policy. 
The Scottish North-Eastern bill for the Denburn Valley line was submitted to meet the 
state's timetable,195 and the subsequent act transferred the powers granted to the 
Scottish North-Eastern to invest in the abortive Scottish Northern Junction to the 
Oenburn Valley scheme.196 To avoid future conflict, the Scottish North-Eastern 
192 Railway Times, 8 November 1862, p.1590 and p.1594, noting 'the war into which these 
two companies are evidently drifting'. 
193 26&27 Vic. cap.164, 1863, The Great North of Scotland (Aberdeen Junction) Railway Act; 
Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 20 May 1863, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, p.38. 
194 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 17 
September 1863, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, p.88; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North 
of Scotland Railway, p.81. states that the chairman of the House of Commons Committee 
brokered an agreement between the Great North and the Scottish North-Eastern Railways 
because of the strong local opposition to the Great North's 'Circumbendibus' scheme and the 
logic of constructing the direct continuous route via the Denburn Valley. The Great North's 
subscription of £125,000 matched the sum it was proposing to spend on its 'Circumbendibus' 
scheme around the city, but was specified as a subscription under 27&28 Vic. cap.111, 1864, 
The Oenburn Valley Railway Act. 
195 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 17 March 
1864, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, p.219. 
196 27 &28 Vic. cap.111, 1864, The Den burn Valley Railway Act, in which section 26 
authorised the use of the £90,000 capital powers granted to the Scottish North-Eastern 
Railway under 25&26 Vic. cap. 79, 1862, The Scottish Northern Junction Railway Act for the 
Denburn Valley Railway. 
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offered to reduce the Great North's subscription of £125,000 by £17,000 provided 
that they 'agree to leave the whole execution of the Works of the Line and Station to 
the Scottish North-Eastern Company without any interference therewith on their 
part', 197 to which the Great North consented. 198 
A further attempt was made in 1864 to secure an amalgamation of the Scottish 
North-Eastern and Great North companies.199 Initially, the Scottish North-Eastern 
expressed interest in a union excluding Great North branch lines, which were 
nominally independent of the parent company, but requested the accounts of the 
branch companies after it was suggested that the Great North 'should take upon 
themselves the liabilities attached to the Branches ... '. 200 The financial condition of 
the branches must have discouraged immediate progress because the Scottish 
North-Eastern did not seek to resume negotiations until March 1865, when it also 
petitioned unsuccessfully against the proposed amalgamation of the Caledonian 
Railway with the Scottish Central Railway.201 By November, however, the Scottish 
North-Eastern had concluded its own agreement with the Caledonian for 
amalgamation from August 1866.202 The Great North therefore remained isolated 
197 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 22 September 1864, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2. 
p.383. 
198 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5. 
p.214, recording the offer from the Scottish North-Eastern Railway dated 22 September 1864 
to which the board agreed. 
199 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 22 September 1864, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, 
p.379; Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.215; Herapath's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1177. 
200 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 November 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, 
p.253; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 24 November 1864, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, 
p.417: TE Harrison (engineer to the North-Eastern Railway in England) was the appointed 
arbiter in settling terms for a union and had suggested the inclusion of Great North branches 
in the scheme. 
201 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 16 March 1865, NAS/BR/SNE/1/2, p.475, 
reporting a board agreement to 'resume negotiations for an amalgamation with the Great 
North of Scotland Railway Company on the basis of including therein the Great North 
branches as recommended by Mr Harrison'; Report to the 42nd Ordinary General Meeting of 
the Caledonian Railway, 12 September 1865, NAS/BR/CAU1/2; 28&29 Vic. cap.287, 1865, 
The Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways Amalgamation Act: the Scottish Central 
Railway was amalgamated with the Caledonian Railway from 1 August 1865. 
202 29&30 Vic. cap.350, 1866, The Caledonian and Scottish North-Eastern Railways 
Amalgamation Act; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 1 O November 1865, 
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and disconnected from the southern network until the Denburn Valley link finally 
opened in November 1867, by when the market advantage of a northern trunk route 
via Aberdeen had already been lost.203 The Railway Times observed that 'the 
capital expended on it will, we fear, be unremunerative for many years to come'.204 
The Great North, however, was already experiencing severe financial difficulties as 
the result of its branch line investment and the destructive effect on its traffic 
unleashed by the Inverness-Perth direct line. 
Defence and collapse of the Aberdeen monopoly 
When, in 1859, the Great North opposed the proposals of the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction to raise new preference share capital, which culminated in the 
sale of its shares in the company, it was already planning its western expansion to 
Elgin. An approach to retain Great North support was made by Thomas Bruce, 
deputy chairman of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction, who suggested the 
possibility of a £20,000 subscription from Inverness towards the cost of a Great 
North line across Aberdeen to link to the Scottish North-Eastern, as chapter 6 has 
identified.206 Bruce, however, made a further suggestion: he would recommend to 
the Earl of Seafield, for whom he was commissioner, support for a Great North line 
from Dufftown to Grantown in the Spey Valley where Seafield held extensive timber 
reserves. 
Such a promotion appears contrary to the Inverness interests that Bruce represented 
and in which Seafield had already made a significant investment, but Bruce was also 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/3, p.118, recording the agreement with the Caledonian Railway; Report to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 27 October 1866, 
NAS/BR/SCM/1/4, recording that the amalgamation bill with the Caledonian Railway had 
gained Royal Assent on 10 August 1866 and that the Caledonian had been in possession of 
the line since 1 August 1866; Caledonian Railway; Report to the 43rd Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 14 September 1866, NAS/BR/CAU1/2. 
203 HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway, p. 71. 
204 Railway Times, 7 April 1866, p.420. 
205 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 December 1859, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, 
pp.418-19. 
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chairman of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, which had opened with 
Seafield support from Grange on the Great North main line to Banff in 1859.208 A 
Grantown line would therefore give a rail outlet for timber previously floated down the 
Spey to Garmouth for shipment.207 This episode illustrates the complex inter-
weaving of highland business interests and, in particular, some apparent conflict of 
interest held by railway directors. Moreover, it confirms that a Great North advance 
south-westwards into the Spey valley was under consideration in 1859 as part of its 
expansionist designs westwards from Keith. 
- south-western defence: the Strathspey Railway 
Plans for an extension from the Keith and Dufftown line into the Spey Valley 
emerged in July 1860 at the same time as the Inverness proposals for the direct line 
to Perth.208 Great North shareholders were advised that it 'will suit our purpose as 
well as any branch we could recommend to you to make',209 a view not shared by 
the Railway Times which professed that 'We cannot, notwithstanding the reputable 
parentage of the Strathspey, bring our minds to believe in its reality' .210 Inverness 
viewed the Strathspey as an attempt 'to strangle, if possible, and to damage the 
through line'.211 
206 20&21 Vic. cap.53, 1857, The Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway Act; Minutes of the 
Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 31 December 1857 and 23 February 1858, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, p.18 and p.31. 
207 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD thesis, Aberdeen University, 2001), 
p.357; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.51. 
208 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 13 July 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.500 
and p.501. 
209 Report to the 16th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 
October 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/3, p.548. 
210 Railway Times, 1 December 1860, p.1363. 
211 Railway Times, 1 December 1860, pp.1367-68, quoting a report from the Inverness 
Advertiser of a promotional meeting for the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway held at 
Grantown, which also asserted that the Strathspey was 'just another exhibition of the 
antagonism of certain parties in Aberdeen to north country interests'. 
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The proposed Great North branch to Grantown was extended to Nethy Bridge to try 
to capture the whole of the valley traffic, arousing opposition from Inverness because 
of its proximity to the proposed Perth line.212 Following an agreement between the 
Great North, Morayshire and Inverness companies not to oppose each other's 
parliamentary bills in March 1861,213 Bruce assured Perth Junction shareholders 
that 'we shall have so very much the best line, that any line running into it could do it 
no harm .. .'. 214 
The Strathspey displayed all the characteristics of Aytoun's Glenmutchkin. It ran 
through a sparsely populated area, it had no terminus of significance and quickly 
encountered financial difficulties. The Strathspey was authorised in 1861 with 
almost two-fifths of the capital to be subscribed by the Great North.215 Of the ten 
Strathspey directors appointed in 1861, five were also directors of the Great North 
and they formed the Finance and General Purposes Committee to run the affairs of 
the company. 216 The Great North provided its subscription in the form of a cash 
account on which the company could draw.217 
Only ten percent of share capital had been raised by August 1862, exclusive of the 
Great North subscription.218 Borrowing powers were released in November and, 
although published accounts show that £89,999 of the £90,000 authorised loans had 
been raised by August 1863, company minutes reveal that by September 1863 the 
212 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 20 December 1860, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, 
p.29 and p.31. The Craigellachie-Nethy Bridge line was 28½ miles in length, 4½ miles 
further than the original Grantown proposal; Scroll minutes of the Inverness and Perth 
Junction Railway, 6 October and 7 December 1860, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/2. 
213 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 March 1861, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.75. 
214 Herapath's Railway Joumal, 5 October 1861, p.1020, reporting the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway held on 19 September 1861. 
215 24&25 Vic. cap.16, 1861, The Strathspey Railway Act, with authorised share capital of 
£270,000 and £90,000 in borrowing powers: the Great North was authorised to subscribe 
£100,000 and the Keith and Dufftown to subscribe £25,000. 
216 Minutes of the Strathspey Railway, 16 August 1861, NAS/BR/STY/1/1, p.6. 
217 Minutes of the Strathspey Railway, 22 and 26 November 1861, NAS/BR/STY/1/1, p.8 and 
p.9; Appendix, table 22(a), note (2). 
218 Appendix, table 22(a); £27,205 of share capital had been raised by August 1862. 
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authorised limit had been breached and £143,941 of debenture stock had been 
issued;219 of this total, £50,000 was issued as a guarantee for bank loans in January 
1863. 220 The debentures attracted lenders because the Great North guaranteed the 
4 percent interest on them.221 
Shortage of capital resulted in a mounting deficit on the capital account, although 
capital expenditure was kept close to estimate and land costs comprised only 2.2 
percent of expenditure by 1864.222 By July 1864, the Great North had made 
temporary advances totalling £43,576 to the Strathspey, which received 
retrospective parliamentary sanction.223 The extent of the dependence of the 
Strathspey on the Great North was illustrated in 1866, just prior to amalgamation, 
when Great North directors reported their company's investment in Strathspey 
shares amounted to £192,700, whereas only £12,360 had been raised from other 
sources which included £11,000 from the Keith and Dufftown Railway. 224 Local 
219 Minutes of the Strathspey Railway, 16 December 1862 - 4 September 1863, 
NAS/STY/1/1, pp.83-128, recording approval of debenture loans totalling £143,941 on 29 
specific dates during this period and issued in 111 bonds that included £50,000 issued on 27 
January 1863 (bonds 19-27) to the North of Scotland and National Banks for loans. However, 
even deducting these £50,000 debentures held in security, the total of debentures issued 
(£93,941) slightly exceeds the authorised loan limit of the company, but all published 
accounts show debentures to be just below the authorised limit of £90,000; Appendix, table 
22(a). 
220 Minutes of the Strathspey Railway, 27 January 1863, NAS/STY/1/1, p.86, recording 
acceptance of £50,000 in loans from the North of Scotland and National Banks. 
221 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 31 March 
1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.291. 
222 Appendix, table 22(a): by 1864, capital expenditure was 7.4% above estimates. 
223 Accounts to 31 July 1863, reported to the 24th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 28 September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.222-23; 27&28 Vic. 
cap.26, 1864, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act, authorising additional subscriptions 
of £50,000 to the Strathspey Railway (new total £150,000), £10,000 to the Keith and 
Oufftown Railway (new total £36,000), and £15,000 to the Morayshire Railway (new total 
£35,000). 
224 Report of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 
June 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.39-40, page 2 of inserted printed report: the Great North's 
subscription of £192,700 to the Strathspey comprised 94.0% of the £205,060 share capital 
specified as raised in the act of amalgamation (29&30 Vic. cap.288, 1866). Furthermore, this 
sum of £192,700 represented 53.1 % of the total of £363,231 subscribed by the Great North 
to five branches that had agreed amalgamation terms by June 1866 (the Alford Valley, 
Aberdeen and Turriff, Banff, Macduff and Turriff, Keith and Dufftown and Strathspey 
Railways). 
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support for the Strathspey therefore amounted to £1,360, just half of one percent of 
its authorised share capital.225 
The Strathspey Railway paid no dividend and returned a consistent deficit on its 
revenue account.226 As the proportion of capital raised from shares was low, the 
company exhibits a high ratio of debenture loans to capital raised and, in 1864, the 
interest due on authorised and temporary loans alone exceeded gross revenue.227 
With significant temporary debt and a static trend of revenue, its debt gearing was 
the weakest of the Great North branches and the company remained insolvent 
throughout its nominal independence (table 65). 
Table 65: Revenue and financial indicators for the Strathspey Railway, 1863-66 
31 Auaust 1863 186-4 1865 1866 
Gross annual revenue (£\ Ooen 2 months 5930 5839 4607 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised 39.1% 39.1% 39.1% 30.1% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt - 0.038 0.034 0.045 
Source: Aooendix, tables 22(bl and 22/c\. 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
O .162 for aross revenue/debt. 
Although planned as part of the Great North's expansion and defence, the 
Str~thspey represented another branch line with severe financial weaknesses. A 
justification of the Strathspey and Elgin lines was given to Great North shareholders 
in 1863: 
... for self-defence, the project was all but necessary. When our friends north 
of the Spey promoted their though highland line, they were already within our 
district at Keith, and would have been in a condition almost to have dictated 
225 Appendix 22 (a), note (6): the authorised share capital of the Strathspey Railway was 
£270,000. 
226 Appendix, table 22(b). 
227 Appendix, table 22(b}: gross revenue in 1864 was £5,930, but interest due totalled £7,449 
and the Great North's working charges amounted to £1,890. 
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terms to us, had we not been in a position to have dealt with the traffic 
westwards and southwards.228 
The dire state of Strathspey finances caused friction within the Great North as the 
effects of the Inverness direct line and the full impact of branch line development 
became apparent. Deputy chairman John Stewart and fellow director, Joseph 
Rowell, who between them held one-fifth of Great North share capital, dissented to a 
board decision to seek retrospective legalisation of advances to branch companies 
and, in particular, disagreed with the significant Great North investment in the 
Strathspey, arguing that taking Strathspey stock in return for advances was of no 
value to Great North shareholders.229 In response, chairman Elphinstone placed the 
blame on his deputy chairman for the difficulties that the Great North was 
experiencing: 
... it was owing to Mr Stewart's influence that in 1860 and 1861 we did not 
come to an Agreement with the Scottish North-Eastern and Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Boards . . . and the large amount of money which has 
been expended in various ways in shielding our Company from the 
threatened inroad from Limpet Mill to Kintore would have been saved and it is 
the opinion of many, and opinion I myself have consistently maintained and 
expressed, that had it not been for the circumstance to which I refer we would 
not now have had to compete with the Highland Line.230 
228 Herapath's Railway Journal, 25 April 1863, p.440, reporting John Stewart's address to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway on 27 March 1863; Report 
to the 21 st Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 27 March 1863, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.492 and page 3 of inserted printed report. 
229 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 December 1863, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, 
pp.69-70, both John Stewart and Joseph Rowell had written formally to Great North secretary 
Milne, dissenting to the board's approval of the proposed 'Money Bill'. Stewart noted 'we two 
representing nearly £250,000 of stock' and both Stewart and Rowell compared this sum to 
the £1,830 held by the five directors approving 'the Board's illegal advances to the Strathspey 
Railway': Appendix, table 10{c), showing Great North ordinary and preference share capital 
at 31 July 1863 to be £1,200,214 and so Stewart and Rowell's holding of £250,000 
represented approximately 21% of total share capital; 27&28 Vic. cap.26, 1864, The Great 
North of Scotland Railway Act, which authorised additional subscriptions to the Keith and 
Dufftown {£10,000), Strathspey {£50,000) and Morayshire {£15,000). 
230 Letter of Sir James Elphinstone, chairman to the Great North board, dated 21 December 
1863, in minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 December 1863, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.71-73. 
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Elphinstone was Member of Parliament for Portsmouth; Great North and branch 
company records show that his attendance at meetings was spasmodic, with the 
result that Stewart had taken a lead within the company. 231 Elphinstone's 
acknowledgement of the deteriorating state of the Great North, however, contrasts 
with his optimistic statement given to Strathspey shareholders the previous month 
when that company had returned capital and revenue deficits: 
This line appears to me to turn out pretty well ... The amount of traffic passing 
over the line is remarkable.232 
Stewart's formal motion to the Great North board that no funds should be paid to any 
branch lines without shareholder approval or without satisfactory security was lost. 233 
John Duncan, chairman of the Deeside, who had been appointed to the Great North 
board in March 1864, replaced Stewart as deputy chairman in September 1864 after 
Stewart had refused to sign fifty-five sets of company minutes dating back to 
November 1863 because he 'disapproved of several'.23-4 
The Strathspey, therefore, had opened serious divisions within the Great North. The 
report to shareholders in October 1864 showed scale of the capital cost that had 
been incurred to secure the Great North routes to Elgin and into the Spey valley in 
competition with the Inverness companies; the new authorised subscription limits of 
£150,000 to the Strathspey, £36,000 to the Keith and Dufftown, and £35,000 to the 
231 Burke's Peerage, Baronetage and Knightape, 104th edition (London, 1967), p.679: entry 
for Sir James Dalrymple-Horn-Elphinstone, 2" baronet of Logie. 
232 Report of the 3nl Ordinary General Meeting of the Strathspey Railway, 13 November 
1863, NAS/BR/STY/1/1, p.127. 
233 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 December 1863, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, 
p.74. 
23-4 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /5, 
p.133, reporting John Duncan's election as a director, and 28 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.226 recording his appointment as deputy chairman; Minutes of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 23 September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.211. 
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Morayshire, to which Stewart and Rowell had objected, sanctioned the temporary 
advances already made to these companies.235 The Inverness lines, however, were 
able to produce a rising stream of revenue in contrast to the negative revenue 
balances returned almost universally from the Great North's subsidiaries.238 By 
January 1865, the Strathspey owed £64, 159 to the Great North, its revenue was 
insufficient to meet expenditure, and its survival depended on amalgamation with the 
Great North.237 The Great North contended: 
We have £170,000 in it, so that there is scarcely any other Proprietor than the 
Great North. That line, then, having been constructed as it has been with the 
money of the Great North, it should be made an integral part of its system.238 
A short southerly extension was authorised in 1865 to link into Highland main line,239 
but the Strathspey was never likely to carry substantial flows of through northern 
traffic, despite the confident report given to its shareholders that it 'would become 
part of the trunk line which they wished to see established, carrying goods coming by 
235 Accounts to 31 July 1864, presented to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North 
of Scotland Railway, 28 September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.222-23, recording temporary 
advances made totalling £43,576 to the Strathspey, £30,988 to the Keith and Dufftown, and 
£12,620 to the Morayshire; 27&28 Vic. cap.28, 1864, The Great North of Scotland Railway 
Act, which increased authorised subscriptions by £50,000 to £150,000 for the Strathspey 
Railway, £10,000 to £36,000 for the Keith and Dufftown Railway, and £15,0000 to £35,000 
for the Morayshire Railway. 
236 Appendix, tables 12(b), 13(b) and 14(b), showing revenue trends for Inverness 
companies; Appendix, tables 3(b), 4(b), S(b), 9(b), 16(b) and 22(b), showing revenue trends 
for Great North subsidiaries: only the Formartine and Buchan Railway, table 9(b), shows 
evidence of a rise in revenue. Negative revenue balances were returned from the other five 
subsidiaries. No detailed accounts survive for the seventh subsidiary, the lnverury and Old 
Meldrum Junction Railway. 
237 Minutes of the Strathspey Railway, 31 March 1865, NAS/BR/STY/1/1, p.148, recording 
the balance due to the Great North on 31 January 1865that 5,000 Strathspey shares were 
offered as a part payment of the debt; Appendix, table 22(b). 
238 Herapath's Railway Journal, 7 October 1865, p.1091, reporting the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway held on 29 September 1865. 
239 28&29 Vic. cap.345, 1865, the Strathspey Railway Extension Act, with share capital of 
£25,000 and loans of £8,000 for a 4¾ mile extension of the Strathspey to join the Highland 
line at Boat of Garten; Report to the 5th Ordinary General Meeting of the Strathspey Railway, 
29 November 1865, NAS/BR/STY/1 /1, pp.153-56, records that the cost had been reduced to 
£15,000 as a result of an amended junction agreed with the Highland Railway. 
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the Highland line over to the great part of the Great North System'.240 Amalgamation 
of loss-making branches simply relocated their financial instability into the parent 
company. Nevertheless, the Great North, already weakened by its branch line policy 
and the results of competition, saw latent possibilities for a westward incursion into 
Inverness web territory by a coastal route using another branch company, the Banff, 
Portsoy and Strathisla Railway. 
- a northern coastal route: the Banffshire Railway 
The Great North had intended to serve the Moray Firth ports of Banff and Portsoy 
under its 1846 authorisation. In 1856, as part of its branch line strategy, the Great 
North offered to subscribe £2,000 to a new company to build the line and work it at 
cost.241 The Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway was incorporated in 1857.242 Its 
board included Bruce and Tayler, commissioners to the Earls of Seafield and Fife 
respectively, both of whom were directors of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway.243 Bruce was appointed chairman of the Strathisla; Tayler was chairman of 
the Turriff Extension Railway, also running to Banff but controlled by the Great 
North.244 The Strathisla Act authorised a working agreement with the Great North 
and Tayler was charged to arrange one,245 but terms must have been unsatisfactory 
240 Report of the 5th ordinary General Meeting of the Strathspey Railway by the Great North's 
deputy chairman John Duncan, 29 November 1865, NAS/BR/STY/1/1, contained in an 
unattributed newspaper cutting inserted at p.151 of the minute book. 
241 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2, 24 October 1856, 
p.476, and 12 December 1856, NAS/BR/GNS/1/2. p.508. 
242 20&21 Vic. cap.53, 1857, The Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway Act, with authorised 
share capital of £90,000 and borrowing powers of £30,000: the company was authorised to 
negotiate a working agreement with the Great North of Scotland Railway. This 18 ¼ mile 
railway line ran for12 ¾ miles from Grange on the Great North main line to Portsoy with a 
branch of 6 miles from Tillynaught to Banff. 
243 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway, 8 August 1856, p.164. 
244 Minutes of the first Ordinary General Meeting of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla 
Railway, NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, 24 September 1857, p.1; Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and 
Turriff Extension Railway, 24 September 1857, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1. p.2. 
245 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 24 September 1857, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, p.4. 
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because the company purchased its own rolling stock in 1859.246 The company 
therefore remained independent, but subject to the influence of Inverness and 
Aberdeen through its directors. 247 
The company encountered the same difficulties in raising capital that other branches 
further east were experiencing. The line opened in 1859 by when only half the 
authorised share capital had been raised.248 A capital cost of £5,465 per mile had 
been incurred by February 1861, but expenditure was 13.9 percent above estimate, 
principally due the purchase of rolling stock rather than operating under a working 
agreement as originally planned.249 Land costs accounted for just 7.5% of 
expenditure as a result of the acceptance of feu duties.250 Once borrowing powers 
were released, 95 percent of authorised debentures were issued as guarantees 
against two bank loans totalling £28,400.251 
The capital account remained in deficit throughout 1859-67; gross revenue rose 
slowly, but was insufficient to meet working expenses and interest between 1861 
246 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 12 January 1859, NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, 
p.143; Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 4 February 1859, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, p.149, approving the purchase of two locomotives and four coaches. 
247 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 5 August 1859, NAS/BR/BAN/1 /1, 
p.218, recording the derailment of the sole company locomotive on the day the line was due 
to open, which was resolved by the loan of a locomotive and fireman from the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway. 
248 Appendix, table 6(a); accounts of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway to 31 August 
1859, NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, pp.232-38, showing £46,002 of the authorised £90,000 ordinary 
share capital raised. The line opened on 30 July 1859. 
249 Appendix, table 6(a), note (4) and note (5), and table 26. 
250 Appendix, table 6(a); land costs in February 1861 were £7,680 of the £102,470 capital 
spent; Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 23 February 1858, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, p.31: much of the route crossed land owned by the Earls of Seafield and 
Fife but, while Seafield and others accepted feu duties, the board agreed that Fife might 
charge land costs against his offered £4,000 subscription .. 
251 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 21 September 1859, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, p.224, recording a £15,000 loan from the North of Scotland Bank; Minutes 
of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 3 January 1860, NAS/BR/BAN/1 /1. p.248, 
approving a £13,400 loan from the Royal Bank of Scotland on which directors personally 
guaranteed the interest of 4 ½ %. 
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and 1867.252 With a further temporary bank loan of £38,000 taken in 1861 , the 
company's debt gearing remained extremely weak (table 66).253 The company was 
insolvent with little prospect of debt repayment. 
Table 66: Revenue and financial indicators for the Banff, Portsoy and Strathlsla 
Railway, 1860-67 
31 August 1860 
31 Julv 1861 1862 1863 186" 1865 1866 
Gross annual revenue (£) 5218 5331 5502 5973 58134 6279 6535 
Dividend 2% - - - - - -
Great North working charges 65% 65% 60% 55% 
Ratio of debentures to capital 37.3% 37.0% 36.7% 36.7% 36.7% 36.7% 36.7% 
raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.171 0.128 0.097 0.095 0.097 0.076 0.070 
total debt 
Source: Aooend ix, tables 6(b) and 6(cl. 
1867 
6759 
-
55% 
36.7% 
0.090 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 0.162 
for aross revenue/debt. 
With the outburst of competition between Aberdeen and Inverness, however, the 
company attracted attention from both as an expansionist route for the Great North 
and as a defensive block for Inverness. In April 1862, Bruce recommended to the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction that a working agreement with the Strathisla was 
advisable,254 but the Great North concluded an agreement with the company to work 
the line in perpetuity from February 1863 and to promote a westerly extension to 
Buckie, Portgordon or to 'a point east of the Spey'. 256 Under Parliamentary approval 
252 Appendix, tables 6(a) and 6(b). 
253 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy, and Strathisla Railway, 1 March 1861, p.299, recording a 
£38,000 loan from the North of Scotland Bank. 
254 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 23 April 1862, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, 
p.322. 
255 Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 3 July 1862, NAS/BR/BAN/1/1, 
p.351, recording the minute of agreement with the Great North dated 23 June 1862 and 
setting 1 February 1863 as the date for, the Great North to work the line; Minutes of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 24 June 1862, NAS/BR/GNS/1/4, p.336, recording that the Great 
North would subscribe £25,000 in shares to the western extension and work the Strathisla 
initially at 65% of gross receipts, but that the charge could reduce progressively to 50% if 
revenue grew: the western terminus of the line was to be 'agreeable to the Duke of 
Richmond'; Minutes of the Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, 18 November 1862, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/2, pp.18-23, setting out the terms of the agreement with the Great North. 
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granted in 1863, the Strathisla was renamed the Banff-shire Railway and the Great 
North was authorised to subscribe up to £80,000 and to guarantee Banffshire 
loans.256 Thus, the branch assumed its delayed place within the Great North's 
branch line system and the companies were amalgamated in 1867.257 
Inverness responded by promoting its only defensive branch, the Fochabers and 
Garmouth Railway, as a short northerly extension from its main line to the coast to 
try to block any further Great North advance westwards.268 The Great North was, 
however, already slipping into financial chaos as a result of competition and branch 
line commitments and it was unable to progress the westward extension even to 
Buckie.259 Inverness, too, was coming under severe financial pressure; powers for 
256 26&27 Vic. cap. 170, 1863, the Banffshire Railway Act, authorising an additional £100,000 
capital (which could be 5% preference stock) and £33,000 in additional borrowing powers. 
The act identified Portgordon (14 miles) as the western limit of the line, but Buckie (11 ½ 
miles) was agreed as the initial objective (minutes of the Banffshire Railway, 2 January 1864, 
NAS/BR/BAN/1/2, p.64). 
257 30&31 Vic. cap.190, 1867, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act, approving a 
retrospective amalgamation with the Banffshire Railway from 31 July 1867: the proposed 
amalgamation in 1866 under 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 1866, The Great North of Scotland Railway 
(Amalgamation) Act, failed on a technicality because half the capital of the new Banffshire 
Railway authorised to construct the extension to Buckie and Portgordon had not been paid 
up at the time. 
256 26&27 Vic. cap.65, 1863, The Fochabers and Garmouth Railway Act, authorising a 5¾ 
mile branch with £15,000 to be subscribed by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
and £10,000 by the Inverness and Perth Railway. 
259 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 16 September 1864, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /5, 
pp.209-1 O; Minutes of the Banffshire Railway, 22 September 1864, NAS/BR/BAN/1 /2, pp.64-
65; Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 26 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/ 5, pp. 342-46, page 5 of printed 
report identifying the commitment of the Great North to provide £78,500 for a westward 
extension of the Banffshire from Portsoy to Buckie and recommending postponement, which 
was agreed by the board on 18 May 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.391; 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 
1866, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Amalgamation) Act, extended the time allowed 
to construct the Buckie extension. 
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the Garmouth line were abandoned in 1869.260 The coastal route to Elgin was 
ultimately constructed by the Great North in the 1880s.261 
The Banffshire Railway provides a further example of a small branch company that 
sank into insolvency as a result of difficulties in raising share capital and acquiring 
large temporary debt as a result. Its strategic value to the Great North rescued it 
from bankruptcy, although its transferred debts added to the Great North's financial 
predicaments. 
- the signs of financial collapse 
A stark sign of the rapid collapse of the Aberdeen monopoly was displayed by Great 
North dividends. From 7 percent paid on ordinary shares in 1863, dividend fell to 5 
percent in 1864 and to zero in 1865.262 Thereafter, no ordinary dividend was paid 
until 187 4, which indicates the scale of the financial crisis into which the Great North 
descended. 
A concern which only three years ago paid 7¼ percent to be now unable to 
pay a penny; shares which only a few weeks ago were worth £90 now 
sticking in the market at £40 or £45 - this is a result almost without 
precedent, - in legitimate commercial transactions.263 
260 Warrant for the abandonment of the Fochabers and Garmouth Railway, 1669, 
NAS/BR/AP(S)/1/123; Minutes of the Highland Railway, 25 September 1867, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.319: minute 6 resolved to apply under the Railway Companies (Scotland) 
Act 1867 to abandon the Fochabers and Garmouth Railway and reclaim the parliamentary 
deposit of £2,400. 
261 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 August 1872, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /9, 
p.162, recording the resolution to proceed with the extension from Portsoy to Buckie, but a 
further delay was agreed on 7 November, 1872, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, p.196; HA Vallance, The 
Great North of Scotland Railway, pp.92-94: the route between Grange and Elgin was opened 
progressively between 1884 and 1886: Railway Times, 11 September 1886, p. 326, reportinj 
that •The company's Moray Firth Coast Railway was opened throughout for traffic on the 3 
of May last". 
262 Appendix, table 10(d). 
263 Railway Times, 8 April 1865, p.444, reproducing a leading article from the Buchan 
Observer. 
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With a certain inevitability, the 1865 shareholders' meeting appointed a committee of 
inquiry of six members, including one each from Liverpool and Manchester to 
represent shareholder interests in those places, indicating that the English influence 
in the financing of the earlier 1845-46 Scottish lines remained important in Aberdeen, 
no doubt boosted by the subsequent high dividends paid by the Great North.264 The 
results of the Great North inquiry are considered in the following chapter, but the 
confinement and isolation of the former monopoly were aptly described by Duncan: 
... we are placed in a corner, on a siding as it were. We are not in possession 
of a line which is a thoroughfare from one part of the kingdom to another ... 
we are in a great degree dependent upon the traffic in the locality wherein the 
line is placed.265 
During the five years explored in this chapter, the long-established strategic plans of 
the two northern railway monopolies to extend their control over traffic from the north 
of Scotland for the economic benefit of their own regional centre came into open 
conflict. Previously, the Great North and the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
companies relied upon their joint use of the Aberdeen-Inverness main line, but the 
success of the Great North in securing access to a westward route to Elgin to 
264 Report of the 25th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 
April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.334-35 and page 5 of inserted printed report, noting 'There is 
a large interest in the Company held in Liverpool and Manchester': Report of the Committee 
of Investigation to the shareholders of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 April 1865, 
presented to the adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 26 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, printed report inserted between pp.346-47; 
Minutes of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 
June 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, pp.34-39, held to approve the parliamentary bill for the 
amalgamation of the Great North with the branch companies: of those present or giving 
proxies, 120 gave Scottish addresses and 41 gave English addresses (of which 12 were from 
Liverpool, 6 from Manchester (2), Lancashire (2) and Cheshire (2), and 9 from London). 
These 161 shareholders represented £830,940 of the £1,408,305 ordinary and preference 
share capital of the company issued at 31 July 1966 (59.0%). 
265 Report to the 34th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 
October 1869, NAS/BR/GNS/1/8. pp.213-14 and page 4 of inserted printed report. 
337 
circumvent the territorial border established at Keith prompted the Inverness 
strategists to bring forward earlier than planned the promotion of a direct line to 
connect Inverness to Perth and the southern railway network, by which the 
Aberdonian share of through northern traffic was to be captured. 
The state's predilection for free-market capitalism was epitomised by the vigorous 
competitive response to the Great North's use of monopoly powers; the impact of 
that competition was demonstrated by the collapse in the Great North's previously 
high dividend to zero. This outburst of railway promotion, however, added to the 
financial pressures already building within both companies. Indeed, the state added 
to the burdens of the Great North by revising its bill for a cross-Aberdeen railway, 
submitted almost two decades after the original authorisation of the line, and 
transferring the powers to determine and construct this long-awaited continuous 
route to the rival Scottish North-Eastern, whilst also specifying the substantial capital 
sum to be contributed by the Great North. 
All the northern lines constructed in this period achieved significantly lower capital 
costs per mile than the earlier Scottish inter-urban railways and most contained 
expenditure within their authorised powers for share and loan capital. Although the 
Inverness and Perth Junction exceeded its estimates by a considerable margin, this 
main line crossing mountainous terrain represents a signal example of the 
application of 'cheap railway' principles: its cost per mile was approximately a quarter 
of the cost of the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway and three-fifths of the Great 
North's cost.266 This apparent paradox lends support to Robertson's suspicion that 
some estimates of costs may have been set deliberately low to try to attract 
subscribers and to ease the Parliamentary approval of some railway schemes.267 
This chapter has shown the continued difficulty of raising share capital for railways in 
northern Scotland. With the exception of the Great North, English investment within 
northern railway companies remained insignificant. Local capital, principally from 
large landowners, remained the prime source of railway investment. The 
266 Appendix, table 26. 
287 CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844, p.323. 
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widespread conversion of unissued ordinary shares into guaranteed preference 
stock and the extensive use of bank advances to raise capital, already illustrated in 
the previous two chapters, were repeated to raise sufficient funds for these new 
northern routes. The accounts of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway in 
particular provide a further example of the fundamental importance of the banking 
sector in providing an alternative source of railway finance, both before and after the 
line opened to traffic. As with earlier Inverness railway companies, however, this 
main line offered the prospect of a secure and growing revenue stream and its loans 
were assured by the personal guarantees of directors. Nevertheless, this temporary 
borrowing was recorded below the line in the accounts and, in common with many 
other northern railway companies, added significantly to the burden of total debt that 
had to be serviced from revenue. 
From this intense period of competition in 1860-65, Inverness appeared to derive 
tangible advantages at the expense of Aberdeen, but this chapter has focused 
specifically upon the implementation of plans by the two regional railway monopolies 
to strengthen their command of railway traffic in the north. The profound 
repercussions of the methods adopted by the companies to finance both these and 
earlier railway developments were not revealed fully until the amalgamations of 
1865-66. The next chapter examines these financial consequences, which seriously 
weakened the new Highland Railway and the re-constituted Great North of Scotland 
Railway, and appraises the policies adopted to extricate these enterprises from their 
inherited financial difficulties. 
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Chapter 8: Northern regional monopolies and their finances, 1865-74 
The regional centres of Aberdeen and Inverness had each devised strategic plans in 
1845-46 for the control of railway development in the north of Scotland, but the 
inability of the Great North to realise the scheme that the state authorised it to 
construct, primarily due to capital constraints, had allowed the rival Inverness railway 
web progressively to challenge its monopoly. Chapter 5 illustrated how the Great 
North consolidated its regional dominance by supporting a series of branch lines in 
north-east Scotland, although it has highlighted the growing financial weaknesses 
within these nominally independent branch companies that threatened their survival. 
Chapter 6 explained the contemporary implementation of the Inverness strategy for 
the local command of northern railways through the promotion of lines to the east 
and north of the highland capital. The completion of the Inverness-Perth direct line 
as the final component of that strategy was outlined in chapter 7, which also 
identified the further financial commitments undertaken by the Great North to 
promote expansionary and defensive secondary routes. 
A recurring theme in this study has been the consistent difficulties experienced by 
these remote northern railways in raising share capital, which forced most 
companies to rely upon guaranteed funds and, in particular, on bank and other forms 
of temporary credit to complete their lines. The promotional competition of 1860-65 
had only added to these financial pressures. Historiography documents little beyond 
a recognition of the existence of financial problems in both centres, but, as the scale 
and consequences of company debt challenged the independent existence of the 
two northern regional monopolies during much of the following decade, a closer 
examination is warranted. Barclay-Harvey concludes that the Great North was 
'based on insecure foundations', for which the only remedy was 'strict economy'; 
Vallance agrees that the company required 'strict economy' because rapid 
expansion 'had over-strained the company's resources'.1 Sinclair observes that the 
Highland Railway's first half-yearly report in 1865 showed the company to be in •a far 
1 Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway (London, 1949, 
reprinted Shepperton, 1998), p. 68 and p.86; HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland 
Railway (Newton Abbot, 1965), pp.87 and p.88. 
340 
less favourable position that its constituents had been',2 and Ross refers to large 
interest payments making 'a heavy drain on revenue'. 3 The earlier works of Vallance 
and Nock on the Highland, however, largely ignore the finances of the company and 
its constituents.4 
This chapter assesses the extent of the financial difficulties faced by both regional 
monopolies and examines how the companies were able to resolve them. First, the 
chapter summarises the moves towards the amalgamation of railway companies In 
Scotland in 1865-66, which saw the Inverness companies incorporated as the 
Highland Railway in 1865 and the Great North re-constituted in 1866 to include most 
of its satellites. The following section appraises the depth of the financial crisis faced 
by the Great North following its absorption of these branch companies and the loss 
of through northern traffic, while the third section presents a similar analysis for the 
new Highland Railway and identifies the scale of its hidden, or floating, debt held 
outside the main company accounts. The next section explores the separate and 
often clandestine negotiations by both companies with the Caledonian to seek a 
lease to help to resolve their financial difficulties. With the failure to obtain 
Caledonian assistance, however, the final section investigates how the two 
companies extricated themselves from their respective financial crises and, as in 
earlier chapters, the extensive and crucial role of the banking sector is revealed. 
The moves to amalgamation 
Scotland experienced a widespread amalgamation of railway companies in 1865-66 
to strengthen their regional control, but, as Michie has observed, 'Even the five 
concerns that dominated the Scottish network after 1865 could do no more than 
2 NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998), p.37. 
3 D Ross, The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005), p.56. 
4 HA Vallance, The Highland Railway (4th edition, Newton Abbot, 1985); OS Nock, The 
Highland Railway (London, 1965). 
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generate sufficient profit to finance maintenance and minor works'. 5 Coalescence of 
the Inverness companies had always been a stated objective of the web promoters: 
chapter 6 considered the Nairn and Ross-shire amalgamations with the Inverness 
and Aberdeen Junction, while chapter 7 identified the condition for amalgamation set 
by the Aberdeen Junction when approving a subscription to the Inverness and Perth 
Junction in 1860.6 This latter amalgamation in 1865 created the Highland Railway, 
and its act of incorporation included clauses for through rates and the interchange of 
traffic sent via Aberdeen to provide some protection for the Great North.7 
Chairman Matheson reminded Aberdeen Junction shareholders in 1865 of the 
original vision of a unified railway system controlled from lnverness8 and, at the first 
shareholders' meeting of the new Highland company, Matheson contended that 
amalgamation had been essential to avoid any chance of competition between the 
two companies." While the commonality of directorships across web companies 
suggests that such competition in Inverness was unlikely, the Caledonian had 
expressed interest in 1865 in subscribing £50,000 to the Perth Junction under the 
powers previously given to the Scottish Central and a further £50,000 to the 
5 RC Michie, 'Investment in railways in nineteenth century Scotland', Scottish Industrial 
History, 5, No.1 (1982), p.52: the five principal Scottish companies formed in 1865-66 were 
the Caledonian Railway, the North British Railway, the Glasgow and South-Western Railway, 
the Great North of Scotland Railway and the Highland Railway. 
8 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 13 December 1860, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, pp.199-200. 
7 28&29 Vic.cap.168, 1865, The Highland Railway Act: section 82 required the Highland to 
grant to the Great North 'all needful accommodation, facilities and conveniences ... by 
Through Booking, Through Rates and, so far as reasonably may be, Through Wagons and 
Carriages and Through Trains and in all respects conduct forward, carry on, and 
accommodate all such Traffic on equal Terms with and as well as if it were their own proper 
Traffic ... '. 
8 Herapath's Railway Journal, 17 June 1865, p.648: Matheson stated that 'The line was 
projected in 1847 by one Company, and at that time it was impossible to carry through the 
scheme but all along since then they had never list sight of it, and felt assured that some day 
or other it would be carried into effect'. 
9 Railway Times, 4 November 1865, pp.1406-1407: 'Indeed, no two railways existed capable 
of inflicting greater injury upon each other. The Junction might have sent all the through 
traffic via Aberdeen, while the Perth, in order to retaliate, might have pushed their line into the 
north, and so stopped the stream of traffic flowing to and from the south'; Herapath's Railway 
Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217, further quoted Matheson: 'Misunderstandings between 
the Companies might arise which would prove disastrous to both'. 
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proposed west-coast Skye line. 10 There had also been proposals to link the 
Highland's Aberfeldy branch to the Caledonian's Callander and Oban satellite near 
Killin.11 
By 1865, the Great North had spent approximately £1 million on its main line and £½ 
million on branches; deputy chairman Duncan acknowledged that many of the 
branches were 'unproductive', 12 but he estimated that branch traffic accounted for a 
third of the revenue derived from the Great North's main line.13 Had the Great North 
abandoned the branches to bankruptcy, the company could have expected some 
loss of traffic, a large capital write-off and the possible severing of its independent 
route to Elgin. The Great North therefore amalgamated with its allied branches in 
1866-67, formalising the control that had been exercised in all but name, although an 
agreement with the Morayshire was not concluded until 1880.14 Of shareholders 
present or giving proxies at the Great North meeting that approved the 
10 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 7 July 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, 
p.148: the Scottish Central Railway was amalgamated with the Caledonian Railway from 1 
August 1865 under 28&29 Vic. cap.287, The Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways 
Amalgamation Act. 
11 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 7 July 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, 
p.150, reporting letters of 27 and 30 June 1865 concerning a line to 'connect with the Oban 
Line near Killin with Aberfeldy and wishing to know the views of this Company on the matter'. 
12 Railway Times, 15 April 1865, pp.450-53; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.334-35 and page 3 of 
inserted printed report. 
13 Herapath's Railway Journal, 15 April 1865, p.419, reporting the Ordinary General Meeting 
of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 April 1865, at which Duncan stated that he 
calculated that traffic on the main line yielded £85,000 per annum of which £29,000 came 
from the branches (34.1%). 
1-4 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 1866, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Amalgamation) Act, 
which included general powers for lease or amalgamation of the Morayshire Railway; 29&30 
Vic. cap.30, 1866, The Morayshire Railway Act, giving powers to amalgamate with the Great 
North with 'terms to be agreed upon': the Morayshire amalgamated with the Great North in 
1880, which was authorised retrospectively under 44&45 Vic. cap.201, 1881, The Great 
North of Scotland Railway Act; 30&31 Vic. cap.190, 1867, The Great North of Scotland 
Railway (Further Powers) Act, approving a retrospective amalgamation with the Banffshire 
Railway from 31 July 1867: the proposed amalgamation in 1866 under 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 
failed on a technicality because half the capital of the new Banffshire Railway authorised to 
construct the extension to Buckie and Portgordon had not been paid up at the time. 
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amalgamation bill, 120 were Scots but 41 gave English addresses, confirming a 
continued English influence within that company.15 
Elsewhere in Scotland, there was unanimity in agreeing amalgamations: 
The purpose of amalgamation has taken a thorough hold of the intentions of 
shareholders; and the public itself is ripe for the consummation.16 
In a coordinated approach, the North British, Edinburgh and Glasgow, Monklands, 
Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways agreed that the loss of one amalgamation 
bill would result in the withdrawal of all other bills.17 The North British amalgamated 
with the Edinburgh and Glasgow and Monklands Railways, while the Caledonian 
absorbed the Scottish Central and Scottish North-Eastern Railways, finally acquiring 
the trunk route to Aberdeen it had sought in 1845.16 The Scottish amalgamations 
produced five comparatively large companies by 1866, controlling 98 percent of the 
route mileage.19 From a system of 1043 route miles in Scotland in 1854, the network 
15 Minutes of an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 
June 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.34: of the 41 English shareholders, 12 gave Liverpool 
addresses, 6 gave Manchester, Lancashire or Cheshire addresses and 9 gave London 
addresses. 
16 Railway Times, 8th April 1865, p.439; Herapath's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1177: 
'Amalgamation is the order of the day.' 
17 Minutes of Directors and Shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway Company, 16 May 
1865, NAS/BR/SCC/1/10, pp. 178-79, recording the Memorandum of Terms of Arrangement 
between the Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways, and North British, Edinburgh and 
Glasgow and Monklands Railways, dated 12 May 1865, which stated' ... if any one of them 
(parliamentary bills] be defeated or do not pass (except by default or consent of the 
promoters), the rest are to be withdrawn at the instance of the promoters of the Bills so lost': 
General minutes of shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway Company, 18 March 1865 
and 9June 1865, NAS/BR/SCC/1/15 (no page numbers in minute book). 
18 28&29 Vic. cap.287, 1865, The Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways Amalgamation 
Act; 29&30 Vic. cap.350, 1866, The Caledonian and Scottish North-Eastern Railways 
Amalgamation Act; Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 10 November 1865, 
NAS/BR/SNE/1/3, p.118; Report to the 43rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian 
Railway, 14 September 1866, NAS/BR/CAL/1/2. 
19 Railway News, 16 May 1868, p.531, reporting 2,244 route miles of railway in operation in 
Scotland at 31 December 1866, of which 2,193 were worked by the Caledonian, North 
British, Glasgow and South-Western, Great North of Scotland and Highland Railways: SG 
Checkland and O Checkland, Industrial Ethos: Scotland 1832-1914 (London, 1984), p.27; RC 
Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock 
Exchange in Nineteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 1981), p.143. 
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had grown to 2200 miles by 1865;20 242 miles were worked by the Highland on its 
formation in 1865 and 276¼ miles by the Great North after its amalgamations of 
1866.21 
Insolvency: the Great North of Scotland Railway 
The Great North had attracted consistent compliments from the contemporary 
railway press, 22 but the rapid disappearance of dividends engendered concern: 
The opening of the competing Highland line has cut into their vitals, added to 
which is loss from new extension lines recently opened ... we deeply regret 
the sudden disappearance of the Great North of Scotland dividend. The 
effect is to undermine confidence in the security of railway property. 23 
The inability of the company to meet all guaranteed dividends in 1865 was attributed 
to the loss of traffic to Inverness and the 'natural failures' of the branches, which 
'although protective batteries against invasion for all time to come, must remain a 
burden upon revenue for several years .. .' .24 
The Great North began to lose northern traffic immediately the Inverness-Perth line 
opened in 1863, but its directors reported that the new route to Elgin had proved to 
20 Railway News, 31 August 1867, p.218, quoting statistics from the Board of Trade Blue 
Book. 
21 HA Vallance, The Highland Railway, p.29; HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland 
Railway, p.66: these data include leased and worked lines. Vallance notes that the Great 
North's worked mileage rose to 287¼ in October 1866 with the lease of the Deeside 
Extension Railway. 
22 Examples include: Herapath's Railway Journal, 12 September 1857, p.959; 24 March 
1860, p.315; 15 September 1860, p.945; 21 September 1861, p.983; 5 April 1862, p.736; and 
Railway Times, 7 April 1860, p.389; 22 September 1860, p.1077; 30 March 1861, p.409; 27 
September 1862, p.1421. 
23 Herapath's Railway Journal, 1 April 1865, pp.378-79. 
24 Railway Times, 1 April 1865, p.41 O; Report to the 25th Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.330, in which directors 
announced that preference B shares were to receive only ½ % interest instead of 4½ %, 
although 4½ % preference A and 5% preference shares were paid in full. 
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be a 'great disappointment'.25 The debt burden of the branches was confined to 
those companies until amalgamation and so the Great North's capital account 
remained in overall balance between 1860 and 1864. 211 However, the fall in revenue 
surplus and the collapse in dividends from 1863 indicate the impact of competition 
(table 67). 
Table 67: Revenue account for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1861-66 
07.1861 07.1862 07.1863 07.188' 07.1865 07.1866 
Total annual revenue £ 89895 100608 109611 113165 93214 103785 
Total annual expenditure £1 37557 41136 37986 59169 52286 71919 
Surplus £ 52338 51M72 71625 53996 40928 31866 
Change in surplus %) - 13.6 20.4 -24.6 -24.2 -22.1 
Dividend to 31 Januarv %, 6½ 7½ 7 5 0 0 
Dividend to 31 Julv % 7 7 7 5 0 0 
Source: Aooendix, table 10(d). 
(1 ): the large increase in total expenditure and the modest rise In total revenue in 1863-64 were caused principally 
as the result of the Great North beginning to work the through route to Elgin from 1 July 1863. The data of revenue 
surpluses reflect the impact of competition on the Great North and, in particular, the loss of traffic to the Inverness-
Perth line. 
The Great North accounts disclose a rising level of temporary debt. The debt 
gearing of the company, relatively strong in 1861-64, fell markedly in 1865 to a level 
below the Caledonian benchmark of 1849 (table 68). 
Table 68: Financial indicators for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1861-66 
(Prior to amalgamations of 1866) 31 July 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 
Estimated total debt (£) 438001 423952 390326 504458 615429 733833 
Gross annual revenue (£) 89895 100608 109611 113165 93214 103785 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 31 .0% 25.0% 22.5% 23.2% 23.2% 22.9°~ 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.205 0.237 0.281 0.224 0.151 0.141 
Source: Appendix, tables 10(d) and 10(e). 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% fordebentures/capltal and 
0.162 for gross revenue/debt. 
(2): The accounts to the second half-year ending on 31 July 1866 contain data for the Great North before the 
amalgamations came into effect on 1 August 1866. Accounts to 31 January 1867 and successive half years show 
the revenue and caoital of the consolidated company. 
25 Report to the 25th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 
April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.332-33. 
26 Appendix, table 10(c). 
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From August 1866, Great North accounts consolidate the revenue and capital 
accounts of amalgamated branches and reveal an increased deficit on the capital 
account and a significant weakening in debt gearing in first half-year of 1867 to a 
level significantly below the Caledonian benchmark (table 69). 
Table 69: Financial indicators for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1867-69 
Data for half years (£) 07.1866 01.1867 07.1867 07.1868 07.1869 
(Amalaamations from August 1866) Pre-ams/a 
Caoital raised 1826386 3085817 3087451 3061732 3126200 
Balance of capital account (3) - 137736 -269905 -278030 - 182695 + 41813 
Estimated total debt 733833 1101018 1059750 1015408 944228 
Gross annual revenue 103785 130785 165578 180770 180909 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised 22.9% 24.5% 24.5% 27.2% 27.3% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.141 0.119 0.156 0.17B 0.192 
Source: Appendix, tables 10(d) and 101 e). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonlan Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for gross revenue/debt. 
(2): Data is given for half years 1866-67 to illustrate the effects of absorbing the debts of the amalgamated 
companies. Gross revenue is calculated from cumulative half year revenue data (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
(3): The deficit on the capital account peaked in the half year to 31 January 1868 at £363,741 
(NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
This financial instability brought the company close to collapse at the end of 1866 
and ultimately required a refinancing package from bankers to allow a slow recovery 
to begin, as this chapter will later show. Nevertheless, the company's gross revenue 
showed improvement from 1867, which offered some prospect of debt repayment 
over the longer-term. 
The elimination of ordinary dividend and default on some preference dividend 
resulted in shareholder unrest and, in April 1865, the Great North appointed a 
committee to report on the company's position and prospects.27 The report identified 
expenditure of £684,524 by the Great North on branches, of which £94,432 had 
been spent on shares in the Deeside and Montrose and Bervie Railways without 
parliamentary sanction during the competition with the Scottish North-Eastern 
27 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway and Report to the 25th Ordinary General 
Meeting, 7 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/15, p.329, p.330 and page 5 of inserted printed report, 
showing ½ % dividend was to be paid on 4½ % Preference B stock and 0% on ordinary 
stock; Report by the Committee of Investigation to the shareholders of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, published on 22 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/32, subsidiary document 5, 
and presented to the adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 26 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.346-47. 
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Railway; additionally, £19,249 had been spent above authorised limits on the 
Strathspey, Keith and Oufftown and Morayshire Railways.28 
Your Committee are fully satisfied that your Financial difficulties and loss of 
Dividends are to be entirely attributed to this very large outlay upon Lines, 
particularly those constructed north of Keith, from which the actual returns 
are so very unprofitable.2' 
Although recommending postponement of the £78,500 commitment to extend the 
Banffshire Railway westwards, the committee supported the investment of £25,000 
to link the Strathspey Railway to the Highland main line at Boat of Garten because of 
'an expectation of improved traffic'.30 The committee, while holding directors to 
account for the company's difficulties, also 'throw blame on the shareholders who 
have sanctioned their policy from time to time'. 31 The committee, however, could 
make no recommendations other than to seek a return from the branches and 
Improve relations with other railway companies.32 
28 Report of the Committee of Investigation, dated 22 April 1866, presented to the adjourned 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 April 1865, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/32, subsidiary document 5, annex to the inserted printed report (the report is 
also contained in the minute book, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.346-47): the Great North had spent 
£14,159 on the Strathspey, £2,812 on the Keith and Dufftown and £2,278 on the Morayshire 
above its authorised limits; Page 2 of this report states that £86,982 had been invested in 
oeeside and Oeeslde Extension shares, £7,450 had been spent on Montrose and Bervle 
shares and, in addition, the Great North had spent £9,423 on the parliamentary expenses of 
the Montrose and Bervie; 23&24 Vic. cap.142, The Montrose and Bervie Railway Act with 
£70,000 share capital of which the Scottish North-Eastern Railway was authorised to 
subscribe £15,000, but no provision was made for the £7,450 spent on Bervie company 
shares by the Great North; Appendix, table 10(c), note 6. 
29 Report by the Committee of Investigation to the shareholders of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 22 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/32, subsidiary document 5, p.5. 
30 Report of the Committee of Investigation presented to the adjourned Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/32, p.6. 
31 Report of the Committee of Investigation presented to the adjourned Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/32, p.5. 
32 Recommendations to the adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 26 April 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.345: ' ... to leave the Directors to 
administer the affairs of the Company, so as may be best calculated to develop and render 
productive the branch lines as early as possible . . . and to promote friendly relations with 
neighbouring companies'. 
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The Great North held £230,000 in bank advances by November 1865.33 In January 
1866, the company was refused further credit: the North of Scotland Bank declined a 
request for £32,000, stating 'The Sum owing to us by the Railway Company is ... 
already very large and, if the Directors feel that they could increase the sum at all, it 
could only be upon additional and much more available security', while the National 
Bank replied that they 'are not disposed to give any further advances'.34 These two 
banks relented to the extent of £10,000 each and the Great North arranged a further 
£30,000 loan from a Newcastle financial intermediary; however, this £50,000 of 
borrowing required £104,350 of preference and debenture stocks as security, which 
indicates the poor credit status of the company and the low value of its stock. 35 
By June 1866, the Great North had subscribed for £363,231 of stock in the five 
branches that had agreed amalgamation terms, compared to only £133,480 held by 
the public.38 The amalgamation act of 1866 converted branch company stock Into 
new Great North stock: Great North shareholders received some nominal return 
because £142 of new ordinary stock was allotted for every £100 previously held.37 
33 Minutes of the Finance Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 25 November 
1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /5, pp.482-84, showing cash credits held from the Commercial Bank 
(£30,000), the National Bank (£100,000), the North of Scotland Bank (£75,000) and the Town 
and County Bank (£25,000): Appendix, table 10(f) summarising bank loans held by the Great 
North and published in half-yearly accounts. 
34 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 January 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.503. 
35 Minutes of the Finance Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 13 March 1866, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.538-39, showing a £10,000 loan from the North of Scotland Bank at a 
minimum of 5% and backed by £20,000 of securities, a loan of £15,000 from the National 
Bank at a minimum of 5% and backed by £20,250 of securities, and a £50,000 loan from 
Woods, Fenwick and Bulman of Newcastle at 1 % above Bank of England minimum discount 
rate and backed by £64,100 of securities. 
36 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 13 February 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, 
p.521; Report of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
23 June 1866, pp.39-40, called to approve amalgamation terms with five branches with which 
agreement had been finalised (the Alford Valley, the Aberdeen and Turriff, the Banff, Macduff 
and Turriff, the Keith and Dufftown and the Strathspey Railways); Appendix, table 10(c), 
shows that the Great North had also invested £175,000 in the Formartine and Buchan 
Railway and £2,000 in the lnverury and Old Meldrum Railway, but agreement with these 
companies for amalgamation had not been finalised by 23 June 1866. 
37 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 1866, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Amalgamation) Act; 
Report to the 28th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 
October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.85-86 and page 3 of inserted printed report: the 
additional stock allocated to Great North shareholders was issued to replace the cancelled 
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Default on preference dividends increased in October 1866 and arrears were paid as 
deferred warrants, which, like Aberdeen Railway in the 1850s, added to the 
accumulating debt. 38 The board had requested shareholders to elect a new board 
to represent the all the interests within the new amalgamated company, although 
deputy chairman Duncan commented that 'I do not mean by any means to say that 
the gentlemen who are presently on the Board retire from it in disgust, or from 
dissatisfaction with themselves .. .'.39 It was at this point that William Ferguson, 
secretary of the Deeside, joined his Deeside chairman John Duncan in the Great 
North as secretary;"0 Duncan became Great North chairman in February 1867 as a 
new board began its attempts to extricate the new consolidated Great North from its 
deep financial crisis.•1 
By January 1867, the financial instability of the company was stark: 69.2 percent of 
raised capital required guaranteed payments as preference stock or debenture loans 
and the company owed £345,972 to bankers, held outside the main accounts.42 An 
auditor's report was produced in November 1866 to assist the Finance Committee in 
shares of these five branch companies previously held by the Great North; Railway Times, 30 
June 1866, p. 783. 
38 Report to the 28th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 
October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.85-86, recording that £3 13s was to be paid on original 
5% preference stock,. £3 6s on preference A 4½ % stock and nothing was to be paid on 
preference B 4½ % stock, with deferred warrants for arrears of dividend on 5% preference 
stock to be issued in lieu; Report of the 28th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 2 October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.85-86 and page 3 of inserted 
printed report: Duncan explained that only holders of the original 5% preference stock were 
to be paid in full by deferred warrant because the 1866 amalgamation act required the 4½ % 
preference A and B stock to be paid annually out of revenue and therefore 'in the event of 
deficiency in revenue in any one year, they have no claim on subsequent years'. 
39 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.78; 
Report of the 28th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 
October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.87-88 and page 3 of inserted printed report. 
"° Minutes of the Oeeside Arrangement Committee, in minutes of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 26 October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.110. 
•
1 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 12 February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.216, reporting the election of John Duncan as chairman with an allowance of £400 per 
annum. 
-42 Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 31 January 1867, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /14, 
showing £3,085,817 capital raised, of which £1,381,530 was held in preference stock and 
£755,042 in debenture loans with £345,972 of temporary loans owed to bankers held below 
the line in the general balance sheel 
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renegotiating bank lending to allow the company time to try to build its recovery and 
repay debts.43 Accountant Robert Fletcher highlighted bank loans as the most 
pressing liability, but indicated that, while revenue was sufficient to pay interest on 
them, the £437,390 of stock held by the banks as security was mainly 'of an 
unmarketable description'.44 The company was advised to seek shareholder 
approval for a pre-preference stock to rank before all other preferences, using 
receipts to repay debt, thereby reducing interest liability and consequently enhancing 
the value of existing stock. With £267,379 of debenture loans due for renewal in 
1867, Fletcher issued a sharp warning: 
. .. if the Company's credit is not completely re-established, it will ultimately 
pay on the whole Debenture debt 1 percent higher than Companies enjoying, 
as this Company formerly did, first-class credit.45 
The report concluded that the availability of any 'temporary accommodation' from its 
bankers would depend upon 'what was done meanwhile in strengthening Direction 
and in placing the Irregular debt on a permanent footing at a moderate rate of 
interest' .46 However, Fletcher pointed out the dilemma faced by the banks: 
The Banks have a most material interest in this question; if the depreciated 
credit of the Company compels it to give high rates for a large amount of 
Debentures, a very serious inroad will be made in the Balance of the 
Company's Revenue available for payment of interest on the debt to the 
Banks.47 
43 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 14 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
pp.121-22. 
44 Report of Robert Fletcher, accountant of Aberdeen, to the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 14 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.4 and p.7. 
'5 Report of Robert Fletcher, accountant of Aberdeen, to the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 14 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.7 and p.10, noting thatthe excess interest 
per annum would be in the order of £8,000. The £267,379 of debentures due for renewal 
represented 38.9% of the £688,225 issued in debentures by 1 August 1866. 
46 Report of Robert Fletcher, accountant of Aberdeen to the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 14 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.17. 
47 Report of Robert Fletcher, accountant of Aberdeen, to the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 14 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.17. 
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Nevertheless, the Great North was facing bankruptcy in 1866 if bank advances were 
recalled. On 16 November 1866, the National Bank demanded £10,670 interest due 
on its loan.48 On 21 November, the Town and County Bank refused further 
advances, 'temporary or otherwise', and required settlement by 29 November of two 
accounts totalling £62,605.49 On 7 December 1866, the National Bank gave the 
Great North one week to pay interest due before legal proceedings were instituted; 
the next day, the Commercial Bank demanded repayment of £4,500.5° Further 
demands for payments were received on 18 December 1866, including a threat of 
legal action from the Railway Clearing House.51 With no repayments made, the 
banks began to sell company stock held in security to redeem some of the funds 
owed.52 In January 1867, the Caledonian Railway joined the list of creditors because 
the Great North owed payments for its share of the cross-Aberdeen railway under 
construction: 'your Company is already largely indebted, and is being every month 
more so ... '.53 
48 Letter from the National Bank of Scotland, 16 November 1866, reported to the board of the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.126, stating that 
£10,670 was due as interest and arrears of interest on a £50,000 loan. 
49 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 November 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.128. 
50 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, 
p.149. 
51 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 18 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, 
pp.158-59 and p.162, reporting the Town and County Bank required repayment of advances 
by 20 December, Woods and Co of Newcastle required repayment of a £5,000 and a 
£10,000 loan, and the Railway Clearing House gave 14 days in which to receive £3,800 due 
from the Great North. 
52 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
pp.168-69. reporting the sale by the National Bank of 4,000 Great North shares and 35 
Oeeside shares and the proposal by the Aberdeen Town and County Bank to 'take steps for 
realising the securities held by the Bank'; Letter from the National Bank to the Great North 
dated 26 December 1866, in minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 January 
1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.171, indicating that they were to continue selling Deeside stock 
'which is giving on the whole a very fair price ... ' in order to reduce the total loan from 
£100,000 to £80,000: the bank letter points out that 'You are aware that our Directors are 
desirous of making some noticeable impression upon the amount of debt due to the Bank'. 
53 Letter of the Caledonian Railway to the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 January 
1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.202-203. 
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Thus, at the end of 1866 and only three years after paying 7 percent dividend, the 
Great North was close to financial collapse as the banking sector demonstrated its 
loss of confidence by selling shares held as guarantees. The accumulated debts of 
its branch line system had impacted simultaneously with the loss of through traffic on 
its main line. The company was committed to investment in the cross-Aberdeen link 
but had defaulted on some payments, bank interest was overdue and it was unable 
to pay its full guaranteed stock dividends, which was adding to its accumulating debt. 
Any additional earnings were increasingly absorbed by interest payments for 
temporary and authorised loans.54 An amalgamation or lease proposed with the 
Caledonian was rejected55 and the only option for the Great North was to seek a 
refinancing of the company with its bankers and apply severe economies to its 
operations in order to build revenue and begin repaying its considerable debts. 
The legacy of the Inverness web: the Highland Railway 
Fusion of the Aberdeen Junction and Perth Junction lines into the Highland Railway 
was justified to achieve economies in management and working and to assist traffic 
development.56 The Railway Times highlighted the apparent prosperity of the 
Inverness companies: 
Heartily supported by the localities through which they sought their way, with 
scarcely other obstacle than what rugged Nature presented and which skill 
could surmount, they not merely arrived at completion, without inordinate 
delay or excessive expenditure, but they as it were found a traffic prepared to 
their hand.57 
54 Report to the 27th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 5 
April 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.555 and page 2 of inserted printed report; Report to the 28th 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 October 1666, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.85-66; Appendix, table 10(e). 
55 See a later section of this chapter, 'A new 'Caledonian system?'. 
56 Herapath's Railway Journal, 17 June 1865, p.648, reporting Matheson's address to the 
Special General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 16 May 
1865: • ... the general management and working of the railway could be carried on more 
cheaply, it would confer great advantages on the Company in the development of the traffic 
and in perfecting the lines themselves'. 
57 Railway Times, 1 April 1865, p.410. 
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Both companies, however, were accumulating temporary debt. With amalgamation 
imminent, Perth Junction shareholders were warned that '... although the Land 
claims along the Line have been ascertained, a considerable sum under that head is 
still unpaid, and therefore some additions to the Capital Account may yet be looked 
fof .58 The Aberdeen Junction acknowledged 'the enormous increase in the capital 
account and the large Expenditure on Works', and attempted to cap expenditure: 
. . . no new works of any kind shall be commenced without being previously 
submitted, with a careful estimate of the expense, and . . . approved by the 
Board on the report of the Committee. 59 
Gross revenue was rising on both lines, but chairman Matheson told Aberdeen 
Junction shareholders that, in working the Perth Junction line, •we made the 
agreement rather too hastily, and at too low a rate of remuneration so that we have 
lost by that'.60 
In 1862, Matheson had advocated that '... once they got in connection with the 
southern lines at Perth and had reached Bonar-bridge in the north, they ought to 
pause'.81 Matheson confirmed that objective in 1863: 
. . . we are quite determined to enter no working agreement or proposal of 
amalgamation that would compromise our independence in the north. I 
consider that before we enter on new undertakings, we should consolidate 
what we have on hand, and see that it gives us a fair return on our capital.82 
58 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 28 
March 1865, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.260. 
59 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1 March 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, 
p.90; Appendix, table 12(a): the capital deficit in July 1864 was £190,585 and £105,588 in 
January 1865. 
80 Railway Times, 20 May 1865, p.641, reporting Matheson's statement to the Special 
General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 16 May 1865. 
61 Herapath's Railway Journal, 22 November 1862, p.1208. 
82 Railway Times, 7 November 1863, p.1434, reporting Matheson's statement to the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 27 October 1863; 
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Requests to support new lines had been received, but the combined capital deficit of 
both Inverness companies in 1864 was £334,607, which suggested the wisdom of 
consolidation.83 In September 1864, Matheson declared that the anticipated 
amalgamation would complete the highland system; ' ... it is not the intention of your 
Directors to recommend to you any further extension of our railway system for the 
present'.64 Nevertheless, at the same meeting, Matheson announced two new 
independent lines, one from Dingwall westwards to Kyleakin on the west coast and 
one extending the system northwards to Golspie, although 'For this latter line the 
public will be indebted to the enterprise and patriotism of his Grace the Duke of 
Sutherland'.65 These proposed extensions were designed to open up large highland 
estates and Matheson indicated Inverness policy towards them: 
As both are likely to throw a considerable amount of traffic on our line, we 
shall deem it a duty to take a limited interest in each, and to arrange for 
working the new lines on fair terms. 88 
Sutherland and Matheson, both directors of the Aberdeen Junction and the Highland, 
were principal landowners in the districts to be served by the proposed independent 
extensions, but 'a limited interest' implied further commitments for an enterprise 
already experiencing financial constraints and some shareholder concern was 
expressed. Matheson assured Aberdeen Junction shareholders that: 
Herapath's Railway Journal, 7 November 1863, p.1181, quoting Matheson statement that 
'We shall remain as we are, with our head quarters at Inverness'. 
63 Appendix, tables 12(a) and 14(a), showing the capital deficit on the Inverness and 
Aberdeen Junction Railway in 1864 to be £190,585, and on the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway to be £144,022, giving a total capital deficit for the projected combined company at 
that date of £334,607. 
64 Herapath's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1166, reporting Matheson's statement to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 28 
September 1864. 
65 Herapath's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1166. 
66 Herapath's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1166. 
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... these branch lines would not form part of the Junction Company's system. 
They would be independent lines altogether; but a proposal had been made 
that they should work them at the cost price -that was to say, that the trunk 
line could not possibly lose by such an arrangement.87 
These developments, which completed the framework of the northern railway 
system, are explored in the following chapter, but the statement of intent to work the 
lines at cost price provided another indication that the promotion and working of 
highland lines was not always undertaken to secure maximum profit for the operator. 
The first accounts of the Highland Railway in August 1865 showed a capital deficit of 
£201,460 and the directors reported that 'the excess of expenditure was divided 
about equally between the two constituent companies'.68 Temporary debt, however, 
was not detailed in the main accounts until 1866, but the floating debt of the new 
Highland company in 1865 was reported to be £850,000.89 Matheson's statement to 
the first shareholder's meeting in October 1865 disclosed that, despite an initial 
dividend of 2 percent, the Highland had inherited capital costs of £300,000 for 
additional works and land and that £550,000 was held as temporary loans from 
banks, of which the directors had taken personal liability for £280,000.70 
87 Railway Times, 8 October 1864, p.1323, reporting the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 28 September 1864. 
68 Appendix, table 11 (a); Accounts of the Highland Railway to 31 August 1865 in the report 
to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43; Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217. 
69 Railway Times, 5 May 1866, p.514; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 28 March 1865, NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1, p.259, indicating the 
need for additional capital of £200,000 'to discharge the debts of the Company': if the 
inherited deficit was therefore equally divided between the two constituent companies, this 
figure given for the Perth Junction suggests debts of circa £400,000 passing to the Highland, 
although Matheson reported inherited capital costs to be £300,000. 
70 Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407, reporting Matheson's address as chairman to 
the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 27 October 1865; Report to 
the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, 
pp.42-43 and page 2 of inserted printed report in which the directors reported that 'The work 
needed to complete and work efficiently the two systems ... has very considerably exceeded 
the cost originally anticipated'. 
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The scale of these loans and guarantees is highly significant; on a 2007 price base, 
temporary banks loans were equivalent to £27.5 million while the personal 
guarantees of directors correspond to £14 million.71 The Highland was directed by 
wealthy and influential landowners, however, who held one-fifth of its ordinary stock 
in addition to their guarantees.72 In April 1866, Matheson was able to illustrate the 
efficacy of the directors to secure lower interest rates for longer periods: 
... we have a large amount of floating debt for which we have hitherto been 
paying the current rates, and these have averaged 7 percent for the six 
months .. . we shall be independent of the bank rates in future, as the 
directors, by interposing their personal security, have been able to make 
arrangements, whereby the money has been obtained for a period of three 
years at 5 percent.73 
These loans at 5 percent had been negotiated at a time when bank discount rates 
had risen from 7 percent in October 1865 to 10 percent in May 1866.74 
Nevertheless, the capital structure of the new company on formation in 1865 showed 
that £750,687 of the £1,837,651 issued share capital required guaranteed payments 
(40.9 percent); furthermore, preference stock and fixed-interest debenture loans 
formed 54.8 percent of the total capital raised (table 70).75 In addition to this 
guaranteed capital, the temporary loans from banks also required interest payments, 
71 See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
72 Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217-19, reporting the 1st Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 27 October 1865, at which George Loch 
(director) stated that £210,590 of ordinary stock (Highland and ex-Ross-shire) was held by 
Highland directors (p.1219): Accounts of the Highland Railway to 31 August 1865, reported 
on 27 October 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43, showing £1,086,963 of ordinary stock had 
been issued (£729,374 of Highland stock, £209,856 of Ross-shire stock and £147,733 of 
Ross-shire Extension stock). Directors' ordinary stock of £210,590 therefore comprised 
19.4% of the total ordinary stock issued. 
73 Railway Times, 5 May 1866, pp.514-15, reporting Matheson's address to the 2nd Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 27 April 1866; Report of the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 April 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.148-49. 
74 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83. 
75 Accounts of the Highland Railway to 31 August 1865, reported on 27 October 1865, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43, summarised in table 70: preference stock (£750,687) and 
debenture loans (£565,241) total £1,315,928, 54. 76% of the £2,402,892 capital raised. 
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and so the Highland began its existence with £1.115 million of authorised and 
temporary loans and £1.866 million of funds requiring guaranteed payments. 
Table 70: Capital structure of the Highland Railway, August 1865 
Shares and Stock Authorised and created Raised(£) 
31 Auaust 18651£1 31 August 1865 
Ounkeld 6% Preference 76000 76000 
Nairn 5% Preference 45000 44960 
Nairn 6% Preference 59080 59080 
Class A 4 ½% Preference 513650 460245 
Class B 5 % Preference 400000 110402 
Stock carrvina oreferential dividend 750687 
Ross-shire ordinarv shares 215000 209856 
Ross-shire Extension ordinary shares 160000 147733 
Ordinary shares 740350 729374 
Total shares and stock created 2209080 1837651 
Total of debenture loans 700880 565241 
Total share and loan capital 2909960 2402892 
Temoorarv bank loans 550000 (3) 
Total of debentures and temporary loans 1115241 
Total of funds reQuiring guaranteed payments 1865928 
Sources: Accounts of the Highland Railway to 31 August 1865 reported to the 1" Ordinary General Meeting of 
the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43; Railway Times, 4 November 1865, 
oo.1406-1407. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Some of the stock shown as raised was held by banks as security for loans, but not identified in the accounts 
until 1866: in February 1866. £465,000 of stock was shown as held in security (NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.148-49) 
(3): The figure of temporary bank loans was reported by the chairman to the first Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Hiahland Railway held on 27 October 1865 (Railwav Times 4 November 1865 oo.1406-1407). 
Revenue rose slowly and reflected the marked seasonal nature of traffic already 
experienced by constituent companies; the week ending 6 August 1865 yielded 
£6,647 which fell to £2,431 during the week ending 4 February 1866 (table 71).76 
The burden of fixed-interest debt was considerable and approximately half of gross 
revenue was absorbed by guaranteed payments reported in the revenue account.77 
76 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 21 August 1865 and 22 February 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, 
p.19 and p.115. 
77 Appendix, table 11{b): interest and preference dividend represented 44.5% of gross 
revenue in February 1866, rising to 49.9% in February 1867. 
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Table 71: Revenue account of the Highland Railway, 1865-1867 
Data for half years {£) 08.1865 02.1866 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 
Total Revenue 100733 82668 99744 96362 103766 
Total Exoenditure: includina 76285 61302 74709 44569 45271 
Interest 26090 19280 29148 
Net revenue (£} 24448 21366 25034 51792 58494 
Interest 27128 28142 
Dunkeld 6% stock dividend 2660 2280 2280 2280 2280 
Nairn 5% stock dividend 1311 1124 1124 1124 1124 
Nairn 6% dividend 2067 1772 1772 1772 1772 
Class A 4 ½% dividend 9468 8218 8218 8558 8893 
Class B 5% dividend 166 4153 6980 7202 7267 
Ordinarv dividend 8516 3649 3649 3649 7299 
ExPenditure on dividends 24191 21197 24025 24586 28636 
Total on loans & dividends 51715 56778 
Balance 256 168 1009 77 1715 
Ordinarv dividend 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Interest as % of aross revenue 25.9% 23.3% 29.2% 28.2% 27.1% 
Interest and oreference dividend as % of aross revenue 41.5% 44.5% 49.7% 49.9% 47.7% 
Source: Minutes and accounts of the Hiahland Railwav, 1865-70, NASIBRIHR/111 . 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The presentation of accounts changed in 1867; interest was previously shown as an item of expenditure but 
from 1867 it was oresented alonaside oreference dividends. 
However, deputy chairman Bruce stated that one-third of interest due was paid from 
capital: £12,000 interest had been charged to capital in the half-year to August 1865 
and a further £10,000 in the half year to February 1866, but it was 'expected to halve 
this in the next half year and then meet most thereafter from revenue'. 78 In these two 
half-years, the ordinary dividend and the balance carried forward would have been 
insufficient to meet the interest charged to capital and, had the full interest burden 
fallen fully on the revenue account, the Highland, like the Great North, would have 
had to default on some guaranteed payments. 79 
76 Railway Times, 5 May 1866, p.515; Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Highland Railway, 30 October 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.218-19 and page 2 of printed 
report, recording that the whole of interest due had been charged to revenue for the half year 
to 31 August 1866: Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 
October 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43 and page 2 of printed report, which states the 
intention of the new Highland board to charge the cost of temporary loan capital to the capital 
account rather than to revenue to 'represent in the fairest manner the real position of the 
company'. 
79 Table 71 shows that, in August 1865, the revenue balance (£256) and ordinary share 
dividend (£8,516) totalled £8,772, which was insufficient to pay the £12,000 interest reported 
to be charged to capital. In February 1866, the revenue balance (£168) and ordinary share 
dividend (£3649) totalled £3817, which was insufficient to pay the £10,000 interest reported 
to be charged to capital. 
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Data for the Aberdeen Junction and Perth Junction Railways produce debt gearing 
ratios for 1864 of 0.159 and 0.185 respectively, similar to the 0.162 ratio of the fragile 
Caledonian in 1849.80 A combination of data for the final half year of these two 
companies and the first seven months of the Highland Railway suggest a debt 
gearing ratio for the new company of 0.184,81 but the impact of the inherited capital 
deficits and commitments of its constituent companies and the high level of bank 
borrowing required by the Highland depressed its debt gearing to a level almost 
identical to the Caledonian benchmark from 1866 until 1871 (table 72).82 
Table 72: Financial indicators for the Highland Railway, 1865-67 
Data for half vears ([) 08.1865 02.1866 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 
Caoital raised 2402892 2671637 2722249 2779300 2813473 
Debenture loans 565241 669128 693172 694122 697872 
Temoorarv loans 550000 465000 485000 505000 535000 
Total fixed interest debt 1115241 1134128 1178172 1199122 1232872 
Gross half year revenue 100733 82668 99744 96362 103766 
Gross annual revenue - 183401 182412 196106 200128 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 23.5% 25.0% 25.5% 25.0% 24.8% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.18" 0.162 0.155 0.164 0.162 
Source: Appendix, tables 11(b) and 111 C). 
(1): Table 81 in this chapter shows that the Highland's debt gearing ratio remained between 0.158 and 
0.165 in 1868-70, followed by a steady improvement in 1871-74. 
Like the Caledonian, however, the Highland envisaged increased revenue as its 
main line became established and, unlike the ailing Great North, it could rely on 
substantial financial backing from its directors. Moreover, Matheson disclosed that 
the Inverness promoters had not expected instant returns: 
It is only right to state that, after the Directors fairly embarked in the system of 
railway communication in the Highlands, the different extensions were to a 
certain extent promoted more as strategic lines than lines which would bring 
80 Appendix, tables 12(c) and 14(c); the Caledonian debt gearing to 31 December 1849 was 
0.162 (Table 18, chapter 3). 
81 Appendix, table 11(d), deriving a debt gearing for the Highland Railway to 31 August 1865. 
82 Appendix, table 11(c): see also Table 81 in this chapter giving Highland Railway data for 
the period 1867-74; the benchmark debt gearing ratio of the Caledonian for December 1849 
was 0.162 (chapter 3, table 18). 
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an immediate and large traffic, although the latter was certain to follow in time 
... The result is that we have now a line perfectly secure from attack. 83 
Nevertheless, the Highland began its operations exhibiting many of the financial 
weaknesses of other northern lines, although Matheson identified the cost of the 
lines as the cause, 'for it must be observed that in no case has the traffic failed' . a.. 
The additional costs of the Inverness web, some of which were due to capital works 
not included in original plans, were reported to shareholders (table 73): 
Table 73: Estimated and actual costs of Inverness web railway companies, October 
1865 
Company Route Estimate Coat Excess Exceaa 
(£) (£) (£1 ('la) 
Inverness and Nairn Inverness and Nairn 80000 118000 38000 47.5% 
Inverness and Aberdeen Nairn to Keith 325000 578000 253000 77.8% 
Junction 
Inverness and Ross-shire Inverness to lnveroordon 215000 285000 70000 32.6% 
Ross-shire extension lnvergordon to Bonar 160000 160000 0 0.0% 
Bridae 
Inverness and Perth Junction Inverness to Perth 654000 1056000 402000 61 .5% 
Total 1434000 2197000 763000 53.2o/o 
Source: Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407. 
The Inverness web of lines had cost 153 percent of their parliamentary estimates. 
Despite the financial support of a relatively small number of large landowners and 
many small local shareholders, share capital had proved difficult to raise outside the 
region and the companies had been forced increasingly to finance their rising capital 
costs from guaranteed dividend stock and temporary loans. Matheson summarised 
the Highland's predicament: 
... we had not only the excess of cost to contend with, but we were placed in 
a still greater difficulty from the original capital not having been taken up by 
the public. We were compelled to raise a large amount in preference stock, 
83 Herapath's Railway Journal, 4 November 1865, p.1217-18, reporting Matheson's' address 
to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 27 October 1865. 
a.. Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407. 
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and, in addition, to borrow considerable sums from banks, on our personal 
guarantee, and at the prevailing high rates of interest.85 
In the immediate aftermath of the opening of the direct Inverness-Perth line, a 
superficial assessment might conclude that Inverness, now secure, able to pay a 
small dividend, and experiencing a growth in traffic, had relegated the Great North to 
the status of a rural railway, the very existence of which was threatened by 
overwhelming debts. While the Great North was undoubtedly close to financial 
collapse, the Highland also faced severe financial vulnerability from its floating debt. 
The Railway News concentrated on the positive economic results of the Inverness 
railways: 
. . . it will not be surprising to hear that Highland property is increasing in 
value. The shootings have greatly advanced in rental, and the sheep farms 
are on the rise . . . it is to be hoped that we have seen the end of that 
periodical distress which had become chronic, and could never have been 
relieved by the old system of the cottages and the croft. 86 
The Railway Times concluded that the Highland system 'is now impregnable'.87 The 
Inverness strategy to secure the control of railways serving the northern counties of 
Scotland had been accomplished, but the Highland, like its rival the Great North, had 
to resolve the financial instability resulting from competition and expansion. 
Financial indicators for the two companies show similar degrees of weakness as a 
result of accumulated debt, despite the small dividend paid on the Highland 
maintained by paying some interest from capital (table 74). 
85 Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407. 
66 Railway News, 17 September 1864, p.299: the journal also noted that 'The Highlands and 
Islands of Scotland are now within 24 hours distance of London'. 
87 Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1417. 
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Table 74: Comparative indicators for the Great North and Highland Railways, 1865-67 
Great North of Scotland Rallwav 07.1865 01.1866 07.1868 01.1867 07.1867 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 23.2% 22.5% 22.9% 24.5% 24.5% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.151 0.151 0.141 0.119 0.158 
Ordinarv dividend QOA, 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Hlghland Railway 08.1865 02.1886 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 23.5% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 24.8% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.184 0.162 0.155 0.164 0.162 
Ordinary dividend 2% 1% 1% 1% 2°k 
Source: Appendix, 1 0(e) and 11 (c) and table 25. 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital 
and 0.162 for Qross revenue/debt. 
The financial difficulties faced by both companies reached their zenith as a major 
national crisis erupted following the failure of the London finance house of Overend 
Gurney in 1866, caused by its over-extended dealings in railway securities, with the 
result that the northern companies had little prospect of raising new share capital. 88 
National shortages of capital for railways had increased the practice of paying 
contractors by company bills and stock, for which financial intermediaries had 
established a market to convert such securities into cash.89 The Railway Times 
reported: 
The failure of Overend, Gurney, and Company to meet its engagements - its 
inability to repay money it had borrowed on immediate call, in consequence 
of having lent it at enormous interest to parties who were at all times on the 
verge of bankruptcy - is represented as a calamity of unparalleled description 
. . . The disastrous effects of this inveterately encouraged panic are making 
themselves felt on every description of security.90 
With no immediate solutions to their own financial crises, the Highland and Great 
North each turned to the possibility of amalgamation with the Caledonian during 
1866-67. 
88 TL Alborn, Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics in Victorian England (London, 1998), 
p.201; TR Gourvish, 'Railways 1830-70: the formative years', in MJ Freeman and DH Aldcroft 
(eds.), Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), p.65. 
89 PL Cottrell, 'Railway Finances and the Crisis of 1866: contractors' bills of exchange and 
finance companies' Journal of Transport History, new series, Ill, No.1 (February 1975), 
pp.24-26. 
90 Railway Times, 12 May 1866, pp.563-64. 
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A new 'Caledonian system'? 
The Caledonian's previous attempt to take control of the northern route to Aberdeen 
was overtaken by its financial failure in 1849, as chapter 3 has shown, but, by 
amalgamation with the Scottish Central and the Scottish North-Eastern in 1865-66, 
the Caledonian achieved that objective.91 The price was considerable; Scottish 
Central shareholders received a guaranteed 7 percent,92 while Aberdeen 
shareholders were ultimately to receive 4 percent with former Scottish Midland 
shareholders retaining their proportional premium over Aberdeen stock. 93 The 
Caledonian inherited the Scottish Central commitment made in 1864 to subscribe 
£200,000 to the proposed Callander and Oban Railway, promoted to connect the 
west highland coast with the main railway network, and to work the line at 50 percent 
of gross receipts.94 The Scottish Central also held an unexercised power to 
subscribe an amount not exceeding £120,000 to the Inverness and Perth Junction 
91 Minutes of the 42nd and 43rd Ordinary General; Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 12 
September 1865 and 14 September 1866, NAS/BR/CAU1/2; Caledonian directors reported 
in 1866 'Amalgamation with the Scottish North-Eastern Railway Company has been 
authorised and the Caledonian System now extends as far north as Aberdeen'; 28&29 Vic. 
cap.287, 1865, The Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways Amalgamation Act; 29&30 Vic. 
cap.350, 1866, the Caledonian and Scottish North-Eastern Railways Amalgamation Act 
92 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 12 September 1865, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3; General minutes of shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 9 
June 1865, NAS/SCC/1/15. 
93 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 10 November 1865, NAS/BR/SNE/1 /2, 
p.118; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 31 March 1866, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 27 
March 1867, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, shows that the Caledonian paid 6½ % on its own shares, 
and guaranteed dividends of 7% on Scottish Central shares, 3% on Aberdeen shares (which 
was to rise by ¼ % per half year until it reached 4% by January 1869) and 6% on Scottish 
Midland Junction shares; see also chapter 4, table 34, which shows the pattern of Aberdeen 
and Scottish Midland Junction dividends in 1861-66. 
94 28&29 Vic. cap.266, 1865, The Callander and Oban Railway Act, authorising share capital 
of £600,000 and borrowing powers of £200,000: the Scottish Central Railway was authorised 
to subscribe £200,000 and work the line; Agreement between the promoters of the Callander 
and Oban Railway and the Scottish Central Railway, 17, 19 and 22 December 1864, 
NAS/BR/AP(S)/146; Agreement between the Caledonian and Callander and Oban railway 
companies, 19, 22, and 23 July and 3 and 10 August 1869 contained within a further 
agreement between the companies dated 16 September 1869, NAS/BR/AP(S)/146; 
Prospectus of the Callander and Oban Railway, 1864, NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1/3. 
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Railway.95 Both lines offered scope to the Caledonian to extend considerably its 
influence in the north and west of Scotland. 
Shortage of capital for the Inverness-Perth direct line prompted Inverness to 
approach the Caledonian. Andrew Dougall, general manager and secretary to the 
Inverness companies, reported in July 1865 that the Caledonian had offered to 
subscribe £50,000 to the Perth Junction and £50,000 to the proposed Dingwall and 
Skye Railway and intended to justify the investment to their shareholders as gaining 
'an interest in the Line from their terminal station in Perth on to Skye'.96 
Parliamentary authorisation of the independent Dingwall and Skye, however, gave 
powers to the Caledonian to subscribe £100,000, just over one-fifth of authorised 
share capital, which implies a predatory intent.97 The Caledonian also offered 
Dougall a management post at £2,000 per annum,98 twice the minimum salary he 
agreed to accept to remain in lnverness.99 
95 24&25 Vic. cap.186, 1861, The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway Act. 
96 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 7 July 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, 
p.148; Minute 589 of the Caledonian Railway, 25 July 1865, NAS/BR/CAU1 /15, which 
indicated that the proposition for investment came from Inverness via Andrew Dougall, 
secretary to the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway. Dougall became the Highland's 
general manager and secretary on amalgamation In June 1865. 
97 28&29 Vic. cap.223, 1865, The Dingwall and Skye Railway Act, with authorised capital of 
£450,000 and borrowing powers of £150,000: the Caledonian Railway was authorised to 
subscribe £100,000, the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction £25,000 and the Inverness and 
Perth Junction £25,000. 
98 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 11 September 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1 /1. pp.64--65. 
99 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 29 November 1865, NAS/BR/HR/.1/1, p.70, recording a 
new agreement with Dougall as general manager and secretary at a minimum salary of 
£1,000 for seven years from 1 December 1865 'during which period he had signified his 
willingness to remain in the Company's employment': the Board also recorded their 
appreciation 'of the pecuniary sacrifice made by him in not accepting the offer made to him 
by the Caledonian Railway'; Railway Times, 7 December 1895, p.726; D Ross, The 
enigmatic Mr Dougall', Highland Railway Journal, 5, No.75 (Autumn 2005), p.13: D Ross, The 
Highland Railway, pp.96-102: Dougall resigned as general manager and secretary of the 
Highland Railway in December 1895 following allegations of irregular share dealing, but he 
left the company in February 1896 with a year's pay and his gold pass for travel. Dougall had 
joined the Inverness and Nairn Railway in 1855 and had therefore given over 40 years 
service to the Inverness web companies. 
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Highland minutes are silent about negotiations with the Caledonian, although in 1866 
officers asked the board to protect their interests in the event of amalgamation with 
·any of the great Companies in the South'.100 Nevertheless, a response from the 
Caledonian was sent to Dougall in August 1865 ' ... in reply to the overtures made by 
the Highland Railway Company for a more intimate alliance with the Caledonian' .101 
Some consideration of lease or amalgamation was therefore in progress at the time 
the Highland was incorporated and its directors would be aware of the scale of the 
company's debt. The Caledonian received a shareholder's proposition in November 
1865 for the 'acquisition' of the Highland, 102 but the Railway Times expected a lease: 
. . . the [Highland] dividend is apparently to remain at one percent, until 
several capital liabilities are cleared off, and the line thereby made 
acceptable to the Caledonian on a lease of four percent.103 
The Caledonian withdrew its investment offer in August 1866 because '... in the 
present position of their finances, they were unable to take £50,000 of the Highland 
Company's Ordinary Stock as suggested by them last year', 104 but some 
negotiations continued. Caledonian records, although cursory, indicate that the draft 
of an agreement between the Caledonian and Highland was submitted in June 
1867,105 and, in July, Caledonian director Buchanan and Bruce, deputy chairman 
and managing director of the Highland, urged the Caledonian for a 'final adjustment' 
100 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 20 March 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, item 9, p.132; Order 
of Business Book, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 20 March 1866, NAS/IAJ/1/6, 
item 1 O, recording, in a response to a memorial from heads of departmen~ 'Say that no 
arrangement of the kind alluded to is in contemplation, and also in the event of amalgamation 
this Board will do their best to protect the interests of the Memorialists'. 
101 Minute 729 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 22 August 1865, NAS/BR/CAU1 /15. 
102 Minute 1151 of the Calectonian Railway Board, 7 November 1865, NAS/BR/CAU1/15. 
103 Railway Times, 27 April 1867, p.429, reviewing the Highland directors' report prior to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 29 April 1867. 
1°" Minutes of the Highland Railway, 10 August 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.193, recording a 
letter from the Caledonian Railway dated 8 August 1866. 
105 Minute 1608 of the Caledonian Railway, 11 June 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/15: Highland 
Railway minutes are silent on any negotiations with the Caledonian Railway. 
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of the agreement.106 Temporary bank loans on the Highland at this point exceeded 
£½ million.107 In August, the Caledonian recorded that an agreement had been 
finalised, presumably with Bruce's approval, but, in September, Dougall raised 
objections to proposed Caledonian charges, with which the Caledonian disagreed: 
'Mr Dougall's alterations appear to be inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the 
Agreement ... '.108 These clandestine negotiations, by which the Highland appears to 
have sought a solution to its financial difficulties, suggest that some disagreement 
may have arisen between Bruce and Dougall over the terms of the agreement or the 
authority of each in the negotiations because, just days after the Caledonian had 
questioned secretary Dougall's amendments to the apparently finalised document, 
the Highland directors took the unusual step of recording a minute expressing their 
'entire confidence' in Bruce.109 In February 1868, Bruce accepted a seat on the 
board of the London and North Western Railway, which strengthened the alliance of 
the Highland with the west-coast companies.110 
A revised agreement was prepared in October 1867,111 but, by then, the Caledonian 
was under investigation by its own shareholders due to 'distrust in the affairs of the 
106 Minute 1795 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 5 July 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/15: the 
Caledonian Board received letters from Buchanan and Bruce and the matter was remitted to 
the committee that met in London 'to settle the Agreement as soon as passible'. 
107 Appendix, table 11{e): temporary bank loans amounted to £535,000 in August 1867. 
108 Minute 1855 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 20 August 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/15, 
recording acceptance of an agreement 'as in draft revised in blue ink'; Minute 1908 of the 
Caledonian Railway Board, 16 September 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/15, reporting that Dougall 
had raised objections to the charges proposed by the Caledonian and resolving that the 
'Gentlemen who met in London', who included Bruce, were to resolve the matter. 
109 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 25 September 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.319: 'The 
Board take this opportunity of expressing their satisfaction with the manner in which he has 
managed his duties and to record their entire confidence in him'. 
110 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 4 February 1868, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.363; Bradshaw's 
Railway Almanack, 1869, p.193; MC Reed, The London and North Western Railway: a 
history, p.37, identifies a long-standing Inverness link with the London and North Western 
Railway that had been established since the North Western's incorporation in 1847 through 
the statutory power of the Duke of Sutherland to nominate one director (initially George Loch) 
by virtue of his investment in that company. 
111 Minute 170 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 29 October 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1 /16, 
recording that a further draft of an agreement had been amended by the committee at a 
meeting in Perth on 12 October 1867, which was returned by the Highland board and 
recorded in minute 288 of the Caledonian Board on 19 November 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/16; 
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Company', and no further progress with the Highland was recorded. 112 The Railway 
Times reported: 
The [Highland] directors announce . . . that it is not their intention to promote 
any bill in the ensuing session. We take for granted, therefore, the lease by 
the Caledonian at 4 percent is adjourned sine die. 113 
The failure of the Highland to secure a lease with the Caledonian left its directors 
with growing bank debt, which reached £535,000 in February 1868 and £625,000 in 
1869.114 The Great North was also indebted to banks; £274,527 was owed in July 
1866 at the time of its branch amalgamations and its bank loans peaked at £350,348 
in January 1868.115 This maximum was equivalent to 11 percent of the authorised 
capital raised by the Great North, but the Highland's bank borrowing, still rising in 
1868, corresponded to 19 percent of its raised authorised capital.118 The 
Minute 402 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 18 December 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/16, 
reporting that the agreement had been signed by the Highland and the board resolved to 
'Execute Agreement', but no further reference was made thereafter in the minutes. 
112 Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 3 January 1868, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3 and NAS/BR/CAL/1/99: the shareholder 
inquiry into the running of the Caledonian Railway was established by a board minute of 22 
October 1867; also NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, paragraphs 45 and 46, pp.14-15, recommending 
the abandonment of all unnecessary works, which ended any prospect of further Caledonian 
progress towards a lease of the Highland; Minute 595 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 22 
January 1868, NAS/BR/CAL/1/16, recording the offer of resignation from Lt Col Salkeld, 
chairman of the Caledonian, following the results of the inquiry. 
113 Railway Times, 26 October 1867, p.1093; also Railway Times, 31 October 1868, p.115, 
recalling the Caledonian's 'offer to lock the Highland in its embrace at 4 percent ... '. 
114 Appendix, table 11 (e): Highland bank loans peaked at £625,000 during three half-years, 
ending February 1869, August 1869 and February 1870, falling to £605,000 in August 1870 
and £520,000 in February 1871. 
115 Appendix, table 10(f). 
118 Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, half year report to 31 January 1868, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, showing total capital raised from shares and debentures to be 
£3,171,552 and bank loans to be £350,348 (11.0%); Accounts of the Highland Railway, half 
year report to 29 February 1868, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.380-81, showing total capital raised 
from shares and debentures to be £2,818,848 and bank loans to be £535,000 (19.0%): the 
Highland's ratio of bank debt to capital raised peaked at 22.2% by 28 February 1869 when 
bank debt reached £625,000 and total capital raised was £2,813,059; Appendix, tables 10(c); 
10(f);11(a) and 11 (e): data of capital raised contained in Great North and Highland accounts 
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dependence on bank loans was therefore proportionally greater on the Highland, but 
the scale of its financial difficulties attracted less attention than the Great North 
because of the security provided by its directors. 
The Railway Times reported a rumour in August 1866 of an amalgamation between 
the Great North and the Caledonian,117 later described as a possible working 
agreement.118 In November 1866, the Great North proposed that the Caledonian 
should work its lines at 38 percent of gross revenue.119 The Caledonian requested 
the Great North's accounts, which showed working expenses to be 44 percent, but 
the Great North responded that their expenses could be reduced to 40½ percent with 
lower train mileage and 'the saving in the cost of fuel by land as compared with sea 
carriage in the event of your working the line .. .', 120 which illustrates the continued 
use of sea transport by the Great North south of Aberdeen. The Great North asked 
the Caledonian at what figure below 40¾ percent they would work the line 'with your 
numerous advantages and experience', asserting that 'we have gone to the very 
lowest point at once'.121 In January 1867, noting that the Great North owed £25,918 
plus interest for work on the cross-Aberdeen railway via the Denburn Valley, the 
Caledonian declined to work the Great North, but agreed to explore a traffic 
agreement.122 Whilst in conference with the Caledonian, the Great North had 
include the nominal receipts from shares issued as security for loans, which explain some of 
the fluctuations between half-years in the reported figures of total capital raised. 
117 Railway Times. 25 August 1866, p.1014, reproducing a report from the Dundee 
Advertiser. 
118 Railway Times, 15 December 1866, p.1437. 
119 Minutes of the Finance Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 November 
1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.126; Minute 711 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 4 December 
1866, NAS/BR/CAU1/15. 
120 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.136. 
121 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.136 and p.139. 
122 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 January 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
pp.202-203, recording a reply from the Caledonian Railway dated 22 January 1867; Minute 
995 of the Caledonian Railway Board, 22 January 1867, NAS/BR/CAU1/15: the Caledonian 
had assumed responsibility for the Denburn Valley line across Aberdeen from the Scottish 
North-Eastern on amalgamation in August 1866. 
369 
postponed decisions on bank demands for repayment, 123 but Duncan told 
shareholders 'I regret to say that our negotiations have terminated' .124 Caledonian 
records show repeated attempts to extricate payment from the Great North for 
Oenburn work, which culminated in the Great North obtaining powers in 1867 to 
raise £41,600 in loans.125 The bargaining position of the Great North was weak: 
. . . the hopes of the proprietary of the Great North are rested upon a 
prospective amalgamation with the Caledonian, but until the company's 
affairs are established on a better basis, it would be in vain to expect good 
terms in such a transaction. 126 
The Caledonian faced no competitive pressure to obtain control of the insolvent 
Great North; the scale of its debts and the nature of its isolated rural system 
precluded consideration of amalgamation whilst the rival east-coast alliance still 
relied on two major estuary crossings for a northern route. Indeed, if Great North 
creditors had forced the company into liquidation, its assets and routes would have 
been available for sale at a much reduced price and, given the concurrent 
negotiations with the Highland Railway, an agreement for traffic from the Inverness-
Perth direct line offered greater prospective returns to the Caledonian than via 
Aberdeen. 
123 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 3 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, 
p.141. 
124 Report to the adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 5 February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.211-12 and page 1 of inserted printed 
report. 
125 Examples of Caledonian demands for payment include 9 April 1861 (minute 1431) and 1 
May 1867 (minute 1473), in minutes of directors and committees of the Caledonian Railway, 
NAS/BR/CAL/1/15, and 21 November 1867 (minute 298), NAS/BR/CAL/1/16; 30&31 Vic. 
cap.190, 1867, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act: the Great North was authorised to 
raise £41,600 in loans for the Denburn Valley Railway even though half of its £125,000 share 
capital authorised under 27 &28 Vic. cap.111, 1864, The Den burn Valley Railway Act, had not 
been paid up. 
126 Railway News, 16 March 1867, p.271. 
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However, Caledonian plans were brought to an abrupt halt as the result of its own 
shareholder inquiry, which reported in January 1868. The 1849 inquiry had criticised 
the unjustified lease costs of the Scottish Central and the consequences of the 
Caledonian's rapid expansion, as chapter 3 has identified.127 The 1867-68 inquiry 
recognised the 'securing, though at much too great a cost, a united line from Carlisle 
to Aberdeen',128 but surmised: 
... we are unable to place before you the results of the Scottish Central and 
Scottish North-Eastern Railways, but we very much doubt if either can have 
been beneficial to the Catedonian Proper. The Scottish North-Eastern has, 
we have no doubt, entailed a heavy toss, and is another fruit of reckless 
competition.129 
The inquiry reported a liability of £149,816 for the Callander and Oban line and 
concluded that 'this expenditure is not at all likely to be productive, and we have 
urged its abandonment', a proposal that had significance for the Dingwall and Skye 
Railway that is examined in the following chapter.130 The inquiry judged that the high 
dividends paid by the Caledonian had been artificially inflated as the result of 
charging revenue items to capital and condemned 'the disastrous effects of 
competition and rivalry', recommending 'the abandonment of every work which can 
be stopped without evident injury to your undertaking' .131 
127 Report of the Committee of Investigation to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 1849, NAS/BR/CAU1 /98, p. 7: the Committee concluded that 'the conduct of the 
Directors ... indicates a want of judgement and discretion' and that 'their over-zeal induced 
them to embark on schemes and speculation in an extent seriously compromising the safety 
of the Company'. 
128 Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders of the Caledonlan Railway 
Company, 3 January 1868, NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/3, paragraph 45, page 14; Railway Times, 11 
January 1868, p.22. 
129 Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 3 January 1868, NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/3, paragraph 26, page 10. 
130 Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 3 January 1868, NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/3, paragraph 28, page 10. 
131 Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway 
Company, 3 January 1868, NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/3, paragraphs 45 and 46, pp.14-15: dividends 
paid of £7.7s.6d to 31 July 1866 and £5.17s.6d to 31 July 1867 should, in the view of the 
committee, have been £5.2s.0d and £2.18s 2d respectively, although the auditors considered 
even lower dividends of £4.1 0s.1 d and £2.2s.4d respectively were warranted. 
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For a brief period, therefore, there had been a prospect of the Caledonian obtaining 
control of the entire existing northern railway system, although the state's rejection of 
the 'end-on' amalgamation of the Glasgow and South-Western and Midland 
Railways in 1867 suggests that a similar Caledonian, Highland and Great North 
arrangement might have fared no better. 132 The Caledonian's own financial affairs, 
however, precluded any possible monopoly of the northern network and the Great 
North and the Highland were left independently to tackle a rising burden of debt, 
which threatened their financial viability. 
The path to recovery 
Both the Highland and the Great North faced mounting bank debt at the time of the 
collapse of Overend Gurney on 11 May 1866, which Railway Times estimated wiped 
over £10 million from the value of railway stock.133 The resultant financial crisis was 
described contemporarily as 'the most important and serious stoppage ever 
announced in the City of London';134 interest rates rose to 10 percent on 12 May.135 
132 J Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, vol.1 (Leicester, 1978), p.69, 
noting that the state rejected an amalgamation between the Glasgow and South-Western and 
the Midland Railways in 1867, 1872 and 1873; Railway Times, 10 August 1872, pp.811-12, 
commenting on the report of the joint committee of both Houses of Parliament on 
amalgamations, published on 1 August 1872: ' ... the conclusion of the inquiry is alike evasive 
and unsatisfactory. Much was expected - nothing is accomplished'; H Parris, Government 
and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1965), p.221, notes the withdrawal 
of large-scale English amalgamation schemes following the report of the parliamentary joint 
committee on railway amalgamations, 1872. 
133 Railway Times, 12 May 1666, pp.563-64, and 26 May 1866, p.613, reporting a meeting of 
Overend-Gumey shareholders held to consider re-establishing the company, at which the 
liabilities of Overend-Gurney were estimated at £20 million of which £12 million was on call 
and £8 million in securities: £2.8m.of this sum was reported as secured in various forms and 
ultimately realisable; Railway News, 15 December 1866, p.614, reported that liabilities had 
been reduced form £19 million to about £5 million following the realisation of assets; MC 
Reed, entry on 'Speculation', in J Simmons and G Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to 
British Railway History (Oxford, 1997, re-issued 1999) p.464, gives the gross liabilities of 
Overend, Gurney and Company as 'over £18 million'. 
134 Railway News, 12 May 1866, p.510. 
135 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83. 
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Many railway stocks had recovered by June (table 75)136 , but Cottrell notes that the 
1866 crisis bankrupted the smaller finance houses and only five important 
companies survived.137 Highland stock was not quoted on the London exchange 
until 1871 , but £100 of Great North ordinary stock stood at just £15-16 in December 
1867.138 
Table 75: Examples of railway share prices, May.June 1866 
Closing prices 4 May 1866 11 May 1866 Reduction 18 May 1866 16 June 1866 
Scottish companies (£) 
Caledonian 126 ½ -127 ½ 124 - 126 2 ½- 1 ½ 126 - 129 126 - 127 
Glasaow and South-Western 112 - 114 111 -113 1 - 1 112 - 114 112 - 114 
North British 55 - 57 52 - 54 3 - 3 54 - 56 55 - 57 
English comoanles (£) 
London and North Western 119 ½ - 120 115½ - 116½ 4 - 3 ½ 119 ½- 120 117 - 117 ½ 
Midland 122 ¼ - 122 ½ 118½ - 119½ 3¾ - 3 122 ¾ - 123 ¼ 123 ¾ - 124 ¼ 
North-Eastern (Berwick 108 ½ - 109 ½ 106 - 108 2 ½- 1 ½ 108 - 110 108 ½- 109 ½ 
stock) 
Source: Railway Times, 12 May 1866, o.564, 19 May 1866, p.592, and 16 June 1866, p.726. 
Whenever economic events pushed interest rates upwards, railway companies 
seeking renewal of debenture loans could become locked into increased costs of 
servicing their debt and many explored converting debenture loans into debenture 
stock, offered with a fixed rate of interest to forestall future interest rate variations. 
However, such conversions required careful timing to coincide with periods of low 
interest rates. Furthermore, the more capital that was raised from guaranteed stock, 
the greater the proportion of revenue required to meet contracted payments, which 
left less revenue to provide a dividend to ordinary shareholders. The Railway Times 
136 Railway Times, 19 May 1866, p.592, commented that 'the idle terror which spread 
throughout the city in the latter part of last week originated in a desperate effort of a few 
jobbers to bring down the current value of shares' and concluded that the depreciation it 
reported on 12 May had taken place 'without one bona fide sale having taken place, in the 
space of eight days ... '. 
137 PL Cottrell, 'Railway Finances and the Crisis of 1866: contractors' bills of exchange and 
finance companies', pp.34-35: Cottrell concludes that the Overend Gurney collapse 
depressed railway securities on the stock exchange until 1870 and, in particular, hindered the 
conversion of debenture loans, which had previously been regarded as 'riskless', into 
debenture stock. 
138 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 5 December 1871 , NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.124, recording 
that Bruce was charged to arrange for Highland stock to be quoted on the London Exchange 
Share Lists; Railway Times, 7 December 1867, p.1233, quoting Great North shares at £ 15-16 
on £100 par value. 
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described debentures as '... dangerous, they are erratic, they are uncontrollable', 
and argued that the original intention had been that such loans were to be paid off 
and not converted into long-term debt. 1311 When the South-Eastern Railway In 
England issued a debenture stock at 5 percent, the Railway News was critical: 
The preference shareholders are provided for, the debenture holders have 
power to protect themselves, but the holders of ordinary stock are entirely at 
the mercy of the directors ... 140 
This Railway News article was circulated by Great North secretary Ferguson to his 
board and the North of Scotland Bank when a similar debenture conversion was 
under consideration in Aberdeen. 141 
Both the Highland and Great North were heavily reliant on preference stock and 
debenture loans; the Highland held 55.6 percent of capital raised in the form of 
preferences and debentures in August 1867, while the Great North held 69.3 percent 
in July 1867.142 However, the 24.8 percent of capital raised by debentures on the 
Highland and the 24.5 percent on the Great North are close to the British average of 
26-27 percent derived by Irving and therefore the significant proportions of capital 
raised by preference stock, 30.8 percent on the Highland and 44.8 percent on the 
Great North, support Irving's argument that the contribution made by preference and 
139 Railway Times, 28 July 1866, p.886; H Pollins, 'Aspects of Railway Accounting before 
1868', in MC Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969), p.141. 
140 Railway News, 30 May 1868, p.568. 
141 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 June 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.290. 
142 Accounts of the Highland Railway to 31 August 1867, in minutes of the Highland Railway, 
30 October 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.332-33: the Highland had raised capital of £2,813,473 
of which preference stock accounted for £866,235 (30.79%) and debentures for £697,872 
(24.80%); Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway to 31 July 1867, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14: the Great North had raised capital of £3,087,451 of which £1,381,530 
(44.75%) was in preference stock and £756,579 (24.50%) in debentures: TR Gourvish, 
Railways and the British Economy 1830-1914 (London, 1980), p.18, identifies that, by 1870, 
48% of United Kingdom capital excluding loans required fixed interest payments. 
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guaranteed stock to railway capital has been understated. 143 It was against this 
unpromising background that the two companies began their financial recovery. 
- refinancing the Great North of Scotland Railway 
In October 1866, deputy chairman Duncan had suggested the reconstruction of the 
Great North board1« and, when shareholders reconvened in December, North of 
Scotland Bank manager Robert Lumsden commented to applause that 'the Board, 
as presently constituted, does not appear to enjoy in a high degree the confidence of 
the shareholders ... '.145 A delay in reconstituting the board was agreed because the 
company was not only negotiating with the Caledonian Railway but also with its 
bankers, who began to take a more strategic role in the Great North. Accountant 
Fletcher's report had recommended that the company should obtain powers to Issue 
a pre-preference stock to rank before any other preferences, but that proposal 
aroused concern from the Aberdeen Town and County Bank about the value of stock 
held in security, which secretary Ferguson had to diffuse by confirming that 'there 
was no intention to force the new Bill on lenders without their consent' .146 Lumsden's 
North of Scotland Bank offered a temporary advance, but other banks continued to 
demand debt repayment.147 The critical role of the banks was highlighted when 
Duncan consulted Lumsden on the constitution of a new board; Lumsden then 
143 RJ Irving, 'The capitalisation of Britain's Railways1830-1914', Jou ma/ of Transport 
History, 3n1 series, 5, No.1 (March 1984), pp.3-4 and appendix 3, pp.21-22, suggests that the 
proportion of funds obtained through loans and debentures remained steady at 26-27% 
between 1830 and 1890; Appendix, tables 1 0(c) and 11 (a): the Great North and Highland 
companies began to replace debenture loans with debenture stock from 1869, but only 
nominal amounts were converted before their debts were cleared in 1872. 
144 Report to the 28th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 
October 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.87-88 and page 3 of inserted printed report. 
145 Minutes of a reconvened Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 4 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.143. 
146 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 12 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, 
pp.151-52. 
147 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 18 December 1866, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.157: the North of Scotland Bank provided a temporary advance of £14,000. 
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submitted a list of directors that would command support from the bank.148 At the 
reconvened shareholders' meeting in February 1867, it was Lumsden who proposed 
acceptance of the resignations of five directors, including chairman Elphinstone, the 
reappointment of six existing directors, the nomination of Duncan as the new 
chairman, and the appointment of six new directors.149 The North of Scotland Bank 
as a principal creditor therefore took a central role in determining the revised 
direction of the Great North of Scotland Railway. Moreover, to achieve savings, 
Lumsden explored with Bruce of the Highland a possible closure of the Morayshire's 
Rothes-Elgin line, used by the Great North, and the establishment of a joint-purse 
arrangement between the Highland and the Great North, which provides further 
evidence of the involvement of bankers in the strategic planning of a northern railway 
company.150 
Dividend on the proposed pre-preference stock was to be paid after debentures and 
before existing preference stock, but Duncan warned of difficulty in Parliament,151 
where Lord Redesdale, chairman of the House of Lords' Private Bills Committee, 
was resistant to the creation of such stocks.152 Some shareholders took legal advice 
to protect their position 153 and the North of Scotland, Aberdeen Town and County 
and National Banks and the Scottish Provident Assurance Company petitioned 
against the Great North's proposal.154 Duncan warned his new board that 'that they 
148 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 8 January 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.179 and 4 February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.205. 
149 Minutes of an adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 5 February, 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.212; Duncan was confirmed as chairman at 
the board meeting of 12 February, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.212. 
150 Letter from Bruce of the Highland Railway, dated 28 December 1868, replying to 
Lumsden of the North of Scotland Bank, in minutes of the Finance, Works and Traffic 
Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 7 January 1869, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.545. 
151 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 5 
February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.211-12 and page 1 of inserted report. 
152 Railway Times, 13 July 1867, p.697. 
153 Minutes of the Finance and Works Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway. 14 
February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.220. 
154 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, 
p.240. 
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will not find it idle play ... it requires all the skill of tried financial and business men to 
conduct the affairs of a company such as this'.155 
Shareholder meetings in Aberdeen, Glasgow, Liverpool and London approved the 
Great North's bill that sought powers for £330,000 of 4½ percent pre-preference 
stock 'to provide for the liquidation of the Floating Debt'.158 In March 1867, faced 
with the alternative option of forcing the Great North into liquidation with a 
consequential loss of bank capital, the North of Scotland, Aberdeen Town and 
County and National Banks agreed a refinancing arrangement with the Great 
North.157 The agreement, however, was dependent upon parliamentary 
authorisation of pre-preference capital and its acceptance by shareholders because 
the Great North was required to use pre-preference receipts to redeem outstanding 
loans. The banks agreed to hold the rate of interest on debts to 4 percent for three 
years and allow repayment over five years, thus giving the Great North a period of 
some stability within which to restore its financial affairs. 
The Great North reported to the banks that opposition to the pre-preference 
proposals had been withdrawn, 158 but, at the ensuing shareholders' meeting in April, 
the directors urged shareholders to return their papers giving assent to the pre--
preference issue and reinforced their appeal with a circular to 'non-assenters'.159 By 
May, shareholders representing £156,230 of stock had still to consent and the Great 
155 Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 5 
February 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.211-12 and page 3 of inserted report. 
156 Report to the Special General Meetings of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 12, 13 
and 14 March 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pages 249, 250 and 251 and pages 1 and 3 of 
inserted printed report: the bill had proposed powers for £378,000 of pre-preference stock, 
but the Board recommended a sum of £330,000; Circular to shareholders to state that 
opposition to the pre-preference stock had been withdrawn at meetings in Glasgow, 
Liverpool, and London, 25 March 1867, in accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14. 
157 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 March 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
pp.257-60. 
156 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 March 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, 
p.261. 
159 Report to the 29th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 17 
April 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.299-300 and page 2 of inserted printed report and 25 April 
1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.309. 
377 
North's parliamentary agents reported 'the obstinacy of Lord Redesdale upon the 
Preference Question' .160 Parliament struck out the pre-preference capital from the 
Great North bill, but authorised the amalgamation of the Great North and Banffshire 
Railways and loan capital for the cross-Aberdeen rail link.161 The agreement with the 
banks therefore terminated because of the rejection of the pre-preference clauses. 
The Great North held £367,940 of floating debt at this juncture, 162 already reduced by 
selling Deeside Railway shares held without sanction.163 The Great North re-opened 
negotiations with banks, seeking to use preference stock authorised for the 
Formartine and Buchan Railway to raise capital.164 The banks still faced the 
dilemma that their funds were at risk if the Great North was precipitated into 
bankruptcy. The Aberdeen Town and County Bank continued to press for 
payment165 and declined to accept a draft agreement with the Great North submitted 
in November 1867,166 although, in December, the North of Scotland and National 
160 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 2 May 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1 /6, p.320. 
161 30&31 Vic. cap.190, 1867, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act; Minutes of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 15 August 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.443; Report to the 30th 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 3 October 1867, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.519-20 and page 2 of inserted printed report. 
162 Report to the 30th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 3 
October 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.519-20 and page 2 of inserted printed report setting out 
that £303,171 was owed to bankers, £31,013 was owed for work on the Denburn Valley 
scheme and £33,756 was owed on bills; page 3 also records that £30,000 of Deeslde stock 
had been sold to reduce debts. 
163 Report to the 30th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 3 
October 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.519-20 and page 3 of inserted printed report, recording 
that £30,000 of Deeside stock had been sold to reduce debts; Report of the Committee of 
Investigation dated 22 April 1865, in minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 April 
1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, pp.346-47 and page 2 of inserted printed report, which identified 
that £86,982 had been invested by the Great North in Deeside shares without sanction. 
164 Minutes of the Finance and Works Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 24 
October 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.545. 
165 Minutes of the Finance and Works Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 29 
August 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, p.459: the Aberdeen Town and County Bank claimed 
£7,498 was due as accumulated interest. 
166 Minutes of the Finance and Works Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 21 
November 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.14, recording that a draft agreement had been sent to 
the banks for comment; Minutes of the Finance and Works Committee of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 5 December 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.40, recording that the Aberdeen 
Town and County Bank had declined to accept the agreement. 
378 
Banks were 'disposed to enter into the Agreement under certain modifications as to 
the amount of Stock to be taken in absolute discharge of their debts ... '.167 
Meanwhile, the Great North faced legal action from shareholders over the 
distribution of preferential dividends; in October 1867, original preference and 
preference A stock was paid just under half the dividend due to each and preference 
B stock received nothing.168 
Table 76: Share movements in the refinancing of the Great North, 1868 
Purchased at par: Purchased at par: Discharged Shares returned from 
Formartine and Aberdeen and Turriff Debt bank security 
Buchan Preference Preference stock 
stock (£) (£) (£) (£) 
National Bank 53950 7700 61650 
North of Scotland Bank 30970 17700 48670 
Loans replaced by share 84920 25400 64370 ('B' shares) 
ownership 22970 (F&B shares) 
10000 (A&T shares) 
(£97340 in total) 
Reduction of Great North 110320 
of Scotland floating debt 
Source: Draft agreement with the National and North of Scotland Banks, in minutes of the Great North of Scotland 
Railwav. 1 April 1868 NAS/BR/GNS/1/7 o.212. 
A new agreement was finalised between the Great North and the North of Scotland 
and National Banks in April 1868, which allowed the Great North's recovery to begin 
in earnest.169 Both banks agreed to purchase £110,320 of preference shares at par 
and returned £97,340 of stock held in security (table 76). The Great North was 
required to use the proceeds to redeem loans and the two banks therefore became 
full shareholders in the company. The agreement was risky for the banks, but it 
enabled the Great North to reduce its floating debt signficantly and the resulting 
167 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 December 1867. NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, 
p.72. 
168 Report to the 30th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 3 
October 1867, NAS/BR/GNS/1/6, pp.519-20: holders of original 5% preference stock 
received £2.8s, 4½ % preference A received £2 3s and 4½ % preference B received nothing; 
Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 26 December 1867 and 9 January 1868, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.73 and p.85, recording proposed summonses from two lawyers on 
behalf of shareholders regarding the allocation of dividends between preferential stocks. 
169 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1868 and 1 April 1868, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.210 and p.212. 
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lower debt charges released more revenue to begin repaying other debt and 
preferential dividends. Consequently, bank debt fell sharply from £350,348 in 
January 1868 to £181,549 in July 1868.170 The North of Scotland Bank purchased a 
further £37,500 of Buchan preference stock at par in April 1868 to clear the arrears 
on the Buchan Railway bank account.171 By October, shareholders were told that 
£136,01 O of preference stock previously held by the banks in security had been 
returned to the company and cancelled. 172 With additional receipts, bank debt fell 
further to £94,331 by January 1869.173 
During these refinancing negotiations, the Great North had sought maximum 
economy in the operation of its lines to maximise revenue. 174 When asked for 
£18,200 for replacement rolling stock spread over 6 years, the board agreed to put 
aside just £1,000 per half-year for renewals.175 However, secretary Ferguson 
advised: 
It is to a reduction of the rate of interest on the debenture debt and the 
improvement of the Traffic that we must look for a return of prosperity and to 
that end all our efforts must be directed. There is nothing to hope for from 
reduction in working expenses and renewals as our first duty must be to keep 
up the value of the property judiciously and well.176 
170 Appendix, table 1 0(f). 
171 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 April 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.238. 
172 Report to the 32nd Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 8 
October 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.447 and page 4 of inserted printed report: the £136,01 O 
of stock returned and cancelled was 4½ % Great North preference B stock. 
173 Appendix, table 1 0(f). 
174 CJA Robertson, entry on 'William Ferguson' in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.), 
Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography 1860-1960, vol.2 (Aberdeen, 1990), p.279, noting 
that between 1867 and 1879, Great North revenue rose by 57.6% and expenditure fell by 
15.5% as a result of moving some revenue costs to capital, higher fares and goods rates, 
minimal maintenance, no system extensions and minimal track or rolling stock replacement. 
175 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 10 September 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, 
p.416. 
176 Minutes of the Finance and Works Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 
June 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.293. 
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Ferguson suggested that debenture loans should be replaced by debenture stock to 
stabilise interest payments, a proposal supported by the North of Scotland Bank, 
which advocated a 5 percent stock payable by instalments whilst such a rate 
remained attractive. m Discount rates in July 1868 were 2 percent, but the board 
concluded 'that it is not advisable under existing circumstances of this Company to 
issue Debenture Stock at such a high rate'178 and it was not until October that the 
creation of debenture stock was agreed, provided the offer was available to all 
shareholders.179 
In April 1869, Duncan was able to report that 'We have nearly got rid of a most 
overwhelming load of debt .. .',180 although the Great North remained in default in 
paying preference dividend.181 The capital account returned to balance in 1869,182 
and the revenue surplus earned from the Great North system rose steadily (table 
77). 
177 Letter from the North of Scotland Bank dated 3 June 1868 in minutes of the Finance and 
Works Committee of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 June 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, 
p.294: 'The weather in money matters is too severe and it will again in the course of a few 
years get stormy but now is the time to put your finances in a permanently stable position ... '. 
178 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 23 July 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, p.362; 
Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83. 
179 Minutes of the Finance, Works and Traffic Committee of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 22 October 1868, NAS/BR/GNS/1/7, pp.471-72: conversion of debenture loans to 
debenture stock up to a limit of £100,000 was agreed in principle by the committee and by 
the board (22 October 1868, p.474), but the decision was also subject to Lumsden's approval 
and the views of the National Bank, which considered that 5% was too high a rate for the 
stock (29 October 1868, p.478); Appendix, table 10(c), showing that only £11,915 of 
debenture stock was issued in 1869-71; Report of the Special General Meeting of the Great 
North of Scotland Railway, 10 October 1871, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, p.72, at which shareholders 
approved conversion of debenture loans into debenture stock 'provided the rate did not 
exceed 4 ¼ %'. 
180 Report to the 33rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 8 
April 1869, NAS/BR/GNS/1/8, pp.53-56 and page 3 of inserted printed report. 
181 Report to the 33rd Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 8 
April 1869, NAS/BR/GNS/1/8, pp.53-56: 5% original preference shares received £1.7s.9d, 
4½ % preference A shares received £1 5s and 4½ % preference B shares received nothing. 
182 Appendix, table 10 (c): the capital account to 31 July 1869 shows a surplus of £41,813 
compared to a deficit of £182,695 in July 1868. 
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Table 77: Revenue data for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1867-74 
/£) 31 July 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Total annual revenue 165578 180770 180909 184608 196918 209168 219921 240764 
Total annual exoenditure 100800 115264 96443 94663 98926 99218 111278 119637 
Net surplus after 39243 29707 43004 48996 58075 71604 71387 83851 
debenture interest 
Debt owed to banks 345972 181549 91963 32674 10300 0 0 0 
Ordinary dividend: 
- to 31 Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ % 
- to 31 July 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11/8 % 
Sources: Appendix, table 10(dl; Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1849-75, NAS/BR/RAC S)/1/14. 
(1 ): Revenue data is shown from 1867, after one year of operation following the amalgamation of the Great North 
with its allied branch comoanies on 31 July 1866. 
The rapid reduction of bank lending resulted in a steady improvement in debt gearing 
(table 78), which, in 1871, reached the level that the Great North had last 
experienced in 1862-64. 183 The refinancing agreement with two banks had, 
therefore, provided the means for the Great North to recover slowly from its deep 
financial difficulties. In January 1871, the Great North's share price was quoted as 
£17-19 per £100, but by November, it had increased to £37-39, although still only 
two-fifths of its par value. 184 
Table 78: Financial indicators for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1867-74 
(£) 07.1866 01.1867 07.1867 07.1868 07.1869 
Gross annual revenue 103785 130785 165578 180770 180909 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised 22.9% 24.5% 24.5% 27.2% 27.3% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.141 0.119 0.156 0.178 0.192 
(£) 07.1870 07.1871 07.1872 07.1873 07.1874 
Gross annual revenue 184608 196918 209168 219921 240764 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 28.0% 28.0% 28.1% 28.0% 27.4% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.207 0.226 0.242 0.255 0.279 
Source: Aooendix, table 10(e). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for gross revenue/debt. 
(2): July 1866 data relates to the Great North prior to amalgamation with branch companies and is shown for 
comoarison. 
183 Appendix, table 1 0(e); the debt gearing for the Great North in 1862 was 0.237, 0.281 in 
1863 and 0.224 in 1864. 
18-4 Railway Times, 7 January 1871, p. 9, and 18 November 1871 , p.1121 : the Railway Times 
gave no quotations for Great North stock from 18 November 1859 (when prices were quoted 
for £10 shares at £10¼- 10¼) until 21 September 1867 (p.969) when a price of £16-18 was 
quoted for £100 of stock; on 18 April, 1874, Railway Times quoted a price of £50-52 (p.408) 
and, by 26 December 1874, the price had reached £65-67 (p.1278). 
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The Railway News reported of the Great North that "We can scarcely point in the 
whole railway system to a line which has made progress more marked . . . or more 
gratifying .. .',185 while the Railway Times commended the 'rigorous economy and 
well-planned finance' of the company.186 Duncan recalled the Great North in 1866: 
The difficulty then was to find who would go on to this sinking ship, and 
imperil his life and means to keep up a rickety concern that was going as fast 
as possible to the bottom ... 187 
Nevertheless, arrears in preferential dividends continued to rise and, by January 
1871, totalled £44,555, although floating debt was eliminated by January 1872.188 
The company's recovery allowed the full payment of preference dividends on 5 
percent and 4 ½ percent A stock in March 1872, but 4 ½ percent B stock, 
representing one-fifth of all preference stock issued, still received no dividend.189 
William Leslie, who succeeded John Duncan as chairman in October 1871,190 
indicated the board's intent to capitalise the arrears of preference dividend.191 At the 
shareholders' meeting in October 1872, the directors formally proposed capitalisation 
powers since, otherwise, it would take between three and five years to pay arrears 
185 Railway News, 30 September 1871, p.458. 
186 Railway Times, 8 April 1871, p.341. 
187 Report of the 36th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 
October 1870, NAS/BR/GNS/1/8, p.486. 
188 Report to the 37th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 
March 1871, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, pp.7-10; Appendix, tables 10(c) and 10(f). 
189 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 March 
1872, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, pp.119-22; Appendix, table 10(c), showing in 1872 that£291,090 of 
5% preference, £482,050 of 4½ % preference A and £218,030 of 4½ % preference B stock 
had been issued: B preference shares therefore represented 21.99% of all preference stock. 
190 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 19 October 1871, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, 
p. 73, reporting the election of Lord Provost William Leslie as chairman, although Duncan 
remained on the board: the death of John Duncan on 12 December 1874 was reported in the 
minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 24 December 1874, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, 
p.455. 
191 Report of the 29th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 28 
March 1872, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, pp.119-22 and page 1 of inserted printed report. 
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from revenue and therefore ordinary shareholders would have no prospect of any 
return.192 At the same meeting, secretary Ferguson, who had reduced his salary 
voluntarily in 1866 from £600 to £350 as one of the economy measures, had his 
salary raised to £500. 
The directors made an agreement with the holders of the 4½ percent B preference 
shares, issued 'when the affairs of the Company were in a very inflated position ... ', 
whereby preference B dividends were to be restricted initially to 3 percent for up to 
five years to allow scope to offer some ordinary shareholder dividend because 
'considerably more than one-half of the ordinary stock' was held in Liverpool. 193 The 
company wished to rebuild the status of ordinary shares on the national capital 
market and powers for such a restriction were therefore included in the 1873 act 
which capitalised arrears of preference dividend into a 4 percent preference stock.194 
The January 1874 accounts show that 5 percent preference and 4½ percent 
preference A dividends were paid in full, and preference B holders received 3 
percent, which allowed the payment of a one-half percent dividend to ordinary 
shareholders, the first such ordinary dividend since 1864.195 The holders of these B 
preference holders are unknown, but their benevolent action suggests that many 
must have been closely associated with the Great North board. 
Revenue and debt gearing continued to strengthen between 1871 and 1874.196 The 
improving finances of the company allowed the board in 1872 to agree to progress 
192 Report to the 40th Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 4 
October 1872, pp.181-86 and page 1 of inserted printed report. 
193 Report to the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 12 
February 1873, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, pp.237-38 and page 1 of inserted printed report. 
194 36&37 Vic cap.104, 1873, The Great North of Scotland Railway Act, in which arrears of 
dividend on 5 percent preference stock were consolidated into a redeemable 4 percent 
preference stock. 
195 Report to the 43nl Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 27 
March 1874, pp.376-78 and page 1 of inserted printed report; Appendix, table 10(d). 
196 Appendix, tables 10(d) and 10(e); debt gearing at 31 July 1871 was 0.226 and at 31 July 
1874 was 0.279. Gross annual revenue rose from £196,918 in July 1871 to £240,764 in July 
1874. 
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the extension of the Banffshire Railway from Portsoy to Buckie, 197 which had been 
postponed in 1865.198 However, the decade following the Great North's financial 
crisis of 1866-68 was one of consolidation for the company and the route of this 
extension was still under negotiation in 1875.199 
- hidden debt: the Highland Railway 
This chapter has identified that the Highland held larger temporary debt than the 
Great North, which continued to grow until 1869.200 Matheson claimed that 'The 
opening of the Highland has given the northern counties a fresh start' ,201 but the 
Railway News noted the onset of a 'period of trial and financial depression' for the 
Highland 'after a short period of apparent prosperity'.202 The Highland succeeded in 
negotiating bank loans in 1866 for three years at 5 percent,203 but the Great North 
had to pay 6 percent in 1866-67 .204 The greater financial influence of the Highland 
197 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 22 August 1872, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, 
p.162. 
198 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 18 May 1865, NAS/BR/GNS/1/5, p.391; 
30&31 Vic. cap.190, 1876, the Great North of Scotland Act, in which the Great North and 
Banffshire Railways were amalgamated, but also in which the proposed Banffshire extension 
from Portsoy to Buckie was abandoned. 
199 Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 5 August 1875, NAS/BR/GNS/1/9, p.530; 
the Buckie line was authorised under 45&46 Vic. cap.126, 1882, The Great North of Scotland 
(Buckie Extension) Act; Railway Times, 11 September 1886, p.326: the railway did not reach 
Buckie until May 1886 when the coastal route from Portsoy to Elgin opened. 
200 Appendix, table 1 O(f) and 11 ( e ). 
201 Railway Times, 5 May 1866, pp.514-15. 
202 Railway News, 12 May 1866, p.505. 
203 Railway Times, 5 May 1866, pp.514-15: Matheson reported to the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 27 April 1866 that, In the previous half-year from 31 
August 1865 to 28 February 1866, the Highland had paid 'the current rate' of 7% interest; 
Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 April 1866, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.148-49 and page 2 of inserted printed report: ' ... the floating debt of the 
Company has been consolidated and is to bear interest at the rate of 5 percent from 
Whitsuntide next'. These 5% loans were negotiated in December 1865 and January 1866 
(footnotes 216,217,218 and 219). 
204 Railway Times, 8 April 1871, p.334, quoting Duncan's address to the Ordinary General 
Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway held on 30 March 1871; Report of the 
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was also evident from the stock supplied as security. Its temporary loan debt was 
closely matched by stock at par value due to the additional security given by the 
personal guarantees of directors, whereas the Great North had to supply significantly 
more stock than the value of its loans, reflecting its lower credit status (table 79). 
Table 79: Bank debt and stock held in security: the Great North and Highland 
Railways, 1867-72 
Great North of Scotland (£) 01.1887 07.1887 01 .1888 07.1888 01 .1889 07.1889 
Balances due to bankers 345972 303171 350348 181549 94331 91963 
Stock held in securitv 457240 448266 456973 162040 132361 131512 
Highland (£) 02.1867 08.1867 02.1888 08.1868 02.1869 08.1869 
Balances due to bankers 505000 535000 535000 565000 625000 625000 
Stock held in securitv 505000 535000 535000 565000 524000 524000 
Great North of Scotland (£1 01 .1870 07.1870 01 .1871 07.1871 01 .1872 07.1872 
Balances due to bankers 39099 32674 32695 10300 0 0 
Stock held in securitv 47061 37636 37538 18400 6000 6000 
Highland (£) 02.1870 08.1870 02.1871 08.1871 02.1872 08.1872 
Balances due to bankers 625000 605000 520000 450000 0 0 
Stock held in security 524000 504000 384000 274000 0 0 
Sources: Appendix, tables 10(c) and 11 (e); Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1849-75, 
NAS/BR/RACIS\/1 /14. 
(1): The significant fall in the amount of Great North stock held in security between the first and second half 
veers of 1868 reflects the imoact of the refinancina oackaae aareed with its bankers on 1 Aoril 1868. 
The new Highland Railway quickly appreciated the impact on its revenue from the 
tolls agreed by the Inverness and Perth Junction with the Scottish North-Eastern in 
1861 for use of the line into Perth, identified in the previous chapter. 205 The annual 
cost was close to £10,000,206 but a request to convert the tolls into a fixed annual 
payment of £5,000 was refused by the Scottish North-Eastern.207 Despite mounting 
debt, the Highland proposed construction of its own line into Perth although, as 
Sinclair suggests, the promotion was doubtless intended as a competitive lever to 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 30 March 1871, 
NAS/BR/GNS/1 /9, p.10. 
205 Minutes of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 7 February 1861, NAS/BR/SNE/1/1 , 
p.397-98. 
206 Appendix, table 11 (b). 
207 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 22 September 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.25; Minutes of 
the Directors of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 8 September 1865, NAS/BR/SNE/1/3, 
p.59. 
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seek better terms.208 The cost of this new 11 mile line was estimated at £124,000, 
but, following an arbiter's report, the directors acknowledged the strained finances of 
the company.209 An agreement for use of the Perth line was finalised in June 1866 
at an annual charge of £5,000,210 and clauses were included in the Caledonian and 
Scottish North-Eastern amalgamation act to protect Highland traffic.211 
Highland records reveal a constant struggle to obtain sufficient capital. In 
September 1865, Charles Waterston, manager of the Caledonian Bank in Inverness, 
was elected to the board, which recognised the importance of that bank to the 
Inverness railway web.212 However, not all banks were accommodating; the 
Commercial Bank required additional stock as security in November 1865 'in 
consequence of the recent fall in the price of the Company's shares .. .'.213 When 
Bruce was unsuccessful in securing a £150,000 loan from the Standard Insurance 
Company, attention turned to the London capital market because there was 'little 
prospect of finding such a sum elsewhere in Edinburgh'. 214 In December 1865, 
London supplied £140,000 for 3 years, but backed by preference stock and directors' 
208 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 22 September 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.25; Railway 
Times, 1 April 1865, p.194; Herapath's Railway Journal, 1 April 1865, p.364; NT Sinclair, The 
Highland Main Line, p.30. 
209 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 13 December 1865 and 8 May 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, 
p.83 and p.154. 
210 29&30 Vic. cap.350, 1866, The Caledonian and Scottish North-Eastern Railways 
Amalgamation Act: section 59 set the toll for Highland Railway access to Perth at £5,000 per 
annum; Minutes of the Highland Railway, 7 and 19 June 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.167 and 
p.172; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 30 October 1866, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.218-19 and page 2 of inserted printed report 
211 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 8 May 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.154; 29&30Vic. 
cap.350, 1866, The Caledonian and Scottish North-Eastern Railways Amalgamation Act: 
clauses 48-59 set out arrangements with the Highland Railway. 
212 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 22 September 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.27: Waterston 
had been a director of the Inverness and Nairn Railway from 31 May 1858 until its 
amalgamation with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway in May 1861, 
NASIBR/INR/1/1, p.544. 
213 Letter from the Commercial Bank dated 2 and 3 November 1865, in minutes of the 
Highland Railway, 7 November 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.54. 
214 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 7 November, 1865, 9 November 1865 and 5 December 
1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.54, p.65 and p.79. 
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personal guarantees.215 The 5 percent interest rate obtained may reflect some 
influence of the directors, given that bank discount rates were 7 percent in December 
1865 and did not fall to 5 percent until September 1866.218 A £100,000 loan at 5 
percent for 3 years was secured via Waterston at the Caledonian Bank in January 
1866,217 and £110,000 due to the National Bank was extended to December 1868.218 
Thus, £350,000 was obtained from banks for three years, equivalent to £17½ million 
on a 2007 price base,219 backed by company stock and the personal security of 
directors. 
Despite their individual wealth, the faith of directors making that scale of commitment 
should not be underestimated. Pressure from the Duke of Sutherland in 1866 for 
payment of an agreed subscription of £30,000 to the new Sutherland Railway220 
caused the Highland board to respond sharply that, while the Duke had contributed 
extensively to the companies forming the Highland, he and his commissioner George 
Loch had declined to give personal guarantees,221 whereas without the guarantees 
of other directors and 'the large sums held by them in ordinary stock, to larger 
amounts than His Grace's contributions', there would have been no railway from 
which the Duke could have sought a northerly extension.222 
215 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 30 December 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.89. 
216 Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83. 
217 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 2 January 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.90. 
218 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 12 January 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.97. 
219 See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
220 The Sutherland Railway is considered in chapter 9, 'The Far North lines: ownership and 
control'; 28&29 Vic. cap.169, 1865, The Sutherland Railway Act, authorising the construction 
of a railway from Bonar Bridge to Brora with share capital of £180,000 and borrowing powers 
of £60,000. The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railways were each authorised to subscribe £15,000, a commitment inherited by the 
Highland Railway in 1865. 
221 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 25 May 1857, NAS/NR/IAJ/1/1, 
p.282. 
222 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 30 January 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.101-102: the 
board recorded that 'the other Directors severally contributed largely according to their ability 
to important schemes which did not reach or pass through their respective estates' and, 
without their investment and personal guarantees, 'Railway enterprise in this part of the 
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Further pressure from Loch for the Highland subscription revealed that all unissued 
stock of the company was held by directors as their security for personal guarantees 
given for loans and so no capital could be raised for the Sutherland Railway unless 
shares held by directors were appropriated.223 Highland accounts for August 1866 
show that only £180,000 of share capital remained unissued, which suggests the 
limited security available to directors for their guarantees of the £485,000 of bank 
debt.224 Unsurprisingly, the directors declined to reduce their security held in shares 
or to raise the capital limit of the company, which introduced an untypical tension 
over finance between Highland board members as the next chapter will illustrate.225 
The directors were anxious to demonstrate that the Highland was a sound enterprise 
and, as identified earlier, interest costs were split between revenue and capital 
accounts to maintain a dividend.226 When questioned by shareholders in May 1866, 
Bruce stated that this had been a common practice since the Inverness lines were 
formed, but expressed the intent to pay all interest from revenue,227 which was 
accomplished in the August accounts.228 In April 1867, Directors reminded 
country would long since have been utterly crushed, and would never have reached the 
borders of the County of Sutherland'. 
223 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 19 June 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.168-69, recording 
that 'The whole of the unissued Capital of the Company is held by the Directors who have 
subscribed these Bills as a security for the advances guaranteed by their signatures. Under 
these circumstances no advances could be made by the Highland Company to the 
Sutherland line except by issuing further capital on the Security of the Directors or by 
appropriating part of the shares which now form their Security'. 
224 Accounts of the Highland Railway to 31 August 1866, in minutes of the 30 October 1866, 
NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, pp.218-19, showing authorised capital in August 1866 was £2,909,960, 
comprising £2,209,080 in shares and £700,880 in debentures. £2,722,249 of capital had 
been raised, £2,029,077 in shares and £693,172 in debenture loans, and therefore £180,003 
remained unissued in shares and £7,708 unissued in debentures; Appendix, table 11(a). 
225 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 19 June 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.170. 
228 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 20 March 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.132. 
227 Railway Times, 5 May 1866, p.515. 
228 Appendix, table 11 (b), showing half-year interest charged to revenue in February 1866 to 
be £19,280, but £29,148 for the following half year to August 1866; Report to the Ordinary 
General meeting of the Highland Railway, 30 October 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.218-219 
and page 2 of printed inserted report, stating that interest had been charged in full to 
revenue. 
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shareholders that interest continued to be charged to revenue, 'otherwise the 
dividend would have been nearly 4 percent'. 229 
The Highland's performance justified the commitment of its directors. Gross revenue 
rose consistently, all guaranteed dividends were paid from revenue from August 
1866 and ordinary dividend increased steadily (table 80). In addition, economy in 
operations kept working expenses as a low proportion of receipts. 
Table 80: Revenue indicators for the Highland Railway, 1867-74 
Half year data (£) 02.1867 08.1867 02.1868 08.1868 02.1869 08.1869 02.1870 08.1870 
Gross Revenue 96362 103766 100169 107164 102563 110964 101251 113645 
Net revenue 51792 58494 53721 64420 61743 67000 60138 68616 
Interest & dividends 51715 56778 53603 62271 61619 65791 60032 65101 
Balance 77 1715 118 2148 123 1208 106 3514 
Ordinary dividend 1% 2% 1% 3% 2¼% 3½% 2% 4% 
Working exoenses 42% 40% 42.5% 38.5% 37% 34% 37% 33.39% 
(£1 02.1871 08.1871 02.1872 08.1872 02.1873 08.1873 02.1874 08.1874 
Gross Revenue 107967 118799 123117 131140 124792 133872 134288 146322 
Net revenue 65598 70004 73518 77945 66201 73627 65581 75239 
Interest & dividends 65480 69140 73078 75459 65917 70593 65466 73208 
Balance 117 863 440 2485 284 3033 115 2031 
Ordinarv dividend 4% 5% 6% 6% 4¼% 5% 4% 5% 
Workina expenses 35.76% 34.57% 36.41% 35.53% 43.48% 39.13% 48.59% 42.54% 
Source: Appendix, table 11lbl. 
The Highland was commended for its improvement: 
For a line the stock of which is so largely held by the resident gentry - by 
parties who look not to interest on their outlay so much as to improvement in 
the value of their estates - to be paying four percent is a result which must be 
considered throughout the locality as more than successful.230 
229 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 29 April 1867, 
NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, pp.286-87 and page 2 of inserted printed report: declared ordinary dividend 
was 1 % for the half-year to February 1867. 
230 Railway Times, 22 October 1870, p.1053. 
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The Highland was able to recycle its temporary debt and obtained £160,000 at 4½ 
percent in 1867 from the British Linen Bank for one year to repay the £110,000 loan 
from the National Bank and a personal advance of £50,000 given by director James 
Merry.231 With £405,000 of temporary loans due for repayment in December 1868, 
Matheson and Dougall sought renewals at lower interest, because discount rates 
were currently 2½ percent.232 The Union Bank offered £60,000 at an initial 4½ 
percent for three years,233 and £375,000 held with the Commercial, British Linen and 
Caledonian Banks was renegotiated for two years at 4 ¼ percent. 234 With the 
Highland's sound revenue account and the personal contacts and guarantees of 
directors, credit was available and its approval presented little risk to the banks. 
Bank lending reached a peak of £625,000 in 1869.235 The level of temporary debt 
had accumulated throughout the decade as the result of difficulties in raising share 
capital for the Inverness railway web, but the consolidated company was trading 
successfully. The policy of the Highland board, therefore, was to guarantee loan 
capital whilst building traffic, revenue and dividend, thus making shares more 
attractive to investors, and then seek to release stock held in security and use the 
proceeds from sales to redeem the debt. This policy was, however, only sustainable 
because of the considerable personal financial commitments of the directors. 
231 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 3 September 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.318: the British 
Linen Bank loan attracted interest of 4½ %, ½ % cheaper than the loans taken in 1865-66. 
232 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 4 February 1868, NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, p.363; Bradshaw's 
Railway Almanack, 1875 edition, appendix 12, p.83, showing discount rates at 2½ % 
between May 1867 and July 1868 when rates fell to 2%, rising back to 2½ % in November 
1868. 
233 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 17 March 1868, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.373: the loan was 
agreed for two years, with the first year at 4½ % interest and the second year at 2½ points 
above bank deposit rate. 
234 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 1 and 18 September 1868, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.413, 
p.416, p.423 and p.427: the loans renegotiated were for £160,000 at the British Linen Bank, 
£95,000 at the Commercial Bank and £120,000 at the Caledonian Bank. 
235 Appendix, table 11 (e): £625,000 of bank loans were held for three half-years, to February 
1869, to August 1869, and to February 1870, but with only £524,00 of stock in held in 
security, which suggests that the banks' assessment that the degree of risk of default was not 
high, given the additional security provided personally by Highland directors. 
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In 1869, shareholders approved the conversion of debenture loans into debenture 
stock at 4¼ percent, which yielded a potential saving in interest payments and 
offered greater stability in managing future debt charges.238 By August 1870, with 
dividend reaching 4 percent, market interest in company stock was increasing.237 In 
January 1871, the remaining £15,400 of unissued preference B stock was reported 
as taken.238 Furthermore, the board was able to repay £45,000 to the Union Bank 
and £25,000 to the Caledonian Bank in January 1871 to reduce debt.239 
By June 1871, £33,540 of released preference stock had been sold;240 by 
September, preference share sales had yielded a further £55,505 and Matheson and 
Dougall were authorised to sell unissued ordinary stock at a premium of £105 'if that 
price can be got'.241 A multiplier effect then acted swiftly to reduce the level of bank 
236 Report of the Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 28 April 1869, 
NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, pp.492-96; Minutes of the Highland Railway, 10 April 1866, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.140, recording the setting of debenture interest rates at 5% for 3 years, 
4¾ % for 5 years and 4½ % for 7 years: there was therefore a potential saving of between 
¼% and ¾% by progressively converting debenture loans into debenture stock. 
237 Appendix, table 11 (b ). 
238 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 3 January 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.44, at which 
Dougall reported that the £15,400 of preference B stock remaining unissued at the last 
Ordinary General Meeting had now been sold: Matheson and Dougall were authorised to fix 
the time to sell the remaining £8,350 of preference A stock; Accounts of the Highland Railway 
to 31 August 1870, published at the Ordinary General Meeting held on 28 October 1870, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.25-26, show that £505,245 of the authorised £513,650 4½ % preference 
A stock and £384,362 of the authorised £400,000 5% preference B stock had been issued, 
leaving therefore just £8,405 of A stock (1.6%) and £15,638 of B stock (3.9%) unissued either 
to shareholders or as security for loans at 31 August 1870; unissued preference A stock in 
the accounts differs from sum reported to the board by £55 and preference B stock by £238. 
239 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 3 January 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.44. 
240 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 6 June 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.86. 
241 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 4 July, 1 August and 5 September 1871, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pages 92, 97 and 102, recording that £17,750 of preference A shares were 
sold by 4 July, a further £8,000 by 1 August and £29,755 by 5 September 1871. The amount 
of available ordinary stock was reported to the board on 5 September 1871 to be £400,000 
(p.102). This figure was almost certainly an approximation because the accounts show that 
£274,000 of ordinary shares had been issued as security for loans and guarantees, which 
implies that £126,000 of shares remained unissued. However, the accounts of the Highland 
Railway to 31 August 1871, reported to the Ordinary General Meeting held on 27 October 
1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.111-16, record that £994,046 of the £1,115,350 authorised 
ordinary share capital had been issued, leaving £121,304 unissued. There is therefore a 
difference of £4,696 between the accounts data and the figure of available ordinary stock 
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debt as the rising market demand for shares was supplied by stock reclaimed from 
banks as loans were redeemed and by stock previously held by directors as security 
for their personal guarantees. Interest costs were halved between 1869 and 1872 as 
capital receipts from the sale of released shares progressively reduced company 
debt.242 From £625,000 of bank loans in February 1870, the level fell to £520,000 by 
February 1871 and was eliminated completely by February 1872.243 
The main source of funds to trigger this rapid elimination of temporary debt came 
from the sale of ordinary shares previously unissued or held in security for loans. 
These shares, with a par value of £385,390, were offered from 1 December 1871 at 
par to shareholders and at a small premium on the open market.244 Within a week, 
Highland shareholders had bought £127,000 of shares, the proceeds of which were 
used to repay bank loans; the board requested a London share quotation and 
'resolved no more to be sold after this week under £105'.245 
All available stock was sold by February 1872, with £14,817 received as a premium 
over par, indicating an average premium of 3.8 percent per share, although at the 
given to the board on 5 September 1871, although this represents only 0.4% of authorised 
share capital. 
242 Appendix, table 11(b): in August 1869, interest charged to revenue was £31,594, which 
fell to £28,862 in August 1870, £26,219 in August 1871 and then to £15,511 in August 1872. 
243 Appendix, table 11 (e). 
244 Minutes of the Highland Railway,· 18 October 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.111; Report to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1 /2, p.116 
and page 2 of inserted printed report, recording that Highland shareholders were to be 
offered a rights issue of £20 of new stock for every £100 of stock held provided it was fully 
paid up on the specified date of issue, 1 December 1871; Appendix, table 11 {a): the capital 
account to 31 August 1871 records £274,000 of ordinary stock was still held in security and 
£111,000 had been released from security as a result of debt repayment. This total of 
£385,000 of ordinary stock corresponds with the £385,390 balance of ordinary stock reported 
to the Ordinary General Meeting on 27 October 1871 (p.116) as available for sale. 
245 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 5 December 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.124: £80,000 
was repaid to the British Linen Bank (£160,000 had been borrowed in September 1868) and 
£47,500 repaid to the Commercial Bank (£95,000 had been borrowed in September 1868). 
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peak of sales, some shares sold at £110.246 When Railway Times published its first 
quotation of Highland shares in February 1872, the price was shown as £120-125.247 
Aided by rising revenue, the effect of this rapid debt repayment on the Highland's 
debt gearing was marked. From a level in 1866-70 equivalent to the insolvent 
Caledonian in 1849, the company strengthened to a position in 1872-74 that rivaled 
earlier exemplars of sound financial management, the Deeside and the Scottish 
Midland Junction Railways (table 81).248 
Table 81: Financial indicators for the Highland Railway, 1867-74 
31 Au11ust 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Gross half year 103766 107164 110964 113645 118799 131140 133872 146322 
revenue (£) 
Gross annual 200128 207333 213527 214896 226766 254257 258664 280610 
revenue (£) 
Ratio of debentures 24.8% 24.6% 24.9% 25.0% 25.5% 23.1% 23.1% 22.9% 
to capital raised 
Ratio of gross 0.162 0.164 0.161 0.165 0.197 0.363 0.369 0.400 
revenue to total 
debt 
Source: Appendix, table 11 (c) . 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 0.162 for 
cross revenue/debt. 
While the depth of the financial crisis for the Highland had, in absolute terms, been 
larger than that for the Great North, the financial backing of its directors, their ability 
to secure credit at relatively favourable rates, and the strengthening trading position 
of the company resulted in a dramatic recovery between 1869 and 1872. The board 
meeting of 6 February 1872 reviewed the list of major loans taken and repaid. 
246 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 2 January and 6 February 1872, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.130 
and p.139: £385,390 of shares were sold with a premium of £14,817 received. However, 
£127,000 of these shares were sold to Highland shareholders at par, so therefore the 
premium was generated by the £258,390 of shares sold on the market, which produces an 
average premium per share of 5. 73%, although the average premium for all available shares 
was 3.84%. The premium held in the reserve fund was reported to be £14,544 by 25 April 
1873 (NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.266). 
247 Railway Times, 17 February 1872, p.177, quoting the price of £100 of Highland Railway 
stock. Great North stock was quoted on this date at £41-43. 
248 Appendix, tables 7(c), 11(c) and 20(c). 
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Table 82: Major temporary loans taken and repaid by the Highland Railway 
Loan(£) Source Taken out Repaid Note 
(or renewed) 
60500 Commercial Bank 06.08.1861 02.12.1862 1 
(for the Inverness end Aberdeen Junction Railwavl 
110000 National Bank (originally taken by the Inverness 01.01 .1866 11 .09.1867 2 
and Aberdeen Junction Rallwavl 
20000 Roval Bank 13.11 .1866 09.11 .1870 
50000 Scottish Provident Institution 15.05.1869 13.05.1871 3 
50000 Lord R Leveson-Gower 21 .12.1866 15.05.1871 4 
50000 Lord A Leveson-Gower 21 .12.1866 15.05.1871 4 
60000 Union Bank 08.09.1868 08.09.1871 
10000 James M Graham 13.11 .1866 08.11 .1871 
95000 Commercial Bank 21 .10.1870 03.02.1872 5 
160000 British Linen Bank 31 .12.1870 19.01 .1872 6 
20000 Life Association of Scotland 10.08.1866 03.12.1871 
30000 Standard Life Assurance Comoanv 20.10.1869 26.12.1871 7 
20000 Caledonian Bank 03.09.1864 14.09.1867 
100000 Caledonian Bank 31 .12.1864 03.02.1872 
(835500) 
Source: Minutes of the Hiqhlend Railwav, 6 February 1872 NAS/BR/HR/1/2 P.140. 
(1 ): The Commercial Bank loan of £60,500 was taken by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway and 
renewed on 23 June 1860 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.147): the first installment of repayment (£5,500) was made on 
16 October 1861 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, pp.273-74). 
(2): The National Bank loan comprised three parts: £25,000 was taken by the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway on 2 January 1864 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.521); on 2 June 1864, an additional £15,000 was 
provided by the National Bank to the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction (with a further £50,000 loan granted 
in the same negotiations to the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway) (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.12), and a further 
£70,000 on 6 December 1864 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1 /3, p.69). An additional temporary loan of £20,000 was taken 
by the Inverness end Aberdeen Junction from the National Bank on 1 March 1865 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.91), 
but this loan does not feature in the data contained in the Highland minutes of 6 February 1872. 
(3): The Scottish Provident Institution loan dates from 20 March 1866 (NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.133). 
(4): Lords Albert and Ronald Leveson-Gower were sons of the 3rd Duke of Sutherland (Burke's Peerage, 
Baronetage and Knighlage, 107th edition, vol.Ill, Delaware USA and Stokesley UK, 2003, p.3821). 
(5): The Commercial Bank loan of £95,000 was taken from 21 December 1865 initially for three years and 
consolidated some earlier loans provided by the bank within in this new total amount (NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, p.84). 
(6): The British Linen Bank loan dates from 1 October 1867 (NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.318 and p.327), initially for 
one year end was used to repay the National Bank loan: it was renewed on 18 September 1868 
(NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.423). 
(7): The Standard Life Assurance Company loan was first taken on 6 October 1866 (NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, p.21 O). 
(8): The loans detailed in this company minute do not represent all loans taken by the Highland Railway or its 
constituents. The earlier historv of some of these minuted loans is traced in the table notes above. 
The Highland directors formally marked the end of their personal financial 
commitments: 
The Secretary stated that the Bonds, Bills and Agreements referred to in the 
foregoing statement were now on the table, whereupon it was resolved to 
commit them to the fire, which was accordingly done in the presence of the 
meeting. 249 
249 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 6 February 1872, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.141 . 
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The directors were able announce the Highland to be 'entirely free of debt'.250 
Shareholders recorded their appreciation to the directors 'for having interposed their 
personal security for the large sums of money required during many years to carry 
the undertaking through its difficulties ... '.251 Moreover, Matheson's successful work 
in uniting the constituents of the Highland company and protecting its territory was 
widely acknowledged.252 The astute management of the Highland retained the 
premiums received from the sale of shares in 1872 in a reserve fund and used 
£10,596 the following year to cushion the effect of a short-term reduction in revenue 
as the result of a serious harvest failure in the north, which allowed the maintenance 
of a 6 percent dividend.253 Subsequent dividends in 1873-74 ranged from 4 to 5 
percent.254 The Railway News observed: 
250 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 26 April 1872, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.161-62 and page 2 of inserted printed report: 'Since the last meeting, the 
balance of ordinary stock amounting to £385,390 had been disposed of, and with the 
proceeds, the last installment of the Temporary Loans, which then stood at £450,000, has 
been paid, thus enabling the Directors to make the satisfactory announcement that the 
undertaking is now entirely free of debt'. 
251 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 26 April 1872, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.169. 
252 Railway Times, 6 November 1875, p.1055 and p.1065: 'Mr Matheson has served them 
[the shareholders] well for many years, and to his intimate knowledge of the district and its 
capabilities, and to his able and successful exertions in uniting together the several 
undertakings of which it is composed, and afterwards in protecting it from aggression, they 
are mainly indebted for the successful position their property now holds'. Further examples 
recognising Matheson's work include: Railway Times, 4 November 1871, p.1067, 20 July 
1872, p. 727, 3 May 1873, p.468, 8 November 1873, p.1126, and Railway News, 30 July 
1870, p.110, 20 July 1872, p.72, 1 May 1875, p.595. 
253 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 1 April 1873 NAS/BR/HR/1 /2, p.253; Report to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 25 April 1873, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.261-
62, p.266 and page 2 of printed report, noting a half-yearly traffic increase of only 
£162.18s.11d, which was 'unprecedented' and attributed to failure in the potato and grain 
crops; Railway Times, 3 May 1873, p.468, reporting Matheson's statement of agricultural 
losses in the seven northern counties as a result of crop failure amounting to £ 1.162 million; 
Appendix, table 11(b), showing a fall of 15% in net revenue from £77,945 in August 1872 to 
£66,201 in February 1973 whereas the equivalent period August 1871 to February 1872 had 
produced a rise of 5% from £70,004 to £73,518. 
254 Appendix, table 11 (b ). 
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... the Highland occupies an unusually favourable position, and should, in its 
limited way, be one of the safest and best investments of its time.255 
The Highland exercised its remaining capital powers in 1872 to meet agreed 
subscriptions of £50,000 to the Sutherland and Caithness Railway and £35,000 to 
the Dingwall and Skye Railway.256 In 1874, new capital powers were authorised, 
because the Highland now worked the Sutherland, Duke of Sutherland's, Sutherland 
and Caithness and Dingwall and Skye Railways and had 'incurred debts and 
liabilities to an amount exceeding the capital they are authorised to raise ... '.257 The 
strategy and finance behind these nominally independent companies, which 
completed the framework of the northern railway network, are examined in the 
following chapter. 
The new Highland and Great North of Scotland Railways Inherited considerable 
capital debt through the amalgamations of 1865-66. The impact of the Highland's 
direct Inverness-Perth line and the financial weaknesses of its branch companies 
resulted in the Great North increasing its bank borrowing to try to remain solvent, but 
it could not meet all of its guaranteed payments until 187 4. The Highland began its 
independent existence with substantial bank loans to cover capital costs incurred by 
its constituents and the company only avoided defaulting on its guaranteed 
payments in 1865-66 by charging a proportion of interest to capital. This chapter has 
identified the scale and significance of the hidden debt accumulated by these two 
northern companies, factors that have been largely absent from historiography but 
255 Railway News, 25 October 1873, p.552. 
256 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 26 April 1872, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.169: £39,920 was raised under the Highland Railway Act 1865, £30,000 
under the Sutherland Railway Act 1865, £35,000 under the Dingwall and Skye Railway Act 
1865, and £50,000 under the Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act, 1871. This £154,920 
capital was offered on a rights Issue at £14 of stock for every £100 held, but at a premium 
price of £15.13s for every £14 allotted (11.8%), which illustrates the enhanced value of 
Highland Railway stock. 
257 37 Vic. cap.3, 1874, The Highland Railway (Additional Capital) Act, which gave power to 
raise £500,000 in ordinary or preference share capital with £166,000 in borrowing powers. 
397 
which overshadowed future railway development in northern Scotland for almost a 
decade. In 1870, when 48 percent of United Kingdom railway capital excluding 
loans required fixed-interest payments,268 both companies remained highly geared 
and had only just begun to convert debenture loans into fixed-interest stock. 
Excluding temporary bank loans, guaranteed payments were required for 69 percent 
of Great North capital and 63 percent of Highland capital.259 
Whilst there were similarities in the reasons for the major financial crises faced by 
the two companies in 1865-66, not least of which had been the persistent difficulty in 
raising sufficient ordinary share capital, the capacity of each to resolve its problems 
was very different. The Highland held a good prospect of repaying its considerable 
debts because it had captured the bulk of the traffic from northern Scotland, it had 
established a rising trend of revenue, and it was able to obtain bank credit through 
the contacts and personal guarantees of many of its directors. Using these financial 
advantages, the Highland directors gained time to strengthen the company's 
revenue and thereby its dividend, whereupon Highland shares became more 
attractive to investors and the large amounts of stock held in security for bank loans 
were progressively released and sold to redeem the debt. Notwithstanding their 
personal wealth, the almost unique feature of this successful strategy for the 
Highland's financial recovery was the degree of risk that some of its directors were 
able and prepared to accept to protect their company and their Interests. Moreover, 
the chapter has identified that Inverness directors proposed in 1864 to work new 
proposed independent railways in the far north and west at cost, introducing a facet 
of public service into the future policy of highland railways, which suggests their 
commitment to providing a railway network in northern Scotland to meet local needs, 
but from which increased land values and improved economic prospects for the 
region might indirectly accrue. 
The Great North also held a significant burden of debt, albeit proportionately smaller 
than its Highland rival, but, without the security of northern traffic passing over its 
258 TR Gourvish, Railways and the British Economy, 1830-1914, p.18; TR Gourvish, 
'Railways 1830-1870: the formative years', in MJ Freeman and DH Aldcroft (eds.), Transport 
in Victorian Britain, p.67. 
259 Appendix, table 25. 
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route to Aberdeen, its future revenue stream was uncertain. It was unable to service 
its debt and faced financial collapse in December 1866 as banks began to sell Great 
North stock held In security to recover some of their funds. Aberdonlan banks and 
the Great North had been closely associated since the 1840s, as chapter 3 has 
shown, and the Great North's salvation was to be achieved through a re-financing 
agreement with its bankers. This chapter has explained the decisive role undertaken 
by the banking sector to ensure the survival of the Great North, within which their 
own substantial funds were committed, but it has also indicated a strategic role 
played by one of these banks in particular in shaping the future direction of the Great 
North. Furthermore, the chapter has identified that a majority of ordinary share 
capital of the Great North was held in England, a factor which influenced the decision 
to capitalise the arrears of preference dividend in order to be able to offer a small 
ordinary dividend to rebuild confidence in the company on the capital market. This 
English shareholding may reflect investment interest generated during the period of 
Great North prosperity, but it may also include some longer-term holdings from 1845-
46; unfortunately, no share registers survive to test these possibilities. 
The Great North and the Highland both emerged successfully from their own 
particular financial crises and discharged their bank loans by 1872. They remained 
as independent enterprises despite their earlier exploration of leasing arrangements 
with the Caledonian. The new Great North, confined to its north-eastern territory in 
1866, faced a continuous task to rebuild its traffic, customer loyalty and revenue 
throughout the rest of the period covered by this study. The Highland, however, had 
to respond to new railway promotions in the far north and west of the highlands 
whilst it was still tackling its burden of debt. These promotions form the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Highland development, 1865-74 
Map 10: Inverness railway companies and the Skye and Far North routes 
Oalwhinnle 
Independent companies in the highland area 
D&SR: Dingwall and Skye Railway 
DoSR: Duke of Sutherland's Railway 
S&CR: Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
suR: Sutherland Railway 
Constituents of the Highland Rallway 
l&AJR: Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
l&NR: Inverness and Nairn Railway 
l&PJR: Inverness and Perth Junction Railway 
l&RR: Inverness and Ross-shire Railwav 
Dufftown 
Other companies 
GNSR: Great North of Scotland Railway 
MR: Morayshire Railway 
SR: Strathspey Railway 
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By the time the Highland Railway was formed in 1865, 1 new independent companies 
were being promoted to connect the far north and west of the highlands with the 
northern railway network. The difficulties of raising capital for such remote routes 
were likely to be severe, given the economic disadvantages of the region and the 
paucity of population, illustrated in chapter 2. The Inverness railway system already 
served the agricultural seaboard of Easter Ross, as chapter 6 has indicated, but in 
1864 it had been extended beyond its planned terminus at lnvergordon to Bonar 
Bridge on the southern border of Sutherland-shire, induced by the offer of a 
significant financial contribution from the Duke of Sutherland. The study has 
previously shown that the Inverness railway companies were substantially financed 
and controlled by large landowners, who sought improved transport links to connect 
the northern counties with national markets in order to improve land values and the 
regional economy. Historiography, however, suggests that any such benefits 
accrued over the long-term and are difficult to quantify.2 
This chapter investigates the planning and realisation of these remote railways 
between 1865 and 1874, which completed the main framework of the railway system 
of northern Scotland, and it focuses particularly on the sources and management of 
their finance. The first section considers the motivation of railway promoters in the 
highlands and their existing influence within the Inverness railway web, through 
which the policy of working these lines close to marginal cost was adopted for the 
benefit of the landowners and the wider public interest. The following section 
examines the precarious development of the Skye Railway to the west and reveals 
its inherent financial weaknesses that mirrored earlier Great North branch expansion. 
The final section explores the establishment of the far north route to the ports of 
Wick and Thurso and identifies the extensive capital injections made by the Duke of 
1 28&29 Vic. cap.168, 1865, The Highland Railway Act, which authorised the amalgamation 
of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and Inverness and Perth Junction Railways (see 
chapter 7); the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway had previously amalgamated with 
the Inverness and Nairn Railway (1861) and the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway (1862) 
(see chapter 6). 
2 wvamplew, 'Railway Investment in the Scottish Highlands', Transport History, 3, No.2 
(July 1970), pp.149-52: Vamplew suggests that parishes through which railways passed in 
Sutherland showed a greater increase in land values that those without, but cautions that 
'this took time to become apparent' and there was 'no instantaneous effect'. 
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Sutherland who prompted, drove and controlled its evolution through three 
independent linked companies. 
Both these northern lines replicated much of the earlier experience of railway 
development promoted from Inverness. Ownership and control remained unified 
within them, but the difficulties of raising share capital beyond the contribution of 
local landowners required the consistent support of the banking sector to provide an 
alternative source of finance. Railway development in the far north in 1865, 
however, faced a specific additional constraint because wealthy local landowners 
were in very short supply. 
Highland strategy 
When the Highland Railway's Aberfeldy branch opened in July 1865, shareholders 
were told: 'This completes the Highland Company's system, which extends to 246 
miles'.3 Chairman Matheson had repeatedly stated the intention of the Inverness 
promoters to consolidate the system and not to seek extensions.• The completion of 
the Inverness-Perth line in 1863 prompted new independent schemes, but Matheson 
distanced the Inverness web from direct involvement, emulating the intended branch 
line strategy of the Great North a decade earlier: 
The Caithness people are most anxious to have a line to Wick; the people of 
Fort-William want one to Kingussie; and the people to Skye are urging one 
from Dingwall to the West coast ... and my answer to them has been, that if 
they subscribe the capital and make the lines, they will find us anxious to 
3 Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865. 
NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, pp.42-43 and page 2 of inserted printed report: the Aberfeldy branch from 
the main Perth-Inverness line at Ballinluig opened on 3 July 1865 and provided the 
connection that had been originally authorised in the Strathtay and Breadalbane promotion of 
1846 and outlined in chapter 3, table 20(c); Herapath's Railway Journal, 15 October 1864, 
p.1202. 
• Herapath's Railway Journal, 22 November 1862, p.1206, and 8 October 1864, p.1166; 
Railway Times, 7 November 1863, p.1434. 
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afford them all reasonable assistance and encouragement in order to 
complete them, and to work them afterwards when they are completed. 5 
Also like the Great North before, Matheson identified the projected lines as sources 
of potential traffic to the main trunk route.6 Although the Railway Times noted 'a 
handsome return to the landed gentry' that had supported the Inverness companies,7 
the far north offered even less population from which traffic might be generated 
(table 83). 
Table 83: Population of northern counties, 1861 
County Population Percentage of Scottish ooDulatlon 
Caithness 41111 1.34% 
Inverness, including: 88888 2.90% 
Inverness /own 9518 10. 71" of the countv =nulation 
Ross and Cromartv 81406 2.66% 
Sutherland 25246 0.82% 
Scotland 3062294 
Sources: National census data, in RH Campbell and JBA Dow (eds.), Source Book 
of Scottish Economic and Social History, p.2 and insert 8; EHL MacAskill, 
The Highland Transport Revolution: the growth of the Highland railway 
network 1855-1930, vol.3 (Highland Environmental Link Project, 1988), 
D.15. 
In 1864, as the Ross-shire extension line was due to open to Bonar Bridge, 
Matheson informed Aberdeen Junction directors and shareholders of two new lines 
proposed in these sparsely-populated regions: 
5 Herapath's Railway Journal, 7 November 1863, p.1181, reporting Matheson's statement to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 27 
October 1863: the board meeting held on the same day as the shareholders' meeting, 
however, had agreed to work the proposed railway from Fort William to Newtonmore on the 
Perth Junction line, not Kingussie as Matheson stated to shareholders (Minutes of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 27 October 1863, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2.p.489). 
6 Herapath's Railway Journal, 9 April 1864, p.423, reporting Matheson's' statement to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 30 March 
1864: 'Should these lines be carried out, they cannot fail to prove useful feeders to the 
Junction and Perth lines in common with the southern railways'. 
7 Railway Times, 1 October 1864, p.1306. 
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.. . the Duke of Sutherland was desirous of extending Railway 
Communication northwards from Bonar Bridge, and had offered to subscribe 
£100,000 provided other parties interested suitably supported the project.11 
A scheme for constructing a Line from Dingwall to the West Coast has been 
brought forward under favourable auspices and, as the Line, if made, cannot 
fail to throw a large traffic on your Line which is presently entirely lost to it, 
your Directors view the project favourably ... 11 
Two of the principal promoters were large landowners in the districts to be served by 
these lines and already major investors in Inverness railway companies. The Duke 
of Sutherland, who owned 1.326 million acres of Sutherland-shire by 1872, sought a 
railway connection from his vast territories.10 Sutherland had a gross income in 1865 
of £100,853 (over £5 million on a 2007 price base11 ) from his English and Scottish 
estates and eventually invested £322,064 in the Highland Railway and lines to the 
north of Inverness (over £16 million on a 2007 price base).12 Alexander Matheson, 
chairman of the Highland Railway, who acquired 220,000 acres in east and west 
Ross-shire at a cost of £750,000, was particularly drawn to a west-coast line that 
would connect to his western estates at Attadale and Lochalsh.13 There was a 
8 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 23 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.40. 
11 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway. 
28 September 1864, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.44 and page 2 of inserted printed report. 
10 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Ufe in the Highlands, vol. II (private publication, 2 
volumes, London, 1883 and 1884, reprinted Newton Abbot, 1971), p.79 and p.116: the 
Duke's acreage in Sutherlandshire (1,326,000 acres) comprised approximately three-quarters 
of the county (1,840,000 acres). 
11 See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
12 E Richards, 'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: Income, Consumption, Investments 
and Returns, 1780-1880', Business History, vol. XXI (1979), p.54; D Stirling, 'Land, Railways 
and the Dukes of Sutherland', Highland Railway Journal, 4, No.56 (early 2001), p.5: these 
sources quote investment by the Duke of £99,864 in the Highland Railway, £94,200 in the 
Sutherland Railway, £63,000 in the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, £60,000 in the Sutherland 
and Caithness Railway and £5,000 in the Dingwall and Skye Railway (£322,064), although 
the Railway News, 1 August 1874, p.138, gives figures of £116,000 invested in the 
Sutherland Railway and £105,000 in the Highland Railway in addition to £60,000 in the Duke 
of Sutherland's Railway and £60,000 in the Sutherland and Caithness Railway (£341,000). 
13 HGC Matthew and B Harrison (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol.37 
(Oxford, 2004), pp.280-81, also noting that the purchase and improvement costs of all 
Matheson's lands exceeded £1.46 million. 
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contrast between the sources of these major investments; the wealth of Matheson 
was acquired through the far-east trading firm of Jardine-Matheson while the Duke of 
Sutherland inherited the fortune of the Stafford family, but both used their wealth to 
try to improve their estates and, thereby, the northern economy.14 Sinclair 
conjectures that the independence of the early Inverness railway companies was 
due to 'a fortune made from the Chinese opium trade';15 indeed, Matheson 
expressed concern in the 1840s that the opium trade might be legalised and lead to 
a loss of profit.18 
These two wealthy individuals had a fundamental influence on the strategy of railway 
development into the far north and west of Scotland. The northerly extension was 
intended from the outset to reach the north coast at Wick and Thurso. Parliamentary 
powers were to be sought for the Sutherland Railway to link Bonar Bridge to Golspie, 
supported by £50,000 from the Duke of Sutherland and £30,000 from the Inverness 
companies, with an extension from Golspie to Wick and Thurso, assisted by a further 
£50,000 from Sutherland 'on the condition that the County of Caithness contributes 
£100,000, the Inverness Companies £50,000, and that the balance of the necessary 
Capital be satisfactorily raised' .17 
Matheson's personal interest was in the proposed Dingwall and Skye Railway,18 
which was perceived to be an Inverness web scheme, 19 but he declared that both 
14 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD thesis, Aberdeen University, 2001 ), 
p.25; TM Devine, Clanship to Crofters' War: the social transformation of the Scottish 
Highlands (Manchester, 1994), p.82. E Richards, 'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: 
Income, Consumption, Investments and Returns, 1780-1880', p.65 and p.67. 
15 NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998), p.33. 
18 HGC Matthew and B Harrison (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol.37, 
pp.280-81. 
17 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 23 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.40. 
18 Railway News, 30 July 1870, p.110, describing Matheson as the 'chief promoter' of the 
Dingwall and Skye Railway. 
19 Railway Times, 23 July 1864, pp.993-94: a leading article on the proposed Dingwall and 
Skye Railway noted that' ... this scheme may be regarded as following in the course of the 
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northern lines were promoted 'under the auspices of independent Companies'. 20 An 
Aberdeen Junction shareholder, Mr Grant, expressed concern about the 'many 
instances of through lines that were highly productive of themselves being almost 
ruined in consequence of making rash connections with new lines which were not 
equally remunerative' ,21 no doubt recalling the recent history of the Great North. 
Grant described the country to be served by the proposed Skye line as 'by no means 
populous, and ... very remote and unimproved'; moreover the Skye line had 'no 
concentrated population at the proposed terminus'.22 These characteristics reflected 
those featured in Aytoun's infamous Glenmutchkin lampoon of the 1845 railway 
mania: co-incidentally, Aytoun was a shareholder in the Aberdeen Junction at this 
time.23 A comparison between the Great North and the Highland was later drawn by 
Matheson, who contrasted the 50 miles of Great North main line and 'nearly 200 
miles of branch lines which do not answer, and which the resources of the country 
are scarcely sufficient to support' with the Highland's 230 miles of trunk route and 
only 14 miles of branches.24 
Matheson assured Inverness shareholders that 'The whole cost of working the 
proposed lines would have to be met by their own Shareholders, so that the main 
whole of the Inverness projects that have been devised and so successfully carried out by Mr 
Mitchell'. 
20 Herspath's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1166, reporting Matheson's statement to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 28 
September 1864. 
21 Railway Times, 6 October 1864, p.1323, reporting Mr Grant of Kincorth's statement to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 28 
September 1864. 
22 Herspath's Railway Journal, 6 October 1864, p.1166, reporting Mr Grant of Kincorth's 
statement to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
held on 28 September 1864. 
23 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1, showing WE Aytoun as holder of £500 of ordinary shares in the Inverness 
and Aberdeen Junction Railway on 31 July 1864 and 31 January 1865; Aytoun died at Elgin 
in August 1865 (Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford, 1967-68, pp.774-75); WE Aytoun, 
'How we got up the Glenmutchkin Railway and how we got .out of it', Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine 58 (November 1845), 453-466. 
24 Railway Times, 3 November 1866, p.1266, reporting Matheson's statement to the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 30 October 1866. 
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line could lose nothing', although he also announced that 'a proposal had been made 
that they should work them at the cost price'.25 Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
directors had resolved to work the far north lines 'at prime cost, but not to exceed 75 
per cent of the receipts .. .',26 yet Matheson's assertion that 'the trunk line could not 
possibly lose by such an arrangement'27 also implied that it would gain little either, 
other than from traffic passing onto its system. Cost price working was a realistic 
strategy to help these new lines to become economically viable, given the limited 
traffic that was likely on both extensions, but the statement suggests the intent to 
operate the far north railways for the wider economic interests of the region rather 
than solely for shareholder returns. Such a policy was sustainable because the 
principal railway shareholders were also the large local landowners, whom the 
Railway News acknowledged 'had not anticipated profit but ... collateral advantage, 
and to be satisfied if the business can only be made to pay its way' .28 The Highland 
board built its form of marginal cost pricing into the working agreement made with 
the Skye Railway in 186829 and extended it to the far north route in 1871-72. 30 This 
policy principle for northern lines correlates with the conclusion drawn by Hawke for 
25 Herapath 's Railway Journal, 8 October 1864, p.1166, reporting Matheson's statement to 
the Ordinary General Meeting of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway held on 28 
September 1864; Railway Times, 8 October 1864, p.1323. 
26 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 23 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.40. 
27 Railway Times, 8 October 1864, p.1323. 
28 Railway News, 30 October 1875, p.584. 
29 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 30 October 1868, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.430-31 and page 2 of inserted printed report, recording that 'the 
Directors do not believe it is the wish of the Highland shareholders to secure a large profit by 
working the Skye Line ... ' and setting out the agreement to charge for two trains daily each 
way at 2s per mile with additional trains charged at 1 s.1 0d per mile. 
30 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 7 February 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.51, Special General 
Meeting of the Highland Railway, 28 April 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.73-74, page 2 of 
inserted printed report and pp.78-82, and minutes of the Highland Railway, 5 March 1872, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.149, which extended the Sutherland and Duke of Sutherland Railways 
working agreements to terminate ten years following the opening of the Sutherland and 
Caithness Railway. The Sutherland and Caithness Railway opened in July 1874. 
407 
England and Wales that the pursuit of profit maximisation regionally by railway 
companies in this period was 'not energetic'. 31 
The Sutherland and the Dingwall and Skye Railways were authorised in 1865 during 
the same parliamentary session in which the Highland Railway was incorporated.32 
Unlike the Great North, which had taken strong overt control of the boards of its 
branch companies, the Sutherland and Skye boards preserved an outward 
independence as a result of the strong landowner presence within these companies, 
but the Highland held a covert control both in direction and operation. On the 
Sutherland Railway, the Duke of Sutherland was empowered to appoint two of the 
five directors provided he held at least £30,000 of stock,33 while the Aberdeen 
Junction and Perth Junction were authorised to nominate one director each and 
Matheson and Bruce were appointed. 34 The Earl of Caithness, promoting a far north 
line between Wick and Thurso at the time, was included on the Sutherland board as 
it was expected that a connection would be made between the two lines in due 
course.35 As the Duke nominated himself and his commissioner, George Loch, both 
also Highland directors, the board was, in essence, a Highland committee, although 
company records show that many board meetings comprised only the Duke and his 
commissioner, reflecting the Duke's personal financial commitment. The Skye board 
comprised eight directors, of which two were to be nominated by the Caledonian 
Railway and one each by the Aberdeen Junction and Perth Junction in return for 
31 GR Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870 (Oxford, 
1970), p.333. 
32 28&29 Vic. cap.169, 1865, The Sutherland Railway Act, with authorised share capital of 
£180,000 and borrowing powers of £60,000; the Act authorised construction from Bonar 
Bridge to Brora, 6¼ miles further than the original 1864 objective of Golspie (recorded in 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.40); 28&29 Vic. cap.223, 1865, The Dingwall and Skye Railway, with 
authorised capital of £450,000 and borrowing powers of £150,000. 
33 28&29 Vic. cap.169, 1865, The Sutherland Railway Act, section 14; Minutes of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 17 March 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.95. 
34 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 28 October 1865, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1 /1, p.10. 
35 29&30 Vic. cap.292, 1866, The Caithness Railway Act. 
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their proposed subscriptions.36 As the previous chapter has indicated, however, the 
Caledonian did not invest and the first board appointed included five Highland 
company directors, including Matheson and Bruce. 37 
Under the Sutherland and Skye incorporations, the Highland inherited powers from 
its Inverness constituents to subscribe £30,000 to the Sutherland and £50,000 to the 
Dingwall and Skye, but the Highland's financial difficulties precluded any immediate 
response.38 Nevertheless, Highland shareholders were informed of the 
commencement of work on the Sutherland Railway and the authorisation of the 
independent company to construct the Skye line, and assured that the lines would 
generate substantial traffic for the Highland.39 
Highland company strategy, therefore, was to support the extension of railways 
northwards and westwards into unpromising economic regions, providing some 
capital injection, relinquishing profit from working agreements, and relying instead for 
a return from traffic passing onto the Highland system. Capital for the lines was to 
be provided substantially by local landowners, not primarily for dividend, but for 
improved transport links with their large estates and the broader subsidiary objective 
of encouraging economic development in the districts served. The chapter now 
turns to examine the development of these two northern railways, first across the 
north-west highlands to the west coast and Skye, and then through Sutherland and 
Caithness to the northernmost ports of Wick and Thurso. 
36 28&29 Vic. cap.223, 1865, The Dingwall and Skye Railway Act, with authorised capital of 
£450,000 and borrowing powers of £150,000: the Caledonian Railway was authorised to 
subscribe £100,000, and the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and Inverness and Perth 
Junction Railways £25,000 each. 
37 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 28 October 
1865, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, p.26: the first Skye board comprised eight directors of which five 
were also Highland Railway directors (Matheson, Bruce, Mackintosh, Lovat and Fraser-
Tytler), thus forming a majority. 
38 Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43 and page 2 of inserted printed report; Railway Times, 4 November 
1865, p.1407: Matheson reported that "the excess of capital expenditure over capital 
received is significant' and that over £½ million of bank debt had been incurred; see also 
chapter 8, 'Hidden debt: The Highland Railway'. 
39 Report to the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43 and page 2 of inserted printed report. 
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The enigma of the Skye Railway 
The routes of the Inverness railway web were constructed following careful advance 
planning by its promoters, particularly by securing landowner agreements before 
seeking incorporation to avoid expensive parliamentary contests. The proposed 
Dingwall and Skye Railway appeared to be no different when, in 1864 and a year 
before authorisation, the Railway Times reported that 'The whole of the landlord 
gentry is naturally in favour of this scheme; three-fourths of the land are already to 
be given in exchange for shares .. .'."0 With sparse population along its route, 'cheap 
railway' principles were essential. Mitchell estimated the line could be constructed 
for £5,500 per mile, while Highland secretary Dougall calculated a 4½ percent return, 
although this was advertised in the prospectus as 'a remunerative return'.41 
Matheson told Aberdeen Junction shareholders he believed that 'the projected line 
would pay well', but he also stated that additional traffic should be the principal 
motive to justify support for the Dingwall and Skye and that any dividend 'ought to be 
a secondary consideration'.42 A public meeting in July 1864, timed to coincide with 
the Inverness Sheep and Wool Market to attract maximum support for the Skye 
promotion, identified potential traffic from sheep, fish, tourism and the island steamer 
trade, but also intimated the wider value of the line to the district: 
... the proposed railway cannot be made unless all come forward strenuously 
to aid us ... We do not ask you to give us your money for nothing, although to 
many in the district, it would be of more importance to have the line than to 
be without it.43 
"° Railway Times, 23 July 1864, pp.993-94. 
41 Meeting of 'Landowners and others interested in the formation of a Railway from Dingwall 
to the West Coast', held at Westminster, 26 April 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.1; Herapath's 
Railway Journal, 16 July 1864, p.824; Prospectus of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, in 
Railway Times, 16 July 1864, p.976. 
42 Railway Times, 20 May 1865, p.641. 
43 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 15 July 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.5, reporting 
a public meeting in Inverness; Herapath's Railway Journal, 16, 23 and 20 July 1664, pages 
832, 856 and 888, publishing the prospectus of the Dingwall and Skye Railway. 
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Matheson asserted that the Skye line would mean that 'they would hear no more of 
emigration'.44 Subscriptions from promoters announced at the meeting amounted to 
£40,200, of which £5,000 was offered by the Duke of Sutherland. £12,000 by 
Alexander Matheson and £3,000 by Sir James Matheson; in addition, Matheson and 
Sutherland offered to take stock for land, 24 miles in the case of Matheson and 3 
miles for Sutherland.45 Just under half of the land required was therefore available 
from two promoters and a further 14 miles, owned by Lord Hill, was anticipated 
under a similar agreement.46 By October 1864, a quarter of the projected share 
capital had been subscribed.47 
The positive launch of the Skye scheme mirrored earlier Inverness promotions, but 
the Dingwall and Skye presents an enigma in comparison to the carefully planned 
and ordered realisation of the Highland Railway's constituents. Ross notes that 'For 
businesslike characters like Matheson and Dougall, the confused management of 
the Dingwall and Skye project seems odd, but Matheson had other concerns ... • and 
suggests that one cause was the lack of a specific supervisor to oversee the Skye 
line, unlike the appointments of Bruce on the Perth Junction or Murray on the 
Sutherland.48 The undoubted pre-occupation of Matheson and Dougall was to 
« Herapath's Railway Journal, 30 July 1864, p.862. 
45 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 15 July 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.6: Sir James 
Matheson was the uncle of Alexander Matheson and the head of the Jardine-Matheson 
trading company; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.I, p.269, notes 
that Sir James Matheson Bt owned the western island of Lewis and an estate in Sutherland, 
serving as Member of Parliament for Cromarty in 1847-68. Sir James Matheson died in 
1878; Alexander Matheson was created a baronet in 1882, taking the title of Lochalsh. 
46 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 15 July 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.6 and 30 
December 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.12. 
47 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 6 October 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.8: by 6 
October 1864, £101,160 (22.5%) was subscribed of the £450,000 share capital authorised in 
the 1865 Act, exclusive of shares in return for land, although the Act (28&29 Vic. cap.223, 
1865) also identified the expected cost of the line as £400,000, £50,000 less than the 
authorised capital.. 
48 o Ross, The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005), p.60; Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 2 
July 1866, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.26, recording the appointment of Kenneth Murray of Geanies 
as superintendent and local agent (Murray was a factor of the Duke of Sutherland); Bruce 
was appointed managing director of all the Inverness web lines in 1863, recorded in minutes 
of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction railway, 27 October 1863, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.490. 
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ensure that Highland Railway remained solvent and repaid its considerable debt for, 
without success, the entire Inverness network would have been threatened. 
The Skye enigma arose even before the company was incorporated. Opposition 
emerged from some landowners, resulting in delays that had not been experienced 
elsewhere on the Highland system and disagreement amongst the original 
promoters surfaced, which was also a contrast to the previous harmony in Inverness. 
Of the ten individuals appointed to act as a sub-committee to manage Skye affairs 
until parliamentary authority was obtained, Matheson, Bruce, Mackintosh and Fraser 
of Lovat were already Inverness web directors and banker Waterston was soon to 
join the Highland board.49 Of the remaining five members, all with interests in the 
district to be served by the line, Davidson of Tulloch near Dingwall, who had offered 
land for stock in 1864,50 opposed part of the route, two other committee members 
were ultimately threatened with legal action for non-payment of calls, including the 
chief of Clan Macleod who had chaired the public meeting in Inverness, while a 
fourth, Sir John Stuart, was later a prime instigator of the 1872 unofficial committee 
of investigation. 51 
By February 1865, Davidson and Lord Hill proposed to petition against the bill and 
Sir William Mackenzie, who had spoken in favour of the line at the 1864 public 
meeting and whose name appeared on the prospectus, also announced opposition 
to the bill 'unless certain proportions as to the course of the Line and the nature of 
the works are conceded ... '·. 52 Unusually, Inverness promoters faced a costly 
49 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 6 October 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.9. 
50 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 6 October 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.9. 
51 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 30 December 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.12, 
recording Davidson's objection to the route east of the Dingwall Canal, and Baillie of 
Dochfour's disagreement with being allocated 500 shares: Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye 
Railway, 19 October 1866, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.39, recording the resignation of Macleod of 
Macleod as deputy chairman over difficulties in meeting calls on his £7,000 subscription; 
Minutes of an Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 13 July 
1872, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, p.156, recording the report of a 'so-called Committee of 
Investigation', membership of which included Sir John Stuart and Sir John Fowler (both 
recently resigned directors of the Skye company), and the resolutions passed at the meeting 
that refuted the allegations against the board. 
52 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 6 October 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, pp.17-18; D 
McConnell, Rails to Kyle of Lochalsh (Headington, Oxford, 1997), p.22; 28&29 Vic. cap.223, 
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parliamentary contest and, when problems emerged over the route at Lochluichart, 
the earlier practice of railway promoters to pay compensation above land value that 
had been largely absent in the north was agreed 'to get rid of this opposition'. 53 Lady 
Ashburton at Lochluichart sought £4,000 for land for which company was prepared 
to pay up to £2,000, but Davidson and Lord Hill were principally concerned about the 
route of the railway over their property, issues that on earlier Inverness lines were 
resolved before draft legislation reached parliamentary scrutiny.114 
The evidence therefore suggests that the Skye promotion was not subject to the 
same degree of preparatory negotiation as earlier Inverness web lines to forestall 
possible landowner claims, and that such work that was undertaken proved less 
successful. The Dingwall and Skye, however, faced potential competition for west-
coast island trade from the Callander and Oban Railway, authorised in 1865 with 
large financial support from the Scottish Central, a commitment inherited by the 
Caledonian on amalgamation that year.55 As a result, the Skye promoters faced 
some pressure to achieve a western railhead and establish trading links before any 
competitors, which may have contributed to some omissions in the usual 
thoroughness of planning. 
Although the Caledonian had expressed an interest in July 1865 in subscribing 
£50,000 to the Dingwall and Skye, the act of incorporation permitted a Caledonian 
investment of £100,000 with a further £50,000 to be subscribed from Inverness web 
1865, The Dingwall and Skye Railway: section 34 of the act specifically prescribed that the 
railway should cross four miles of Mackenzie's estate at Coul 'with as little Detriment as 
possible'. 
53 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 6 October 1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, p.19. 
54 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 24 February 1865, 21 March 1865 and 22 June 
1865, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.19, p.20 and p.22. 
55 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 12 September 1865, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3; General minutes of shareholders of the Scottish Central Railway, 18 
March 1865, NAS/BR/SCC/1/15: the Scottish Central Railway was to subscribe £200,000 to 
the Callander and Oban Railway, representing one third of the estimated cost of the line, and 
to work the line in perpetuity; 28&29 Vic. cap.266, 1865, The Callander and Oban Railway 
Act; Prospectus of the Callander and Oban Railway, 1864, NAS/BR/PRO(S)/1/3; Minutes of 
the Callander and Oban Railway, 26 July 1864, NAS/BR/COB/1/1, pp.5-11, reporting the 
preliminary meetings between promoters and the Scottish Central to establish the Callander 
and Oban Railway: Herapath's Railway Journal, 6 August 1864, p.909. 
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companies.56 With control of the Callander and Oban and a large interest in the 
Dingwall and Skye, the Caledonian would have acquired a dominant influence in all 
west-coast trade. A third of authorised capital for the Dingwall and Skye was 
therefore expected from other railway companies, but the Caledonian was unable to 
provide its proposed £50,000 subscription and no Highland investment was 
forthcoming whilst its capital problems remained.57 Thus the Dingwall and Skye 
began its existence with a major shortfall in capital and, like earlier Inverness 
railways, it had to rely substantially upon local sources, which proved to be 
inadequate. 
The threat to west-coast trade posed by the Callander and Oban receded once the 
Caledonian realised the capital costs of driving a route through the West Highlands 
to Oban,58 which had been the core of the abortive Scottish Grand Junction scheme 
of 1845-46 and the original subject of Aytoun's Glenmutchkin lampoon. 59 The 
Caledonian's committee of inquiry urged abandonment of the Oban line in 1868. 60 In 
56 28&29 Vic. cap.229, 1865, The Dingwall and Skye Railway Act, authorising subscriptions 
from the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway (£25,000), the Inverness and Perth 
Junction Railway (£25,000) and the Caledonian Railway £100,000). 
57 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 7 July 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, 
p.148, recording the offer of the Caledonian Railway to subscribe £50,000 to the Dingwall 
and Skye Railway; Minutes of the Highland Railway, 10 August 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, 
p.193. 
58 List of Subscribers to 'The Callander and Oban Railway', 1865, NAS/BR/COB/2/1: of the 
28,337 £10 shares subscribed in 1865, the Caledonian Railway held 20,000, the Earl of 
Breadalbane 2,000 and the Duke of Argyll 600 (79.8%), with a further 1,500 shares held by 
four local directors (5.3%). Thirty (13.2%) of the 228 subscribers held one share and 137 
(60.1%) held 5 shares or less. 174 subscribers (76.3%) were resident in the western 
highlands and islands; only 12 subscribers (5.3%) were registered in England. The 
subscription pattern of the Callander and Oban was therefore similar to those of lines further 
north, in which the majority of capital, excluding investment by other railway companies, was 
supplied by a few large landowners and supplemented by many small local subscriptions. 
59 Railway News, 8 September 1866, p.252: ' ... about 20 miles of the Callander and Oban 
has been contracted for, so that a beginning may be said to have been made to the West 
Highland line, satirised by Aytoun twenty years ago as "the Great Glenmutchkin" '; chapter 2, 
table 19, gives details of the Scottish Grand Junction Railway. 
60 Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway, 3 
January 1868, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/3, page 10, paragraph 28; Resolution to the 47111 Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 29 September 1868, NAS/BR/CAU1/3, 
proposing no further expenditure on the Callander and Oban 'until the proprietors raised 
sufficient funds which, with the Caledonian subscriptions approved, is sufficient to reach 
Oban'. 
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March 1869, the Caledonian proposed to limit Callander and Oban capital to 
£243,900 and their share of it to £162,000, and to terminate the line at Tyndrum, 
over 30 miles from Oban, where drove roads from the west and north-west joined 
and traffic could be tapped.61 The state approved abandonment of the Oban section 
in 1870, but, following new powers in 1874, the railway reached Oban in 1880.62 
The threat of competition to the Dingwall and Skye was delayed, therefore, but not 
removed. The Oban route provided one of the stimuli for a later extension of the 
Skye Railway in 1893 to a west-coast terminus at Kyle of Lochalsh, aided by a 
£45,000 state grant towards the estimated cost of £270,972, which reversed the 
long-standing state policy of refusing public investment in British railways.63 
Although the Dingwall and Skye was authorised in July 1865, difficulties in resolving 
landowner disputes resulted in a decision 'that no steps will be taken until these 
difficulties are removed'.64 Matheson, appointed chairman of the Dingwall and Skye 
in August 1865, reported that Lord Hill had agreed terms, that Davidson 'has been 
more reasonable', but that Mackenzie 'remains as obstinate as ever'.65 Directors 
61 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 30 March 1869, 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/4: the Caledonian also proposed to work the Callander and Oban at cost 
price; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 29 September 
1868, NAS/BR/CAU1/3, recommending extension of the Callander and Oban from Glen Ogle 
to Tyndrum because Glen Ogle was 'a terminus so unfavourably situated ... and nothing but 
loss could result from its working'. 
62 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Caledonian Railway, 30 September 1870 
and 22 September 1874, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/4; 33 Vic. cap.9, 1870, The Callander and Oban 
Railway (Abandonment) Act, reducing authorised capital to £243,000 with borrowing powers 
of £81,300; Railway Times, 11 October 1873, p.1020, reporting the opening of the line to 
Tyndrum on 1 August 1873; 37&38 Vic. cap, 110, 1874, The Callander and Oban Railway 
(Tyndrum to Oban) Act. 
83 o Ross, The Highland Railway, p.93: the extension estimate was £233,873 plus £37,099 
for harbour work; D McConnell, Rails to Kyle of Lochs/sh, pp.128-29 and p.138; 56&57 Vic. 
cap.91, 1893, the Highland Railway Act, with capital of £200,000 and borrowing powers of 
£66,000 to extend the line from Strome to Kyle of Lochalsh and construct a pier at Kyle. 
84 28&29 Vic. cap.223, 1865, The Dingwall and Skye Railway Act; Report to the 111 Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 28 October 1865, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, 
p.27. 
65 Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1422, reporting Matheson's address to the 1st 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway held on 28 October 1865, In 
which he stated that 'under the circumstances, we must postpone doing anything at 
present...'; Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 2 August 1865, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, 
p.23. 
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could report no progress a year later because of continuing difficulties with finance 
and land.66 
With the impact of the Overend Gurney collapse of 1866 on investors' confidence, a 
new and remote Scottish line held no appeal on the national capital market. Of the 
authorised share capital of £450,000, only £91,000 was considered certain by 
September 1866, but a shareholders' circular indicated that a further £26, 160 had 
been offered.67 Maximum funds of £153,160 were identified and the board 
recommended a revised plan to terminate the line at Attadale on Loch Carron, giving 
the nearest deep water access to a sea outlet, for which the cost was estimated at 
£220,000.68 By October 1867, the directors reported that a further £40,000 had been 
raised from additional subscriptions, sufficient to begin construction, and a deviation 
bill was proposed to obviate the remaining difficulties with landowners.69 The 
resultant legislation in 1868 reduced the capital of the company and re-routed the 
line, principally avoiding Mackenzie's obstruction at Strathpeffer, but thereby by-
passing the one significant settlement on the original route.70 
68 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 30 October 
1866, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, pp.35-37: 'The Directors have to report that chiefly in consequence 
of the state of the money market during the last twelve months, the Works have not been 
commenced, and they regret to say that the difficulties in arranging with certain landowners 
on the Line alluded to in [the] last Report still exist'. 
67 Circular to shareholders of the Dingwall and Skye Railway. 5 September 1866, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.37: £91,000 of original subscriptions were regarded as secure, £26, 160 
had been offered in new subscriptions, £6,000 was estimated to represent funds derived from 
the value of land offered for the railway in return for shares, and £30,000 was estimated as 
potential contributions from other railway companies, a total of £ 153, 160. 
68 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 30 October 
1866, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, pp.35-37 and circular to shareholders included in minute book, 
dated 5 September 1866, p.37, giving the estimated cost of the line to Lochcarron as 
£220,000; Railway News, 25 April 1868, p.461, reporting the Special General Meeting of the 
Dingwall and Skye Railway on 15 April 1868 to approve the parliamentary bill by when the 
cost was estimated to be £238,500. 
69 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 30 October 
1867, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, pp.43-44, recording the extra subscriptions,' ... and this, with the 
sum originally subscribed, will admit of the Line being made from Dingwall to Lochcarron, a 
distance of 50 miles'. 
70 31&32 Vic. cap.19, 1868, The Dingwall and Skye Railway (Deviations} Act, which reduced 
share capital to £400,000 and borrowing powers to £133,300; Mackenzie owned the Coul 
estate west of Strathpeffer through which the railway was planned to pass for four miles 
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Highland shareholders approved a working agreement with the Skye Railway in 
October 1868, two years before the line opened.71 Previously, the Highland Board 
had expressed a preference for an agreement 'with security of due payment of the 
working expenses' as on the Sutherland, but a majority also favoured a rebate to the 
Skye 'for all Traffic thrown on the Highland line' and so clearly were not seeking 
maximum profit.72 Rather than adopt the more usual practice of charging a 
proportion of receipts, the agreement provided for two trains per day each way at 2 
shillings per mile and any additional trains were to cost 1 s 1 Od per mile from which 
the Highland expected to cover its working expenses, irrespective of gross revenue 
earned on the Skye line.73 There was some Highland shareholder dissent expressed 
about the level of charges and even the principle of working the line. In response to 
concerns that 'One penny on each mile was a very small margin' ,74 the return was 
'not worth their trouble' and a possible amalgamation with the Skye Railway, deputy 
chairman Bruce assured shareholders that 'No word will be spoken about 
amalgamation until the Highland is paying 5 percent' .75 
{section 34 of 28&29 Vic. cap.223, 1865, prescribed that the line should cause 'as little 
Detriment as possible ... ' when crossing the Coul estate). 
71 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 30 October 1868, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.430-31 and page 2 of inserted printed report. 
72 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 13 May 1868, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.398. 
73 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 30 October 1868, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.430-31 and page 2 of inserted printed report. 
74 The figure of one penny per mile as a return for working the Skye line, quoted by a 
shareholder (Railway Times, 7 November 1868, pp.1126-27), implies that the working 
agreement assumed a maximum 4% margin charged over operating costs of the daily trains. 
75 Railway Times, 7 November 1868, pp.1126-27, reporting the Ordinary and Special 
General Meetings of the Highland Railway held on 30 October 1868: one Highland 
shareholder {AG Dallas of Dochfour House, Inverness, who was also a Skye director) pointed 
out that the Highland directors held £1 million of shares in the Highland, but only £30,000 in 
the Dingwall and Skye. 
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Construction tenders were accepted in August 1868, although the two contractors 
refused to take the full £2,500 of stock sought from each by the board.78 A 
settlement of £2,000 was made with Davidson for land," but, Ironically, an arbitration 
award of £283 to Mackenzie, who had been the principal cause of the need to divert 
the line, came in January 1869 after his death.78 Following questions about the 
wisdom of terminating the line at Attadale, the western terminus was extended by 5 
miles alongside Loch Carron to Strome Ferry at an additional estimated cost of 
£5,232.79 The need for economy was emphasised when the engineer advised three 
months later that the cost would be £2,000 more and was told that 'savings must be 
effected' and that the cost must not exceed £5,300.80 
Replicating the experience of other remote northern railways, the Dingwall and Skye 
was unable to raise sufficient share capital and had to resort to banks as an 
alternative source of capital to meet construction costs. Shareholders were notified 
of the dates of calls on shares to try to ensure a flow of funds,81 but, in August 1869, 
arrears on shares amounted to £75,857, a third of the par value of stock created.82 
The company secured a £30,000 loan from the Commercial Bank for three years, but 
backed by £105,000 of stock and directors' guarantees.83 This loan was increased 
76 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 8 August 1868 and 18 September 1868, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.54 and 55: contractor Granger took £1,500 of stock and contractor 
MacDonald £2,000. 
n Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 20 October 1868, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.59. 
78 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 4 January 1869, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.68. 
79 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 23 March 1869, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.72. 
80 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 4 June 1869, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p. 75. 
81 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1 February 1869, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.70: a 
circular was agreed giving the dates of remaining calls and amounts due on 24 February 
1868 (£2), 26 April 1869 (£1.1 Os), 28 June 1869 (£2) and 15 December 1869 (£1.10s). The 
deposit and first call totalling £3 had already been made. 
82 Appendix, table 8(a): £238,500 of shares of the £400,000 authorised were created, 
although £105,000 of ordinary shares were issued as security for a bank loan in June 1870. 
83 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 4 June 1869, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p. 74: at this 
date, £6 1 Os had been called on the £_10 shares and therefore the par value of the stock in 
security represented £68,250, over twice the loan value. 
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to £50,000 in August 1870.84 Borrowing powers were exercised in September 1869, 
which implies that stock issued as bank security was included in the total claimed as 
subscribed, a device used earlier by the Inverness web and identified in chapter 6.85 
By the time the line opened in August 1870, almost three-fifths of the funds raised 
required fixed interest payments.86 Not all details of the capital accounts have 
survived, but, by 1872, the capital cost per mile was £5,557, almost exactly the 
Mitchell's estimate, albeit for a shortened line.87 
Some capital expenditure was unplanned. Under the original plans to build to the 
west coast, the Dingwall and Skye had intended to connect with the island steamer 
services operated by David Hutcheson, but the shipping company was unwilling to 
serve the railway terminus in Loch Carron 'without a serious loss of money and we 
have therefore resolved not to undertake it' .88 The Skye Railway board agreed the 
purchase of two ships for £6,800 in 1870,89 but in the first year of operation, the 
84 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 2 August 1870, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.108, 
recording an increase in the loan agreed with the Commercial Bank from £30,000 to £50,000 
at 4½ %: the original loan was approved on 4 June 1869 (p.74). 
85 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 8 September 
1869, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.84; Appendix, table 8(a); the authorised share capital revised in 
1868 was £400,000, of which £112,995 was reported as received and £75,857 In arrears by 
31 August 1869. Thus, half of the authorised capital had not been paid up by this date 
unless the £105,000 issued in security was also included in the total. 
86 Appendix, table 8(a): of the £230,580 shown as raised by 31 August 1870, debentures 
accounted for £79,481 and shares for £151,099 (which includes stock issued in security for 
bank loans). Thus, authorised debenture loans (£79,481) and temporary loans (£50,000) 
account for 56.2% of the funds raised by August 1870. 
87 Appendix, table 8(a), notes (6) and (7); Report of a public meeting at Inverness in support 
of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, in minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 15 July 
1864, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.6, which announced Mitchell's estimate of £5,500 for the line; 
Prospectus of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, in Railway Times, 16 July 1864, p.976, giving 
the estimate of £5,500 per mile for the line. 
88 Letter from Messrs Hutcheson and Co to the Dingwall and Skye Railway dated 21 
November 1870, in minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 25 November 1870, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.118. 
89 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 12 May 1870, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.102. 
419 
company's steamer service lost £2,582 to revenue and losses continued until 1877 
when the Highland agreed to take over the steamer operation. 90 
Matheson claimed the Skye line to be 'a main trunk line' and 'no mere branch line 
running into a Highland district, where there was a sparse population and a limited 
traffic', 91 but his optimism was not reflected in the revenue account. The Skye line 
reflected many of the financial characteristics of the earlier Great North branches. 
Although gross revenue covered operating expenses, interest payments exceeded 
the revenue balance throughout the independent existence of the company until it 
amalgamated with the Highland in 1880.92 After the first year of operation, for 
example, an operating surplus of £2,038 was only achieved by charging £2,212 of 
maintenance costs to capital, but even that adjusted balance was insufficient to meet 
the £6,862 due for debenture and temporary loan interest.93 During the winter 
months of 1870-71, the company sought economies by asking the Highland to run 
only one train each way each day, for which the Highland gave a £416 rebate.94 The 
Skye line also reflected seasonal extremes in gross revenue similar to other 
Inverness lines; an average of £524 per week was taken in August-September 1872, 
compared with only £131 per week in February 1873.95 
90 Appendix, table 8(b}; Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 7 August 1877, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.245, resolving to transfer the two steamers and ferry boats at valuation 
to the Highland Railway from 1 September 1877; 40 Vic. cap.4, 1877, The Highland Railway 
(Steam Vessels} Act; D McConnell, Rails to Kyle of Lochalsh, p.72. 
91 Railway News, 6 November 1869, p.483, reporting Matheson's statement at the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway held on 29 October 1869. 
92 Appendix, table 8(c} and accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1871-80, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1: interest due on debentures and temporary loans represented 
approximately half of gross revenue in 1871-77 and two-thirds in 1878-79; 43&44 Vic 
cap.129, 1880, The Highland and Dingwall and Skye Railway Companies Amalgamation Act. 
93 Accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway to 31 August 1871, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1 and 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/68; Appendix, table 8(c). 
94 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 25 November 1870, NAS. BR/DSK/1 /1, p.118; 
Minutes of the Highland Railway, 27 September 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.107, granting a 
£416 rebate for the four months from 1 December 1870 when only one train was operated 
each way on the Skye line. 
95 Data of traffic receipts for 4, 11, 18 and 25 August and 1, 8, 15, 22 and 29 September 
1872, in minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 20 August and 12 October 1872, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.161 and p.163, and for 2, 9, 16 and 23 February 1873, in minutes of the 
Dingwall and Skye Railway, 25 April 1873, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.177. 
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Dougall reported a capital deficit of £31,699 in February 1871,98 and, by the time of 
the shareholders' meeting in October 1871, the company owed £50,000 to the 
Commercial Bank, £10,000 to the Caledonian Bank with a further £20,000 applied 
for, and £15, 173 on overdraft: 
... it was impossible to avoid this result, in consequence of the original capital 
being insufficiently subscribed. The Directors have therefore been under the 
necessity of borrowing £90,000 to complete the Line ... 97 
The Highland Railway held inherited powers to subscribe £50,000 to the Dingwall 
and Skye. At the Highland shareholders' meeting in April 1872, the directors 
proposed to invest £35,000 in the Dingwall and Skye in return for two seats on the 
Skye board 'in consideration of the traffic already received, which is certain to 
increase .. .', and because 'the full benefit of connecting the Western Highlands with 
the railway system will not be realised until the line is extended several miles 
westwards towards the sea'.98 In proposing this subscription, the Highland board 
was replicating the Great North's approach to its branch investment in apparent 
contradiction of the Inverness web policy espoused by Matheson that the 
independent companies should 'subscribe the capital and make the lines'.99 
96 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 5 February 1871, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.127; 
Appendix, table 8(a): the Dingwall and Skye capital account shows a capital deficit of 
£36,856 at 31 August 1871. 
97 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 4 October 
1871, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, pp.139-40 and pages 1 and 4 of inserted printed report; Minutes of 
the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 6 September 1871, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.155, recording that 
the board were seeking an additional £20,000 loan from the Caledonian Bank; Appendix, 
table 8(a): company accounts show £60,000 of temporary loans in August 1871 (£50,000 
from the Commercial Bank and £10,000 from the Caledonian Bank) and £76,498 of 
temporary loans in August 1872. 
98 Railway Times, 27 April, 1872, p.431; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the 
Highland Railway, 26 April 1872, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.161-62 and page 2 of Inserted printed 
report; Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 4 June 1872, NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.152, 
recording acceptance of the condition of two Highland Railway board members in return for 
the £35,000 subscription and the nomination of TC Bruce and Col. H Inglis as directors. 
99 Herapath's Railway Journal, 7 November 1863, p.1181. 
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However, like the Great North branches, the Dingwall and Skye was insolvent and 
the Highland, which had cleared its temporary debt by February 1872, had either to 
give direct support to maintain the traffic flow onto its railway system or allow the 
company to become bankrupt. 
In April 1873, the Commercial Bank agreed to renew its £50,000 loan for two years 
at 4½ percent and the Caledonian Bank agreed the same terms for their £30,000 
loan.100 With increasing temporary debt and only a slow rise in gross revenue, the 
debt gearing for the Dingwall and Skye was as weak as most of the earlier Great 
North branches and significantly weaker than the Caledonian benchmark (table 84). 
The prospect of repaying debt was remote and debt gearing showed no indication of 
improvement by 1875.101 
Table 84: Financial indicators for the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1871-75 
31 Auaust 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 
Temporary loans (£ 60000 76498 80000 80000 80000 
Total debt includina debentures (£ 139481 155979 159414 162472 191172 
Gross annual revenue (£ 11328 14460 15063 17005 18587 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 34.1% 25.9% 25.6% 26.5% 32.7% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.081 0.093 0.094 0.105 0.097 
Source: Appendix, table 8(d). 
(1): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital 
and 0.162 for aross revenue/debt. 
Capital constraints had forced the Dingwall and Skye to retreat from its planned 
western coastal terminus, which hindered its prospects of economic success. The 
Railway Times reported discussions in 1870 concerning an extension six miles 
beyond Strome to the sea coast to improve traffic to the lsles.102 The Highland's 
proposed £35,000 investment offered two potential uses to give financial relief to the 
Dingwall and Skye. While funds were needed to redeem some of the accumulated 
100 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 25 April 1873, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, p.179. 
101 This study covers the period 1844-74, but accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, produce ratios of gross revenue to total debt that continued to be as weak 
in 1876-80 until amalgamation with the Highland Railway in 1880 (0.101 in 1876, 0.087 in 
1877, 0.069 in 1878, 0.067 in 1879, 0.075 in 1880). 
102 Railway Times, 5 November 1870, p.1092. 
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debts of its protege and thereby reduce the burden of interest payments on the 
revenue account, capital expenditure on an extension to the west coast offered the 
prospect of connections with established island shipping services, which would 
remove the drain on revenue incurred from operating the company's own steamer 
services. 
The financial difficulties of the Dingwall and Skye resulted in a small group of 
shareholders conducting an unofficial investigation and circulating two reports to 
shareholders and the local press that alleged financial impropriety.103 A 
shareholders' meeting was called by the board in July 1872 at which Matheson 
refuted the accusations.104 Shareholders expressed 'unabated confidence in the 
Board' and urged the directors 'not to notice any further statements that may be 
made in a similar manner by the same parties' .105 Matheson told shareholders that 
three-quarters of Skye share capital was held by Highland shareholders and he 
himself held £28,000; furthermore, the directors had borrowed £100,000 on their 
personal security, although that commitment had been reduced to £65,000 as a 
result of the Highland subscription.106 Matheson's statement confirmed that, like the 
earlier Inverness lines, the bulk of the capital for the Dingwall and Skye had been 
supplied locally and its paucity had required the acceptance of fixed-interest debt in 
order to finance the line; his own shareholding represented almost one-fifth of the 
103 Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 24 June 1872, p.154: at a meeting in London, 
the directors decided to hold a shareholders' meeting in Inverness on 13 July 1872, rather 
than publish a detailed reply to the allegations. 
104 Railway Times, 20 July 1872, pp.727-29; Railway News, 20 July 1872, pp.71-72; Report 
of the Extra-ordinary General meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 13 July 1872, 
NAS/BR/OSK/1/1. p.156. 
105 Report of the Extra-ordinary General Meeting of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 13 July 
1872, NAS/BR/DSK/1 /1, p.156, recording that 'the self-styled Committee having failed to 
attend this Meeting in order to substantiate or withdraw their charges and meet the Directors 
face to face', the shareholders resolved that the charges were 'uncalled for, irregular and 
wholly unwarranted .. .'. The report shows that 87 people attended, representing 108 
shareholders including proxies, with 94 voting for the resolutions supporting the board. 
106 Railway Times, 20 July 1872, pp.728-29. 
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subscribed share capital.107 Both the Railway Times and Railway News supported 
Matheson and the Skye company: 
The directors are entitled to no little credit for the promptitude with which they 
took up the matter, gossip and its numerous concomitants in such remote 
districts being best avoided and crushed out on the instant and on the spot 
108 
If we permitted ourselves to look for a moment at Mr Matheson's defence, we 
should say that it was complete and unanswerable.109 
In the two decades that Matheson had been associated with northern railway 
development, the Dingwall and Skye was the first company supported by the 
Inverness promoters that had encountered an intrinsic shortfall In its revenue and 
resulted in investigative action by a group of shareholders. Nevertheless, Matheson 
had achieved railway connections to his Ross-shire estates; the Ardross estates in 
the east were served by the opening of the Inverness and Ross-shire in 1863, while 
the Dingwall and Skye gave a connection to the western Attadale and Lochalsh 
estates in 1870, although the line did not reach Kyle of Lochalsh on the west coast 
until November 1897, eleven years after his death.110 
107 Accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway to 31 August 1872, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/68, 
showing that £227,601 share capital had been issued but. of this, £80,000 was held as 
security for bank loans of £76,498, leaving £147,601 of share capital subscribed, of which 
Matheson stated that he owned £28,000 (19.0%). Additionally, the Highland had agreed a 
subscription of £35,000 to the Dingwall and Skye on 4 June 1872 (NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.185), 
which represents a further 23.7% of this subscribed share capital; Appendix, table 8(a). 
108 Railway Times, 20 July 1872, p. 738, which suggested that at least 14 'agitators' were 
responsible for the unofficial committee of investigation. 
109 Railway News, 20 July 1872, pp.71-72, which reported that 23 'malcontent shareholders' 
were supporters of the unofficial committee of investigation. Company minutes 
(NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.156) indicate that 94 shareholders with capital of £181,939 voted in 
favour of the board which is at slight variance with the 92 shareholders and capital of 
£181,839 as reported by Railway News and Railway Times. 
110 o McConnell, Rails to Kyle of Lochalsh, p.175; HGC Matthew and B Harrison (eds.), The 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol.37, pp.280-81. 
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Yet far from the 'remunerative return' anticipated in the prospectus, 111 investors in 
the Dingwall and Skye never received a dividend. Moreover, the modest level of 
gross revenue earned was insufficient to give a realistic prospect of repaying its 
capital debts, accumulated because of the traditional difficulty of raising share capital 
for northern railways. The precarious development of the Dingwall and Skye, In fact, 
provides more parallels with earlier Great North branch companies and Aytoun's 
fictional Glenmutchkin scheme than with its related Inverness web partners, and it 
therefore represents an enigma in the railway system planned and managed from 
Inverness. In 1873, the Railway News concluded: 
The expectation of any return, except the indirect return of the opening up 
and improving the district, must thus be a thing of the far distant future, and 
hence this company has little or no interest financially beyond the locality for 
whose use it has been devised.112 
In a circular to shareholders in 1879, secretary Dougall indicated that the company 
was unlikely overcome its revenue deficit until 1884, but there were financial benefits 
likely to accrue to both companies if the Skye company was amalgamated with the 
Highland.113 The Dingwall and Skye board accepted amalgamation terms in October 
1879 under which Dingwall and Skye shares were exchanged at half par value for 
Highland stock.114 Amalgamation was authorised in August 1880 and the enigma 
passed into the Highland Railway.115 
111 Railway Times, 16 July 1864, p.976; Herapath's Railway Journal, 16 July 1864, p.632. 
112 Railway Times, 25 October 1873, p.552. 
113 Circular to shareholders of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 17 September 1679, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, pp.273-74: the estimate of reversing the revenue deficit by 1684 was 
based on an annual revenue growth of £600, although the circular noted that the average 
increase since the opening of the line had been over £600 per annum. The circular also 
advised that the Highland could replace Dingwall and Skye debentures and temporary loans, 
then amounting to approximately £200,000 and costing 4½ % or more, with Highland 
debentures at 4%, saving £1,000 per year overall. 
114 Circular to shareholders of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 9 June 1680, 
NAS/BR/DSK/1/1, p.285. 
115 43&44 Vic cap.129, 2 August 1880, The Highland and Dingwall and Skye Railway 
Companies Amalgamation Act, under which shareholders received £50 of Highland Railway 
ordinary stock for £100 of Dingwall and Skye ordinary stock. The companies were 
amalgamated from 1 September 1660. 
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The far north lines: ownership and control 
One of the results of the highland clearances in the far north, identified in chapter 2, 
had been to concentrate much of the remaining population on the eastern seaboard 
of Sutherland and Caithness. The Dukes of Sutherland owned the majority of 
Sutherlandshire acreage and invested heavily in projects for economic 
improvement.118 Richards identifies that, between 1803 and 1815, income from 
Sutherland's highland estates trebled, but expenditure on them increased nine-fold: 
'It was investment designed to increase the value of the estates to yield higher rents 
at a future time' .117 
Under the auspices of the Commission for Highland Roads and Bridges, formed in 
1803 in response to national concerns about the highland economy, approximately 
450 miles of road were built in Sutherland by 1833,118 although Smith suggests that 
much of the highland road mileage supported financially by the Commission could 
have been provided entirely by the local heritor landowners who determined county 
administrative affairs.119 In 1800 in Sutherland, there were thirteen heritors, but by 
1851 there were only five.120 Moreover, Smith concludes that state-assisted 
investment in roads did not resolve the inherent economic problems of the 
118 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.79, notes that 
Sutherlandshire comprised 1,840,000 acres, of which 32,000 acres were sea lochs: the 1111 
Duke of Sutherland owned 800,000 acres and Lord Reay 400,000 acres, but Reay's land 
was purchased by Sutherland in 1838 for £190,000 (p.90) and, by 1872, the 3rd Duke of 
Sutherland owned 1,326,000 acres (p.116). 
117 E Richards, 'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: Income, Consumption, Investments 
and Returns, 1780-1880', p.49. 
118 PT Wheeler, 'The development of shipping services to the east coast of Sutherland', 
Journal of Transport History, VI, No.2 (November 1963), p.110: in addition, 192 bridges were 
built in Sutherlandshire in 1803-33. 
119 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', p.83, p.203 and glossary, p.(vi); the Commission 
provided one-half of the road cost and heritors were expected to supply the remainder, which 
could be raised by local assessment; see Glossary entries on 'heritor' and 'assessment'. 
120 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', p.16. 
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highlands.121 In 1862, the state gave notice of the abolition of the Commission for 
Highland Roads and Bridges and its annual £5,000 grant towards road 
maintenance, 122 Although the substantial wealth of the third Duke of Sutherland, 
who succeeded to the title in 1861, could absorb the additional costs that passed 
from the state to heritor, the change in state policy may have strengthened the 
Duke's decision to offer funds towards a northerly extension of the Inverness and 
Ross-shire Railway as a means of securing a more reliable and speedier connection 
of the vast Sutherland lands with the south than existing road or sea transport could 
provide.123 
The Inverness and Ross-shire Railway opened from Inverness to Dingwall in June 
1862, although construction was already in progress to extend the line to 
tnvergordon, as chapter 6 has indicated. Matheson had informed Aberdeen Junction 
directors three months earlier that an extension beyond lnvergordon to Bonar Bridge 
had been proposed for which the Duke of Sutherland had offered £30,000, although 
he had also stated that the Inverness directors expected £70,000 to be subscribed 
locally to demonstrate support for the scheme.124 With £50,000 identified in March 
1862, including the Duke's contribution, the Ross-shire board recorded that an 
additional £20,000 was required to obtain support from lnvemess,125 but the Ross-
121 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', p.362; see also chapter 2, 'The north-south divide: the 
Scottish economy by 1844'. 
122 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.204; JAR Smith, 'From 
Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern Highlands of Scotland, 
1800-1850', p.110. 
123 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 March 1862, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.314, reporting a meeting at lain on 17 March 1862 'of parties interested 
in promoting an Extension of the line northwards from lnvergordon to Bonar Bridge, a 
distance of 27 miles ... '; PT Wheeler, 'The development of shipping services to the east coast 
of Sutherland', p.115. 
124 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 18 March 1862, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.314. 
125 Minutes of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 18 March 1862, NAS/BR/IRR/1/2: • ... 
so soon as they have raised an additional £20,000 the Directors at Inverness would be happy 
to discuss with them measure[s) for making further progress'; Order of Business Book, 
Inverness and Ross-shire Railway, 18 March 1862, NAS/BR/IRR/1/1:'Chairman reported that 
£50,000 had been already got and that the Promoters expect to raise £20,000 more ... '. 
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shire was already in the throes of amalgamation with the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway126 and so the legislation for the Ross-shire extension was obtained 
and enacted by the Aberdeen Junction without confirmation of the stipulated local 
subscriptions.127 
Table 85: Shareholder Investment held in Ross-shire extension stock, 1865 
Amount Invested(£): 31 January 1865 Number of shareholders 
£10 shares 
£10 9 
£20 21 
£30 9 
£40 3 
£50 11 
£51-90 0 
£100 24 
£101-200 4 
£201-300 7 
£301-500 0 
£501-1000 1 
£1001-2000 3 
£2001-3000 1 
£3001-29999 0 
£30000 1 
Total 9-4 
Total paid up (31 January 1865): £44,573 
Source: Data complied for Ross-shire extension stock shareholders at 
31 January 1865 from the Register of Dividends, 1864-65. 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railwav. NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1 . 
By January 1865, only £44,573 of Ross-shire extension share capital had been paid 
up, of which the Duke and Matheson provided almost three-quarters; 128 one-third of 
126 25&26 Vic. cap.113, 1862, the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act, which 
authorised the amalgamation of the Inverness and Ross-shire and Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railways from June 1862. 
127 26 Vic. cap.32, 1863, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway (Bonar Bridge 
Extension) Act, with authorised share capital of £160,000 and borrowing powers of £53,300 
and including clauses to guarantee 3% as share dividend after the first year the line was 
opened, rising by ½ % until the dividend matched that of the Aberdeen Junction ordinary 
stock. 
128 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1, data to 31 January 1865: £445.14s. 7d was paid as guaranteed 3% dividend 
for the first four months since the line opened, which indicates that £44,573 of share capital 
was paid up, and, of this sum, the Duke of Sutherland had invested £30,000, Alexander 
Matheson £2,500 and his uncle, Sir James Matheson, £2,000; Appendix, table 15(a), note 
(5). 
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shareholders held only one or two shares and just over a half held five shares or less 
(table 85), mirroring earlier Inverness investment patterns.129 However, £144,454 of 
stock had been issued, which suggests that £99,881 was held as security for loans, 
three-fifths of the company's authorised share capital. 130 
When the Ross-shire extension opened to Bonar Bridge on the southern border of 
Sutherlandshire in October 1864, reaching the declared boundary for the Inverness 
railway system,131 Matheson announced that the Duke had offered £100,000 to 
construct a line beyond Bonar Bridge to Golspie, to be incorporated initially as the 
Sutherland Railway and then extended beyond to Wick and Thurso: 
The Whole Line from Bonar Bridge to Golspie, Wick and Thurso to form one 
distinct Company ... to be called the Sutherland and Caithness Railway. 132 
Plans for railway development into the far north envisaged two schemes that were to 
be unified within one company. The southern section was authorised in 1865 as the 
Sutherland Railway to extend northwards from the Ross-shire terminus at Bonar 
Bridge to Brora on the Sutherland coast.133 With £50,000 to be provided by the 
Duke of Sutherland and £30,000 from Inverness, almost one-half of company capital 
129 Register of Dividends, 1864-65, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1, data to 31 January 1865, showing that of the 94 Ross-shire extension 
shareholders, 30 held one or two shares (31.9%) and 53 held 5 shares or less (56.4%). 
130 Appendix, 15(a); note (5); Accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 31 
January 1865, reported to the Ordinary General Meeting, 28 March 1865, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, 
p.100. 
131 Herapath's Railway Journal, 22 November 1862, p.1208, and 8 October 1864, p.1166; 
Miscellaneous memoranda on the history of the Highland Railway, NAS/BR/HR/4/3, 
document 2. 
132 Minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 23 September 1864, 
NAS/BR/IAJ/1/3, p.40: the Duke offered £50,000 towards the Bonar Bridge-Golspie section 
and £50,000 towards the Golspie-Wick section. 
133 28&29 Vic. cap.169, 1865, The Sutherland Railway Act, with authorised share capital of 
£180,000 and borrowing powers of £60,000: the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railways were authorised to subscribe £15,000 each. The 
northern terminus was set at Brora, 6¼ miles beyond the original objective of Golspie. 
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was immediately available from just two suppliers. The few recorded meetings of the 
promoters of the Sutherland Railway indicate the early fusion of ownership and 
control because attendance comprised only Matheson and George Loch, who was 
commissioner to the Duke of Sutherland, supported by Inverness web secretary 
Dougall.13-4 
Railway planning in the far north of Scotland was therefore predicated upon the 
objective of the Duke of Sutherland to improve his vast lands in Sutherland-shire, 
and the Duke's substantial financial commitments provide an example of capital 
supply catalyzing railway development. The far north line, serving a remote and 
sparsely populated area with little prospect of capital return, was unlikely to attract 
national investment and, with fewer large landowners in the northern counties than in 
the areas served by earlier Highland constituent companies to the south, the Duke of 
Sutherland and the Highland Railway became the monopsonist suppliers of capital 
for the route. 
To achieve the solvency of any railway scheme in such isolated territory, however, 
the successful use of 'cheap railway' principles was paramount. Geography 
confined any potential railway route to the coast northwards to Helmsdale on the 
border of Sutherland and Caithness, where a sweep inland to the north was 
recommended by engineer Mitchell because of the mountainous nature of the 
country and coastline.135 Along the far north route, the populations of settlements 
were comparatively small, but the port of Wick was of significant size in comparison 
to Inverness (table 86). 
134 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 23 September 1864, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.1, 16 
December 1864, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.2, and 31 August 1865, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.3. 
135 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.214 and p.222; Herapath's 
Railway Journal, 3 September 1864, p.1036, 1 October 1864, p.1153, 5 November 1864, 
p.1273 and 12 December 1864, p.1299, reporting preliminary surveys by Mitchell and the 
desire of Caithness promoters to construct a line via the coast from Helmsdale to Wick; 
Railway Times, 13 October 1866, p.1198, noting a report by rival engineers Maclean and 
Stileman stating that a coast route north of Helmsdale was impractical: Mitchell noted in a 
letter to the Inverness Courier (28 November 1866) that Maclean and Stileman had adopted 
the inland route he had earlier advocated. 
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Table 86: Population of northern settlements, 1861 
1861 Population 
Inverness 16162 
Dingwall 2412 
Golsoie 1615 
Helmsdale 2132 
Thurso 5561 
Wick 12841 
Source: J Thomas and D Tumcock, A Regional History of the 
Railways of Great Britain, vol. 15 (Th& North of 
Scotland) (Newton Abbot, 1989), pp.246-47. 
Reviving an unsuccessful railway proposal from 1845, the northern section of the 
Sutherland and Caithness route was planned to connect the ports of Wick and 
Thurso and extend southwards to meet the Sutherland Railway. 136 Contractor 
Thomas Brassey offered to build the lines for £7,000 per mile and take £100,000 of 
shares, but £50,000 from the Duke of Sutherland was made conditional upon the 
Highland Railway subscribing £50,000 and Caithness residents raising £100,000.137 
Initial local subscriptions yielded only £30,000 and, when the Caithness Railway was 
incorporated in 1866, 138 capital powers were sought for the Wick-Thurso section 
only. 139 Its chairman, the Earl of Caithness, was also a director of the Sutherland 
Railway, thereby maintaining continuity between the two Sutherland and Caithness 
promotions. One of the first Caithness directors was Samuel Laing, Member of 
Parliament for Wick and a former member of the 1845 Railway Board that had 
recommended the Anglo-Scottish railway route to the north.140 The Highland 
136 Bradshaw's Railway Gazette, 13 December 1845, p.843, noting proposed railway 
projects for Scotland that included a line between Wick and Thurso with capital of £120,000 
and an Inverness and Ross Railway with capital of £500,000; see also chapter 3, table 20{a). 
137 Railway Times, 14 October 1865, p.1344; D McConnell, Rails to Wick and Thurso 
(Dornoch, 1990), pp.10-11 . 
138 29&30 Vic. cap.292, 1866, The Caithness Railway Act, with authorised share capital of 
£130,000 and borrowing powers of £43,000, and granting powers to the Highland Railway to 
subscribe £10,000. 
139 Railway Times, 23 December 1865, p.1640, reporting the deposit of the Caithness bill in 
Parliament and that' ... only its first section is at present, for obvious reasons, being 
prosecuted ... '. 
140 See chapter 3, 'The Railway Board and Scottish Railways, 1845'; Railway News, 17 
March 1874, p.336: Laing was Liberal MP for Wick in 1852-57, 1859-60 and 1865-68, when 
he was defeated by George Loch, and subsequently became MP for the Orkneys in 1673. 
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Railway was authorised to subscribe £10,000, which the Highland board approved in 
principle provided the Caithness formed 'part of the Through Scheme to the 
South'.141 
However, difficulties in raising capital for the Wick-Thurso line were compounded by 
the estimated cost of £346, 169 for a connecting line southwards to the Sutherland 
Railway.142 By July 1867, the Caithness directors reported that no progress on 
works had been possible and urged Caithness residents to 'put their hands in their 
pockets .. .'.143 The combined cost of £477,000 for the lines was too great for local 
sourcing, 144 but the Duke of Sutherland would only agree to the Caithness company 
constructing the through section of the far north route provided it was not a 
contractor's line.145 Moreover, the Highland withheld its subscription while the 
Caithness remained moribund.146 The stalemate continued until 1871 when a 
separate Sutherland and Caithness Railway was authorised to extend northwards to 
Wick and Thurso in preference to a bill submitted by Caithness Railway.147 
141 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 29 November 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p. 71. 
142 Railway Times, 13 October 1866, p.1198, reporting the impracticality of a coastal route 
north of Helmsdale and the estimated cost of a proposed 58 mile route linking the Wick-
Thurso line and the Sutherland Railway at Brora; Railway News, 13 October 1866, p.389. 
143 Railway Times, 2 July 1867, p.100, reporting the first meeting of the Caithness Railway at 
which the Earl of Caithness stated 'The Caithness people must put their hands in their 
pockets and endeavour to carry out this very important undertaking'. 
144 Railway Times, 16 October 1869, p.1009, reporting the opinion of the Caithness directors 
that their failure to raise the necessary £477,000 capital for the Wick-Thurso line and a 
connecting line to Helmsdale was due 'in a great measure, to the discouraging traffic upon 
the Sutherland -which, however, is as yet quite undeveloped .. .'. 
145 Railway Times, 3 February 1866, p.130, reporting that contractor Thomas Brassey was 
named as a director of the Caithness Railway in its parliamentary bill; D McConnell, Rails to 
Wick and Thurso, p.26: George Loch, writing as the Duke of Sutherland's Commissioner, 
claimed that the Caithness Railway had 'no shareholders' and it was a 'sham'. 
146 Railway Times, 7 July 1866, p.803, reporting the Highland's subscription 'was only 
proposed to be given in case the Caithness completed its line at present projected, and set 
themselves to its extension southward, so as to form a junction with the Highland system. In 
the meantime, the Highland took no responsibility with regard to the measure ... '. 
147 34&35 Vic. cap.99, 1871, The Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act, with authorised 
share capital of £360,000 and borrowing powers of £120,000. 
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- the Sutherland and Duke of Sutherland's Railways 
With progress halted in the north due to capital constraints, the Sutherland Railway 
constructed the first section of far north route beyond the Highland Railway's 
terminus at Bonar Bridge. The Duke of Sutherland was elected company chairman 
with Matheson as deputy chairman and the board immediately confirmed the need 
for strict economy.148 
The Highland Railway inherited the powers of the Aberdeen Junction and Perth 
Junction Railways to subscribe £15,000 each to the Sutherland company, but the 
substantial personal financial guarantees made by Highland directors and their 
natural unwillingness to commit their company and themselves to further financial 
risk prompted a sharp rebuttal to the Sutherland's request for payment of the 
subscription, as the previous chapter has shown.149 The Duke and his commissioner 
Loch, meeting as the Sutherland board in February 1866, recorded that the refusal of 
the Highland to provide the authorised subscription denied the Sutherland Railway 
access to its borrowing powers 'thus causing a deficiency of £90,000 altogether of 
available capital' .15° Furthermore, the revised cost of the line was estimated at 
£212,000, eighteen percent above the authorised capital limit, but only £10,000 had 
been subscribed by the public and £50,000 by the Duke.151 The Sutherland Railway 
had encountered the ubiquitous constraint experienced by all Highland lines, namely 
that the supply of local capital was insufficient and that the remote nature of the lines 
and their uncertain return deterred extra-district investment. The Inverness web 
lines had been supported by a cadre of wealthy landowners; in Sutherland, however, 
148 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 31 August 1865, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.4: 'The Board 
recorded their disapproval of all ornamental work ... and they desire that no money [is] to be 
spent on anything not essential to the stability of the works'. 
149 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 30 January 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.101-103. 
150 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 5 February 1866, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.14-16: the 
shortfall comprised the Highland's £30,000 subscription and £60,000 borrowing powers. 
151 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 5 February 1866, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.14-16: the 
minutes record that the Duke had offered a further £50,000 to Matheson towards completing 
the line; Appendix, table 23(a): this additional sum offered by the Duke cannot have been 
taken at this juncture, because share receipts by August 1869 were £90.644, of which the 
Duke provided £50,000 and the Highland £30,000, but, by August 1874, the Duke had 
provided £116,000 for the line (Railway News, 1 August 187 4, p.138). 
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there was but one and the Duke minuted that 'he did not feel he would be justified in 
involving himself in liabilities for the whole cost of the Railway, viz. £212,000'.152 As 
a result, construction work was stopped 'only so long as the Highland Company shall 
be unable to contribute their subscription of £30,000' .153 Parliamentary authority was 
obtained in 1866 to increase the authorised capital of company to cover the revised 
estimated cost of the line.154 
Four of the five Sutherland directors, Sutherland, Loch, Matheson and Bruce, were 
also Highland directors, but harmony over the strategy for northern railway 
development was overshadowed temporarily by discord over its finance. 155 The 
Highland board expressed regret at suspension of the work, judging that it would be 
impossible to gain shareholder sanction for a subscription given the financial position 
of the company. 156 However, Highland directors faced less pressure from the 
cessation of work on the Sutherland Railway than the Duke, who was seen to be the 
main beneficiary of the line. The Duke attempted to break the impasse in June 1866 
by offering to buy £30,000 of Highland stock provided that the proceeds were used 
to provide the subscription, but the Highland directors resolved that there was no 
spare stock for sale because it was held by directors as security towards their 
considerable personal guarantees of Highland company debt. 157 The Highland 
finally agreed to sell £30,000 of preference stock at par value to the Duke in October 
1866 and gained shareholder approval for the subscription, which was paid in full by 
152 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 5 February 1866, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.14-16. 
153 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 5 February 1866, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.14-16. 
154 29&30 Vic. cap.181, 1866, The Sutherland Railway Act, which approved a diversion in 
route and raised the authorised share capital of the company by £30,000 to £210,000 and 
borrowing powers by £10,000 to £70,000. 
155 Minutes of the 1st Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 28 October 1865, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.10, recording the election of Sutherland, Caithness, Loch, Matheson and 
Bruce as directors. 
156 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 14 February 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.113; Railway 
Times, 3 November 1866, p.1266. 
157 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 9 June 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.168-70. 
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August 1867 .158 Matheson confirmed the pivotal role of the Duke in creating the far 
north line: 
... with the exception of the Highland's subscription, and a small sum 
subscribed by the tenants and others, the whole expense will fall on the Duke 
of Sutherland.159 
The Railway News reported in 1874 that the Duke had spent £116,000 on the 
Sutherland Railway, which was more than double his original subscription.160 
Seeking to justify the Highland's £30,000 subscription, Matheson argued that £4,000 
of additional traffic was expected from the Sutherland, three times the potential yield 
from an equivalent bank deposit at 4 ½ percent, but a shareholder countered that 
Highland dividend had fallen to one percent.181 Matheson responded that the 
directors were the largest shareholders and that he held £23,500 of ordinary stock, 
so that 'decisions affected their pockets the most', which suggests that ownership 
and control on the Highland remained unified. The compromise solution, whereby 
the Duke bought Highland stock and the proceeds were returned to the Sutherland 
as the Highland subscription, allowed work to restart on the Sutherland Railway and 
borrowing powers to be released, 162 but the incident illustrates that the local sources 
158 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 9 October 1866, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.213: the Highland 
board resolved that its £30,000 subscription was conditional upon the Sutherland Railway 
completing the line from Golspie 'at once' and to Brora within the time allowed by the act; 
Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 30 October 1866, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.224-27; Accounts of the Highland Railway to 28 February 1867 (showing 
£13,500 of the subscription had been paid) and 31 August 1867 (showing that the full 
£30,000 subscription had been paid), NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp. 286-87 and pp.332-33; Order of 
Business Book, Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/6, item 7: with its 
own financial difficulties, the Highland refused to guarantee debenture interest for the 
Sutherland Railway, 5 April 1867. 
159 Railway Times, 3 November 1866, p.1266, reporting Matheson's address to the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Highland Railway held on 30 October 1866, estimating the cost of the 
Sutherland Railway at £200,000. 
160 Railway News, 1 August 187 4, p.138. 
161 Railway Times, 3 November 1866, p.1266. 
162 Minutes of the Special General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 24 April 1867, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.42. 
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of capital on which northern railway development depended were, by 1866, 
extremely stretched. 
Company records show that board business was largely conducted by the Duke and 
Loch alone, which reflects the considerable financial commitment of Sutherland in 
the company. Matheson and Bruce as the Highland representatives did not attend a 
board meeting between October 1865 and October 1867, although some absence in 
1866 was undoubtedly diplomatic while the dispute over the Highland subscription 
continued.183 The Duke appointed one of his factors, Kenneth Murray, as 
superintendent of the line in July 1866; 184 Murray became a director in place of the 
Earl of Caithness in 1870, which gave the Duke a majority control within the 
company. 165 
A working agreement with the Highland was concluded in 1867, which allowed 
charges up to 75 percent of receipts in recognition of the expected limited traffic.186 
In August 1868, the Duke provided a guarantee for a £26,000 bank loan, 'which sum 
it is understood will complete the undertaking' .167 The deficit on the capital account 
increased in August 1869, by when almost ninety percent of the share capital raised 
183 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway showing board attendance between 31 October 1865 
and 30 October 1867, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.12-62: Matheson, however, chaired the Extra-
ordinary General Meeting on 24 April 1867 at which borrowing powers were released 
(NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.42). 
164 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 2 July 1866, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.26. 
185 Minutes of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 28 October 1870, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.94. 
186 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 12 April 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, p.279; Minutes of a 
Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 29 April 1867, NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.286-87; 
Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 7 June 1867, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.48; Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 28 October 
1871, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.104-105 and page 1 of inserted printed report: from 19 June 
1871, when the Duke of Sutherland's Railway opened in full, the Highland's charges for 
working the Sutherland Railway were altered to match those previously agreed for the 
Dingwall and Skye; Report of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 28 April 
1871, NAS/BR/HR/112, pp. 73-7 4 and page 2 of inserted printed report, giving details of the 
new working agreement with the Sutherland and Duke of Sutherland's Railways. 
187 Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 28 August 1868, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.75. 
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comprised the initial subscriptions of the Duke and the Highland Railway. 168 The line 
opened to Golspie in April 1868 and, although no formal decision was recorded by 
the company, the Sutherland Railway did not complete the remaining 6¼ miles to the 
authorised terminus at Brora because of its capital difficulties.169 Shareholders were 
informed in 1869 that the Duke was constructing the line from Golspie to Helmsdale 
at his own expense 'and the works have already made great progress'.170 
By mid-1868, therefore, the Sutherland Railway had extended the northern railhead 
26½ miles beyond Bonar Bridge, but its projected construction to Brora had faltered 
and the intended Caithness development was stagnant. The difficulty in raising 
share capital was the sole cause. Although the capital cost of £6,727 per mile for the 
Sutherland Railway exceeded the original estimate of £5,496, capital expenditure for 
the shortened line remained by 1870 within the original authorised limit.171 The 
company incurred insignificant land costs because the line passed substantially over 
land belonging to the Duke of Sutherland. The company returned a small revenue 
balance in 1869-70, although over two-thirds of its gross revenue was absorbed by 
interest charges. 172 From June 1871, on the opening of the Duke of Sutherland's 
Railway to Helmsdale, the Highland agreed to replace the maximum working charge 
of 75 percent of receipts by a fixed charge for each train run, using the scale of 
charges agreed on the Dingwall and Skye described earlier.173 As a result. working 
168 Appendix, table 23{a): at 31 August 1869, the capital account deficit was £23,481. The 
subscriptions of the Duke (£50,000) and the Highland Railway (£30,000) represented 88.2% 
of the £90,664 share capital raised by that date. 
169 Minutes of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 30 October 1868, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.77: the directors reported the line had opened to Golspie on 13 April. 
1868. 
170 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 29 October 1869, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.86-87 and page 1 of inserted printed report. 
171 Appendix, table 23{a); the original authorised share capital for the Sutherland Railway in 
1865 was £180,000 with £60,000 of borrowing powers and, by August 1870, £178,259 had 
been spent; by 1870, land costs were 0.9% of capital expenditure. 
172 Appendix, table 23{b). 
173 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 7 February 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.50; Minutes of the 
Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 28 April 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp. 73-74, 
page 2 of inserted printed report and pp.78-82; Minutes of the Sutherland Railway, 5 July 
1871, NAS/SLD/1/1, p.101: the new charging system began on 19 June 1871. 
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charges fell from the maximum 75 percent in 1869-70 to 59.5 percent in 1874.174 
Improving traffic and receipts from additional stock taken by the Duke ultimately 
allowed the payment of a one percent dividend in 1875.175 
Table 87: Financial indicators for the Sutherland Rallway, 1869-75 
31 Auoust 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 
Gross annual revenue (£\ 5096 5089 5833 7092 7281 8034 9892 
Ratio of debentures to capital 39.6% 32.1% 32.1% 32.1% 32.1% 32.1% 30.8% 
raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.068 0.061 0.096 0.114 0.110 0.110 0.162 
total debt 
Source: Appendix, tables 23(b and 23/c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital and 
0.162 for cross revenue/debt 
With only 43 percent of its authorised share capital raised by 1869, 176 debenture 
loans formed a relatively high proportion of capital raised and, as gross revenue was 
modest, the debt gearing of the company was weak (table 87). Nevertheless, 
revenue showed growth once the line opened to Helmsdale in 1871 and to Wick and 
Thurso in 187 4, but debt gearing only corresponded to the 1849 Caledonian 
benchmark even when the full route was operational in 1875, which reflected the 
limited traffic that the district generated. 
Without the initial subscriptions of £50,000 from the Duke of Sutherland and £30,000 
from the Highland, the line could not have been constructed, but neither of these two 
principal shareholders invested expecting revenue to generate a dividend. Indeed, 
the construction of unremunerative lines to generate external economies and 
increase land values received national advocacy in The Economist in 1866.177 The 
174 Appendix, table 23(b). 
175 Appendix, tables 23(b) and 23(c): the accounts show that an extra £8,000 of stock was 
issued in 1874-75; Railway News. 30 October 1875, p.594, reporting that 'The Duke of 
Sutherland took an amount of stock [in the Sutherland Railway] which placed the company 
straight with its bankers ... •. 
176 Appendix, table 23(a): authorised share capital was revised in 1866 to £210,000, of which 
£90,664 had been raised by August 1869 (43.2%). 
177 The Economist. 19 May 1866, quoted in W Vamplew, 'Railway Investment in the Scottish 
Highlands', Transport History, 3, No.2 (July 1970), p.148. 
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Highland operated the Sutherland line close to marginal cost to try to capture 
northern traffic from sea trade. Sea competition remained significant in northern 
Scotland and Highland board minutes recorded new competitive steamer services in 
1873.178 
The Dukes of Sutherland spent over £1 million on highland estate improvements in 
1853-82, but Richards describes most of their industrial enterprises as 'financial 
disasters';179 for example, £40,000 was spent in the early 1800s to develop coal 
mining at Brora but without any return.180 Harbours and fish processing were 
established at Brora and Helmsdale.181 Helmsdale had been created as a coastal 
town to receive population from the Sutherland clearances and, in 1864, 364 fishing 
boats operated from the port.182 When the Sutherland Railway opened in 1868 to 
Golspie, however, Brora and Helmsdale remained unconnected to the railway 
network and the Duke took the decision to finance entirely the construction of a line 
not only to complete the unfinished Golspie-Brora section of the Sutherland Railway 
but also to extend the route to Helmsdale on the Sutherland-Caithness border, 
thereby completing a railway link across the county. Sutherland shareholders were 
told the new terminus at Helmsdale would be 'within thirty-seven miles of Wick, the 
seat of the great herring Fisheries' .183 
178 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 2 December 1873, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.332: the 
Highland board noted new steamer services from Aberdeen to lnvergordon and from Leith to 
Inverness via Aberdeen. 
179 E Richards, 'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: Income, Consumption, Investments 
and Returns, 1780-1880', p.67: £1.039 million was spent on improvements on Sutherland's 
highland estates in 1853-82, including £677,671 on estate works, £254,900 on land 
reclamation, £47,516 on work at Brora and £58,907 on estate management (from data given 
by Sutherland's commissioner to the Napier Commission in 1883). 
180 JS Owen, Coal Mining at Brora, 1539-1974 (Inverness, 1995), p.16. 
181 o Stirling, 'Land, Railways and the Dukes of Sutherland, pp.4-5; J Mitchell, 
Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.90; JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to 
Integration: the development of roads in the northern Highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850', 
p.294. 
182 E Richards, The Leviathan of Wealth (the Sutherland fortune in the Industrial Revolution) 
(London, 1973), p.287. 
183 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 29 October 1869, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, pp.86-87 and page 1 of inserted printed report. 
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Work on the extension was in progress before parliamentary authority was obtained. 
The Act authorised the Duke to complete and work the line at his own expense and 
therefore did not prescribe capital powers.184 The line was opened in 1871 and, by 
1872, the Duke had spent £62,862 on its construction, approximately £31 .4 million 
on a 2007 price base, but at a capital cost of just £3,644 per mile.185 The Highland 
worked the line from June 1871, charging for each train run on the same basis as 
agreed with the Sutherland and Dingwall and Skye Railways. 186 
Table 88: Financial indicators for the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-75 
31 AuQUSt 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 
Capital raised (£\ 61869 62862 62351 64723 64653 
Gross annual revenue (£\ 1549 (2) 3668 3955 4430 5124 
Annual revenue balance (£\ 304 597 833 958 1337 
Return of balance on caf)ital (%) 0.5% 0.95% 1.34% 1.48% 2.07% 
Ratio of debentures to caoital raised No authorised or temoorarv debt incurred. 
Ratio of Qross revenue to total debt No authorised or temoorarv debt incurred. 
Source: Anoendix, tables 23(e) and 23m. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The line opened officially in June 1871 , but revenue data to August 1871 also include receipts from some 
unofficial ooerations over cart of the line that commenced in November 1870. 
Approximately 80 percent of gross revenue was absorbed by expenditure but, 
because the Duke of Sutherland's Railway required no loans or temporary debt, the 
revenue balance yielded a small nominal return on capital (table 88).187 The 
accounts therefore suggest that, without the burden of guaranteed capital and 
184 33&34 Vic. cap.31, 1870, The Duke of Sutherland's Railway Act: the act acknowledged 
that the Duke ' ... has already made at his own expense the greater portion of the railway, 
and he is willing on being empowered as in this Act provided to complete the railway, and 
maintain it at his own expense ... '. Section 29 approved the abandonment of the powers 
granted to the Sutherland Railway to construct the section of line between Golspie and Brora 
under 28&29 Vic.cap.169, 1865, The Sutherland Railway Act and 29&30 Vic. cap.181, 1866, 
The Sutherland Railway Act. 
185 Accounts of the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-75, inserted as loose papers in 
NAS/BR/DKS/1/1: the line ran over the Duke's land and therefore capital expenditure was 
free of land costs; Appendix, table 23(d); see Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
186 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 7 February 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.51. 
187 Appendix, tables 23(e). 
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temporary debt, a railway could operate successfully in a sparsely populated district, 
but that any returns to investment were likely to accrue from economic improvements 
in the districts served rather than from the railway company itself. 
- the Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
By June 1871, the far north line had been extended to Helmsdale on the northern 
boundaries of Sutherland under the majority ownership and almost the sole direction 
of the Duke of Sutherland. The Caithness Railway had failed to raise the capital 
required to build its local Wick-Thurso line authorised in 1866, but proposed a 
parliamentary bill in 1870 to construct a line southwards to join the Duke of 
Sutherland's line at Helmsdale.188 Caithness shareholders, however, disagreed on 
action, some advocating delay while others favoured abandoning the local line and 
'and making a strong effort to carry the line into some central part of the county from 
the Helmsdale terminus of the Sutherland' .189 
Joseph Mitchell later wrote that the Duke found the traffic generated from the railway 
to Helmsdale 'wholly unremunerative' because it was dependent upon 'a sparse 
population' and so, for any prospect of return, the line required extension to Wick 
and Thurso.190 The delays in Caithness and the need to improve the operational 
economics of the far north route resulted in the promotion of a new company, the 
Sutherland and Caithness, intimated by the Duke in November 1870.191 In March 
1871, Highland shareholders approved the Sutherland and Caithness bill, which 
188 Railway Times, 8 October 1870, p.999: the Caithness directors warned their shareholders 
that • ... if your directors should be disappointed in the support given to the bill, they will 
withdraw it so far as it relates to the line south, and limit it to the authorised line (Wick and 
Thurso) .. .'. 
189 Railway Times, 8 October 1870, p.999. 
190 J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My Life in the Highlands, vol.II, p.225. 
191 Railway Times, 5 November 1870, p.1092, reporting the Duke of Sutherland's statement 
to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway held on 20 October 1870. 
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contained powers for a Highland subscription of £50,000. 192 The Sutherland Railway 
approved the bill on the same day as the Highland, but with only three persons 
present, which further indicates the limited ownership and absolute control within that 
company. 193 The submission of this rival bill for the final section of the far north 
route, however, caused conflict with the Caithness proposals for its local line and a 
southern connecting route. The Earl of Caithness informed Caithness shareholders 
of 'unreasonable opposition suddenly made to both these lines', 194 and claimed a 
breach of trust because the Caithness lines were: 
. . . part of an entire scheme which was fully discussed, and deliberately 
adopted at Inverness five and a half years ago (in September 1865), with the 
full concurrence, and I might even sar, at the instance of the Duke of 
Sutherland and the Highland Company.19 
Although the Caithness meeting rejected the rival Sutherland and Caithness scheme 
in favour of their own, the shareholders' capital represented at the meeting 
amounted to just £15,590.196 Only the previous year, the Caithness directors had 
acknowledged that any railway through Caithness required the financial support of 
192 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 7 March 1871, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.60; Railway Times, 11 March 1871, p.251, reporting Highland and 
Sutherland Railway meetings to consider the Sutherland and Caithness parliamentary bill 
where it was noted that the steamer from Caithness and Orkney was providing £38,000 of 
revenue yearly, and that Sutherland Railway traffic was 25 percent above that of the same 
period of the previous year. 
193 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Sutherland Railway, 7 March 1871, 
NAS/BR/SLD/1/1, p.99: the meeting was chaired by director Murray with only Fraser-Tytler 
and Dougall present representing the Highland Railway and other proxies. 
194 Railway News, 11 March 1871, p.351, reporting the Special General Meeting of the 
Caithness Railway held to gain shareholder approval for the Caithness Railway bill. 
195 Railway News, 11 March 1871, p.351. 
196 Railway News, 11 March 1871, p.351, recording that £14,500 of capital represented at 
the Special General Meeting of the Caithness Railway voted for the Caithness Railway 
scheme and £1,090 voted for the Sutherland and Caithness Railway bill; Railway Times, 11 
March 1871, p.251, reporting the Special General Meeting of the Caithness Railway held on 
3 March 1871, and recording that an amendment to seek a compromise with the Sutherland 
and Caithness Railway was lost by 290 votes to 1408. 
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the Duke of Sutherland and the Highland, 197 but with that support now assigned to 
the Sutherland and Caithness, the Caithness Railway was denied any prospect of 
raising the capital it had been seeking since 1866.198 
The Sutherland and Caithness Railway was incorporated in 1871 and, of the eight 
directors, two were to be appointed by the Highland in recognition of a £50,000 
subscription and a further two were to be appointed by the Duke of Sutherland in 
return for a £60,000 subscription.199 Thus, thirty percent of the authorised share 
capital was to be provided by the Duke and the Highland. Matheson and Bruce 
represented the Highland; the Duke, who was appointed chairman of the new 
company, appointed Loch and Murray.200 Matheson and Bruce thus held the 
Highland seats on the boards of both its far north subsidiaries, while the Duke 
chaired all three companies comprising the far north route. 
By the time parliamentary authorisation was received, £79,320 had been subscribed 
of which £60,000 was to be supplied by the Duke and the remaining £19,320 by 121 
other individuals (table 89).201 Twenty-five percent of subscribers held just one £10 
share and a further twenty-three percent held two shares, thus replicating the 
investment pattern of earlier Inverness lines, whereby the bulk of capital was 
197 Railway Times, 8 October 1870, p.999. 
198 Railway Times, 17 February 1872, p.193, announcing authorisation of the abandonment 
of the Caithness Railway as the result of a Board of Trade report, which identified that only 
£1,936 of the £130,000 capital had been subscribed [paid up], no contracts for land had been 
made, and that the Sutherland and Caithness Railway had been approved in Parliament in 
1871 in preference to the Caithness Railway bill. 
199 34&35 Vic. cap.99, 1871, The Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act, to construct a 
railway from Helmsdale to Wick and Thurso with authorised share capital of £360,000 and 
borrowing powers of £120,000: the £110,000 subscribed by the Highland and the Duke of 
Sutherland formed 30.6% of the authorised share capital. 
200 34&35 Vic. cap.99, 1871, The Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act, named Matheson 
and Bruce as Highland representatives and Loch and Murray as nominees of the Duke of 
Sutherland, who was appointed chairman at the first board meeting on 19 September 1871, 
NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, p.1. 
201 Data compiled from minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 19 September 
1871, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, pp.2-4: these data refer to subscribers rather than shareholders, 
because the deposit of £2 per share was to be paid within one month of this board minute 
dated 19 September 1871 (p.6). The Duke had guaranteed a bank loan for £14,446 to pay 
the parliamentary deposit (p.8). 
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supplied by a few large landowners, but with the local populace providing their many 
small contributions. Only five subscribers, providing 1.2 percent of the funds, gave 
addresses outside the highland area, two from Edinburgh, one from Glasgow and 
two from England.202 While 68.9 percent of the 122 subscribers gave a Thurso 
address, only 6.6 percent had a Wick address with a further 13.1 percent supplying a 
Halkirk address, the area in which the Thurso branch was join the main route to 
Wick. The small subscription from Wick, which had the largest population in the 
district, was attributed by the Railway News to 'a singular amount of apathy 
displayed in the district' ,203 but it also reflected local disagreement over the proposed 
route.204 
Table 89: Subscriptions to the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, September 1871 
Value of Shareholdina 1£1 No. of subscribers Holder 
£79 320 122 
comorlslna: 
£60,000 1 (1 l Duke of Sutherland chairman 
£6 000 1 (1) Sir JG Tollemache Sinclair deoutv chairman 121 
£1 200 1 (1 l Colonel CS Guthrie director 
£1 000-1,199 5 (1) <all orovided £1 000 each) 
£500-999 4 (all orovided £500 each) 
£200-499 6 
£30 - 199 45 
Two £10 shares 28 
One £10 share 31 
source: Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railwav, 19 Seotember 1871 , NAS/BR/SUC/1 /1 , oo.2-4. 
(1 ): Eight subscribers held £72,200 of the share capital allotted (91 .0%). 
(2): Railway News. 1 August 1874, p.134, reported that deputy chairman Sir JG Tollemache Sinclair had 
given 14 miles of land to the company without charge in addition to his £6,000 subscription. D McConnell, 
Rails to Wick and Thurso, p.36, states that this land was valued at £6,000, which, In effect, doubled Sinclair's 
contribution to the comoanv. 
202 Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 19 September 1871, 
NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, pp.2-4, showing two subscribers from Edinburgh (£200 and £100), one 
from Glasgow (£100) and two from England (£500 and £50), a total of £950 (1.2% of capital 
subscribed) from outside the highland area. 
203 Railway News, 1 August 1874, p.134. 
204 Railway Times, 14 October 1865, p.1344, reporting that the Earl of Caithness had 
confirmed that the local route of the Caithness Railway between Wick and Thurso would be 
via Castletown. That route was authorised under 29&30 Vic. cap.292, 1866, The Caithness 
Railway Act. However, the Sutherland and Caithness main route approved under 34&35 Vic. 
cap.99, 1871, the Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act, ran inland to Wick and did not pass 
through Castletown, which is situated on the north coast between Thurso and Wick. 
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The inland Caithness route presented engineering difficulties in crossing large areas 
of peat moss and engineers predicted that 'to combine economy with efficiency' the 
line would take three years to complete.206 As with the Sutherland Railway, many 
board meetings comprised the Duke and his commissioner Loch alone.208 A working 
agreement with the Highland Railway was made in April 1872 that charged for the 
cost of each train run, as on the Sutherland and Dingwall and Skye Railways. 207 
By August 1873, £202,424 of share capital was shown in the accounts as raised but, 
of this, £72,000 had been issued as security against a loan from the Aberdeen Town 
and County Bank to balance the capital account.208 Thus £130,424 of share capital 
had been received, 36.2 percent of that authorised, but, by recording shares issued 
in security as capital raised, previous Highland practice could be employed to 
declare that half of the share capital had been paid up and borrowing powers were 
released in October.209 Between October 1873 and May 1874, £122,260 of 
debenture loans were issued at 4½ percent, slightly above the authorised limit; all 
debenture holders gave Scottish addresses.210 
205 Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 25 October 1871, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, 
p.13 and p.17. 
208 Examples include the board meetings of 20 and 20 December 1871, 12, 25 and 30 
January 1872, and 26 and 28 February 1872, which comprised the Duke of Sutherland and 
George Loch only, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1; also 27 April, 1 and 28 May, 26 June and 13 July 1872, 
NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, comprising only Sutherland and loch and of which the majority were held 
at Sutherland's London residence at Stafford House. 
207 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 29 April 
1871, NAS/BR/SUC/1 /1, p.42; Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland and 
Caithness Railway, 29 October 1872, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, pp.96-97, and page 1 of inserted 
printed report; Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 26 April 1872, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.170 and page 2 of inserted printed report between pp.161-62 for the 
Ordinary General Meeting held on the same date. 
208 Appendix, table 24(a), note (3). 
209 Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 31 
October 1873, NAS/BR/SUC/1 /1, p.123. 
210 Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 31 October, 8 and 24 November and 
30 December 1873 and 27 January, 27 February, 29 April and 28 May 1874, 
NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, between p~ges 123 and 134; Appendix, table 24(a): by August 1874, 
debenture loans were shown in the accounts as £119,960, £40 below the authorised limit, but 
company minutes on these dates record the total of debentures issued by May 1874 to be 
£122,260, £2,260 above the authorised limit of £120,000. 
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The Sutherland and Caithness Railway opened in July 1874, completing the last 
main artery of the northern Scottish railway network.211 Capital expenditure on the 
line by its opening remained within estimate; land costs by 1874 comprised 6.0 
percent of capital expenditure.212 The capital cost by 1875 was £5,235 per mile, 
confirming that 'cheap railway' principles had been applied successfully.213 
Nevertheless, in 1875, after the first full year of operation, the revenue of the 
company was insufficient to meet the operational costs of the line.214 As on the 
Dingwall and Skye, the directors reduced the number of trains to lower 
expenditure.215 The small revenue balance remaining in subsequent years after 
payment of Highland Railway and company costs was more than absorbed by 
mounting interest payments, which added to the debt of the company. In 1876, the 
£72,000 loan held with the Aberdeen Town and County Bank since 1873 was 
included in a consolidated loan of £112,000 for three years. 218 In 1879, the Duke of 
Sutherland provided a £100,000 loan for ten years and joined the directors in 
guaranteeing a reduced loan of £60,000 from the Town and County Bank.217 
211 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 4 August 1874, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.384. 
212 Appendix, table 24(a). 
213 Appendix, table 24(a), note (4); Report to the Ordinary General meeting of the Sutherland 
and Caithness Railway, 29 October 1875, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, pp.153-54 and page 1 of 
inserted printed report gives a figure of £5,295 for the capital cost per mile. 
214 Appendix, table 24(b): to 31 August 1875, the overall deficit on the revenue account of 
the Sutherland and Caithness was £11,363, comprising £1,421 on operations and £9,942 for 
interest. 
215 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 29 
October 1875, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, pp.153-54 and page 1 of inserted printed report. 
216 Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 15 April 1876, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1: (NB: 
no page numbers are given in the minute book after 3 February 1876, p.157). 
217 Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 22 Feb 1879 and 2 May 1879, 
NAS/BR/SUC/1/1: by 1879, temporary bank loans amounted to £160,000. The Duke offered 
to borrow £100,000 for ten years, secured on his land and estates, to provide longer term 
security of funds to the Sutherland and Caithness; interest charges were to be refunded to 
the Duke by the company. These funds were used to reduce bank debt by £100,000 and 
£100,000 of company stock held as security in the Aberdeen Town and County Bank was re-
assigned to the Duke as his security for the loan. This arrangement only altered the source 
of lending; the level of temporary loans remained at £160,000 until amalgamation in 1884 
when company debts were absorbed by the Highland Railway; Appendix, table 24(a). 
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Table 90: Financial indicators for the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 1875-79 
31 Auaust 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 
Total debt (El 191960 231960 231993 256993 279853 
Gross annual revenue (£) 15389 16367 17865 17989 17483 
Ratio of debentures to cacital raised 37.0% 32.9% 32.8% 30.6% 28.9% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.080 0.071 0.077 0.074 0.062 
Source: Acoendix, table 24(c). 
(1 ): Comparative gearing ratios for the Caledonian Railway in 1849-50 were 24.5% for debentures/capital 
and 0.162 for cross revenue/debt. 
As revenue did not rise sufficiently to reduce the burden of debt, the Sutherland and 
Caithness produces a debt gearing as weak as the Dingwall and Skye (table 90).218 
It remained unable to meet all legitimate charges to its revenue account until it, with 
the Sutherland and Duke of Sutherland's Railways, was amalgamated with the 
Highland in 1884 on expiry of the ten-year working agreement.219 Sutherland and 
Caithness shareholders received £50 of Highland stock for every £100 of stock held, 
Sutherland shareholders received £60, while the Duke received £87 for every £100 
expended on the Duke of Sutherland's Railway.220 
Although financially weak, the far north lines provide a unique example in Scottish 
railway history of the dominance of one large landowner in providing substantial 
capital for a main route, not for direct capital returns from railway investment but for 
the prospect of indirect returns from enhancing land values and stimulating economic 
218 Table 84 in this chapter shows the ratio of gross revenue to total debt on the Dingwall and 
Skye Railway to be 0.081 in its first full year of operation in 1871, and that by 1875 the ratio 
was 0.097. 
219 Appendix, table 24(b), shows the negative net revenue balances returned from 1874 to 
1879; Accounts of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 1880-1884, contained in the 
minute book of the company, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1, show operating revenue surpluses of £5,212 
in 1880 (but with £11,902 interest due), £4,421 in 1881 (with £12,526 interest due), £5,939 in 
1882 (with £12,937 interest due), £8,710 in 1883 (with £13,245 interest due), and £9,377 in 
1884 (with £13,160 interest due). 
220 47&48 Vic. cap.184, 1884, The Highland Railway (Northern Lines) Amalgamation Act, 
sections 15, 16 and 17; Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, 23 October 1883, 
NAS/BR/SUC/1/1: dividend on exchanged Sutherland and Caithness stock was deferred until 
1 September 1886, whereas exchanged Sutherland stock (which had received a small 
annual dividend since August 1875) was eligible for dividend from 1 September 1883 (23 
October 1883, NAS/BR/SLD/1/1). 
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development in the counties served by the lines.221 In 1874, the Railway News 
reported that the Duke of Sutherland had invested £341,000 in the Highland and far 
north lines following his subscription to the Sutherland and Caithness.222 
Recalling perhaps the financial consequences that rebounded onto the Great North 
from its dominance of uneconomic branch companies, the Highland Railway 
provided fifteen percent of the initial capital of the Sutherland and Sutherland and 
Caithness Railways,223 but distanced itself from direct control. It worked the lines 
close to cost and sought its returns from far north traffic that was otherwise lost to 
sea competition. The Highland directors justified their decision: 
This will complete the great line of through communication between all parts 
of the South and the extreme North of Scotland, and cannot fail to be of great 
importance to the Highland Company, in bringing new and additional traffic, 
which will pass over the entire length of the line from Bonar Bridge to Perth 
... There is little or no prospect of the necessary capital being furnished by 
the locality for a long time to come ... 224 
Railways in the highlands, 1865-74 
Earlier chapters have identified the important role played by large landowners in the 
establishment of the railways in the north of Scotland, but their dominance of railway 
development in the far north and north-west of the highlands has been a consistent 
221 Railway Times, 15 March 1873, p.296, reporting a statement by the Duke of Sutherland 
that he had spent 'about £200,000 in promoting and making railways in the north ... which I 
have laid out for the benefits of my estates and of the people in these remote districts'. 
222 Railway News, 1 August 187 4, p.138, recording that the Duke of Sutherland 'held 
£105,000 of the Highland Company's stock, the line from Bonar Bridge to Golspie had cost 
him £116,000, and that from Golspie to Helmsdale £60,000. He now subscribed £60,000 
more, raising his interest to £341,000'. The additional £60,000 subscription reported was the 
Duke's subscription to the Sutherland and Caithness Railway, although the list omitted the 
Duke's £5,000 investment in the Dingwall and Skye Railway. 
223 The Highland subscribed £30,000 of the original £180,000 capital of the Sutherland 
Railway and £50,000 of the £360,000 capital of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
(14.8%). 
224 Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 26 April 1872, 
NAS/BR/HR/1/2, pp.161-62 and page 2 of inserted printed report. 
448 
theme throughout this chapter. Plans for the Skye and far north routes were 
conceived with a common objective of connecting the districts they served into the 
existing railway network by which land values and the economic prospects of the 
region might be improved. The implementation of these plans, however, was 
overshadowed by the financial difficulties of the Highland Railway between 1865 and 
1872, which inevitably preoccupied its directors and officers and offered little 
immediate prospect of financial assistance to the new companies, despite an overlap 
in directorships. The Highland adopted a more detached stance towards these 
northern lines than the Great North had shown to its branch network, but the future 
intention of consolidating the far north companies within the Highland was implied by 
the ten-year working agreement begun when the Sutherland and Caithness opened 
in 1874.225 
Although the strategic planning of highland promoters envisaged a unified scheme 
for a railway to the far north in 1864, the route had to be established in stages 
between 1865 and 187 4 primarily due to capital constraints, mirroring In fact the 
phased development of the Inverness railway web in 1853-63. However, in contrast 
to the thorough planning of earlier railways conceived in Inverness, the plans for the 
Dingwall and Skye proved to be unrealistic and its formation problematic; the line 
exemplified many of the characteristics described in Aytoun's influential 
G/enmutchkin parody of the railway mania. The prime drivers of these northern 
developments were the landowner interests of Alexander Matheson to push a 
railway to the west coast, and of the Duke of Sutherland to establish a railway across 
Sutherland. The substantial capital inducements of the Duke prompted the 
construction of all three sections of the far north route, providing an example of 
capital supply being a cause rather than a result of railway promotion. 
The principal promoters and investors in the Skye and far north railways were also 
major shareholders and directors of the Highland Railway. This integration of 
ownership and control was illustrated by the Highland's agreements to work these 
lines at marginal cost to try to ensure their economic viability and provide an 
225 Minutes of the Highland Railway, 5 March 1872, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.149, which extended 
the working agreements with the Sutherland and Duke of Sutherland Railways to terminate 
ten years following the opening of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway. 
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improved transport service to the region. These agreements suggest that the notion 
of public service became part of the policy of the Highland and its northern satellites, 
but for local economic interests rather than to combat any potentially restrictive 
legislation that Channon concludes was the case in Britain in the last three decades 
of the century.226 Furthermore, the Highland's operation of these northern routes 
without a primary regard to profit parallels Hawke's conclusion that the pursuit of 
profit maximisation was 'not energetic' regionally in railway companies in England 
and Wales during this period.227 The multiplicity of traffic rates was given as the 
reason for the relaxation of profit maximisation in England and Wales, but traffic 
flows and regional development underpinned the motives to operate these northern 
Scottish railways near to cost. This explanation, however, correlates with Hawke's 
further assertion that railways south of the border 'recognised a special responsibility 
for developing the trade of particular regions'.228 The Highland board was prepared 
to countenance some cross-subsidy between component sections of its system to 
capture northern traffic because it was accepted from the outset that the Skye and 
far north lines would not generate returns comparable to those from its main routes, 
given the paucity of population and industry in those areas and the continued 
competition from sea transport. 
The study has suggested that, without the burden of servicing guaranteed capital 
and temporary debt, it was possible for a small railway to operate successfully in a 
remote region; the Duke of Sutherland's Railway produced a nominal return on the 
Duke's capital of 1 ½ percent in 187 4. In contrast, the insolvent Skye, struggling 
without the expected capital investment from larger railways, accumulated fixed 
interest debt to such an extent that it was unable to meet all interest due from 
revenue throughout its independent existence and, like the proteges of the Great 
North in the previous decade, an amalgamation with its parent company became 
essential for survival. The longer-term viability of the far north route strengthened 
226 G Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940 (Aldershot, 2001), 
p.34. 
227 GR Hawke, Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales 1840-1870, p.333. 
228 GR Hawke, Pricing Policy of Railways in England and Wales before 1881', in MC Reed 
(ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969), p.110. 
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once the railway reached the two principal northern ports of Wick and Thurso, but its 
financial weaknesses were masked by the considerable capital investment made by 
the Duke of Sutherland. The evidence therefore supports Vamplew's contention that 
railway returns in the highlands were more likely to benefit the community than the 
investor, but gradually and over the long term.229 
This chapter has shown that difficulties of raising share capital for railways in 
northern Scotland and the patterns of share ownership within them were repeated in 
these northern companies. The remote nature of the territory offered little prospect 
of direct returns on railway investment and so share capital even from other regions 
of Scotland was insignificant. The records of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
confirm the continued reliance on many small local subscriptions and the large 
contributions from a few landowners. The Duke of Sutherland had invested almost 
£¼ million in the far north route by 1874 (almost £12 million on a 2007 price base),230 
while Matheson had invested £28,000 in the Dingwall and Skye by 1872 (almost 
£1½ million on a 2007 price base).231 The chapter has also provided further 
examples of the widespread reliance on bank borrowing as an alternative source of 
finance for northern railways. The Dingwall and Skye and the Sutherland and 
Caithness Railways had both issued considerable amounts of ordinary stock as 
security for bank loans by the time their lines opened to traffic, Only the Sutherland 
and Duke of Sutherland Railways avoided heavy bank borrowing because of the 
substantial investment made by the Duke. 
The Highland had extended its influence and operations between 1865 and 187 4 
whilst building its financial recovery. For the Great North, severely weakened and 
confined to its north-eastern territory, this decade was one of consolidation as the 
229 w Vamplew' Railway Investment in the Scottish Highlands', p.152. 
230 Railway News, 1 August 187 4, p.138, recording that the Duke of Sutherland had invested 
£116,000 in the line from Bonar Bridge to Golspie, £60,000 in the line from Golspie to 
Helmsdale and £60,000 in the line from Helmsdale to Wick and Thurso (£236,000); E 
Richards, 'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: Income, Consumption, Investments and 
Returns, 1780-1880', p.54, provides slightly different data and states that the Duke of 
Sutherland invested £94,2000 in the Sutherland Railway, £63,000 in the Duke of 
Sutherland's Railway and £60,000 in the Sutherland and Caithness Railway (£217,000); See 
Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
231 Railway Times, 20 July 1872, p. 728; See Glossary entry on 'price base'. 
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previous chapter has explained. The Highland paid a 5 percent dividend on ordinary 
shares in August 1873, but it was January 1874 before the Great North was able to 
offer its first ordinary dividend since 1864.232 Nevertheless, both companies had re-
established a sound financial base by 1874 when the region attracted new 
competitive attention.233 Plans were announced for 'a new Highland Railway at a 
cost of two millions' to connect Inverness with Glasgow via the Great Glen and a 
branch to 'touch Skye', for which capital would 'be largely obtained locally .. .'.234 
Scarce local capital was already heavily committed, although the proposal was 
resurrected, albeit unsuccessfully, in 1882 as a contactor's line to challenge the 
Highland's market dominance.235 Moreover, the resurgent Great North renewed its 
attempts to reach Inverness in 1883-84, opening a new competitive era between 
Aberdeen and Inverness, but beyond the scope of this study.238 
232 Appendix, tables 10{d) and 11{b): the Great North dividend for the half year to 31 January 
1874 was½% which rose to 1 1/8 % for the half year to 31 July 1874. 
233 Appendix, table 25: for the second half year of 1873, debt gearing on the Highland had 
reached 0.369 (August 1873), while the Great North's debt gearing was 0.255 (July 1873). 
These ratios were well above their lowest levels of 0.155 on the Highland (August 1866) and 
0.119 on the Great North (January 1867), when the companies had exhibited a greater 
degree of weakness than the insolvent Caledonian in December 1849 (which then had a debt 
gearing of 0.162). 
234 Railway News, 7 November, 1874, p.626, reporting the plans of S McBean CE of 
Westminster, London for a 'proposed Inverness and Glasgow Railway'. 
235 J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: Plan, Politics and People, pp.27-32 and 
appendix 2, p.45, describing the plans of the Glasgow and North Western Railway in 1882-
83. 
238 The subsequent competitive attempts to breach the Highland Railway's monopoly of 
Inverness are recorded in: NT Sinclair, 'The Aviemore Line: Railway Politics in the Highlands, 
1882-1898', Highland Railway Journal, 3, No 46 (Summer 1998), 4-12, and No.47 (Autumn 
1998), 7-11; NT Sinclair, The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998), pp.41-50; D Ross, The 
Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005), pp.104-105; J McGregor, The West Highland Railway: 
Plans, Politics and People (Edinburgh, 2005), pp.27-24 and pp.81-106; HA Vallance, The 
Highland Railway, pp.49-55 and p.68; HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway 
Newton Abbot, 1965), pp.103-115; Sir M Barclay-Harvey, A History of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway (London, 1949, reprinted Shepperton, 1998), pp.95-99 and pp.118-29. 
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Chapter 10: The northern railway system 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate how a railway system was able to 
develop successfully between 1844 and 1874 in the north of Scotland, where 
economic conditions were distinctly unpromising and, drawing upon the 
historiographical record of earlier railway development in Britain, to assess the 
contributions made by the state, strategic planning and finance during this embryonic 
period. This chapter reviews the significance of these factors and concludes that the 
development of the railway system of northern Scotland exhibited some important 
differences from those that shaped the earlier growth of railways to the south in both 
Scotland and England. 
The state and railway development 
The reluctance of the state to intervene in economic affairs during the nineteenth 
century emanated from the dominant ideological influence of free market capitalism. 
Any state involvement was generally a reactive response to events. In northern 
Scotland, the substantial financial assistance given for improvements in highland 
roads and water transport in the early 1800s raised concerns about creating a 
dependency upon state aid and precluded any financial support for Scottish railways 
until the end of the century. In 1845, however, the executive of state in the form of 
the Railway Board recommended a coherent strategic plan for a Scottish railway 
system, which the legislature accepted. This finding contrasts with the general 
historiographical view that the state was largely detached from planning a British 
railway network. The state's blueprint prescribed an Anglo-Scottish trunk route from 
the south to Aberdeen and indicated the logical route for extension further north to 
1 nverness, for which a scheme was approved in 1846. This study shows that railway 
development to the north of Scotland's Forth-Clyde valley was influenced more by 
this strategic plan than by the national railway speculation of 1845. It thus supports 
the contention of Simmons and Robertson that Scotland was less affected by the 
railway mania than England. 
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Historians have argued that throughout the nineteenth century the state adopted 
policies towards British railways that were incongruous. Proposals for the 
amalgamation and lease of railway companies, in particular, elicited disparate views. 
The more economic and efficient working that such arrangements might produce had 
to be weighed against the price and service benefits that free market competition 
was expected to generate. Governments differed on where this balance lay. 
Nevertheless, the principle of amalgamations between companies along one main 
route was widely adopted in northern Scotland because it afforded the only viable 
way of improving transport links into a large and economically disadvantaged region. 
The absence of state opposition to amalgamation proposals emanating from 
Aberdeen or Inverness corroborates Simmons' assertion that from the late 1840s the 
state began to show less concern over amalgamations of 'end-on' railways that 
formed a continuous route. 
The study illustrates contrasting extremes in the use of monopoly powers awarded 
by the state to railway companies. The Great North of Scotland Railway generated 
substantial returns from its truncated main line in 1857-64, but its responses to 
complaints about high prices and quality of service display the traits of a complacent 
monopolist. Vigorous competition reduced this once-dominant regional monopoly to 
a rural, isolated system of branch railways by 1866. As the Highland Railway began 
to operate new railways to the north of Inverness from the mid 1860s, however, the 
study indicates a more benevolent use of market power through a selective 
relaxation of the profit motive. There is a parallel, therefore, with the policies that 
Hawke detected regionally in England and Wales, but the underlying causes were 
different. The purpose in the north was primarily strategic to provide viable 
connections between these remote regions and national networks of trade from 
which improved land values were anticipated by investor landowners. By contrast, 
Hawke considered that the less energetic pursuit of profit maximisation south of the 
border was the result of regional price discrimination and the increasing complexity 
of traffic rates. 
Hawke did argue, however, that railways in England and Wales recognised a special 
responsibility for developing the trade of particular region, an objective that this study 
shows was an important tenet of railway policy in northern Scotland. This principle 
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was exemplified by the decision of the Highland Railway to work the far north and 
west lines close to cost to capture and develop trade in these regions, relying on the 
revenue earned from its own well-established routes to sustain shareholder returns. 
Once again, however, northern motives were different. The far north system was 
developed essentially as a public utility from which the indirect regional economic 
benefits sought by its landowner directors might accrue over time, whereas more 
generally In Britain, Channon suggests that railway companies began to accept the 
obligations of public service as a means to resist further restrictions on their 
commercial freedom. 
State policy towards the Scottish railway system after 1844 therefore illustrates a 
divergence from the generally reactive and detached role that historians have 
identified in England and Wales. Scotland was different. but the case should not be 
over-stated. The state's role in Scotland was as a catalyst rather than an active 
participant in the building of the network into the north of the country. 
Strategic planning and direction 
The British railway network evolved through private enterprise, but the extent to 
which strategic planning influenced its outline has been the subject of 
historiographical debate. This study demonstrates that the railway system of 
northern Scotland, initially stimulated by the state's blueprint for Scottish railways, 
was shaped primarily by judicious strategic planning conceived and directed by the 
commercial leaders of Aberdeen and the landowning proprietors of Inverness and 
the highlands. Their primary motive was to enhance the economic importance of 
their respective centres. Throughout 1844-74, this strategic planning was founded 
upon the objective of obtaining independent regional control of railway transport that 
provided the security of a land-based monopoly. However, the study reveals the 
difficulties encountered in translating these long-term plans into reality. 
The escalating scale of railway enterprise in nineteenth century Britain increasingly 
required a new division of delegated responsibilities between directors and 
managers. The dangers posed by the absence of such structures in periods of rapid 
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expansion were exposed by the findings of the Caledonian shareholders' inquiry of 
1849. In comparison to the Caledonian, however, the northern railway companies 
throughout 1844-7 4 remained relatively small. Regional interests dominated the 
boards of these companies; policies were managed effectively by officers, but set 
and closely supervised at board level. Indeed, the astute strategic planning of 
northern railways identified in this study was generated not as a consequence of 
company size or the evolution of executive management, but through the vision and 
determination of specific individuals and groups within company boards. Foremost 
regional examples of board strategists include Stewart and Duncan in Aberdeen, and 
Matheson and Bruce, aided by engineer Mitchell, in Inverness. While Bruce, as 
managing director of the Inverness web companies, provided the essential oversight 
of the development and operation of the Inverness lines, the study illustrates in 
particular the active leadership and strategic direction given by Matheson, whose 
financial acumen and contacts, substantial personal investment, and dependable 
monetary guarantees were seminal in the successful realisation of the Inverness 
web. The thesis therefore contends that Slaven's assessment that there is little 
evidence to show Matheson played a significant role in the development of the 
operations of the railways of which he was chairman for nearly thirty years is too 
severe a judgement. 
Historiography indicates that a consequence of the increasing scale of railway 
enterprise was a growing separation of ownership and control within companies. 
Expensive competition and expansion approved by railway boards contributed to a 
growth in capitalisation, particularly through the issue of guaranteed stock, which 
tended not only to depress dividends and incite shareholder dissatisfaction but also 
to weaken the influence of ordinary shareholders. Nevertheless, this separation was 
not generally experienced in northern Scotland. The study demonstrates that a 
substantial degree of accountability of board to shareholder was retained as the 
northern railway system expanded. The commercial leaders of Aberdeen held 
control of all the Aberdeen web companies in 1846, but English capital was 
sufficiently strong to be able to recast the board of the Aberdeen Railway in 1848. 
The Great North ensured congruence between the ownership and control of its 
nominally independent branch network by providing much of the capital, holding 
majorities on company boards and providing the operation and management for the 
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lines. The Inverness web companies and their northern satellites, however, provide 
the most striking examples of the accountability retained between directors and 
shareholders in northern Scotland. These companies were financed substantially by 
aristocratic highland landowners and new landowners bringing their own earned 
capital into the highlands. As principal shareholders, they dominated company 
boards, ensuring that ownership and control remained almost synonymous. More 
specifically, it was this unanimity that facilitated the promotion and operation of 
railways to the north of Inverness, where directors and shareholders alike accepted 
that returns were uncertain and unlikely to arise from railway investment alone. 
Whilst acknowledging the interlinking of bank and railway directorships, historians 
have questioned whether financial interests played any important or dominant role in 
shaping the strategies and structure of British railway companies. This study 
suggests a fundamental role was undertaken by banks and bankers in the planning 
and development of the northern railway system. The Caledonian Bank, through 
manager Waterston and director Mitchell, was influential in the formulation and 
implementation of plans for the Inverness railway web from the earliest days of the 
unsuccessful Inverness promotions in 1846. It is the North of Scotland Bank, 
however, that provides examples of a bank guiding the strategy of a northern railway 
company. That bank made any further loan to the Great North in 1854 conditional 
upon not extending the line beyond Huntly. It was its manager Lumsden who 
compiled the list of acceptable directors for the new Great North board in 1867 and 
proposed its new board and chairman, and Lumsden who discussed with the 
Highland a possible abandonment of the Great North route to Elgin via Rothes as 
part of the company's strategy for financial recovery. The bank's primary motive was 
to protect its capital, but these actions shaped the Great North's plans and structure 
at critical points in its development. 
The thesis shows that the development of the Scottish railway system in 1844-74 
was founded upon the cogent strategic plans formulated and driven by two distinct 
regional groups, highland landowners and Aberdonian entrepreneurs, to try to 
secure control of the traffic of northern Scotland. A feature of these plans was the 
desire for local direction of the railway network to meet local needs, exemplified by 
the unity between ownership and control maintained within these northern railway 
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companies as late as the 1870s. Scotland, at least in the north, was thus different 
from many other parts of Britain. 
Sources and management of railway finance 
A persistent theme throughout this study is the almost universal difficulty 
experienced by these remote northern railways in raising share capital, which 
resulted in an extensive reliance on local capital and loans. Borrowing is shown 
consistently to be an alternative rather than a complementary source of capital for 
these railways, and previous chapters illustrate the widespread problems 
encountered in servicing both authorised and floating debt. By 1845, when the first 
trunk route north of the Forth-Clyde valley was authorised, the scale of capital 
required for British main line railways had outstripped local sources and was 
increasingly supplied from a national capital market that could channel funds to the 
most profitable opportunities. The many references in this thesis to the railway 
financial journals of the period indicate that investors had access to comprehensive 
information about the prospects and performance of railway companies. Improved 
knowledge is a feature of a more perfect market and this study demonstrates that 
these northern railways, where returns were uncertain, offered little attraction to 
national investors. 
The study furthers the debate on the sources of capital in the development of 
Scottish railways that previously has been largely confined to the period prior to the 
1845 mania. There is general agreement that English capital invested in Scottish 
railways tended to be directed towards trunk routes, in particular the Anglo-Scottish 
routes of the 1840s, and that local lines relied upon Scottish capital. This pattern Is 
specifically illustrated in this study by the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and 
Elgin schemes of 1846. English investment in the later Inverness railway web and 
its northern satellites, however, was insignificant, which substantiates the 
historiographical view that some Scottish companies faced disadvantages in raising 
capital on a national market because of their small scale and remoteness. Data from 
1854-74 analysed in the study reveal the heavy dependence on local capital to 
finance northern railways, which, almost without exception, proved to be insufficient 
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to meet their needs. The Inverness and far north companies obtained a majority of 
their capital from a few large shareholders, principally the major landowners in the 
districts served by the lines, supported by many small local subscriptions. Moreover, 
the evidence suggests that these shareholdings tended to be held for the long-term. 
In the opening chapter, the question was posed whether the availability of finance 
might have encouraged the promotion of new railways, rather than providing the 
means to realise existing projects. Capital for railways was usually supplied 
following the preparation of plans and the presentation of a prospectus to the public. 
The promotion of the Great North conformed to this pattern; its shares were heavily 
oversubscribed in the maelstrom of the 1845 railway mania. Following the collapse 
of confidence in railway shares after the mania, however, the Great North was just 
one of the many companies nationally unable to translate subscription offers into firm 
investment funds. Northern railway promoters needed to adopt new tactics to raise 
the necessary capital. The Inverness web promotions of 1854-62 illustrate the 
extensive preliminary work undertaken to obtain landowner agreements and to 
identify significant capital sources before seeking parliamentary powers and inviting 
wider public investment. Nevertheless, the plans submitted for these routes 
predated assured capital supply and, in several cases, the tentative offers of 
investment by larger southern railway companies failed to materialise, causing 
similar capital shortages to those experienced by the Great North. Only a few years 
later, however, the far north lines provide examples of capital availability 
encouraging plans for new railways. The offers of large capital investment by the 
Duke of Sutherland, seeking the economic benefits of improved transport for his vast 
estates, induced the extension of the Inverness network north of lnvergordon to 
Bonar Bridge, opened in 1864, and then propelled the creation of the full through 
route to Wick and Thurso by 187 4. Thus the complete system worked by the 
Highland Railway in 187 4 comprised some routes where capital supply had 
stimulated promotion and others where plans had preceded the certainty of 
substantial investment. 
To create economically viable railways, northern promoters had to obtain 
significantly lower capital expenditure per mile than incurred on earlier railways in 
Scotland and England. Historians have generally ascribed the high costs of railway 
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development in Britain to a combination of inaccurate estimates, unforeseen cost 
increases, elaborate construction, engineering difficulties and excessive land costs. 
Northern Scotland, however, provides some contrasts. This study shows that the 
scale of cost inaccuracies tended to reduce progressively as the railway system 
extended northwards. Substantial economies were achieved on main lines and 
branches using the principles of the 'cheap railway', exemplified by the cost of 
approximately £9,000 per mile for the Inverness-Perth main line, only a quarter of the 
cost of the Edinburgh-Glasgow inter-urban route opened twenty years earlier. 
Yet on this highland trunk route, designed by Mitchell who had extensive experience 
of railway construction, costs exceeded estimates by sixty percent despite its 
remarkably low cost per mile. Moreover, overall costs for the Inverness web routes 
were approximately fifty percent above estimates, although some of this excess was 
the result of amended plans. These data lend credence to Robertson's suspicion 
that, in Scotland, there may have been some deliberate attempts to keep estimates 
low to strengthen the perceived viability of schemes to investors and Parliament, but 
the evidence remains circumstantial. 
The study illustrates in particular the large reductions in the proportion of capital 
spent on land for these northern routes compared to the earlier Scottish inter-urban 
lines and many railways in England. It also suggests that land costs were a more 
significant factor in cost excesses on main routes and that feu duties were more 
readily granted on branches and the post-1865 northern extensions because of their 
expected local benefit. With widespread landowner support for extensions into the 
far north and west of Scotland, for example, land costs for these main routes were 
relatively insignificant. 
The widespread use of bank credit is revealed consistently throughout the study as 
an alternative rather than a complementary source of capital for northern railways, 
and thus extends Reed's conclusion drawn for British railways in 1820-44 into the 
post-mania railway history of Scotland. It concludes that capital constraints within 
these northern railway companies arose more from the difficulties of raising initial 
share capital than from erroneous estimates, and it highlights the major impact of 
hidden debt incurred through temporary loans. Furthermore, it confirms that the 
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importance of loan capital in pre-1844 Scottish railways, identified by Gourvish and 
Reed, continued throughout 1844-74 in northern Scotland. The Great North and all 
of its associated branches used bank advances to supply capital prior to their lines 
opening; moreover, debt interest absorbed at least half of gross revenue at some 
juncture on each branch. All the Inverness web companies employed substantial 
bank lending, aided by the personal connections and guarantees of directors. The 
role of banks in the supply of capital was crucial, not just once a railway was open 
and generating revenue as Vamplew suggests, but in many instances by granting 
advances during the construction phase. In effect, banks supplied temporary finance 
within authorised loan limits before the companies could demonstrate legitimately 
that half of the share capital had been paid up, which was the condition imposed by 
the state before borrowing powers could be exercised, and redemption was 
expected once debentures could be issued. Although there is no evidence to link 
directly the earlier development of banking networks in Scotland with the extension 
of railways into the north, the study illustrates the widespread influence of the 
established regional banks in Aberdeen and Inverness and it corroborates 
Checkland's assertion of the importance of banks in Scottish railway finance. 
Through the identification of the scale of hidden debt accumulated by the Great 
North and Highland companies and the analysis of the strategies used by them to 
redeem these considerable liabilities, this study contributes to historiography two 
salient case-histories of Victorian railway companies extricating themselves from 
severe financial crises. Backed by the personal guarantees of some of its directors, 
the Highland was able to extend the term of its bank lending, gaining time to build its 
revenue and strengthen its share value, which then enabled stock held in security to 
be sold to discharge its temporary debt by 1872. The Great North, without wealthy 
guarantors and lacking assured revenue from a trunk route, negotiated a refinancing 
package with two banks in 1868 that facilitated the repayment of its bank debt, also 
by 1872. The Highland, in fact, held a relatively greater burden of bank debt than the 
Great North, but its stronger revenue stream and the sureties of its directors made its 
financial insecurity less apparent. 
The Great North and the Inverness companies demonstrated that main railway 
routes in northern Scotland were viable and could generate returns to capital by 
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containing costs through the successful application of 'cheap railway' principles. 
However, the study shows that the ubiquitous difficulty of raising share capital for 
these small and remote companies from a national capital market resulted in a 
significant dependence on local finance and borrowing. In particular, it reveals the 
burden placed on companies by the scale of temporary debt, which was not always 
disclosed to shareholders in published accounts and which has received little 
previous investigation in the historiography of Scottish railways. 
Northern railways and the Scottish network 
Strategic planning by the state and regional interests, substantial reductions In the 
costs of construction, local investment for future indirect returns to capital, and the 
financial buttress of temporary credit, particularly that supplied by banks, constitute 
the substructure for the successful expansion of the railway network into the north of 
Scotland in 1844-74. Throughout this study, all of these factors evoke contrasts 
between the evolution of a railway system in northern Scotland and that suggested in 
the historiography of railway development in Britain. The nature of the distant 
northern economy and the determined local independence of both Aberdeen and 
Inverness underlie these differences, which is illustrated particularly by the Inverness 
railway web extending outwards to connect into the national railway network, rather 
than awaiting the inclination of large southern companies to push northwards. The 
thesis therefore concludes that Simmons was correct in surmising that different 
developmental characteristics might be found north of the border. Furthermore, it 
supports Devina's wider premise that there were differences between Scotland and 
England in their patterns of economic and social transformation in the nineteenth 
century. 
This thesis has focused upon a particular region and time period, not least for 
reasons of scale. Whilst it offers a comprehensive examination of the establishment 
of the railway system of northern Scotland from 1844, the concluding date of 
Robertson's study, it explores only part of the development for Scotland envisaged in 
the state's blueprint of 1845. Similar investigations of the evolution of the three large 
railway conglomerates in central and southern Scotland, the Caledonian, the North 
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British and the Glasgow and South-Western, are needed to address more fully the 
neglect of the economic history of Scottish railways that Robertson detected in 1983. 
It is perhaps surprising that, although the Caledonian was amongst the largest 
business enterprises in Scotland throughout the century, no detailed business history 
of it has yet been written. 
These substantial topics alone indicate the substantial research still required purely 
to examine the development of the Scottish railway system. Simmons argued, 
however, that the examination of the development of railways was only the first stage 
in assessing their impact and consequences, the focus of his major study of England 
and Wales. A similar evaluation of the contribution of railways to the wider economic 
and social development of Scotland, on which Scottish historiography is largely 
silent, remains to be tackled. 
More specifically, the renewed competition that emerged in the 1880s to challenge 
the Highland Railway's dominance of northern railway traffic suggests an extension 
to the scope of this study. Although the political objectives of these competitors have 
been subject to some investigation, indicated In the previous chapter, further 
research is necessary to determine the financial impact of this new competition and 
thus to assess whether any lessons of the financial crises of 1865-67 outlined in 
earlier chapters were learned or repeated in northern Scotland. 
Vigorous defence of territory and competition was not, of course, unique to the north. 
Reference was made in the opening chapter to Robertson's apt description of 
Scottish railway politics as semi-controlled warfare. This thesis endorses the validity 
of that observation for northern Scotland in 1844-74. Nevertheless, the successful 
products of northern strategies and strategists remain substantially Intact to form 
today's railway system of northern Scotland. 
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Explanatory notes to the financial tables 
(1): Company accounts in 1844-74 were constructed in the currency units of pounds, 
shillings and pence. Shillings (twenty to the pound) and pence (twelve to the shilling) 
have been rounded down In the tables to the nearest pound. Some account totals, 
therefore, may not match precisely the sum of component items. 
(2): Some northern railway companies produced half-yearly accounts, in January or 
February, and again in July or August, but many others reported annually in July or 
August. The period of the account is indicated in the tables. 
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Table 1: Aberdeen Railway 
1(a): Capital account of the Aberdeen Railway, 1845-50 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1845 08.1847 08.1848 08.1849 07.1850 07.1850 
authorised authorlaed 
Capltal raised 
lncludina: 
Orlalnal shares 1845 Act 830000 804125 830000 804955 
Brechln Deviation Act 1847 3000 0 
Pref. Shares 6% 1848 Act 225539 276666 274412 
Pref Shares 7% 1850 Act 150000 0 
Shares 830000 582039 784847 1029664 12511666 1077367 
Loans 1845 Act 276666 276666 
Loans 1847 Act 1000 
Loans 1848 Act 92222 
Loans 1850 Act 50000 
Loans 276886 69376 205556 305350 4111888 383447 
capital (sharea & loans) 1106666 1440814 
Capital ralHd m 653221 1000547 1366713 16711555 1441700 
Balance 4203 5024 • 28151 -1"'8070 
Capital aoent 649018 995523 1394864 1589770 
/ncludina: 
Preliminary & 29393 33440 37807 38998 
Partiamentarv 
Construction 411519 661319 956757 1137527 
Land and comoensation 89815 102675 127314 137723 
Land conslanments 29930 22728 14878 14878 
Enaineerina 3000 6771 20008 22165 
Interest to shareholders 10676 11205 11268 12369 
Interest on loans - 10573 18805 3027-4 
Stations 32903 47462 49465 65718 
Locomotives 9000 3583-4 39912 48789 
Rolling stock 15216 39824 38049 58236 
Alford Vallev Railwav Bond 4699 
Deeslde Railwav Stock 16843 
source: Reoorts to Ordlnarv General Meetlnas of the Aberdeen Rallwav I NAS/BR/RAClSl/1 /36\. 
(1): Data for capital raised includes minor miscellaneous receipts that are not itemised in this table. 
(2): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(3): The Aberdeen Railway opened throughout to Aberdeen on 1 April 1850. Authorised capital under the 1845 Act 
was £830,000 with £276,666 in borrowing powers. 
(4): In August 1849, capital expenditure was 68.1 % above estimate wtth land costs comprising 10.2% of the total. By 
1850 when the full line opened, capital expenditure was 91 .5% above estimate: the capital cost per mile was £22,00-4, 
construction costs were £15,744 per mile and land costs were 9.6% of caoltal exoendlture. 
(continued) 
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1(b): Capital account of the Aberdeen Railway, 1850-56 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1850 01.1851 07.1851 01.1852 07.1852 01.1853 
Shares 1077367 1092529 1160360 1167496 1193032 1228065 
Debenture loans 363447 354381 360312 410590 382349 405610 
Caoltal (shares & loans) 1440814 1446910 1520672 1578086 1575381 1633675 
Caoltal raised (inc misc.) 1441700 1447755 1521562 1578975 1576272 1634565 
Balance -148070 -1893'2 -138939 -102202 -114904 • 58988 
Caoltal spent 1589770 1637098 1660501 1681177 1691176 1693552 
Jncludlna: 
Interest to shareholders 12369 10822 10822 10622 10822 10822 
Interest on loans 30274 33540 42854 44273 46813 47121 
Land 152601 150450 154976 156598 160878 161339 
Plant 105025 109529 102010 105363 105339 108483 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1853 01.185' 07.185' 01.1855 07.1855 01.1858 
Shares 1228295 1228452 1299474 1299474 1302964 1303024 
Debenture loans 407450 414719 456359 473858 477596 489839 
Caoital (shares & loans) 1635745 1843171 1755833 1773332 1780560 1792863 
Caoital raised (inc misc.) 1636635 1644061 1756724 1776454 1785908 1793313 
Balance • 88979 · 85309 • 76832 · 68484 • 80704 • 74288 
Caoital soent 1703614 1729371 1833356 1844939 1846613 1867612 
Interest to shareholders 10822 10822 10822 10822 10822 10822 
Interest on loans 47121 47799 48876 48887 49006 49006 
Land 161688 160734 161465 161676 161222 161499 
Plant 113238 123998 130304 133811 135842 151872 
source: Reoorts to Ordinarv General Meetlnas of the Aberdeen Railwav INAS/BRIRAC7S1/1 /36\. 
(5): Part of the surviving statement of account to 31 January 1856 In the National Archives of Scotland Is damaged 
and the figures for loans have therefore been derived from other data on the published account sheets. 
(6): The capital cost per mile of the Aberdeen Railway by 1851, one year after full opening, was £22,983, 100.1% 
above estimate, which rose to £25,273 per mile by January 1855 after opening of the new Aberdeen terminus at 
Gulld Street, which added approxlmately ¼ mlles to the 72¼ mlles of the system. In July 1851, land costs 
comorised 9.3% of caoital exoenditure. 
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1(c}: Revenue account of the Aberdeen Railway, 1848-56 
REVENUE (£) 08.1648 08.1649 07.1850 
Accounts oeriod 7 months 12 months 11 months 
Gross revenue 14015 30482 48237 
Revenue Balance 4989 - 5-16 -7610 
Exoenditure 9025 31029 55848 
lncludina: 
Ooeratin!l exnenses 19907 25685 
General Balance Shfft 
Bills oavable 134475 
Amounts due to contractors 39657 
REVENUE (£) 07.1850 01.1851 07.1851 01.1852 07.1852 01.1853 
Accounts oeriod 11 months Half vear Halfvear Halfvear Halfvear Halfvear 
Gross revenue 48237 33573 35237 36803 38918 41343 
Revenue Balance -7610 -1305 - 4307 · 4010 • 2889 72 
Fvnendlture 55848 34878 39545 40813 41788 41270 
/ncludina: 
Ooeratlna eimPnses 25685 18862 20216 22474 22301 23789 
Interest (on loans and nla 10024 13282 12292 13440 11«2 
oreference shares) of which 
/nten,st on loans n/a 9675 9775 9565 9670 9376 
General Balance Sheet 
Bills oavable 134475 156020 120750 88914 94096 44207 
Amounts due to contractors 39657 27600 24910 21409 344140 29623 
Amount due on revenue, nla 46951 52769 57313 65484 84629 
Including dividend arrears 
REVENUE (£) 07.1853 01.1854 07.1854 01 .1855 07.18115 01 .1158 
Accounts oeriod Halfvear Halfvear Halfvear Halfvear Halfvear Halfvear 
Gross revenue 41656 46468 49973 53096 56992 61015 
Revenue Balance 274 3232 5339 8287 10800 8751 
Fimendlture 41381 43255 44633 46811 46392 54264 
Jncludina: 
Operatlna exoenses 24233 25494 25695 27388 26994 33927 
Interest (on loans and 11096 11714 12892 13376 13351 14290 
preference shares) of which 
lnten,st on loans 9481 9754 10748 11383 11629 12497 
General Balance Sheet 
Bills oaveble 49736 51881 45130 46799 46647 57355 
Amounts due to contractors 31387 38018 36935 34088 21043 37627 
Amount due on revenue, 91925 116499 50795 61999 58961 80013 
Including dividend arrears 
source: Reports to Ordinary General Meetinas of the Aberdeen Railwav (NAS/BR/RACCSV1 /361. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum 
of component items. 
(2): Amounts due on revenue account in the general balance sheet below the line include the accumulated 
debt on preference dividends and other guaranteed payments. 
(3): The large reduction in suspense account debt on revenue in July 1854 is due lo the capitalisation of the 
arrears of preference dividend. 
(4): No dividend was paid on ordinary stock until 1861 , by when the Aberdeen Railway was a constituent of 
the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, formed from the amalgamation of the Aberdeen and Scottish Midland 
Junction Railways in 1856. In the half year to January 1861 , the first dividend waa paid on Aberdeen 
ordinary stock at ¼ %. See also Appendix table 21 (a), and tables 33 and 34 In chapter 4 of the main text of 
the thesis. 
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1(d): Financial Indicators for the Aberdeen Railway 1849-56 
Data for norlods a shown (£) 08.1848 08.1849 07.1850 
Accounts comoi~ for: Partvear 12 months 11 months 
Capital raised 1000547 1366713 1-4-41700 
Debenture loans 205556 305350 363447 
Interest paid to shareholders 11205 11268 12369 
Interest on loans /excludlna shareholder loans) 10573 18805 30274 
Total Interest paid on capital account 21778 30073 -42643 
Estimated fixed interest debt at a notional 5% interest -435560 601460 852860 
Debi below the line in accounts 13«75 
Estimated total debt 435560 601460 987335 
Gross half veer revenue (14015) 30482 48237 
Gross annual revenue n/a 30482 52622 (2) 
Ratio of loans to caoital raised 20.5% 22.3% 26.2% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.051 0.053 
(1): Total debt Is Imputed from the total Interest paid given In the accounts at a notional 5% Interest rate. 
(2): Gross annual revenue for 1850 is estimated from the figure of £-48,237 reported for the 11 months shown In 
the accounts. 
Data for half years (£) 01.1851 07.1851 01.1852 07.18152 01 .1853 
Accounts compiled for Halfvear 
Caoital raised 1447755 1521562 1578975 1576272 1634565 
Debenture loans 354381 360312 410590 382349 405610 
Interest paid to shareholders 10822 10822 10822 10822 10822 
Interest on loans /excludina shareholders) 33540 42854 44273 46813 471 21 
Total interest oaid on capital account 44362 53676 55095 57635 57943 
Estimated fixed Interest debt at a notional 887240 1073520 1101900 1152700 11 58860 
5% Interest 
Debt below the line in accounts (3) 202971 173519 146227 159580 128836 
Estimated total debt 1090211 1247039 1248127 1312280 1287696 
Gross half year revenue 33573 35237 36803 38918 41343 
Gross annual revenue (2) 59884 68810 72040 75721 80261 
Ratio of loans to caoltal raised 24.5o/o 23.7% 26.0% 24.3'Y. 24.8% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.055 0.055 0.058 0.058 0.082 
Data for half years (£) 07.1853 01 .1854 07.1854 01 .1855 07.1855 01.1858 
Accounts comolled for Halfvear 
Caoital raised 1636635 1644061 1766724 1776454 1785908 1793313 
Debenture loans 407450 414719 456359 473858 477596 489839 
Interest oald to shareholders 10822 10822 10822 10822 10822 10822 
Interest on loans (excluding 47121 47799 48876 48887 49006 49006 
shareholders) 
Total interest oak! on caoltal account 57943 58621 59698 59709 59828 59828 
Estimated fixed interest debt at a 1158860 1172420 1193960 1194180 1196560 1197760 
notional 5% interest 
Debt below the line in accounts 141661 168380 95925 108798 105608 137368 
Estimated total debt 1300521 1340800 1289885 1302978 1302168 1333928 
Gross half year revenue 41656 46488 49973 53098 56992 61015 
Gross annual revenue 82999 88144 96461 103071 110090 118007 
Ratio of loan• to capital raised 24.9'Yo 25.2% 26.0% 26.7% 26.7°/4 27.3% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total 0.064 0.066 0.075 0.079 o.ou 0.088 
debt 
(3): Debt below the line in the accounts comprises bills and amounts due on revenue including arrears of 
dividend. 
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Table 2: Aboyne and Braemar Railway 
2(a): Capital account of the Aboyne and Braemar Railway, 1866-74 
CAPITAL(£) 31 July 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 Ordinarv shares (4\ (6\ 39696 40096 40096 38250 38250 38250 38250 38250 38250 Loans 900 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 Capital ralHd 40596 62095 62095 60249 60249 60249 60249 80249 80249 
Balance -7370 • 508 • 3730 -10558 -10899 .9993 
-9993 -10287 -10287 CaDltal spent 47988 82804 65828 70808 70948 70242 70242 70516 70516 
lncludlna: 
Preliminarv & Parliamentarv 1582 2206 
Enoineerino and olans 58 549 
Land and compensation 186 1278 
Land consignments 2000 4590 
Construction inc rails 43735 48973 
Stations 0 3975 
Interest (5) 182 558 
Capital spent to the last ½ 63557 69006 70841 70085 70242 70477 70516 year 
Cao/ta/ saent in ½ Yttar 2249 823 106 157 0 39 0 
General balance sheet 
Amount due to bankers 3009 3126 2995 3048 3397 3421 SUndries due 7408 7264 7237 6169 6098 6103 6142 6202 6144 /ncludina: 
Commercial Bank 2778 
Commercial Bank 2000 
Contractor 5436 
Bills 4564 
Source: Minutes of the Abovne and Braemar Rallwav. 1865-76 (NAS/BR/ABR/1-2). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Authorised share capital In 1865 was £66,000 plus £22,000 In borrowing powers. The line opened In October 1866· 
by 1869, capital expenditure was 7.3% above estimate with a capital cost per mile of £6,437. Lend costs In 1867 were · 
9.4% of capital expenditure. 
(3): The line was subsidised by the Deeside/Great North lease In that working expenses were not to be charged until the 
line dividend reached 4½% but that period was not to exceed 10 years from the opening of the line. 
(4): Of the 6,600 £10 shares, 3,312 shares had been paid in full at £10 by July 1866. 
(5): The company defaulted on £219 of interest on debentures In the first half year of 1867. 
(6): The reduction in share capital raised in 1869 was caused by the declaration of additional contractor shares 88 
forfeited. These shares had been issued nominally to allow the company to access Its borrowing powers (Minutes of the 
Abovne and Braemar Railwav, 18 May 1866 NAS/BR/ABR/1 /1 D.32l. 
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2(b): Revenue account of the Aboyne and Braemar Railway, 1867-74 
REVENUE(£) 31 Julv 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Total annual revenue 1852 3269 3159 3113 3369 3562 3524 3780 
Balance 332 512 2136 2123 2383 2475 2281 2305 
Total annual exoenditure 1520 2677 1023 990 986 1087 1243 1475 
lncludina: 
Workina exoenses (3) 624 893 899 851 883 870 1033 1169 
Feu duties taxes and rates 33 132 123 137 101 216 208 305 
Debenture and other interest 810 1649 1622 1525 1430 1418 1414 1379 
lncludina: 
Interest on ~benture loans 672 1099 1096 1120 1113 1099 1087 1050 
Interest to banks 189 312 526 405 317 31Q 327 32Q 
Interest (miscellaneous) 186 
Balance for dividends (3) 449 1708 2604 2373 2574 2819 2511 2524 
Annual dividend(%) (3) 0 0 2 2 2 3 
Source: Minutes of the Aboyne and Braemar Railway, 1865-76 (NAS/BR/ABR/1-2). 2½ 2¼ 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Data is calculated for the full year from half-yearly data in the accounts. 
(3): The line was subsidised by the Deeside/Great North lease in that working expenses were not to be 
charged until the line dividend reached 4 ½% but the period was not to exceed 1 O years from the opening of the 
line. Therefore the balance shown as available for dividends, which Included carryforwards, was artificially high 
because no charge was made for working the line throuahout this oeriod. 
2(c): Financial Indicators for the Aboyne and Braemar Railway. 1866-74 
(£) 31 Jury 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Caoital raised 62095 62095 60249 60249 60249 60249 60249 60249 
Debenture loans (2) 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 21999 
Estimated temporary loans 3780 9960 10520 8100 6340 6380 6540 6580 
Estimated total debt 25779 31959 32519 30099 28339 28379 28539 28579 
Gross annual revenue 1852 3269 3159 3113 3369 3562 3524 3780 
Ratio of debentures to 35.4% 35.4% 36.5% 36.5% 36.5% 36.59/e 36.5'Y. 36.5% 
capital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.072 0.102 0.097 0.103 0.119 0.126 0.123 0.132 
total debt (3) 
(1): Estimated temporary loans are derived from bank Interest paid and calculated from a noUonal 5% Interest rate 
on total gross interest paid, which was the rate charged by the Great North to other branch lines for plant use. 
(2): £219 of Interest due on debentures was. not paid in the_ first h_alf of _1867. 
(3): The ratio of gross revenue to total debt Is calcul~ted without imputing any cost for working the line which was 
in abeyance until dividend reach 4½ % or for a m8Xlmum of ten years. If a 50% working charge had been 
charged, as commonly applied on other railways, the company would have been unable to pay its interest and 
debts. 
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Table 3: Alford Valley Railway 
3(a): Capital account of the Alford Valley Railway, 1857-65 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1857 08.1858 08.1859 
Share capital 14447 43401 37267 
New preference stock 
Temporary loan from the Great North of Scotland 7437 
Debenture loans 28000 28000 
Total capltal raised (2) 14447 71401 72705 
Balance 897 905 • 28258 
Total exoenditure 13549 70496 100961 
lncludina: 
Preliminary and Par1lamentarv exoenses 5593 5593 6645 
Construction 6527 59769 84339 
Land and compensation 510 1829 2487 
Land assignments 648 934 
Emilneering and clans 400 1514 2247 
Interest 462 740 2515 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1860 08.1861 08.1862 08.1863 08.1864 08.1885 
Share capital 37291 37821 38940 38939 38939 38939 
New 0reference stock (3) (5) 39420 4-4920 -45020 
Great North temoorarv loan 7437 6907 
Debenture loans 28000 27962 27962 27762 27162 2-4282 
Total capltal raised (3) 72729 72692 66902 106122 111022 108242 
Balance • 30807 • 31821 -38508 -50 +4288 + 1115 
Total expenditure 103536 104513 105410 106172 106753 107127 
Caoital scent to orevious vr 100961 103536 104513 105410 106172 106753 
Caoital scent in current year 2575 976 597 761 581 373 
Source: Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 1855-66 NAS/BR/ALF/1/1 ). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): The figure for share capital in 1858 includes the sum paid by the Great North for its subscription of 
1,600 shares. 
(3): The large fall in capital raised shown between 1861 and 1862 was due to the cancellation of forfeited 
shares used to create preference stock, which was then taken by the Great North in payment of debts· 
thus the burden of debt was redistributed within the company and not fully discharged. • 
(4): The authorised capital for the line in 1856 was £85,000 plus £28,000 in borrowing powers. The 
capital expenditure by opening in 1859 exceeded estimates by 18.8%; land costs were 3.4% of capital 
expenditure. The capital cost per mile was £6,310 by 1859. 
(5): Preference stock was authorised from the conversion of forfeited ordinary shares under 25&26 Vic. 
cao.87 1862. 
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3(b): Revenue account of the Alford Valley Railway, 1860-65 
REVENUE (£) 08.1860 08.1861 08.1862 08.1863 08.1864 08.1865 
Total annual revenue (4) 5987 5604 5756 5009 5562 5864 
Balance -607 -2062 -2017 -2408 -192 + 241 
Total annual exoenditure 6595 7666 7773 7418 5754 5623 
lncludina: 
Debenture interest 754 1205 1190 1176 1148 1118 
Bank and temoorarv loan interest (2)(5) 1877 2112 1956 2176 343 202 
Workina charae to GNSR 1428 1531 1662 1462 1452 1463 
5% interest on olant to GNSR 447 493 508 433 426 426 
Interest as % of oross revenue (3) 51.4 68.0 63.5 75.6 34.5 29.8 
General balance shNt 
Amount due to bank 5198 6246 4294 3569 3238 3636 
Sundries on account 26622 28769 39068 3894 3019 8453 
Source: Minutes of the Alford Valley Railway, 1855-66 (NAS/BR/ALF/1/1). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2) In 1860, the Alford Valley was paying 5% annually on a £30,000 loan from the Great North. 
(3): Interest as a proportion of gross revenue includes the 5% Interest charged by the Great North on the use of 
plant. 
(4): Data for the first five months of operation in 1859 are omitted; net revenue for this period was £512 and 2% 
dividend was paid; no further dividends were subsequently paid by the company. 
l5l: Interest on temporarv loans fell sharolv once oreference stock had been issued in 1863 
3(c): Flnanclal Indicators for the Alford Valley Railway, 1860-65 
(£) 31 Auaust 1860 1861 1882 1863 1864 1865 
Caoital raised 72729 72692 66902 106122 111022 108242 
Debenture loans 28000 27962 27962 27762 27162 24282 
Temoorarv debt 37540 42240 39120 43520 6860 4040 
Total debt lexcludina oreference stockl 65540 70202 67082 71282 34022 28322 
6% oreference stock (2} 39420 44920 45020 
Total debt (includina oreference stock} 65540 70202 67082 71282 78942 73342 
Gross annual revenue 5987 5604 5756 5009 5562 5864 
Ratio of debenturea to capital raised 38.5% 38.So/, 41.8% 28.21/o 24.5o/, 22.4% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.091 0.080 0.086 0.070 0.183 0.207 {excluding oraference stock) 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.091 0.080 0.088 0.070 0.070 0.080 (lncludina nreference stock) 
(1): The estimated temporary debt is calculated from a notional 5% interest rate, which was the rate 
charged by the Great North for plant use and Includes advances made by the Great North. 
(2): The 6% preference stock is shown as a component of debt gearing from 1864, the year when the 
guaranteed preference dividends were due for the 1863-64 financial year, because these shares were 
issued to replace loans made by the Great North and therefore re-distributed debt within the accounts 
rather than discharaina it. 
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Table 4: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway, 
renamed the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway (1859) 
4(a): Capital account of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railway, 1856-65 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1856 08.1857 08.1858 08.1859 08.1860 
Shares 30224 75748 84535 85155 85290 
Calls in advance 8108 
Preference stock 
Debentures 33800 39700 39900 39900 
Capltal raised 38332 109549 124236 125056 125191 
Balance 2936 -19858 -20773 -23289 -23483 
Capital spent 41268 129407 145009 148345 148674 
Including: 
Prellmlnarv and Par11amentarv 1888 2029 2831 3674 
Construdion 29401 109187 121803 122615 
Land 3023 9702 10758 11160 
Land consianments 3900 2400 2400 2400 
Interest 234 1118 1519 1606 
General balance sheet 
Due to bankers (4) 12545 20473 17148 18843 1454 
Bills payable 4547 1077 
Sundries owina (4) 419 4794 25141 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1861 08.1862 08.1883 08.1884 08.1885 
Shares 85290 85290 85290 85290 85290 
Calls in advance 
Preference stock 32900 
Debentures 39900 39475 39830 36886 39371 
Capital raised 125191 124766 125121 122177 157562 
Balance -23278 -24783 -24830 -28344 + 7844 
Capital spent 148469 149549 149951 150521 149717 
General balance sheet 
Due to bankers (4) 2199 1107 (Cr) 73 140 (Cr) 218 
Bills payable 
Sundries owina (4) 25400 27821 30499 34597 336 
Source: Minutes of the Aberdeen and Turriff Railwav. 1854-66 (NASIBR/ABTl1 /1 l . 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match 
precisely the sum of component items. 
(2): Authorised capital was £120,000 plus £40,000 in borrowing powers and so capital 
expenditure exceeded estimates by 23.6% by 1859. 
(3): The capital cost per mile was £8,241 In 1859. Land costs by 1859 represented 9.1 % of 
capital expenditure. 
(4): The general balance sheet line for sundries includes advances made by the Great North 
to replace bank loans in 1859-60. The amount due for sundries fell sharply in 1865 when 
the Great North replaced floating debt by paying for £32,900 of preference stock. 
(5): Preference stock was authorised from the conversion of forfeited ordinary shares under 
22 Vic. cap.11, 1859 and the Great North look the full approved £37,220 as collateral for 
their £25,000 advance to the company from 29 November 1859 (NASIBR/ABT/111. pp.126-
27), which was not shown in the accounts until 1865 because new capital was not raised 
from this preference stock .. 
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4(b): Revenue account of the Aberdeen and Turrlff Railway, 1858-65 
REVENUE(£) 31 Auoust 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1884 1865 
Total annual revenue 7589 7478 6945 7852 8257 8410 8768 8969 
Balance + 200 -1113 -1256 • 899 - 278 · 288 • 525 + 11 
Total annual eimenditure 7388 8592 8201 8751 8536 8699 9294 8958 
lncludina: 
Workina exoenses 4110 4880 4465 4571 4564 4772 4958 5257 
(of which Great North charoesJ (2) 2008 1743 1640 1672 1800 1823 1795 1833 
(of which GN interest on plant at 557 535 500 481 518 535 522 519 
5%1 
Interest -,4\ 2980 2914 3024 3466 3271 3253 3677 3066 
(of which dtJbenture interest) 1430 1952 1709 1928 1907 1846 1632 1658 
(of which interest on temporary 1221 835 1321 1537 1364 1406 2044 1408 
loans) 
Interest as % of aross revenua l3\ 46.6 46.1 50.7 50.3 45.9 45.0 47.9 40.0 
source: Minutes of the Aberdeen and Tuniff Railwav, 1854-66 (NAS/BR/ABT/1 /1 \. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The reduction in the Great North's working charges from 1858 was as a result of cutting the number of trains run to 
reduce costs as the result of limited traffic. 
(3): Interest as a proportion of gross revenue includes the 5% interest charged by the Great North on the use of plant. 
(4): The total of interest oaid was offset bv interest received on cast share calls and arrears on calls. 
4(c): Financial indicatora for the Aberdeen and Turriff Rallway, 1868-66 
(£) 31 Auaust 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1884 1865 
Caoital raised 12-'236 125056 125191 125191 12,166 125121 122177 157562 
Debenture loans 39700 39900 39900 39900 39475 39830 36886 39371 
Temoorarv debt 24420 16700 26420 30740 27280 28120 40880 28160 
Total debt 64120 56600 66320 70640 66755 67950 77766 67531 
Gross annual revenue 7589 7478 6945 7852 8257 8410 8768 8969 
Ratio of debentures to 32.0% 31.9% 31.9% 31.9"1. 31.6% 31.8% 30.2% 25.0% 
caoltal raised 
Ratio of gross revenue 0.118 0.132 0.105 0.111 0.124 0.124 0.113 0.133 
to total debt (1 ): Estimated temporary debt is calculated from e notional 5% Interest rate, which was the rate charged by the Greet 
North of Scotland Railwav for the use of olant. 
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Table 5: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway 
5(a): Capital account of the Banff, Macduff and Turrlff Extension Railway, 1858-65 
CAPITAL {£) 08.1858 02.1859 08.1859 02.1860 
Caoital raised from shares 24862 35024 42623 44864 
Debenture lo11ns 17187 27000 
Capltal raised (Inc ml1cell1neous) 29499 35685 59810 71866 
Balance 6711 2843 79-4 -260 
Capital exoendlture 22787 32841 59016 72128 
Including 
Spent to previous veer 
Spent in year 
Preliminarv and Partiamentarv costs 1687 1692 3098 3898 
Construction 20146 27901 50801 62983 
Land and compensation 871 2096 2459 2470 
Engineering 11nd pl11ns 29 976 1240 1314 
Source: Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 1857-66 
(NAS/BR/BMEX/1 /1 ). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): Land costs were only 3.4% of capital expenditure by opening In 1860 because most land was given 
via a feu duty by Eart of Fife, whose commissioner, WJ Tayler, was chairman of the Extension Railway. 
(3): The total of capital raised includes some miscellaneous items: for example, transfer fees. 
(4): Authorised capital was £81,000 with £27,000 in borrowing powers, giving an estimated cost of 
£6,894 per mile. 
(5): Preference stock was authorised from the conversion of forfeited ordinary shares under 26&27 Vic. 
cao.188 1863. 
CAPITAL {£) 08.1880 08.1861 08.1862 08.1863 08.1864 08.1885 
Caoital raised from shares 49845 49872 49872 49875 49875 49875 
Debenture loans 27000 27000 27000 27000 27000 27000 
Capltal raised (Inc misc.) 76846 76846 76874 78878 76876 78878 
Balance -3236 -4850 -5500 -5886 -6352 -7825 
Caoltal expenditure 80083 81724 82374 82743 83228 84501 
15): The capital cost per mile by Auaust 1860 was £6 816, 1.1% within estimate. 
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S(b): Revenue account of the Banff, Macduff and Turrlff Extension Railway, 1861-65 
REVENUE (£} 08.1861 08.1862 08.1863 08.1864 08.1885 
Total annual revenue 3108 3170 3438 3313 3240 
Balance -922 -1316 -1003 -1108 
-1222 
Total annual exnenditure 4030 4486 4441 4421 4462 
/ncludina: 
Woritin!l expenses 2129 2526 2500 2441 2449 (of which GNSR charoes) 885 907 931 904 904 (of which GNSR inlerest on 1>/ant at 5%) 209 219 236 226 214 
Interest 1425 1465 1454 1484 1534 
of which debenture interest) 1285 1335 1335 1335 1335 
of which interest on advances) 127 7 18 33 54 
. of which inl9rest on bills) 0 121 100 114 144 
Interest as " of oross revenue (2) 52.6 53.1 49.2 51.6 54.0 
General balance sheet 
Sundries due 9712 13769 17003 11663 14593 
Amount due to bankers 583 636 1148 313 311 
Source: Minutes of the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway, 1857-66 
(NAS/BR/BMEX/1 /1 ) . 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): Interest as a proportion of gross revenue includes the 5% interest charged by the Great North on 
the use of plant. 
S(c): Financial Indicators for the Banff, Macduff and Turrlff Extension Railway, 1861-65 
1£) 31 August 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 
Capital raised 49872 49872 49875 49875 49875 
Debenture loans 27000 27000 27000 27000 27000 
Estimated total debt 28500 29300 29080 29680 30680 
Gross annual revenue 3108 3170 3438 3313 3240 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 54.1% 54.1•/4 54.1o/o 54.W. 54.1% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.109 0.108 0.118 0.111 0.106 
(1): Estimated debt is calculated from a notional 5% Interest rate on total Interest paid, which was the 
rate charged by the Great North for the use of plant. £27,000 of debt is represented by debentures, 
although statements made by the company chairman indicate that debenture interest was not paid in 
full when due (18 April 1863, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1 . pp.194-99). 
(2): The accounts are obscure on the level of bank loans, but minutes show that a bank loan of £15,000 
was taken In 1857 (30 November 1857, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1 , p.7) and a further loan of £4,000 In 1860 
(23 February 1860, NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1, p.95). 
(3): Great North accounts (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14 and NAS/BR/GNS/1/5) shows advances and 
subscriptions were made by the Great North to the company, which are not matched fully in the 
Extension Railway accounts. If these sums attracted 5% Interest, as was customary for Great North 
advances then the estimated total debt shown above represents a minimum amount. 
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Table 6: Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla Railway, renamed the Banffshlre 
Railway (1863) 
6(a): Capital account of the Banffshire Railway, 1858-67 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1858 02.1859 08.1859 02.1880 08.1880 02.1881 
Ordinarv shares 16519 26524 46002 46848 47715 48212 
Advance calls and interest 200 244 173 
Debenture loans 28400 (3) 28400 28400 
Caoltal received 16709 26769 46175 75248 76115 78612 
Balance 621 • 8145 -16908 • 4860 -20876 . 25858 
Caoltal exoandlture 16087 34914 63084 80108 96991 102<470 
/nc/udina: 
Prelim and Parliamentary 1216 1216 1216 1216 1531 1531 
Construction 12894 30592 55456 62900 73624 76527 
Enalneerina and olans 1574 2074 2574 3174 3174 3174 
Land and compensation 149 617 3295 5865 7378 7680 
Rollina stock 5786 9133 11095 
General balance sheet 
Bills due (2) 6161 15000 9455 11077 9600 
Bank balance - 2346 - 2242 + 5393 - 7558 
- 15566 
Sundries due 
Source: Minutes of the Banffshire Railway, 1857-67 (NAS/BR/BAN/1/1-2). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The £15,000 bill, shown on 31 August 1859, was a credit from North of Scotland Bank, which was 
converted into debentures from 29 February 1860. 
(3): The £28,400 total of debentures reported issued at 29 February 1860 was held as security against a 
£15,000 loan from the North of Scotland Bank and a £13,400 loan from the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
(4): The capital authorised in the 1857 Act was £90,000 in shares and £30,000 in borrowing powers. The cost 
of line by February 1861 was 13.9% above estimate and land costs formed 7.5% of capital expenditure. 
(5): The capital cost per mile was £5,465 in February 1861, rising to £6,313 by 1863 when the Great North 
beoan workina the line 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1861 07.1862 07.1863 07.1884 07.1885 07.1888 07.1867 
Ordinary shares 48276 49020 49076 49076 49076 49076 49076 
Debenture loans 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 
Caoital received 76676 77420 77478 77476 77478 77476 77476 
Balance . 32495 . 37911 -40898 -41850 -42879 -42954 
-43101 
Capital exD&nditure 109172 115332 118374 119326 120355 120430 120577 
Spent to previous ½ 102470 114377 116401 118374 119326 120355 120430 
veer 
Soent in current ½ veer 6701 954 1973 952 1029 75 147 
General balance sheet 
Bills due (6) 38000 38000 38000 40000 40943 40681 40681 
Bank accounts + 5730 + 858 - 1071 - 379 - 651 - 260 
- 43 
Sundries due 4896 7853 9816 12570 17264 18608 
GNSR advances 2000 4626 2000 
included in sundries 
(6): A new loan of £38,000 from North ~f Scotland ~ank shown in the July 1861 accounts below the line was 
secured by a bill and financed the deficit on the capital account. 
(7): The capital authorised in 1857 Act was increased in the 1863 Act by £100.000 In shares and £33,000 In 
borrowing powers for the Buckie extension. The proposed 1866 amalgamation with the Great North felled In 
Parliament because half this total capital had not been paid up. The 1867 amalgamation act included 
abandonment of the Buckie extension and so the paid up capital then more than met lhe standing orders for the 
amalgamation bill, allowing amalgamation from 1867. 
(8): The advances shown as paid by the Great North are taken from the Great North's accounts contained In 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /14 and are included in the sundries of the general balance sheet. 
(9): The accountina period chanaed to January/Julv from Julv 1861 . 
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6(b): Revenue account of the Banffshlre Railway, 1860-67 
REVENUE (£) 08.1860 07.1861 07.1862 07.1863 07.1864 07.1865 07.1866 07.1887 
Total annual 5218 5331 5502 5973 5864 6279 6535 6759 
revenue 
Balance 664 -895 -1306 -1472 -1229 -1755 
-1837 
· 855 
Total annual 4534 8228 6808 
Exoenditure 
7445 7093 8034 8372 7815 
lncludina: 
Wor1dna exoenses 2856 3443 3762 3710 3810 3767 3594 3717 
Gross interest (3) 1523 2078 2847 3156 4070 4824 5585 4527 
Less interest on - 1~8 • 675 - 950 - 781 
olant (4) 
Net interest 1523 2078 2847 3156 3022 4149 4635 3746 
tncludina 
Loans and 665 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a nla n/a 
debentures 
Bank interest 415 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dividend 2% - - - - - - -GNSR working 65% 65% 60% 55% 55% 
charnes 
Source: Minutes of the Banffshire Railway, 1857-67 CNAS/BR/BAN/1/1-2). 
(1): Shillings and pence rounded down: totals may not match precisely the sum of component Items. 
(2): The accounting period changed to January/July from July 1861. 
(3): Gross interest includes bank loans. Two bank loans were taken in 1859-60 for a total of £28,400, but are not 
identified separately in the accounts because the funds are recorded as issued debentures. The £38,000 loan taken 
from North of ScoUand Bank in 1861 was recorded in the general balance sheet below the line of the main accounts. 
(4): Interest was charged on plant from 1863-64 when the Great North took over working the line. Net Interest shown 
is the amount due on loans. 
6(c): Flnanclal Indicators for the Banffshlre Railway, 1860-67 
(£) 08.1860 07.1861 07.1862 07.1863 07.1864 07.1865 07.1888 07.1887 
Canital raised 76115 76676 77420 77476 77476 77476 77476 77476 
Debenture loans 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 28400 
Estimated debt (1) (2) 3~60 41560 56940 63120 60440 82980 92700 74920 
Gross annual revenue 5218 5331 5502 5973 5864 6279 6535 6759 
Ratio of debentures 37.3% 37.0% 38.7% 38.7'Y, 38.7% 38.7% 38.7% 38.7% 
to capital raised 
Ratio of gross 0.171 0.128 0.097 0.095 0.097 0.078 0.070 0.090 
revenue to total debt 
(1): Estimated debt is calculated from a notional 5% interest rate on net interest paid, which was the rate charged by 
the Great North for plant use. 
(2): Estimated debt based on interest paid must be regarded as conservative because a bank loan of £38,000 was 
taken from the North of Scotland Bank in 1861 on a bill with interest and with stock given as security. By 1864, the 
bank was demanding unpaid interest due (1 November 1864, NAS/BAN/1/2, pp.68-69). 
(3) Company debts were underwritten by the Great North of Scotland Railway, which temporarily took 100% of line 
revenue (14 September 1865 NASBAN/1/2. oo.96-97). 
479 
Table 7: Accounts of the Deeside Railway 
7(a): Capital account of the Deeslde Railway, 1853-74 
CAPITAL(£) 31 Auaust 1853 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 
Authrs'd 
Deeslde ordinary shares 106250 54725 71172 76668 83378 90297 
Deeside Loans 35400 22750 35380 35400 34530 35364 
Authorised car,/tat 141650 
Miscellaneous 112 17 17 17 17 
Capital raised 77588 106569 112085 117725 125678 
Balance + 1968 
- 2281 -16083 -11788 -9988 
Caoital exnanditure 75620 108851 128168 129713 1356'6 
/ncludina: 
Prelim and Plmt costs 1846 act 4250 4250 4250 4250 4250 
Prelim and Plmt costs 1852 act 1360 1421 2979 2979 3100 
Land and comoensation 11259 16259 17695 17695 18547 
Consionments for land 528 775 19 19 19 
Construction works 55814 65992 71641 71641 72531 
Enoineerina and olans 1610 2892 3305 3305 3345 
Interest 141 1143 1298 1298 1298 
Locos and rollina stock 11497 16149 16149 19869 
General balance sheet 
Bank accounts +1780 +2101 +2241 +3588 +11 
Ooen accounts due 6111 14306 11781 
Bills due 4425 300 0 
Sundries due on revenue 1765 1987 2217 2288 
Sundries due on capital account 3907 
Source: Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 1845-76 lNAS/BR/DEE/1/1-31. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): The Deeside Railway opened to Banchory in September 1853. The capital cost per mile for the 
Aberdeen-Banchory section was £6,803 on opening in 1854 and £8,011 by 1855. In 1854, therefore, the 
capital expenditure was only 2.5% above estimate, but 20.6% by 1855: approximately one-quarter of the 
Increase (£19,317) can be attr1buted to the purchase of extra plant to deal with Increased traffic (£4 652). 
Land costs were 15.6% of total capital eXl)enditure in 1854 and 13.8°,i, in 1855. ' 
(continued) 
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7(a): Capital account of the Deeside Railway (continued) 
CAPITAL ff) 31 Au11ust 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1862 
Authrs'd 
Deeside ordinarv shares 90367 94245 95808 101526 106250 106001 
Deeside Loans 35400 35400 35400 35400 35400 35400 
4 ½ % oreference stock 24000 
1862 Act loans 8000 
Authorised csnital 173650 
Miscellaneous 17 17 17 17 17 
Capital raised 125783 129662 131224 138943 141417 
Balance -13390 -20900 -20078 -23788 -20270 
Capital expenditure (3) (41 139174 150562 151303 180729 161887 
/nc/udino: 
Prelim and Partiamentarv costs (5) 7350 7475 
Land and comoensation 18547 18837 
Consianments for land 19 0 
Construction works 72531 72564 
Enaineerina and olans 3345 3345 
Interest 1298 1298 
Locos and rollina stock 19870 26555 
Shares in Deeside Extension 625 5000 5000 5000 5000 
caoital sMnt in nrevious veer 150562 146303 155729 
C&oital SMnt in cum,nt veer (6\ 740 9426 958 
General balance sheet 
Bank accounts +51 +77 +31 +6 +12 
sundries due on revenue account 1191 2483 3825 2964 3362 
Sundries due on ca~ ital account 79 14437 19515 16747 12273 
(3): Capital spent in 1859 included the £5,000 subscription to the Deeside Extension Railway. Capital spent 
however, exceeded the authorised limit for the Deeside Railway from 1859 until the 1862 act amended capit~I 
powers (25&26 Vic. cap.88, 1862, The Deeside Railway Act). 
(4): By 1859 when the extension line opened, the capital cost per mile had risen to £9,410 but 36.6% of the 
increased capital expenditure since 1854 was spent on rolling stock to accommodate additional traffic (£15,058 
of the additional £41,171 capital expenditure). 
(5): Preliminary and par1iamentary costs cover both the original 1846 Act and the revised 1852 Act. 
(6): The figure of £9,426 capital spent to 31 August 1860 includes £6,183 for the rolling stock for the Deeslde 
extension line. 
CAPITAL(£) 31 AU!IUSt 1863 1864 1865 1885 1886 1867 
Authrs'd 
Oeeside ordinarv shares 106227 106227 106250 106227 106227 112227 
Oeeside Loans (2) 35400 35400 35400 35400 42811 43400 
4 ½ % oreference stock 8412 8547 24000 10388 14168 17257 
1862 Act loans 8000 
1865 Abovne & Braemar Act 10000 
Authorised caoital 183650 
Premium on shares 1293 
Miscellaneous 17 17 17 17 1 
Caoltal raised 150056 150191 152032 163223 174178 
Balance -12364 -18456 • 21207 -19935 -10073 
Caoltal exnandlture (4) 162420 168647 173239 183158 184252 
/ncludina: 
Shares in Deeside Extension 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 
Shares in Abovne & Braemar 4800 4800 
C&nital soent in nrevious vear 156687 157420 163647 168239 173358 
Cariital soent in cum,nt ""'Br 733 6227 4591 5118 1094 
General balance sheet 
Bank accounts + 2421 +7 
Ooen accounts due 
Bills due 
Sundries due on revenue 3317 3936 4025 4225 
Sundries due on caoital 9367 10672 14275 11760 
(continued) 
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7(a): Capital account of the Deeslde Railway (continued) 
CAPITAL(£) 31 August 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 (7) 
Ordinary shares 116227 116227 116227 116227 116227 116227 116227 
Debenture Loans (8) 43400 43400 43400 43400 43400 43400 43400 
4 ½ % oreference stock 23825 23825 23825 23825 23825 23825 23825 
Premium on shares (9) 2948 2948 2948 29'48 29'48 29'48 2948 
Miscellaneous 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Caoltal raised 186401 188401 186401 186401 186401 186401 188401 
Balance -1126 -3122 • 3122 • 3122 -3122 
· 3122 · 3122 
caoltal exoondlture 187526 189524 189524 189524 189524 189524 189524 
lncludina: 
Shares in Deeside Extension 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 
Shares in Abovne & Braemar 8000 8000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 
Capital spent in previous vear 174452 174524 174524 174524 174524 174524 174524 
Capital sn111nt in current year 76 -4 0 0 0 0 0 
General balance sheet 
Bank accounts • 1150 -1478 -1414 -1410 • 1416 - 1415 
Temoorary loans -590 
Debts due 5696 5149 6944 9477 9019 9772 (7): The format of accounts was changed from 1867 one the Great North began its lease of the Deeslde Railway 
from 1 September 1866 which was authorised under 29&30 Vic. cap.288, 31 July 1866. 
(8): Loans are shown in the accounts as combined for the Oeeside and Deeside Extension - the maximum sum 
authorised (£43,400) was held on loan for the rest of the existence of the Deeside as an independent company. 
(9): The successful trading of the company allowed a premium on shares to be obtained. 
(10): The Deeside Railway was amalgamated with the Great North of Scotland Railway from August 1875, for 
which the 1876 legislation was retrospective. 
7(b): Revenue account of the Deeslde Railway, 1854-74 
REVENUE(£) 31 August 1854 1855 1858 1857 
Total annual revenue 8836 10808 12392 12834 
Balance 3536 3638 4379 5092 
Total annual exoenditure 5300 7170 8012 7742 
lncludina: 
Wor1<ina exoenses 3598 4358 4766 4745 
Feu duties taxes and rates 392 1201 1289 1315 
(includina rent to Aberdeen Railway) (2) 698 700 725 
Total interest oaid (3) 1309 1610 1957 1681 
lncludina: 
Interest on loans 1118 1607 1526 1501 
Interest on bank accounts nAt 399 711 275 
Annual ordinary dividend 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Wor1<ina expenses (net) 41% 40% 39% 37% 
Source: Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 1845-76 CNAS/BR/OEE/1/1-3). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match 
precisely the sum of component items. 
(2): Rent to the Aberdeen Railway (the S~ottis~ North-East~m R~ilway after the 1856 
amalgamation of the Aberdeen and Scottish Midland Junction Railways) was for the use of the 
Guild Street station and lines from Ferryhill. 
(4): Total interest paid was offset by interest paid on calls in advance in the period 1854-60; 
therefore, total interest paid appears in some years to be less than debenture and bank loan 
interest. 
(continued) 
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7(b): Revenue account of the Deeside Railway (continued) 
REVENUE 1£1 31 Auaust 1858 1859 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1888 Total annual revenue 13072 14296 14569 15102 15458 15398 16763 19792 18638 Balance 4721 5616 5727 6023 6782 6922 7666 8873 8213 Total annual exoenditure 8351 8680 8842 9078 8675 8475 9096 10919 10424 Including: 
Workina e"""'nses 4783 5043 5211 5210 5078 5164 5735 7061 6TT1 Feu duties, taxes, rates 1625 1713 1786 1831 1854 1876 1934 2152 2093 fine. rent to SNERJ 1025 1100 1100 1125 1150 1150 1225 1385 1310 Total interest oaid 1931 1923 1844 2035 1742 1434 1426 1705 1559 lncludina: 
Interest on loans 1495 1458 1422 1428 1415 1416 1415 1418 1497 
Interest to banks 433 441 435 607 774 18 10 287 228 Annual dividend 5% 6% 6% 6% 7¼% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Workina excenses Inell 36.5% 35% 35.75% 34.5% 33% n/a 34% 35.7% 36.3% (5): With the lease to the Great North of Scotland Railway commencing on 1 September 1866, the format of the revenue 
account chanced and combined the Deeside and Deeside Extension into one account. 
REVENUE 1£1 31 Auaust 1867 1868 1869 
Deeslde Railwav 
1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Gross Revenue 17397 17422 18470 18698 19265 20331 20917 23485 Deeside Extension Railway 
Gross Revenue 6994 6767 7068 6994 7374 7845 TT66 8639 TOTAL REVENUE 24391 24190 25538 25892 26840 28177 28683 32125 Less debenture and guaranteed 14917 14884 14784 14746 14662 
dividends 
Max gross revenue to be 27000 27000 27000 
charged for worl<ina sareement 
Excess for extra dividends (6) 1177 1683 5125 Surplus for working expenses, 9474 9306 10753 10946 12017 
rents and taxes 
Annual ordinarv dividends (%) 
Deeside Railwav 7½ 7½ 7½ 7½ 7½ 8 8¼ 9½ 
Deeside Preference Stock 4½ 4½ 4½ 4½ 4½ 4½ 4½ 4½ 
Deeside Extension Railwav 3 3½ 3½ 3½ 3½ 4 4½ 6 3/8 (6): The Great North of Scotland lease of the Deeside lines guaranteed 7½ % dividend on Deeside ordinary stock. 
4½ % on Deeside preference stock and 3% on Deeside extension ordinary stock, rising to 3½ % in the second year. 
The lease also allowed for extra dividends to be paid above the guaranteed levels once gross revenue exceeded 
£27,000 per year. Half of any surplus was to be paid to the Deeside lines to be divided in the proportions of 17/32 to 
the Deeside and 15/32 to the Deeside Extension. 
(7): Apart from debenture loans, the Deeside lines held no other debt under the terms of the Great North's lease from 
1866. 
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7(c): Financial indicators for the Deeside Railway. 1854-74 
(£) 31 August 1854 1855 1858 1857 1858 1859 1860 
Caoital raised 106569 112085 117725 125678 125783 129662 13122,4 
Debenture loans 35380 35400 34530 35364 35400 35400 35400 
Estimated temporarv loans 1800 7908 14220 5500 8660 8820 6700 
Estimated total debt 37180 43308 48750 40864 44060 44220 44100 
Gross annual revenue 8836 10808 12392 12834 13072 14296 14569 
Ratio of debenturn to 33.2% 31.6% 29.3% 28.1% 28.1o/. 27.3% 27.0°k 
caoltal raised 
Ratio of grou revenue to 0.238 0.250 0.254 0.314 0.297 0.323 0.330 
total debt 
(1): Estimated temporary loans are derived from bank Interest paid and calculated from a notional 5% Interest 
rate on total gross interest paid, which was the rate charged by the Great North to other branch lines for plant 
use. The Deeside did not hold any temporary loans in the general balance sheet; its total debt comprised 
debenture loans and temporary loans from banks, both of which were reported consistently In the revenue 
account and were oaid fully from it. 
(£) 31 August 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1868 
Caoltal raised 136943 141417 150056 150191 152032 163223 
Debenture loans 35400 35400 35400 35400 35400 42811 
Estimated temoorarv loans 12140 15480 360 200 5740 4560 
Estimated total debt 47540 50880 35760 35600 41140 47371 
Gross annual revenue 15102 15458 15396 16763 19792 18638 
Ratio of debentures to 25.9% 25.0°k 23.6% 23.&o/. 23.3% 26.2% 
caoltal raised 
Ratio of grou revenue to 0.318 0.304 0.431 0.471 0.481 0.393 
total debt 
(£) 31 August 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Oeeside capital 174178 186401 186410 186410 186410 186410 186410 186410 
Extension capital 103946 103946 103946 103946 103946 103946 103946 103946 
Total capital 278124 290347 290356 290356 290356 290356 290356 290356 
Deeslde Debentures 43400 <13400 ,43400 ,43400 43400 ,43400 ,43400 <13400 
Extension debentures 24300 2,4300 2,4300 2,4300 24300 2<4300 2,4300 24300 
Estimated temporary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
loans 
Estimated total debt 67700 67700 67700 67700 67700 67700 67700 67700 
Gros& annual revenue 24391 24190 25538 25692 26640 28177 28683 32125 
Ratio of debentures to 24.3% 23.3% 23.3°k 23.3% 23.3% 23.3% 23.3% 23.3% 
caoltal raised 
Ratio of gross revenue 0.360 0.357 0.377 0.379 0.393 0.416 0.424 0.475 
to total debt 
(2): Under the lease agreement, the only fixed interest debt incurred by the Deeside companies was for its debenture 
caoital. 
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7(d): Capital account of the Deeslde Extension Rallway, 1858-74 
CAPITAL{£) 31 Auaust 1858 1859 1860 1881 1882 1863 1884 
Ordinary shares 21522 42258 51847 48737 79560 79644 79644 
Debenture Loans 12870 24300 24300 24300 23174 24262 
Miscellaneous 133 1 2 2 2 2 2 
CaDltal raised 21655 55130 76149 73039 103882 102820 103901 
Balance 10360 -14334 -25043 -29598 +254 
-1090 -211 
CaDltal exoendlture 11295 69465 101192 102635 103607 103910 104119 
Including: 
Preliminarv & Parliamentarv 1457 1624 1671 1763 1848 1998 2002 
Enaineerina and 1>lans 912 1662 2593 2916 3010 3010 3010 
Land and comcensation 2095 6880 8256 8557 8621 8634 8638 
Consignments for land 
Construction works 6754 58025 73721 76833 77256 77393 77467 
Rollina stock (3) 6183 - 6183 1133 1133 1133 
Interest 1124 1133 
General balance aheet 
Bank accounts +340 +192 +29 +42 + 31 + 27 + 39 
Ooen accounts due 2511 
Sundries due on revenue 692 7286 266 122 282 385 
Sundries due on cai>ilal 17681 21161 30699 788 1211 362 
Source: Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 1845-76 (NAS/BR/DEE/1/1 -3). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Authorised capital for the 1857 Deeside Extension Railway was £80,000 share capital plus £26,600 In 
borrowing 1>owers: by 1860. capital expenditure was 26.5% above estimate with a capital cost per mile of £6,529. 
Land costs formed 8.2% of capital expenditure by 1860. 
(3): The decision of the Deeside company to charge 1859-60 rolling stock costs to the extension railway account 
was reversed in 1860-61 . 
(4): No change In the authorised capital for the Deeslde Extension was made In the 1862 Act (25&26 Vic. cap.88, 
1862, The Dee side Railway Act) because the Great North of Scotland bought the full £30,823 of unallocated 
shares of the extension company, which enabled the redemption of bank advances, Indicated by the large fall In 
the sundries on the general balance sheet and the rise in ordinarv share capital .. 
CAPITAL(£) 31 August 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870-74 
Ordinary shares 79644 79644 79644 79644 79644 Note(51 
Debenture Loans 24300 24100 24300 24300 24300 
Miscellaneous 2 2 2 2 2 
CaDltal ralaed 103948 103746 103946 103948 103948 103948 
Balance -197 -3931 -3900 -858 -858 -858 
caoltal exoendlture 104143 107677 107846 104804 104804 104804 
lncludina: 
Prelim and Plmt costs 2002 2052 
Enaineerino and plans 3010 3010 
Land and comcensation 8638 8648 
Consionments for land 
Construction works 77491 77500 
Rollinq stock 1133 
Interest 1244 
Shares in Abovne & Braemar 3200 
General balance aheet 
Bank accounts +47 -3752 
Open accounts due 
sundries due on revenue 439 
Sundries due on caoital 89 
(5): From 1869-74, _the ~pltal 9:ccount remains un_changed at the figures shown for 1~9. The company's 
bank account remained 1n deficit by amounts ranging between £3,775 and £3,900 dunng the period 1870-
74. 
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7(e): Revenue account of the Deeslde Extension Railway, 1860-67 
REVENUE(£) 31 Auaust 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1885 1866 1887 8 months (4) 
Total annual revenue 3833 5327 5569 5657 5777 6003 6724 6994 Balance 677 - 117 905 1616 1606 1660 2105 
Total annual exoenditure 3156 5445 4664 4040 4171 4343 4618 
Including: 
Wor1<ino exPenses 1563 3116 2855 2921 3036 3155 3460 
Total interest paid 1465 2107 1572 901 907 953 923 
lncludina: 
Interest on loans 702 1020 1012 850 963 974 986 
Interest to bsnks (31 828 1087 644 71 0 0 47 
Dividend •;. 1¼"1. 0 1•1. 2% 2% 2"!. 2"1.% (5) 
Wor1<ina exoenses 40% 52.5% 51 .5% 
Source: Minutes of the Deeside Railway, 1845-76 NAS/BR/DEE/1/1-3 . 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The line opened in December 1859. 
(3): The impact of the purchase of shares by the Great North of Scotland In 1862 Is Indicated by the fall In Interest 
paid on bank advances from 1863. 
(4): From 1867, the line was wor1<ed by the Great North and the revenue accounts were combined with those of the 
Oeeslde Railway- see table 7(b). 
(5): Dividends reached 4% in 1872 and 4½ % in 1873 under the Great North's lease aareement. 
7(f): Financial indicators for the Deeside Extension Railway. 1861-66 
(£) 31 Auaust 1861 1882 1883 1864 1885 1888 
Capital raised 73039 103862 102820 103901 103946 103746 
Debenture loans 24300 24300 23174 24262 24300 24100 
Estimated temporarv loans 21740 12880 1420 0 0 940 
Estimated total debt 46040 37180 24594 24262 24300 25040 
Gross annual revenue 5327 5569 5657 5777 6003 6724 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 33.3% 23.4% 22.5"1. 23,4"/o 23.4% 23.2% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.116 0.150 0.230 0.238 0.247 0.269 (1): Estimated temporary loans are derived from bank interest paid and calculated from a notional 5% Interest 
rate on total gross interest paid, which was the rate charged by the Great North to other branch lines for plant 
use. 
(2): The Great North purchased all uniss~ed ordi~ary sh~re~ in the ext~nsion comp~ny in 1862 to try to block the 
plans of the Scottish North-Eastern to build the Limpet Mill hne, which included running powers over the Dee side 
Into Aberdeen- the Impact of this ourchase Is evident by the virtual removal of temoorarv debt by 1863. 
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Table 8: Accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway 
8(a); Capital account of the Dlngwall and Skye Railway, 1865-74 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1865 08.1866 08.1867 08.1868 08.1869 
Caoital received 9841 10293 10293 14326 112995 
Caoital soent 1210 383 4815 12262 106016 
Balance 8631 9910 5478 2064 6979 
Sources: Minutes and accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1864-80 (NAS/BR/DSK/111 and 
NAS/BR/RAClSl/1 /681. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): Authorised capital was £450,000 with borrowing powers of £150,000 under 28&29 Vlc.cap.223, 1865 
The Dingwall and Skye Railway Ad. The Ad was for a line from Dingwall to Kyle of Lochalsh (63½ ' 
miles), but the line was built to Strome Ferry (53 miles) opening in 1870; the extension to Kyle was 
opened in 1897. The estimated capital cost per mile of the full projected line to Kyleakin was £7,087. 
(3): 31 Vic. cap.19, 1868, The Dingwall and Skye Railway (Deviation) Ad reduced the capital to £400,000 
with borrowing powers of £133,300 with the intention of constructing to Attadale (48 miles) giving a capital 
cost per mile of £8,333, but the company resolved to build an extra 5 miles to Strome Ferry at an 
estimated additional cost of £5,232 (Minutes of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 23 March 1869, 
NAS/BR/OSK/1I1 o.72). 
CAPITAL (£1 08.1869 08.1870 08.1871 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 
Share capital created 238500 238500 238500 238500 238500 238500 
loan capital created 0 79500 79500 79500 79500 133300 
Stocks and shares (31 (81 112995 151099 153666 227601 228546 229047 
Arrears on share calls 75857 n/a 63269 3929 2862 2631 
Unissued shares 16320 n/a 21564 6969 7091 7091 
Debentures 0 79481 79481 79481 79414 82472 
Total capital raised 112995 230580 233147 307082 307961 320972 
Balance 6979 3489 -36856 12573 14011 4830 
Capital exoandlture (5) 106016 227091 270004 294509 293949 316342 
Including spent within the 
vear: 
Land: 4305 n/a 2182 7767 1516 828 
Construction 56246 n/a 31518 17166 2542 
Maintenance 2122 
Rails, sleepers etc. 28228 n/a 
Enaineering and survevina 1487 n/a 950 743 
Law par1iamentarv. !leneral 1896 n/a 146 559 2117 489 Steamers (5) 7249 2186 1732 (crl 54 18532 
Loans and stock In security 
Stock issued as security on 105000 (4) 105000 105000 80000 80000 80000 
loans 
Temoorarv loans (81 30000 (4) 50000 60000 76498 80000 80000 (4) Data for 1870 Is drawn from Bradshaw's Railway Almanac/< as there is no data in surviving company records 
(NAS/BR/DSK/1/1 or NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/68). 
(4): £105,000 of stock was Issued in 1869 as security for temporary loans. Although the company report for 
1870 Is missing from the Natlonal Archive records, Dlngwall and Skye accounts survive for 1871 and show the 
same £105,000 of stock held in security against the £50,000 bank loan. Therefore, this figure of £105,000 for 
stock held in security is assumed for 1870. Bradshaw, however, indicates a figure of £50,000 to match the value 
of the loan, which appears to be illogical given the evidence of£105,000 held in security in 1889 and 1871 . 
(5): Capital expenditure on the line of £219,842 by 1870 was increased by £7,249 for expenditure on steamers 
to provide a service to the Isles following the refusal of David Hutcheson and Company to provide a service from 
Strome. 
(6): Data of capital expenditure in company records is given for each year and therefore the absence of data for 
1870 does not allow total costs to be calculated. Caution therefore is required In making any comparisons of 
costs due to incomplete data. 
(7): By 1872, capital expenditure was 26.4% below estimate, albeit for a shorter line. Capital cost per mile was 
£5,557. Known cost of land to that date accounted for 4.8% of capital expenditure, but 1870 data for land costs 
is not available. 
(8): The accounts for 1869-71 appear to include in the sum of share capital raised the receipts from temporary 
bank loans, but included at ~e value of the loan and not the total par value of shares issued in security, which 
was considerably greater untll 1872. 
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B(b): Steamer account for the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1871-77 
(£) 08.1871 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 08.1878 08.1877 
Caoital scent 9433 7701 7756 26288 29494 29620 29634 
Revenue 1835 2986 3667 4788 5389 4855 4958 
Exnenditure 4417 3546 4254 4954 6699 5334 5133 
Balance -2582 - 560 -587 -166 - 1310 -479 
-175 
Sources: Minutes and accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1864-80 (NAS/BR/DSK/1/1 and 
NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/68). 
(1 ): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): The steamer services were taken over by the Highland Railway in 1877 (40 Vic. cap.4, 1877) and then 
bv David MacBrayne successor to Hutcheson's in 1880. 
B(c): Revenue account for the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1871-76 
Annual reports 08.1871 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 
Revenue (£) First full vear 
Passengers and mails 7786 10013 10447 11456 11391 
Goods 3403 4269 4517 5459 7076 
Miscellaneous 138 178 98 88 118 
Total annual revenue 11328 14460 15063 17005 18587 
Exoanses, including: 
Hiahland Railwav working charge 6386 6840 6834 6844 7079 
Steamer exoenses 4417 3546 4254 4954 6699 
Maintenance charged to caoital 2212 credit - -
-
-
Total annual exnandlture 9290 11155 12096 12874 14838 
Balance before lntere1t 2038 3305 21186 4130 3748 
Ordinarv dividend - - - -
-
Debenture interest 3972 3973 4117 3620 4844 
Interest on temporary loans 2890 4191 3788 4171 3805 
Total Interest due 6862 8164 71105 77111 86411 
Interest as % of aross revenue (3) 60.6% 56.6% 52.5% 45.8" 46.5% 
Net balance -4824 - 48511 - 411311 -3861 
- 41101 
Other data quoted In reDOrts 
Traffic exoenses as % receipts 63.31 53.27 52.40 46.82 44.07 
Steamer expenses as 0k receipts 39.48 24.83 28.43 29.29 36.28 
Total exoenses as% receiots 83.02 (4) 78.10 80.83 76.11 80.35 
Mileage authorised (constructed) 63 ½ (53) 63 ½ (53) 63 ½ (53) 63 ½ (53) 63 ½ (53) 
Mileaae run (all mixed trains) 57053 68569 686« 68691 ½ 71203 ½ 
sources: Minutes and accounts of the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1864-80 (NAS/BR/DSK/1I1 and 
NAS/BR/RAC(Sll1 /68). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum 
of component items. 
(2): From 1873, Highland Railway charges were included in data of total expenditure. 
(3): Interest as a percentage of gross revenue was 50.1% in 1876, 52.8% in 1877, 65.1% In 1878, and 68.4% 
in 1879 (NAS/BR/DSK/1/1 and NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/68). 
(4): The percentage of receipts absorbed by total expenses in 1871 was offset by the £2212 credit obtained 
bv moving maintenance costs to capital. 
&(d): Flnanclal Indicators for the Dingwall and Skye Railway, 1871-75 
(£) 31 August 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 
Caollal raised 233147 307082 307960 311519 340220 
Debenture loans 79481 79481 79414 82472 111172 
Temoorarv loans 60000 76498 80000 80000 80000 
Total debt 139481 155979 159414 162472 191172 
Gross annual revenue 11328 14460 15063 17005 18587 
Ratio of debentures to caoltal raised 34.1% 25.9'1, 25.8% 28.5'1. 32.7'1, 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.081 0.093 0.094 0.105 0.097 
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Table 9: Accounts of the Formartine and Buchan Railway 
9(a): Capital account of the Formartlne and Buchan Rallway, 1859-65 
CAPITAL 1£) 08.1859 08.1860 08.1881 08.1882 08.1883 
Ordinarv shares 57303 157799 159236 180995 182256 
Preference shares 
Debenture loans 45458 100228 99978 
Capital raised 57303 157799 204894 281223 282234 
Balance -15084 - 23891 
- 72755 -48987 -88593 
Capital exoenditure 72387 181490 277450 330191 350828 
lncludina: 
Prelimlnarv and Parliament (2) 27664 28502 28998 29033 
Construction 40435 133818 214658 261753 
Land and compensation 1351 9807 1228 14034 
Land consianments 949 1303 
Enalneerina and plans 292 2641 3601 4981 
Caoital spend orevious vear 330191 
Capital soend In vear 19660 
Fraserburah extension exoenditure 976 
Peterhead extension eimenditure 
Shares held in security (7) 50000 50000 50000 
General Balance Sheet 
Bills due 21365 1500 4105 
Amount due to bank 16812 +9906 63109 2389 22162 
Advances from Great North of 54600 54600 84100 100300 
Scotland Railway (5) 
Amount due for sundries 6593 21212 1093 
Source: Minutes of the Forrnartine and Buchan Railway, 1858-66 (NAS/BR/FBR/111). 
08.1884 08.1885 
187439 191172 
175000 200870 
97579 98974 
460018 491017 
- 87149 -132385 
547188 823382 
349851 352075 
2223 5686 
70093 108830 
352075 357762 
125000 156790 
0 23761 
76714 75627 
25000 25000 
986 8935 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The high costs of preliminary and parliamentary expenses were the result of obtaining incorporation after three 
applications to Parliament and vigorous competition from th~ rival Aberdeen, Peterhead and Fraserburgh company. 
(3): Authorised capital in 1858 was £300,000 plus £100,000 In borrowing powers. Land costs were only 4.64% of 
capital expenditure by 1862 but the line was only open for 29 miles of its projected 54 miles. 
(4): Authorised capital was raised in 1863 to £400,000 plus £133,000 In borrowing powers to allow construction to 
Fraserburgh: the cost by 1865 was 55.8% above estimate and the capital cost per mile was £11,544. 
(5): Advances made by the Great North by 1863 amounted to £100,300 on which interest was charged et 5%. 
(6): £100,000 of preference shares were issued to the Great North in 1864 in settlement of advances and a new 
additional subscription of £25000 from the Great North was agreed. 
(7): Shares shown In Italics were held In security for loans and are Included In the figures given by the company for 
issued ordinary and preference shares. 
(Bl: Preference stock was authorised under 26&27 Vic. cao.189 1863 The Forrnartlne and Buchan Railway Act. 
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9(b): Revenue account of the Forrnartlne and Buchan Railway, 1861-66 
REVENUE (£) 08.1862 08.1863 08.186-4 08.1885 
Total annual revenue 16130 20276 21453 25915 
Balance before 5% preference dividend 1388 686 4487 6680 
Less preference share dividend 5% 4574 5000 
Net balance after oreference dividend 1388 686 - 87 1680 
Total annual exoendlture 14742 19590 18988 19235 
lncludina: 
Wor1dna exoenses 6319 9026 9247 10569 
Interest (3) 7555 9105 6082 6859 
lncludina: 
Interest on debentures 3849 4452 4385 4409 
Interest on bank accounts 1829 59 2209 4611 
Interest on advances from the Great North 2075 5038 2193 1619 
Interest on contractor's bills 982 2685 421 
Dividend(%) 1¼ ¼ 0 1¼ 
Interest as % of aross revenue (3) 46.8 44.9 43.1 26.5 
Wor1dna exoenses (% of 11ross receipts) 39 40 44 41 
Source: Minutes of the F ormartine and Buchan Railwav. 1855-66 (NAS/BR/FBR/1 /1 J. 
(1 ): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match 
precisely the sum of component items. 
(2): Revenue increases reflect the opening of specific sections of the line; to Mintlaw in 1861, to 
Peterhead in 1863 and to Fraserburgh in 1865. 
(3): Interest shown in the accounts in 1863-65 was offset by a charge for Interest on expenditure 
for extension lines to Peterhead and Fraserburgh and by interest on share guarantees, and so 
the net total interest paid appears lower than the sum of the specific component items shown In 
the table for 1863-65. 
9(c): Financial indicators for the Forrnartine and Buchan Railway, 1861-65 
(£) 31 Auaust 1882 1883 1884 1885 
Caoital raised 281223 282234 460018 491017 
Debenture loans 100228 99978 97579 98974 
Amount due to bank (aeneral balance sheet) 2389 22162 76714 75627 
Advances from the Great North Caeneral balance sheet) 84100 100300 25000 25000 
Amount due for sundries Caeneral balance sheet) 21212 1093 986 8935 
Bills due (aeneral balance sheet) 0 4105 0 23761 
Estimated total debt 207927 227638 200272 232297 
Gross annual revenue 16130 20276 21463 25916 
Ratio of debentures to total capital raised 35.6°/e 35.4% 21.2% 20.2% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.078 0.089 0.107 0.112 
(1): Estimated debt is calculated from specific items in the capital account and the general balance sheet 
and detailed above because the company revenue account offsets a notional sum for interest charged on 
the expenditure of extension lines and for share guarantees and so the net figure of Interest published does 
not reflect the total of authorised and temporary debt of the company (see also note (3) in table 9(b) above). 
(2): The significant fall in the debenture/capital ratio in 1864 is caused by the issue of preference shares, the 
maioritv of which were allocated to the Great North for advances made. 
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Table 10: Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway 
1 O(a): Authorised capita I of the Great North of Scotland Railway 1855-61 
Authorised capital reoorted In company accounts 31.08.1855 31.08.1859 
Ordinarv shares 1846 Act (revised in 1851 Act> 276860 
1959 GNSR Consolidetion Act - oriciinel sheres 276860 
1851 5 % preference shares (£10) 830580 
1859 5% preference sheres (£10) 291090 
New 1859 4 ½%preference shares (£10) 482050 
Total shares euthorlsed 1107400 1050000 
Loans 300000 350000 
Total loans authorised 300000 350000 
Total Capital authorised 1407440 1400000 
sources: Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845-83 (NAS/BR/GNS/1/1"'4) 
and accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railwav. 1849-75 (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
10(b): Capital account prior to construction, 1845-52 
CAPITAL 31 August 1846 1847 1848 1849 1849 1860 1851 1852 ([) (March) 
note (2) 
Total caPital raised 143416 143809 144252 70901 71242 71754 72400 7247-4 
Balance - 18436 58817 • 20-420 - 20-420 -21384 -22398 
-22894 -23272 
Totel capital spent 161852 84991 16-4672 91322 92627 94153 95295 957◄6 
Sources: Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845-54 (NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1) and accounts of the Great 
North of Scotland Railwey, 1849-75 (NAS/BR/RAClS)/1/1-4\. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Capital receipts prior to 1849 include £73,350 nominally received as £45 paid on each of 1,630 shares Issued to 
the Great North's law agents, Adam and Anderson and using a loan of that amount arranged by the law agents with 
the North of Scotland Bank (of which they were both directors). The sum was repaid by the Great North to Adam and 
Anderson in 1849, when the North of Scotland Bank was under pressure, and the bank loan was redeemed (recorded 
in minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 11 and 24 February 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.177 and p.181). 
Great North minutes (29 March 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.189) show the revised receipts at 1 March 1849 to be 
£70,901 following the repayment made for the shares, at which point the liabllltles of the Great North exceeded assets 
by £8,275. The accurate ftgure of capital raised by the Great North is therefore shown in the accounts from 1849 
onwards. 
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10(c): Capital acco_unt of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1853-1874 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1853 08.1854 08.1855 08.1858 08.1857 08.1858 
Ordinarv shares 1846 Act 94042 160719 230322 232094 2322« 232324 
Preference shares 1851 Act 94125 325174 287265 289000 330390 330768 
Total stock (inc miscellaneous receiots) 188210 485946 517642 521149 567689 565147 
Debenture loans - - 65100 212616 248963 299998 
Total capital raised (Inc. miscellaneous) 188210 485948 582742 733785 818852 885145 
Balance -12130 - 32285 -•2569 -1'558 -29885 - ,2011 
Total caoltal snant - includina 200340 518232 625312 748323 846318 907223 
Pre~minarv and nar1iamentarv exoenses 83835 84185 86054 89313 89447 89463 
Construction and works 79189 250516 322876 394226 426568 440213 
Land and comoensation 6649 26438 43100 49706 57347 59496 
Consionments on account of lands 5726 14330 8498 7436 3090 3090 
Consionments for Aberdeenshire Canal 39272 39272 39272 39272 39272 
Enoineerino 1834 5293 9006 12755 13532 13584 
Locomotives 10013 20362 31531 40374 40440 
Cerrieoes weoons end rollina stock 4952 43949 48187 57066 63663 
Interest on calls naid in advance 700 3924 4584 4584 4584 4584 
Interest end commission 1416 6232 8280 9676 12288 14842 
BrokeraQe on sale of shares 503 2507 4226 4226 4226 4226 
Subscrlotlons, disbursements 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 
inverurv and Old Meldrum Junction Railway 310 610 2000 2000 
Banff. Macduff and Turriff Junction RailwaY 7689 20200 36650 40020 
Banff Macduff and Tuniff Extension Railwav 750 1750 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction ReilwaY 4000 20234 40000 
Alford Vallev Railwa11 1887 6411 15000 
Keith and Dufftown Railway 150 350 
Moravshire Railwa11 5000 
Balance due to bankers 412« 5983 13840 50837 
sources: Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845-76 (NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1 -9) and accounts of the Great 
North of Scotland Railwav. 1849-75 lNAS/BR/RAClS\/1/14\. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down: as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2\: B11 1857 the canital cost of the 54 miles to Keith was £15 672· land land canal) comorlsed 11.8°.4 of exoendlture. 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1859 01.1880 07.1880 01.1881 07.1881 
thalf vearlv renorts In Jan/July from 1859) 
Ordinarv shares 1846 Act 276545 276860 276860 276860 276860 
Preference shares 1851 Act 290780 291090 291090 291090 291090 
Preference shares 1859 Act 199625 209925 210000 210800 
Total stock(includina misceUaneous receiots) 607380 767630 777930 778005 778805 
Debenture loans 340548 349145 349999 349999 349999 
Total caDltal raised Unc. miscellaneous\ 947928 1118775 1127929 1128004 1128804 
Balance -38298 + 70750 + 88784 + 72281 + 49258 
Total capital anant 986225 1046024 10411« 1055742 1079546 
Revised ,ennrtJna from 1859: 
Capital spent to July in previous year on 693481 874348 889147 919027 930713 
works, land, leaal etc. (3) 
Subscrintlons, dl1bursements 1859 1880111 1860 (2) 1881 (1) 1861121 
lnYerurv and Old Meldrum Junction Rallwav 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway 40020 40020 40020 40020 40020 
<renamed Aberdeen and Turriff Railwav) 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railwav 3990 5085 5085 5085 5085 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Rallwav 40000 40000 repaid 
Alford Valley Railwav 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 
Keith and Dufftown Rallwav 350 350 4494 7406 8000 
Formartine and Buchan Rellwav 5000 50000 50000 50000 50000 
General Balance Sheet 
Sundries and debit balances 28601 17017 
Balance due to bankers 33652 18915 34703 43879 70985 
(3): The format of reporting was changed in 1859; capital shown as spent to the end of 1858 referred to works, 
land and legal costs and this budget line did not Include subscrtpUons made to other railways. 
141: In 1859; the reoortina ooriod was adiusted to Julv rather than Auaust and half-vear reports beaan in 1860. 
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10(c): Capital account of the Great North of Scotland Railway (continued) 
CAPITAL (£) 01.1862 07.1862 07.1863 07.1884 07.1865 07.1868 (reports continued ½ yearly but the 
data below la shown annually from 
1862) 
Ordinarv shares 1846 Act 276860 276860 276860 276860 276860 276880 
Preference shares 1851 Act 291090 291090 291090 291090 291090 291090 
Preference shares 1859 Act 391612 482012 482050 482050 482050 482050 
Preference shares 1862 Act 150160 317825 345985 358305 Total stock (including 959617 1050017 1200214 1367880 1395985 1408305 
miscellaneous receipts\ 
(including shares issued in sscuritv) 100000 128160 140380 
Debenture loans 350000 350000 348750 412887 420661 418081 
Total capital ralaed (Including 1309617 1400017 1648984 1780767 1818848 1826388 
miscellaneous recelnts\ (5) 
BALANCE + 88077 • 40084 + 75501 +111375 
· 301164 - 137738 
Total capital soant 1221539 1440081 1473463 1689392 1847810 1984122 
Expenditure to 31 .07 previous year on 953924 995917 1027969 1081992 1108981 1189531 
works land leaal etc. 
Subscription, dlaburaementa 1862(1) 1862 (2) 1863 (2) 1884f2l 1865 (2) 1888 (2) 
lnverury & Old Meldrum Junction 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 Railway 
Banff, Macduff & Turriff Junction 40020 66114 69744 74129 72920 72920 
Railway 
(renamed Aberdeen and Turriff 
Railway) 
Banff, Macduff & Turriff Extension 5085 5085 5085 27065 27578 31904 Railway 
Alford Valley Railway 15000 53970 54420 59920 59920 59920 
Keith and Dufftown Railwav 8000 24595 26000 26000 34780 36000 
Formartine and Buchan Railwav 50000 146170 150000 175000 175000 175000 
Moravshire Railway 17844 20000 10531 23151 23151 
Strathsoey Railway 100000 100000 100000 100000 173841 184785 
Branch company shares held as 100000 128160 140380 
securitv 
General Balance Sheet 
sundries and debit balances 32859 23289 22948 25353 41057 41225 
Balance due to bankers 963 50663 18628 66218 153711 274527 
Advances to other railway companies 179479 92703 179416 151826 143742 (6) 
(5): Total capital figures include miscellaneous amount for transfer fees and forfeited shares. 
(6): The general balance sheet shows sums given to other railway companies, some as advances and some backed by 
stock. lnYestmentln the Deeslde and Montrose and Bervle Railways, which amounted to £102,762 In July 1866, was 
held in the general balance account and formed 71 .5% of this total budget line (accounts of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway, 31 July 1866, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14, showing under the general balance sheet heading of 'temporary 
advances' £90,762 to the Deeslde and Deeslde extension, and £12,000 to the Montrose and Bervie Railways). 
Investment in shares of these companies by the Great North had attracted censure in the 1865 shareholder inquiry 
because the committee concluded that the share purchases had never been authorised (report of 22 April 1865 
NAS/BR/GNS/1/32). At the time of that inquiry, £86,982 had been invested in Oeeside shares and £7,450 in th~ 
Montrose and Bervie (accounts to 31 January and 31 July 1865, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14), but further calls were pending, 
hence the higher figure reported in July 1866. 
(7): After 1866 {2nd half veer to 31 Julv\. the accounts show the capital of the new amalaamated Great North companv. 
(continued) 
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10(c): Capital account of the Great North of Scotland Railway (continued) 
CAPITAL (2na half year accounts) (£) 07.1867 07.1868 07.1869 07.1870 
GNoSR Preference Stock 5% (1859) 291090 291090 291090 291090 
GNoSR New Preference Stock A 4 ½ % (1859) 482050 482050 482050 482050 
GNoSR New Preference Stock B 4 ½ % (18821 358410 222400 222400 218030 
GNoSR (Old Meldrum) Preference Stock 4 ½ % (18661 13810 13810 13810 13810 
GNoSR (Aberdeen &Turriffi Preference 5% (18661 32900 32900 32900 25400 
GNoSR (Formartine & Buchan) preference 5% (1866) 203270 198526 199613 172598 
GNoSR (Formartlne and Buchan) Ordinary Stock (18661 129874 124892 124916 108466 
Banffshire Preference Stock 5% (1867) 44500 46010 
GNoSR Ordinarv Stock 819383 862205 862655 862655 
Total stock (includinQ miscellaneous receipts) 2330872 2227873 2273934 2218109 (includina total of stock held in securiryJ 448266 162040 131512 37636 
Debenture loans 840350 848948 
Debenture Stock 11915 1191 5 
Debentures and Debenture Stock 756579 833859 852265 860863 Capital raised (Inc ml1cellaneou1) (9) 3087451 3081732 3128200 3078872 
BALANCE -278038 -182895 + 41813 + 19003 
Capltal spent, Including: (10) 3385489 32444211 3084387 3059889 
- in 1867 and 1868 stock and debentures held in securitv 448266 162040 (10) 
-Subscrlotlons and advances to other comn11n/es (Included aboveJ 
Banffshire (amalaamated 31 July 1867) 2000 
Moravshlre (amaloamated 1 October 1880) 23151 23151 231 51 231 51 
General balance sheet Items 
Balances due to bankers 303171 181549 91963 32674 
Amounts due to contractors 31013 10673 7704 0 (8): Accounts from 1867 show the capital for the amalgamated Great North company. 
(9): Minor miscellaneous receipts are not itemised, but Included in total of capital raised. 
(1 O): In the 1867 and 1868 accounts, the Great North Included stock and debentures Issued In security within 
its total capital spend, but ceased to do so from 1869, hence the apparent fall in capital expenditure between 
1868 and 1869. 
CAPITAL (2"u half year accounts) (£) 07.1871 07.1872 07.1873 07.1874 
GNoSR Preference Stock 5% (1859) 291090 291090 291090 291090 
GNoSR New Preference Stock A 4 ½ % (1859) 482050 482050 482050 482050 
GNoSR New Preference Stock B 4 ½ % (18621 218030 218030 218030 218030 
GNoSR (Old Meldrum) Preference Stock 4 ½ % <18661 13810 13810 13810 13810 
GNoSR (Aberdeen &Turriffl Preference 5% (1866) 25400 25400 25500 32900 
GNoSR (Formartine & Buchan) preference 5% 11866) 179133 174123 183973 203270 
GNoSR (Formartine and Buchan) Ordinary Stock (1866) 102313 102413 102413 102822 
Banffshire Preference Stock 5% (1867) 46010 46010 46010 46010 
GNoSR Ordinary Stock 860936 860962 860962 860962 
Redeemable GNoSR Preference Stock 4 % (1873) (11) 40615 
Total stock (including miscellaneous receipts) 2218872 2213888 2223838 2291109 (includina total of stock held in security) 18400 6000 5000 0 
Debenture loans 848039 838110 819294 809926 
Debenture Stock 11915 25140 44210 54210 
Debentures and Debenture Stock 859954 863250 863504 864136 
C8Dltal raised 3078827 3077139 3087342 31155246 
BALANCE + 11837 + 837 
- 10244 + 2916 
capital spent 113) 3066989 3076302 3097587 3152329 
Subscrlotlons and advances to other comaanlu (Included abon 
Moravshire (amalgamated 1 October 1880) (12) 23151 23151 231 51 23151 
General balance aheet Item• 
Floatina debt to bankers 10300 0 
(11): The 4% redeemable preference stock (1873) was created to convert arrears of dividend due on the 5% 
preference stock. 
(12): The £23151 expenditure on the Morayshire comprised £10531 in subscription and £12620 In advances. 
(13): The capital expenditure in 1874 (2) included a one-off payment of £40165 to reduce arrears of 
preference dividend. 
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10(d): Revenue account of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1855-74 
REVENUE (£) 08.1855 08.1856 08.1857 08.1858 07.1859 07.1880 07.1881 
Line opening dates: To Huntly To Keith 
Great North of Scotland (GNSR) 09.1854 10.1856 
Line opening dates to: To Nairn To Keith 
11.1855 08.1858 
Inverness and Nairn (l&NR) l&NR 
Inverness and Aberdeen (l&AJR) l&AJR 
Passenaer Numbers 244758 313011 410290 416707 457314 533113 565219 Goods (tons) 61555 87243 121285 131974 159475 170594 196547 ½ year revenue to 31 Januarv 40280 43038 ½ vear revenue to 31 July 44323 46857 Total annual revenue 3-4123 48388 59751 83201 89488 84803 89895 
½ vear exoenditure to 31 January 20718 18319 
½ vear exoenditure to 31 July 19784 19238 Total annual exoendlture 19021 21500 27083 27253 40976 40502 37557 Surplus fE) 15102 24868 32668 35948 28492 44101 52338 ½ vear ordinarv dividend - January 6% 6½% ½ vear ordinary dividend - July 7% 7% 
Annual dividend (%) 1 ½% 2¼% 4½% 4½% 5% 6½ 6¼ 
WorkinQ exoenses (%) 31 ½ 32½ 33 30½ 
Sources: Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1845-76 (NAS/BR/GNS/1 /1 -9) and accounts of the Great North 
of Scotland Railway, 1849-75 {NAS/BR/RAC/Sl/1/14). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of component 
items. 
(2l: The accounting oeriod chanaed from Auoust to Julv in 1859. Half-veartv reoorting commenced In 1859-60. 
REVENUE (£) 07.1862 07.1863 07.1884 07.1885 07.1886 
½ vear revenue to 31 January 50715 53694 54811 40731 52112 
½ vear revenue to 31 July 49893 55917 58354 52483 51673 
Total annual revenue (3) 100808 109811 113185 93214 103785 
½ veer eicpenditure to 31 January 18424 18615 26463 19177 33517 
½ year expenditure to 31 July 22712 19371 32706 33109 38402 
Total annual exoendlture 41136 37986 59169 52288 71919 
Surolus (El 59472 71825 53998 40928 3188& 
Chanae in surplus {") 13.6 20.4 -24.6 -24.2 
- 22.1 
½ vear ordlnarv dividend - January 7½% 7% 5% 0 0 
½ year ordinarv dividend - July 7% 7% 5% 0 0 
Annual dividend (%) 7¼0-', 7% 5% 0 0 
Wor1<ini:i exPenses (4) (%) 33 32¼ 36 38 41 ¾ 
(3): In the period 1862-65, company reports to Ordinary General Meetings gave few statistics, confining 
information to generalised statements in the published reports. However, the rise in gross expenditure 
(55.8%) in 1863-64 is the result of the Great North beginning to worit the through route to Elgin from July 
1863. Therefore, it is the data of revenue surpluses from 1863 that show the impact of competition on the 
Great North and, in particular, the effects of the new the Inverness-Perth line, and account for the very 
modest growth of gross revenue (3.2%) in 1863-64. 
(4) : Worl<ina expenses for 1866 are the averaae of the two helfvears auoted bv the comoanv. 
(continued) 
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10(d): Revenue account of the Great North of Scotland Railway (continued) 
REVENUE 1£) 07.1867 07.1868 07.1869 07.1870 07.1871 
½ vear revenue to 31 Januarv 79112 90112 90209 89394 97228 
½ vear revenue to 31 Julv 86466 90658 90700 95214 99690 
Total annual revenue (5) 165578 180770 180909 184608 196918 
Chanae in total 19venue (6) Q.2'¼ 0.1'¼ 2.09' 6.79' 
½ vear exoenditure to 31 Januarv 46596 56838 47572 46711 49390 
½ vear e><rv.nditure to 31 Julv 54204 58426 48871 47952 49536 
Total annual expenditure (5) 100800 115264 98443 94663 98926 
ChBn"" in tots/ exrv.nditure (6) 14.3" -16.3" 1.8" 4.5" 
Surplus before fixed interest 64778 65506 84466 891M5 97992 
Debenture interest (£) 25535 35799 41462 40949 39917 
Surplus after fixed lnterNt 39243 29707 43004 48998 58075 
Flostina Debt f£1 345972 181549 91963 32674 10300 
½ vear ordinarv dividend - Januarv 0 0 0 0 0 
½ vear ordinarv dividend - Julv 0 0 0 0 0 
Working expenses (%) 
Full year n/a 46.00 46.56 47.11 
- to 31 January 44.62 
- to 31 Julv 43.28 
(5): The large rise in revenue and expenditure between 1866 and 1867 reflects the first full year of 
operation of the Great North with its amalgamated branches. 
(6): No figures for change in revenue and expenditure are shown for 1867 as the new amalgamated 
company began operations in 1866 and the 1866 accounts data refers purely to the original Great 
North company and does not include Its branches. 
(7): Between 1867 and 1871, the company built up arrears of dividend due on preference stock of 
£-4-4 55-t bv pavino less than the ouaranteed 4½% and 5% due. 
REVENUE (£) 07.1872 07.1873 07.1874 
½ vear revenue to 31 Januarv 103621 107745 119613 
½ vear revenue to 31 Julv 105548 112176 121151 
Total annual revenue 209168 219921 240764 
ChBfllM in total revenue 6.2% 5.1" 9.5" 
½ veer expenditure to 31 Januarv 48722 52917 59022 
½ vear exoenditure to 31 Julv 50496 58361 60615 
Total annual exoendlture 99218 111278 119637 
Chan- in total exoenditul9 0.3" 12.2" 7.5" 
surplus before fixed Interest 109950 108643 121127 
Debenture interest l£l 38346 37256 37276 
Surplus after fixed interest 71604 71387 83851 
Floatina Debt (£1 0 0 
½ vear ordlnarv dividend - Januarv 0 0 ½ DA, (10) 
½ year ordinarv dividend - Julv 0 (8) 0 (9) 11/8% 
Working expenses (%): 
- to 31 January 40.67 42.56 42.77 
-to 31 Julv 41.52 -4-4.80 43.59 
(8): An additional 1 ½% was paid on preference stock in 1872 to reduce the arrears of dividend 
owed to shareholders. 
(9): An Act of Parliament (36&37 Vic. cap.107, 1873, The Great North of Scotland Act) allowed 
the capitalisation of arrears of dividend into a new 4°A. preference stock. 
(10): On 27 March 1874, the Ordinary General Meeting authorised the first payment of ordinary 
dividend since 1864 (27 March 1874 NAS/BR/GNS/1/9 p.378). 
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10(e): Flnanclal Indicators for the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1855-66 
(£) 31 August 1855-58 08.1855 08.1856 08.1857 08.1858 07.1859 07.1860 31 Julv from 1859 
Capital raised 582742 733765 816652 865145 947928 1127929 Debenture loans 65100 212616 248963 299998 340548 349999 
Temporarv loans 41244 5983 13840 50837 33652 34703 
Debit balances 28601 Hidden debt (by 2'N half vear\ 41244 5983 13840 50837 33652 63304 
Estimated total debt 106344 218599 262803 350835 374200 413303 Gross annual revenue 34123 46368 59751 63201 69468 84603 Ratio of debentures to capital raised 11.2% 29.0% 30.5% S4.7o/o 38.0% 31 .0% Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.321 0.212 0.227 0.180 0.186 0.204 
(£) 31 July 1861-65 07.1861 07.1862 07.1863 07.1864 07.1865 
Half-vear data 1866 01 .1888 07.1888 Capital raised 1128804 1400017 1548964 1780767 1816646 1816126 1826386 
Debenture loans 349999 350000 348750 412887 420661 407821 418081 Temoorarv loans 70985 50663 18628 66218 153711 245156 274527 Debit balances (1) 17017 23289 22948 25353 41057 41225 41225 Hidden debt 88002 73952 41576 91571 194768 286381 31 5752 
Estimated total debt 438001 423952 390326 504458 615429 694202 733833 Gross annual revenue 89895 100608 109611 113165 93214 104595 103785 
Ratio of debentures to 31.0% 25.0% 22.S'Yo 23.2% 23.2% 22.5% 22.n. 
capital raised 
Ratio of groH revenue to 0.205 0.237 0.281 
total debt 
0.224 0.151 0.151 0.141 
(1): No debit balance is shown in the accounts for 1866(2) and so it is assumed at the level of 1866(1) In the table. 
(2): Data for 1866(1) to 31 January 1866 and 1866(2) to 31 July 1866, shown In the shaded columns, refers to Great 
North finances before the branch amalaamations commenced on 1 Auaust 1866. 
Data for half veara as shown (£) 01.1866 07.1886 01.1867 07.1867 07.1868 07.1869 
Capital raised 1816126 1826386 3085817 3087451 3061732 31 26200 
Debenture loans (and stock from 1869) 407821 418081 755046 756579 833859 852265 
TemPorarv loans 245156 274527 345972 303171 181549 91963 
Estimated total debt 694202 733833 1101018 1059750 1015408 944228 Gross annual revenue (4) 104595 103785 130785 165578 180770 180909 Ratio of debenture, to caDltal ralsad 22.5% 22.8% 24.5% 24.5% 27.2% 27,3% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.151 0.141 0.119 0.158 0.178 0.1112 (2): Data for 1866(1) to 31 January 1866 and 1866(2) to 31 July 1866, shown in the shaded columns, refers to Great 
North finances before the branch amalgamations commenced on 1 August 1866. 
(3): Data is given for half years 1866-67 to illustrate the effects of absorbing the debts of the amalgamated 
companies. Gross revenue is calculated from cumulative half year revenue data (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
(4): The Great North estimated the combined revenue of the original company and its branches to 31 July 1866 as 
£147 610 reported at the Ordinarv General Meetina held on 2 October 1886 CNAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
(£) 31 July 07.1870 07.1871 07.1872 07.1873 07.1874 
Caoital raised 3078972 3078827 3077139 3087342 3155246 
Debenture loans and stock 860863 859954 863250 863504 864136 
Temporarv loans 32674 10300 0 0 0 
Estimated total debt 893537 870254 863250 863504 864316 
Gross annual revenue 184608 196916 209168 219921 240764 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 28.0% 28.0% 28.1% 28.0% 27.4% 
Ratio of aros• revenue to total debt 0.207 0.228 0.242 0.255 0.279 
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10(f): summary table of Indebtedness of the Great North of Scotland Rallway to Its 
bankers, 1855-75 
Date Amounts due to bankers for 
temporary loans held on the general 
balance sheet(£} 
31.08.1855 - 41244 
31 .08.1856 - 5983 
31 .08.1857 - 13840 
31 .08.1858 - 50837 
31 .07.1859 - 33652 
31 .01 .1860 - 18915 
31 .07.1860 - 34703 
31 .01 .1861 - 43879 
31 .07.1861 - 70985 
31 .01.1862 - 963 
31 .07.1862 - 50663 
31 .01 .1863 - 33093 
31 .07.1863 - 18628 
31 .01.1864 - 53624 
31 .07.1864 - 66218 
31.01.1865 - 95804 
31 .07.1865 -153711 
31 .01.1866 -245150 
31 .07.1866 -274527 
31 .01 .1867 -345972 
31.07.1867 -303171 
31.01 .1868 -350348 
31 .07.1868 -181549 
31.01 .1869 - 94331 
31 .07.1869 - 91963 
31.01 .1870 - 39099 
31 .07.1870 - 32674 
31.01 .1871 - 32695 
31 .07.1871 - 10300 
31.01 .1872 0 
31 .07.1872 0 
31 .01 .1873 0 
31 .07.1873 0 
31.01 .1874 - 877 
31 .07.1874 0 
sources: Minutes of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 1854-76 
(NAS/BR/GNS/1/2-9) and accounts of the Great North of 
Scotland Railway, 1849-75 (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
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Table 11: Accounts of the Highland Railway 
11(a): Capital account of the Highland Railway, 1866-74 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1865 02.1866 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 02.1868 
Stocks and shares 1837651 1537509 1544077 1580177 1580600 1583610 
Debentures loans 565241 669128 693172 694122 697872 700237 
Temporary loans (3) 550000 465000 485000 505000 535000 535000 
Stock issued and held in securitv fine.above) 465000 485000 505000 535000 535000 
Total raised 2-402892 2671637 2722249 2779300 2813473 2818848 
Balance • 201460 • 13582 • 4626 10654 9069 1157 
Total caoltal expenditure 2604352 2685220 2726878 2788845 2804403 2817690 
Caoital exoenditure on Hiahland 2604352 2685220 2726876 2755145 2774403 2787690 
Sutherland Railway stock - - - 13500 30000 30000 
source: Minutes and accounts of the Hiahland Railwav, 1865-76 (NAS/BR/HR/1/1-2}. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. . (2): Authorised capital under the 1865 was £2,209,080 wtth £700,880 in borrowing powers (£2,909,960) 
(3): The £550,000 of temporary loans held at the formation of t_he Highland Railway In 1865 (shown In Italics above) Is 
not identified in the first accounts, but was reported by the chairman at the first ordinary general meeting in October, 
1865 and is induded in the total of stocks and shares of £1,837,651 (Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407; Report 
to the first Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, NAS/BRn-tR/1/1, pp.42-43). Security 
stock is seoaratelv identified from 1866. 
Capital (£) 08.1868 02.1869 08.1869 02.1870 08.1870 02.1871 
Stocks and shares (4) 1585230 2112490 2113450 2117540 2123690 2196798 
Less stock issued as security - - - - 20000 120000 
re-acauired bv the comoanv 
Debenture loans 700634 700419 700549 699999 700049 696277 
Debenture stock account 150 150 710 710 4600 
Temporary loans 565000 625000 625000 625000 605000 520000 
(stock held as securiM (4) 565000 524000 524000 524000 504000 384000 
Total capital raised 2850864 2813059 2814149 2818249 2804449 2777875 
Balance 10952 - 95827 -122824 -126132 -123000 -154442 
Total caoltal exoendlture 2839912 2908886 2936973 2944382 2927449 2932118 
Total exoended on Hiahland 2809912 
Subscription to the Sutherland 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 
Raltwav 
-(4): from 1869, stock held as securitv aoainst loans was induded in the total of stocks and shares issued. 
CaPltal (£) 08.1871 02.1872 08.1872 02.1873 08.1873 02.1874 08.1874 
Stocks and shares 2159536 2474885 2327600 2327633 2327633 2364000 2364000 
Less stock issued as 110000 274000 Ailstock 
security re-acquired by the acquired 
Comoanv 
Loans and debenture debt 696172 666200 614030 576310 482649 444257 418802 
Debenture stock account (5) 4600 31674 86606 124192 218139 256550 282020 
Temporary loans 450000 All repaid 
(stock held as security) 274000 
Total caoltal raised 2750308 2898759 3028238 3028135 3028421 3084807 3084822 
Balance (6) -186375 - 46937 +248 -17927 - 45171 • 30541 -131815 
Total caoltal exoendlture 2936684 2945697 3027988 3046063 3073593 3095349 3198437 
Caoital oreviouslv spent 2568413 2573859 2578117 2581913 2585768 2594253 2616302 
Subscriptions to the 30000 30000 95000 105000 115000 115000 115000 
Suther1and, Suther1and and 
Caithness and Dingwall and 
Skve Railwavs. (5) By 1874, one third of authorised borrowing had been converted from debenture loans to debenture stock. 
(6): 37 Vic. cap. 103, 1874, The Highland Railway (Additional Capital) Act, authorised an additional £500,000 of capital 
with £166,000 of borrowino oowers, which aave scooe to resolve the caoital deficit. 
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11(b): Revenue account of the Highland Railway, 1866-74 
08.1865 02.1866 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 02.1868 08.1868 
Revenue (£) 
Total Revenue includina: 100733 82888 99744 98382 103718 100189 107184 
Passenaer traffic 51187 39376 52138 43345 49587 43142 51858 
Mails 6076 5230 5246 5227 5227 5227 5227 
Less Scottish North-Eastern tolls 5343 4531 4119 Amalaamated with Caledon/an. 1866 
Less Scottish Central tolls 52 52 Amalaamated with Ca/edonion 1865 
Less Caledonian Railwav tolls - - - 2500 2500 2500 2500 
Goods oarcels livestock 46691 41006 44783 45177 50476 50826 511 30 
Expenditure (£) 
Total workina exoenses 46244 38264 40803 39958 40508 42073 37925 
Feu duties, rates and taxes 2709 2598 3383 3262 3300 3279 3191 
Passenaer dutv 1241 1159 1374 1349 1462 1094 1627 
Interest 26090 19280 29148 
Total annual exoendlture 1£) 78285 81302 74709 
Net revenue(£) 24448 21388 25034 51792 58494 53721 84420 
Interest 27126 28142 28590 29941 
Dunkeld 6% stock dividend 2660 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 
Nairn 5% stock dividend 1311 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 11 24 
Nairn 6% dividend 2067 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 
Class A 4 ½% dividend 9468 8218 8218 8558 8893 8893 8893 
Class B 5% dividend 166 4153 6980 7202 7267 7293 7310 
Ordlnarv dividend 8516 3649 3649 3649 7299 3649 10949 
-
Exoendlture on dividends 24191 21197 24025 24588 28838 25012 32329 
Total on loans & dividends 51715 58778 53803 82271 
Balance 256 168 1009 77 1715 118 2148 
Ordlnarv dividend 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 
Worklni:i exoenses 44½% 44½% 38% 42% 40% 42 ½% 38 ½% 
source: Minutes and accounts of the Hlahland Rallwav, 1865-761NAS/BR/HR/1/1-2). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
comnnnent Items. 
REVENUE (£) 02.1869 08.1869 02.1870 08.1870 02.1871 08.1871 02.1872 
Total Revenue includina: 102583 110984 101251 113845 107987 118799 123117 
Passenaer traffic 44515 53404 41852 54463 44819 58018 48011 
Mails 5238 5232 5235 5283 5292 7612 10015 
Less Caledonian Railwav tolls 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 
Parcels carriaaes, horses 4348 2464 4509 3877 4575 5563 6355 
Goods livestock, minerals 46785 49490 48795 50694 50315 48160 58289 
Exnanditure: 
Total workina exoenses 37328 38240 37312 38164 37547 41259 44665 
Feu duties, rates and taxes 2136 4016 2333 4793 3268 5603 3314 
Passenaer d•"" 1354 1707 1466 2071 1552 1931 1617 
Net Revenue 61743 67000 60138 68616 85598 70004 73518 
Interest 32004 31594 31251 28862 28275 26219 15674 
Dunkeld 6% stock dividend 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 
Nairn 5% stock dividend 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
Nairn 6% dividend 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 
Class A 4 ½% dividend 8893 8893 8893 8893 8894 9496 11325 
Class B 5% dividend 7334 7353 7411 7570 8533 9998 10000 
Ordinarv dividend 8212 12774 7299 14599 14599 18249 30900 
-
Total on loans & dividends 61619 65791 60032 65101 65480 69140 73078 
Balance 123 1208 106 3514 117 863 440 
Ordinarv dividend 2¼% 3½% 2% 4% 4% 5% 6% 
-
Workin!l exoenses 37% 34% 37% 33.39% 35.76% 34.57% 36.41% 
" revenue from mail contracts 5.19' 4.7% 5.29' 4.6% 4.99' 6.49' 8.19' 
(continued) 
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11(b): Revenue account of the Highland Railway (continued) 
REVENUE (£) 08.1872 02.1873 08.1873 02.1874 08.1874 
Total Revenue lncludlna: 131140 124792 133872 134288 148322 
Passenaer traffic 62044 48574 62806 50337 70174 
Malls 9999 10006 10001 10004 10002 
Less Caledonian Railway tolls 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 
Parcels, carnages, horses 6119 6910 5597 5947 6817 
Goods livestock, minerals 52955 57342 55518 64023 59580 
Exoendlture: 
Total workinii expenses 46594 53390 52408 63323 62356 
Feu duties rates and taxes 4580 3588 5733 3725 6615 
Passenaer dutv 2019 1612 2103 1658 2110 
Net Revenue 77945 66201 73627 65581 75239 
Interest 15511 14768 15136 15753 16469 
Ounkeld 6% stock dividend 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 
Nairn 5% stock dividend 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
Nairn 6% dividend 1772 1772 1772 1772 1772 
Class A 4 ½% dividend 11557 11557 11557 11557 11557 
Class B 5% dividend 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 
Ordinarv dividend 33213 24414 28722 22978 30004 
Total on loans & dividends 75459 65917 70593 65466 73208 
Balance 2485 284 3033 115 2031 
Ordinarv dividend (3) 6% 4¼% 5% 4% 5% 
Workinii exPenses 35.53% 43.48% 39.13% 48.59% 42.54% 
" n,vi,nui, from mail contracts 7.6" 8.°" 7.5" 7.5" 6.8" (2): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match 
precisely the sum of component items. 
(3): The 4¼ % dividend to February 1873 was raised to 6% by a 1¼ % addition taken from the 
reserve account containing the accumulated premiums received from share sales In 1872. 
This decision was justified because of a temporary fall in revenue as a result of crop failures in 
the northern counties (Report to the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 25 
April 1873, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, p.266). 
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11(c): Financial Indicators for the Highland Railway, 1865-74 
Data for half vears (£) 08.1865 02.1866 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 02.1868 08.1868 Caoital raised 2402892 2671637 2722249 2779300 2813473 2818848 2850864 Debenture loans 565241 669128 693172 694122 697872 700237 700634 
Temoorarv loans (1) 550000 465000 485000 505000 535000 535000 565000 Total fixed interest debt 1115241 1134128 1178172 1199122 1232872 1235237 1265634 Gross half vear revenue 100733 82668 99744 96362 103766 100169 107164 Gross annual revenue 
-
183401 182412 196106 200128 203935 207333 Ratio of debentures to 23.5°!. 25.0% 25.5% 25.0% 24.8% 24.8% 24.6% 
caoltal raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.162 0.155 0.164 0.162 0.165 0.164 total debt 
(1): The figure of £550,000 in temporary loans is obtained from the Highland Railway chairman's statement to the first 
Ordinary General Meeting of the company on 28 October 1865 (Railway Times, "4 November 1865, p. 1-407; Report to 
the first Ordinarv General Meetina of the Hiahland Railwav 27 October 1865 NAS/BRn-tR/1/1 oo.42-43). 
Data for half ........ (£) 02.1869 08.1869 02.1870 08.1870 02.1871 08.1871 02.1872 
Caoital raised 2812909 2814149 2818249 2804449 2777675 2750308 2898759 
Debenture loans 700419 700549 699999 700049 696277 696172 666200 
Debenture stock 150 150 710 710 4600 4600 31674 
Temoorarv loans 625000 625000 625000 605000 520000 450000 0 
Total fixed interest debt 1325569 1325699 1325709 1305759 1220877 1150772 69787"4 
Gross half vear revenue 102563 110964 101251 113645 107967 118799 123117 
Gross annual revenue 209727 213527 212215 214896 221612 226766 2"41916 Ratio of debenture loans 24.9°!. 24.9% 24.11°!. 25.0% 25.2% 25.5% 24.1% 
and debenture stock to 
capital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.158 0.161 0.160 0.165 0.182 0.197 0.347 
total debt 
Data for half vears (£) 08.1872 02.1873 08.1873 02.1874 08.1874 
Caoital raised 3028236 3028135 3028421 3064807 3064822 
Debenture loans 614030 576310 482649 444257 "418802 
Debenture stock 86606 124192 218139 256550 282020 
Temoorarv loans 0 0 0 0 0 
Total f1Xed interest debt 700636 700502 700788 700807 700822 
Gross half vear revenue 131140 124792 133872 134288 146322 
Gross annual revenue 254257 255932 25866"4 268160 280610 
Ratio of debenture loans and stock 23,1°1. 23.1% 23.1% 22.9% 22.9% 
to caoltal raised 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.363 0.365 0.3611 0.383 0.400 
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11(d): Comparison of debt gearing of Highland Railway constituents, 1864-66 
1884 08.1865 (4) 
Comoanles l&AJ/l&PJ HR 
l&AJR revenue (to 31 Julv 1864) 91356 (2) 
l&PJR revenue <to 31 Julv 1864) 78531 (2) 
l&AJR revenue (1 Auaust 1864 to 31 January 1865\ 67310 
l&PJR revenue (1 Auaust 1864 to 31 January 1865\ 52030 
HR revenue (seven months 31 January to 31 Au!lust 1865\ 100733 (5) 
HR revenue adjusted for a six month period 86343 (5) 
Total combined annual revenue 169887 205683 
l&AJR debenture loans 320179 
l&PJR debenture loans 243000 
HR debenture loans at 31 August 1865 565241 
Total combined debenture loans 583179 565241 
l&AJR estimated hidden debt 220352 
l&PJR estimated hidden debt 171480 
Total of l&AJR and l&PJR estimated debt 391832 
Floatina debt reported to Hi!lhland Railway shareholders 550000 
Total estimated debt 955011 1115241 
Debt gearlna for the two lnvemus comoanlN (186'J 0.178 
Debt gearing us/no Hlohland RIii/way fl011tlna debt (1865J 0.184 
(1): The table uses 1864 data from the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction (l&AJR) and Inverness and Perth 
Junction (l&PJR) Railways contained in appendix tables 12 and 14 and combines the final half year data of 
these constituent companies with the revenue, capital and debt of the new Highland Railway for January-
August 1865 in order to derive an indicative debt gearing for the amalgamated company. 
(2): The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction and Inverness and Perth Junction Railways adjusted their 
accounting periods from February/August to January/July for accounts first reported at their ordinary general 
meetings both held on 30 March 1864, although the Highland reverted to February/August accounting 
periods in 1865. As a result, reported revenue for the Aberdeen and Perth Junction companies to 31 
January 1864 represented only five months trading and so the data above includes an adjustment to reflect 8 
six month period, as also explained in footnote (5) of appendix table 12(c) and footnote (2) of appendix table 
14(c). 
(3): The 1864 debt gearing of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway was 0.169 (table 12c); the 1864 
debt gearing of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway was 0.189 (table 14c). 
(4): The data for August 1865 are as reported to the first Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway 
27 October 1865, (NAS/BR/HR/1/1, pp.42-43), and includes the figure given by Chairman Alexander ' 
Matheson that £550,000 was owed in floating debt to banks by the new company (quoted In Railway nmes, 
4 November 1865, p.1407). 
(5): The first reporting period of the Highland Railway covered 7 months to 31 August 1865 and so the 
revenue used to calculate debt gearing has been adjusted pro-rata to represent a six month period to allow 8 
com0arison with the estimated debt gearing of the Aberdeen and Perth Junction companies in 1864. 
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11 (e): Summary of debentures, loans and share capital for the Highland 
Railway, 1865-74 
Data published In Hlahland Rallwav accounts 
A B C D E F 
(£) ½yr Total Debenture Temporary Share Share Stock• 
report share loans and Loan• capital capital shown 
and loan stock from banks raised raised held In 
capital created (excluding (Including security 
issued and Issued stock In stock In 
securltvl aecurltvl 
1865 Aua 2402892 565241 550000(e) 1837651 n/a 
1866 Feb 2671637 669128 465000 1537509 n/a 
Aua 2722249 693172 485000 1544077 n/a 
1867 Feb 2779300 694122 505000 1580177 n/a 
Aua 2813473 697872 535000 1580600 n/a 
1868 Feb 2818848 700237 535000 1583610 n/a 
Aua 2850864 700634 565000 1585230 n/a 
1869 Feb 2813059 700569 625000 2112490 524000 
Aua 2814149 700699 625000 2113450 524000 
1870 Feb 2818249 700709 625000 2117540 524000 
Auo 2804449 700759 605000 2103690 504000 
1871 Feb 2777675 700877 520000 2076798 384000 
Aua 2750308 700773 450000 2049535 274000 
1872 Feb 2898759 697874 0 2200885 0 
Aua 3028236 700636 0 2327600 0 
1873 Feb 3028135 700502 0 2327633 0 
Auo 3028421 700788 0 2327633 0 
1874 Feb 3064807 700807 0 2364000 0 
Aua 3064822 700822 0 2364000 0 
Derived data 
G 
G• IA-B-Dl 
Stock held In 
security but 
not 
separately 
Identified 
n/a 
465000 
485000 
505000 
535000 
535000 
565000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
source: Minutes and accounts of the Hiahland Railwav, 1865-76 (NAS/BR/HR/1/1 -21. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. (2): (e) shows the estimated figure of temporary loans given at the first shareholder's meeting, 27 October 1865. 
(3) Highland accounts in 1865 did not specify temporary loans and any shares issued in security for loans were included 
in the total of share capital raised. (4): From 1866-68, the accounts do not show the amount of share capital issued as security for loans but the amount can 
be derived. The accounts, however, show data of share and debenture capital issued and data of share and debenture 
capital actually received. Published data of debenture capital issued and raised were identical, but there is a difference 
between the value shares issued and share receipts, which can therefore be deduced as the value of stock held by banks 
as security for loans. In this period, 1866-68, the par value of stock matches the published figures of bank lending. 
(5): From 1869, the accounts published data of bank debt and stock held in security, which show that the par value of 
stock issued was less than the amount of bank lending, which reflects the reduced degree of risk to the banks as a result 
of the oersonal auarantees aiven for the loan caoital and interest bv directors of the comoanv. 
(continued) 
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11(e): Summary of debentures, loans and share capital for the Highland 
Railway, 1865-74 (continued) 
Derived data Data publl1hed In Hlahland Railway accounta 
H J K L M 
H=B+C Authorised cacltal 
(£) 1/a yr Total of Total Interest on Authorised Authorised 
report authorised Interest on temporary Share loan 
and debenturea loan, capital capital 
temporary and loans Included In 
loans columnJ 
Aua 1115241 26090 6605 2209080 700880 
1866 Feb 1134128 19280 14774 2209080 700880 
Auo 1178172 29148 13315 2209080 700880 
1867 Feb 1199122 27128 13594 2209080 700880 
Aua 1232872 28142 14365 (el 2209080 700880 
1868 Feb 1235237 28590 15170 (el 2209080 700880 
Aua 1265634 29941 14952 2209080 700880 
1869 Feb 1325569 32004 14178 2329000 700880 
Aua 1325699 31594 13648 2329000 700880 
1870 Feb 1325709 31251 13296 2329000 700880 
Aua 1305759 28862 12337 2329000 700880 
1871 Feb 1220877 28275 10453 2329000 700880 
Aua 1150773 26219 0 2329000 700880 
1872 Feb 697874 15674 0 2379000 700880 
Aua 700636 15511 0 2379000 700880 
1873 Feb 700502 14768 0 2379000 700880 
Aua 700788 15136 0 2379000 700880 
1874 Feb 700807 15753 0 2379000 700880 
Aua 700822 16469 0 2879000 888880 
N 
Total of 
authorised 
capital 
2909980 
2909960 
2909960 
2909960 
2909960 
2909960 
2909960 
3029880 
3029880 
3029880 
3029880 
3029880 
3029880 
3079880 
3079880 
3079880 
3079880 
3079880 
3745880 (e): Highland Railway accounts omit details of interest paid on temporary loans for the half years ending 
February and August 1868. The interest paid on temporary loans in the four half years In the accounts for 1867 
and 1869 averaaes at 5.37% and this rate is aoolied to derive the two estimates above 
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Table 12: Accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
12(a}: Capital account of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1859-65 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1859 08.1860 08.1861 08.1862 08.1863 07.1864 01.1865 
Amalgamations (2) l&NR /&RR /&PJR 
£10 ordinarv shares 318503 319944 320067 320109 339783 339857 339907 
5% Nairn Preference A stock 42811 44903 44916 44956 44956 
6% Nairn ordinarv B Stock 59242 59242 59242 59242 59080 
Preference capital 0 54812 
4 ½ % l&AJR Preference C 99875 124248 149998 150000 150000 
4 ½ % l&AJR Preference D - - 108982 109538 109570 
Ross-shire stock 73\ - 129751 131219 136671 209764 
Ross-shire Extension stock - - 16459 42743 144454 
{3\ 
Burahead Branch 9198 -
Debenture loans 107910 108298 187848 266266 265528 320179 320199 
CaDltal Raised 426413 483054 7011844 1153738 11181211 1203188 13771131 
Balance -75007 -411380 +28485 +14552 - 4308 -190585 -105588 
CaDltal SDent 501421 532435 6813511 11311186 1120437 13113772 1483520 
/ncludina: 
Preliminarv & Parliamentarv 12851 12910 
Enaineerina 6043 8593 
Law expenses 4818 9824 
Land and comoensalion 34305 38351 
Works and stations 358022 369609 
Plant 64091 67194 
Annual interest & commission 10867 14596 n/e 
includina: 
Interest on debentures (5) 2635 5057 6840 8721 10892 nltt nltt 
Interest on temporary loans 2214 3894 nltt n/a n/a n/a nltt 
(5) 
Inverness & Ross-shire Stock - 2250 25000 25000 25000 25000 (3) 0 
Inverness end Perth Stock 7500 50000 50000 50000 
sums due 
Sundries due (6\ 86679 112562 36161 47847 26937 220352 146102 
source: Minutes and accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railwav, 1855-65 CNAS/BRIIAJ/1/1 -3\. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. (2): Authorised capital in 1856 was £32_5,000 _with £108,300 in borrowing powers. The capital account reflects the 
amalgamation of the Inverness and Nairn Railway (l&NR) from 17 Mey 1861 and the Inverness and Ross-shire 
Railway (l&RR) from 30 June 1862. (3): The Ross-shire capital includes undefined levels of stock held as security against loans (see table 15). The 
separate stock of the Inverness and Ross-shire ceased to be identified separately in the capital account by 1865. 
(4): The line opened to Keith In August 1858; by 1860, capital expenditure was 63.8% above partiamentary estimate. 
Land costs accounted for 7.2% of total capital spent by 1860; capital cost per mile in 1860 was £13,395. 
(5): Interest data on debentures and temporary loans shown for 1859 is for the second half year only; the accounts 
contain no data for the first half year, although total interest and commission paid for the full year was £10,867. A 
proportion of interest on debentures continued to be paid from the capital account until at least 1863: the practice was 
continued by the successor Highland Railway in 1865 and 1866 (Railway Times, 5 May 1866, p.515; Report to the 
Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 27 October 1865, NAS/BR/HR/1 /1, pp.'42~3 and page 2 of printed 
report). . . . (6): Sundries are not detailed in the accounts other than by a one-line statement. In 1864, for example, this budget line 
of £220,352 represents the hidden debt of the company. 
(7): Chairman Matheson_ gave the cost_ of the Inverness and ~erdeen Junction Railway as £578,000 In October 1865, 
which would imply a capital cost per mile of £14,541 for the line and 77 .8% above the 1855 estimate. 
(8): Account reporting dates were amended from February/August to January/July at the Ordinary General Meeting of 
30 March 1864, althouah the Hiahland reverted to Februarv/Auaust accountina oeriods in 1865. 
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12(b): Revenue account of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1869-66 
REVENUE (3)1£) 08.1859 08.1880 08.1881 08.1882 08.1883 07.1884 01.1885 Amslgsmstions (4) l&NR /&RR (6\ ½ vear revenue to Jan/Feb n/a (2\ 21753 20736 23272 27672 26997 (3) 67316 ½ vear revenue to Julv/Aua 21619 22863 24515 27404 35935 58960 (5\ 
-Gross revenue . 4-4818 45251 50878 83807 85957 128278 
Less sums paid to Inverness & 3331 6199 2530 
- -
- -Nairn and Morayshire Railwavs 
Total revenue . 3U17 42721 50876 83807 85957 128276 
½ vear exoenditure to Jan/Feb nla (2) 12667 10825 12188 15182 12194 48633 ½ vear exoenditure to Julv/Aua 11318 13161 12568 13186 17883 40944 (5) 
-Total expenditure . 25828 23393 25374 33085 53138 895n 
/nc/udinq snnus/ interest 3060 6123 5265 4887 6243 9532 (5097) 
Surplus(£) 12589 19328 25302 30542 32819 38899 
½ vear dividend - Jan/Feb 4% 3¼% 3¼% 4% 4% 4% 
½ vear dividend - Julv/Aua 2½% 4% 4½% 5% 5¼% 4% 
Annual workin!l expenses m 37% 37½% 37% 36¼% 37¼% 44°k n/a 
Source: Minutes and accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Rallwav. 1855-65 (NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1 -3 . 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match preclsely the aum of 
component Items. 
(2): The first detailed data for the line is reported in the company minutes for the half year to August 1859, although the 
line opened to Keith In August 1858. 
(3): Account reporting dates were amended from February/August to January/July at the Ordinary General Meeting of 30 
March 1864, although the Highland reverted to February/August accounting periods In 1865. Revenue to 31 January 
1864 therefore covers a five month period. 
(4): The Inverness and Nairn Railway (l&NR) amalgamated with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway from 17 
May 1861 ; the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway (l&RR) amalgamated with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway from 30 June 1862. 
(5): The large Increases in revenue and expenditure from 1864 are due to the working of the new Inverness and Perth 
Junction line by the Inverness and Aberdeen Ju~ction ~ailway; revenue includes the working charge of 50% of gross 
receipts levied on the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway. 
(6): The figures for gross revenue and expenditure for 1865 represent the previous 12 months trading up to January 
1865, i.e. half-yearly revenue reported to 31 July 1864 and 31 January 1865, and are therefore not directly comparable 
with prevlous full-year figures, Which cover a slightly different accounting period (see note (3) above). 
(7): Working expenses shown are an averaae of the fiaures contained In half-vear1v reoorts to shareholders. 
12(c): Flnanclal Indicators for the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1860-65 
(£) 31 August 1860-63 1880 1861 1882 1883 
(4) 31 Julv 1864-65 1864 1865 
Caoltal raised 483054 681359 939186 1120-437 1393772 1483520 
Debenture loans 108298 187848 266266 265528 320179 320199 
Hidden debt (estimated) (1) 112562 36161 47847 26937 220352 146102 
Estimated minimum total debt (2) 220860 224009 314113 292465 540531 466301 
Total revenue (annual) 38417 42721 50676 63607 91356 (5) 126276 
Ratio of debentures to caoltal raised 22.4% 27.8% 28.4o/o 23.7% 23.0% 21.8% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.174 0.191 0.161 0.217 0.169 (4) 0.271 (31 (1): The company did not publish details of loans within its general balance sheet and so the amounts shown In the 
accounts as 'due to sundries' are taken as the only available indicator of hidden debt. Interest paid in 1860 If paid at a 
notional 5% rate, suggests bank lending of approximately £77,800. The lower level of hidden debt from 1861 reflects 
the Improvement In the capital account balance. 
(2): From 1863, the capital contributions to the Ross-shire and Perth lines Impinge significantly on the company; the 
capital account deficit and hidden debt was passed to the Highland Railway on Its formation In 1865. 
(3): The gearing for 1865 Is based on the twelve months of revenue earned between 31 July 1864 and 31 January 1865 
and must therefore be treated with great caution, particularly as the figure of capital raised was artlflclally boosted by 
issue of Ross-shire shares as security for loans. The trend of annual gearing Is reflected in the data for 1860-64 and the 
effect of increasing debt Is indicated by the fall in the gearing ratio between 1863 and 1864. 
(4): Account reporting dates were amended from February/August to January/July at the Ordinary General Meeting of 
30 March 1864, although the Highland reverted to February/August accounting periods in 1865. 
(5): As the accounting period was changed in 1864, the half-year revenue reported to 31 January 1864 represented 
only five months of trading. A figure of £32,396 is therefore imputed to represent six months revenue and Included in 
the figure of gross revenue shown for 1864. 
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Table 13: Accounts of the Inverness and Nairn Railway 
13(a): Capital account of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1856-61 
CAPITAL 1£) 09.1856 09.1857 08.1858 08.1859 02.1860 08.1860 02.1861 
Ordinary share capital 52895 56287 56787 57862 57867 59141 59242 
Preference stock 10216 22193 30813 33446 34365 38346 
Loans 26630 26630 34192 30792 28143 28143 28683 Total C8Dltal raised 79525 93133 113173 119467 119456 121649 126271 
Balance -36543 -26907 + 5175 + 5721 + 4026 + 1992 + 1359 
Total capital exDenditure 116068 120041 107997 113745 115430 119657 124912 
lncludino: 
Preliminary and 3853 4472 3769 3920 3920 3920 3920 
Parliamentary costs 
Engineering 3600 3439 2630 2630 2630 2630 2630 (subseauent to act) 
Law (subseQuent to actl 1420 2112 2350 2462 2696 
Land and comoensation 14576 14893 15371 16779 17057 19515 19709 
Works and stations 79317 82251 82343 83550 83803 83803 83803 
Including: Worlcs 69568 71606 
lncludina: Stations 9749 10645 
Plant 11725 11730 11929 11930 11930 11930 11930 
Inverness and Ross-shire - - 1500 6000 
Stock 
Comorlsina: 
Caoital expenditure on l&NR 121006 126755 128439 132667 137922 
Less: value of plant to l&AJR 13009 13009 13009 13009 13009 
Interest statement: 
Interest on debentures 584 567 578 570 
Preference dividend 676 797 844 899 
Interest on temporary loans 113 102 112 31 
Total interest 1053 1393 1098 1373 1476 1534 1500 
sources: Minutes and accounts of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1855-61 (NAS/BR/INR/1/1 -2) and 
Harapath's Railwav Journal, 1856-58. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Authorised capital In 1854 was £80,000 with borrowing powers not to exceed a third of share capttat. 
(3): Company minute books do not provide detailed data until 1859; data for 1856-58 are drawn from Harapath's 
Railway Jouma/(20 December 1856, p.1315, 31 October 1857, p.1133, 20 October 1858, p.1086). 
(3): The line opened in November 1855; by September 1856, capital expenditure was -45.1 % above the 
parliamentary estimate. Land costs per mile by September 1856 were 12.6% of capital expenditure. 
(4): By September 1857, capital expenditure exceeded estimates by 50.1%; the capital cost per mile was £8,003. 
Land costs were 12.4°.4 of caoital exoenditure. Construction costs per mile were £5-483. 
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13(b): Revenue account of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1866-61 
REVENUE (£) 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 ½ vear revenue to 28 Februarv 2342 3965 3982 4821 6032 5509 ½ vear revenue to 31 Auaust 4199 4999 4802 5650 8820 Amaloamated Gross revenue from the llne (4) 6541 896' 878' 10471 14852 14329 (4) 
Working recelots from Inverness & Aberdeen Junction Ral/way (3) 
½ year revenue to 28 Februarv - - - 2362 2849 Amaloamated ½ vear revenue to 31 Auoust 
- - - 2775 3126 
Total recelots 5137 5975 
½ vear el(nenditure to 28 Februarv 1860 3696 3088 3632 
½ vear emenditure to 31 Auaust 3030 4329 3848 4263 
Total ex..,.nditure 4890 8025 6936 7895 
Surplus l£l 1651 11311 18'8 2578 
½ year dividend to 28 Februarv 2% 0% 
- 3½% 5% 5% 
¼ vear dividend to 31 Auoust 2½% 4% 4% 4½ % 6½% Amoloomatt,d 
Sources: Minutes and accounts of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1855-61 (NAS/BR/INR/1/1-2), 
Heraoath's Railwav Joumo/, 1856-61 and Bradshaw's Rai/wav Almanack 1858. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Company records do not provide full details of revenue; the table incorporates some data from Horapath 's 
Rai/woy Journal (17 May 1856, p.527, 20 December 1856, p.1315, 1 May 1858, p.444, 30 October 1858, p.1086, 
7 May 1859, p.466, 5 November 1859, p.1125, 5 May 1860, p.445, 3 November 1860, p.1102, 4 May 1861, 
p.455) and Bradshaw's Railway Almanack (1858, p.128). 
(3): The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction wor1<ed the Nairn line from 31 December 1857, returning 50% of 
receipts to the Inverness and Nairn Railway. The Inverness and Nairn Railway amalgamated with the Inverness 
and Aberdeen Junction Railway from 17 May 1861 . 
(4): The rise in rE:ven~e in 1859 followed the opening of_the l~verness and Aberdeen Junction Railway and its 
connection at Keith with the Great North of Scotland Railway m August 1858. The figure for annual revenue In 
1861 before amalgamation is derived from the total of the half year revenue to 31 August 1860 and that to 28 
February 1861. 
(5): Dividend data is taken from reoorts to shareholders at ordinarv aeneral meetlnos of the comoanv. 
13(c): Financial Indicators for the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1856-61 
(£) 31 Auoust 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 
Caoital raised 79525 93133 113173 119467 121649 126271 
Debenture loans 26630 26630 34192 30792 28143 28683 
Temoorarv loans 2260 4280 2860 
Estimated total debt 26630 26630 34192 33052 32423 316-43 Gross annual revenue 6541 8964 8784 10471 14852 14329 Ratio of debentures to caoltal raised 33.511. 28.6o/o 30.2% 25.8% 23.1% 22.1•1. 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.246 0.337 0.257 0.317 0.458 0.454 (1): A notional 5 % interest rate is applied to interest paid on temporary loans shown In the capital account to 
derive an estimate of temporary debt. 
(2): The majority of Inverness and Nairn company debentures were issued at 4¼ %. 
(3): Data for 1861 refer to the first half year (February) before amalgamation with the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railwav in Mav 1861 . 
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Table 14: Accounts of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway 
14(a): Capital account of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 1862-65 
CAPITAL (£) 02.1862 08.1862 02.1863 08.1883 01.1864 07.1864 01.1885 
Ordinary shares 344447 396508 389264 
4 ½% oreference stock 51902 103236 200080 6% Perth & Dunkeld pref. 76000 76000 
Total of share caoital 396349 575744 665345 
Debenture loans 223000 243000 242700 
Caoltal received 51182 212181 432534 507389 6193'9 818744 908045 
Balance 5912 • 25587 20271 -173883 -173712 -144022 -144308 
Caoltal exoendlture (5) 45270 237789 412283 881253 793082 982787 1052351 
/ncludina: (3) 
Preliminary and Par1iamentarv 16361 17920 18857 18857 
En9ineerina and Inspection 7950 9950 11500 12200 
Construction 619756 717234 777677 840112 
Land and compensation 13616 21133 28999 45023 
Interest 19133 19423 19812 25349 
Law and aeneral expenses 4435 7400 9918 14339 
Purchase of Perth and 96000 96000 
Ounkeld Railwav (7) 
General balance sheet • includina 
Amount due to sundries (6) 171441 183212 171480 171368 
Source: Minutes and shareholders' reports of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 1861-65 
(NAS/BR/lPJ/1/1). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Authorised capital in 1861 was £654,000 with £218,000 in borrowing powers. On amalgamation with the Perth and 
Ounkeld Railway in 1863, capital powers were amended to £734,000 share capital and £243,000 borrowing powers. 
(3): The accounts presented to shareholders do not show details of capital expenditure until 1863. No data Is given of 
the amount of stock held as security against loans until 1865 when reference is made to an unspecified sum. 
(4): The estimate for the line was £654,000, but this sum did not include the subsequent acquisition of the Perth and 
Dunkeld Railway. Therefore the estimate of capital cost per mile must be taken for the 103¾ miles between Ounkeld 
and Forres and 8¼ mile Aberfeldy branch (112½ miles), while the actual capital cost per mile including the £96,000 cost 
of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway !"ust be taken for t~e full 12~/4 miles from Stanley to Forres and the Aberfeldy 
branch. The estimated cost per mile based on authonsed capital of £654,000 was £5,813 for the Dunkeld-Forres line 
and the Aberfeldy branch. Mitchell gave the act~al total cost per mile for the Forres-Dunkeld line as £8,880 (J Mitchell, 
The Construction and Works of the Highland Railway, 1867, NAS/BR/HR/41100, p.159; J Mitchell, Reminiscences of My 
Life /n the Highlands, vol. II, p.196). Capital expenditure was 46.2% above estimate by January 1865, excluding the 
cost of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway. Land costs by 1865 comprised 4.3% of capital expenditure, although further 
claims were reported as expected. 
(5): In October 1865, Highland chairman Matheson gave the cost of the ln~emess and Perth Junction Railway as 
£1 056,000 (Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407), 61 .5% above estimate, which produces a capital coat per mile 
of £9 387 for the Forres-Dunkeld line and Aberfeldy branch of 112 ½ miles. However, if Matheson's estimate included 
the n~minal cost of the Perth and Dunkeld, met by increasing the issued share and loan capital of the company, then 
the capital cost per mile of the Stanley-Forres and Aberfeldy lines of 120¼ miles falls to £8,745. 
(6): Data for 'amount due to sundries' provides an indication of the amount of floating debt held outside the main 
I accounts. This figure as an estimate of debt may be low, as £45,000 was taken as a loan on 30 March 1864 and a 
further £50,000 on 2 October 1864, to add to the ~100,~~ taken for two years on 25 August 1863. These loans total 
£195,000, above the sundries figure quoted and, in addition, £100:0~0 of loans from three banks had been agreed on 
23 April 1862 and ii was unlikely that these would have been repaid m full by 1864. 
(7): Nominal expenditure on purchase of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway of £96,000 was balanced by the creation of 
£76 000 6% Perth and Ounkeld preference stock to replace the £76,000 of Dunkeld ordinary stock and an additional 
£20:000 of debentures were issued to replace the £20,000 of Dunkeld debentures, 
(8): Account reporting dates were amended from February/August to January/July at the Ordinary General Meeting of 
3o March 1864, although the Highland reverted to FebruarylAuaust accounting periods In 1865. 
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14(b): Revenue account of the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 1863-66 
Half year reoorts 08.1863 01.1864 07.1864 01.1885 
Amalaamations Perth & Dunkeld Perth & Dunkeld Hiahlend Rellwey 
Act: 08. 06. 1863 From:28.02.1864 Act: 29.06.1865 
Account period 3 months 5months &months 6 montha 
Pessenaer numbers 68967 106564 121521 162120 
Total Revenue (£\ 9236 30006 42524 52030 
Available Balance (£\ 2006 5270 10755 13223 
Total Exoandlture (£\ 7229 24736 31768 38807 
Including: 
Working charaes by l&AJR 4012 13920 21084 23302 
Rents for use of stations (2) 455 646 592 
Rent of Perth & Dunkeld Riv 1140 1900 380 (3) (3) 
Tolls to SNER and SCR (2\ 1339 3413 3486 4988 
Interest on debentures· loans 400 4199 4922 5154 
Bank interest 729 
Interest on overdrafts and bills 3060 
Interest to P&DR 200 
Interest as " Iota/ revenue 7.6% 16.4" 11.5" 15.8" 
Dividend payments 
Perth and Dunkeld stock 1900 2280 
4 ½% preference dividend 371 1746 2347 
Proposed ordinary dividend 4734 7000 8000 
Ordinary dividend (half-vearl - 3% 3½% 4% 
Source: Minutes end shareholders' reports of the Inverness end Perth Junction Railway, 1861-65 
(NAS/BR//IPJ/1/1). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; es a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Tolls were paid to the Scottish North-Eastern and Scottish Central Railways for use of tracks from Stanley 
to reach Perth General Station. 
(3): Rent of the use of the Perth end Dunkeld Railway ceased following Implementation of the Inverness and 
Perth and Perth and Dunkeld Railways Amalaamation Act 26&27 Vic.cao.58 1863 on 28 February 1864. 
14(c): Financial indicators for the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway, 1864-65 
Half-yearly data 01.186-4 07.186-4 01.1865 
(£) 
Caoital raised 619349 818744 908045 
Debenture loans 223000 243000 242700 
Estimated hidden debt (1) (2) 183212 171480 171368 
Estimated total debt 406212 414480 414068 
Half year revenue 36007 (3) 42524 52030 
Gross annual revenue 78531 94554 
Ratio of debenturea to capital raised 36.0% 29.7% 26.7% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 
-
0.189 0.228 (31 
(1): The data for estimated hidden debt are represented by the 'amount due to sundries' held outside 
the main accounts In the general balance sheet and shown In table 14(a). See note (2) below. 
(2): Records of the company (BR/IPJ/1/1) indicate agreements made to take temporary loans, but 
are not clear on when such loans were either renewed or repaid. Minutes show that £100,000 of 
loans for two years were sought from the Commercial, National and Caledonian Banks on 23 April 
1862 (p.34), but, given the financial difficulties of the company, were unllkely to have been repaid In 
full by 1864. On 25 August 1863, the board accepted two £SOK loans from each of the Commercial 
and National Banks for two years (p.149). A £50,000 loan from the National Bank was agreed on 2 
January 1864 (p.181), and an 'occasional overdraft' of £45,000 agreed with the Commercial Bank on 
30 March 1864 (p.195). The level of hidden debt suggested by the sole budget line of 'sundries' 
published in the company's accounts may therefore underestimate temporary debt and account for 
the apparent improvement in debt gearing for January 1865, which was not reflected In the debt 
gearing of the Highland Railway from 1865 shown In table 11 (c). 
(3): £30,006 was reported as gross revenue for the five months lo January 1864: An Imputed figure 
of £36,007 for a six month oeriod is therefore included in the figure of aross annual revenue for 1864. 
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Table 15: Accounts of the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway 
15(a): Capital data for the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway 1862-65 
(£) 08.1862 02.1863 08.1863 01.1864 07.1864 01.1865 
Inverness and Ross-shire Railway 
Capital expenditure (in vear) 
Construction 37804 20669 11975 11872 
En!lineerinll 1350 300 
Land 5322 7267 
Inverness and Ross-shire stock held 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 
by the Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction Railway 
Ross-shire extension 
Preliminarv expenses 1588 
Wor1cs enaineerinll 16360 41742 42078 32131 
Land and compensation 1500 
Share capital raised 
Ross-shire stock (4) 129751 130804 131219 136492 136671 209764 
Ross-shire extension stock (5) 16459 30552 42743 144454 
Sources: Accounts of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1859-65 (NAS/BR/IAJ/2-3) and the 
Reaister of Dividends 1864-65 Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway (NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1 ). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Capital for the Ross-shire authorised in 1860 was £215,000 with £71,600 in borrowing powers. Capital for the 
Ross-shire extension authorised in 1862 was £160,000 with £53,300 In borrowing powers. No capital accounts 
for the Inverness and Ross-shire Railway survive; such data that exist are contained In the accounts of the 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway. 
(3): The Ross-shire was amalgamated with the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway on 30 June 1862, two 
weeks after the first section of the line opened to Dingwall on 11 June 1862 and nine months before the full line 
was opened to lnvergordon on 25 March 1863. Under amalgamation, Ross-shire stock was guaranteed 3% In the 
first year, rising by ½% per year until the dividend matched Inverness and Aberdeen Junction dividend (25&26 Vic. 
cap.113, 1862, The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act). In July 1864 and January 1865, 3½% was 
paid on Ross-shire stock. 
(4): The figures of capital raised on the Ross-shire included unspecified sums held In security for bank advances. 
The surviving dividend book of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, 1864-65, NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1 , records 
that, for the half-year to 31 July 1864, £1 ,020.11s.5d was paid as 3¼% dividend on Ross-shire stock, which 
suggests that £58,318 of share capital had been paid up from subscriptions. However, Inverness and Aberdeen 
Junction accounts show that £136,671 of Ross-shire share capital had been Issued. The balance of £78,353 must 
therefore represent the amount of Ross-shire stock issued by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway as 
security for loans (36.4% of the Ross-shire company's authorised share capital and 57 .3% of its Issued share 
capital). on 31 January 1865, the half-year dividend paid on Ross-shire stock was £1022.12s.7d, which Implies 
paid up capital of £58,-'36, but Inverness and Aberdeen Junction accounts show that £209,764 Ross-shire stock 
had been issued by that date and so £151,328 must have been Issued as security for loans (70% of the authorised 
capital and 72.1 % of the issued capital). Not all of this significant level of lending, however, can be 
attributed solely to the capital requirements of the Ross-shire company. Following amalgamation, Ross-
shire stock was used for security by the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway to raise loans for the wider 
Inverness web: for example, the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction negotiated a £25,000 loan for its own 
requirements and £50,000 for the Inverness and Perth Junction Railway with the National Bank of Scotland on 2 
January 1864, which was backed by Inverness and Ross-shire stock and Inverness and Perth Junction preference 
stock (recorded in minutes of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway, NAS/BR/IAJ/1/2, p.521). 
(5): on 31 January 1865, Rosa-shire extension stock was paid a guaranteed dividend of 3%. The dividend book 
of the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway (NAS/BR/IAJ/2/1) records that £""5.14s.7d was paid as dividend 
for the 4 months since the Ross-shire extension line opened to Bonar Bridge on 1 October 1864, which suggests 
that £"-',573 of Ross-shire extension stock had been paid up. Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway accounts 
show, however, that £1"-',454 of Ross-shire extension share capital had been issued and so £99,881 of Ross-
shire extension share capital must have been held as security for loans (62.4% of the authorised capital for the 
Ross-shire extension and 69.1 % of the issued capital). Highland Railway chairman Matheson announced In 
October 1865 that the Ross-shire extension had cost £160,000 (Railway Times, 4 November 1865, p.1407, 
reporting the first shareholders' meeting of the Highland Railway held on 27 October 1865) and so it can be 
assumed that this large amount of borrowing was applied to construction of the Ross-shire extension line. The 
£44,573 of share capital subscribed by January 1865 comprised just 27.9% of the authorised share capital for the 
Ross-shire extension, of which £30,000 was provided by the Duke of Sutherland (67 .3%) and £2,500 by Alexander 
Matheson £2,500 (5.6%). 
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Table 16: Accounts of the Keith and Dufftown Railway 
16(a}: Capital account of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 1859-66 
CAPITAL(£) 31 Auaust 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 186"' 1865 Ordinarv shares (4) (8) 2380 2462 26172 32765 32765 32933 48678 
Miscellaneous receipts I 1038 1125 Preference shares (authorised under the Strsthspey Railway Act 1861} 2610 5820 5850 15850 Debenture loans (7\ 16000 16598 16600 16600 11397 Capltal raised 2380 2462 43211 51974 55188 55384 77051 
Balance -29 -2048 -9414 8585 -28329 -28882 -8968 Capital expenditure: lncludina 2409 4510 52828 80540 83515 84088 84018 
Prelim and Parliament 869 2381 3693 4234 
Construction: Keith and Dufftown (3) 1306 0 36744 56997 
Construction: Keith and Dufflown in vear 85 48 372 Construction: Strathspev (2) 6519 above 
Land and compensation 0 120 3818 5342 
Land and comoensation in vear 346 442 81 Stock held in the Strathsoev (SR) (6) 2610 25000 25000 25000 Less: Interest paid to GNoSR) 
-211 
Expenditure to 31 .08.of orevious veer - 2409 4510 52626 57930 58515 59066 Exoenditure in year on K&DR and SR (2\ 2410 2101 48115 23647 585 650 172 
Less amount spent on Strathspey since -18343 
remitted to Keith and Dufftown 
General balance sheet 
Due to sundries (5\ 3742 5623 1724 25136 44881 30262 6822 Due to comoanv's bankers (credit as +l -35 +24 - 7497 +16099 
- 2226 -1330 - 2184 Interest on GNSR advances 2124 Charae to K&DR for use of extension 1200 1129 
source: Minutes and accounts of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 1856-66 CNAS/BR/KDR/1/1). 
(1 ): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): In 1861, the capital costs of the Balvenie extension from Dufftown to Craigellachie were charged to Keith and 
Dufftown Railway accounts, but identified as expenditure for the proposed Strathspey Railway. The 1862 accounts do 
not distinguish clearly the difference between Keith and Dufftown and Strathspey expenditure as the Great North had 
used the Keith and Dufftown accounts for Strathspey expenditure before the Strathspey was authorised In May 1861 . 
(3): No capital expenditure is shown in the accounts for the year to 31 July 1860; the previous year's accounts show 
that £1,306 was spent: this was preliminary work done by contractors Mitchell and Ireland before the railway company 
lay dormant until the new company Act of 1860. 
(4): The large rise in share receipts of £23,710 in 1861 indudes £12,110 shares issued as security to banks for loans. 
(5): The amount due to sundries on account contains the sums owed to the Great North for advances and payments 
made on behalf of the Keith and Dufftown Company. 
(6): The £25,000 stock held in the Strathspey was arranged by the Great North, which had a majority on the board of 
I: the of Keith and Dufftown Railway, and this authorised subscription remained a long-standing Issue of contention 
between the Keith and Dufftown shareholders and the Great North until amalgamation. 
(7): A minute of 28 May 1861 (NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.76) records that £16,000 of debentures were Issued to the North of 
Scotland and Aberdeen Town and County Banks as security for advances but later released when the Great North 
guaranteed Keith and Oufftown deben!ures fr~m 1862. . . 
(8): The fall in the level of debentures m 1865 Is off~et by a nse in share capital as a result of the Great North deciding 
to exercise its powers under the 1857 and 1860 Keith and Dufftown Acts to take up the balance of £16,870 of shares 
(NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, 24 February 1865, p.146). 
(9): Authorised capital for the Keith and Dufft?wn Railway was £50,000 pl~s £16,600 in borrowing powers for the line. 
By 1862, capital costs were 21 .1% above estimate, and land costs c~mpnsed 8.8% of capttal expenditure. The capital 
cost per mile by 1862 was £5,632. The costs of the Balvenle extension from Dufftown to Craigellachle to connect with 
the Morayshlre and Strathspey Railways as part of the Strathspey Railway were assigned to the accounts of that 
comoanv after its Incorporation in Mav 1861 . 
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16(b): Revenue account of the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 1869-65 
REVENUE (£1 08.1862 
6months 
08.1863 08.186" 08.1865 08.1888 
Total annual revanua 1755 3187 3123 3205 2777 (2) 
Balance 286 29 -1383 • 270 -298 
Total annual axoendltura including: 1469 3158 4508 3475 3075 
Total working exoenses 911 1943 2409 2391 2267 
lncludina GNSR working chsraes 461 896 1163 1106 1072 
Including GNSR interest at 5% on plant 100 248 267 233 235 
Interest oaid 534 1035 1858 811 579 
lncludina: 
Interest on debentures 28 595 665 578 486 
Interest to banks and on temoorary loans 501 440 119<# 233 92 
Interest as a pronortion of aross revenue (4) 36.2" 40.3" 68.0% 32.69' 29.39' 
Source: Minutes and accounts of the Keith and Dufflown Rallwav. 1856-86 (NAS/BR/KDR/1 /1 ). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The line opened on 26 February 1862 and so the 1862 revenue account was for 6 months only. 
(3): The toll that was payable to the Strathspey for the use of the Balvenie Extenalon waa not charged to the 
Keith and Oufftown revenue account, but appears in the general balance sheet in table 16(a). It was shown In 
Strathspey accounts as £1,200 to 31 August 1864 and £1,129 to 31 August 1865. 
(4): Interest paid as a proportion of gross revenue includes the Great North interest for use of plant. 
16(c): Financial Indicators for the Keith and Dufftown Railway, 1862-65 
(£) 31 August 1862 1863 186" 1865 
Capital raised 51974 55186 55384 77051 
Debenture loans 16600 16600 16600 11397 
Sundrv debt (from aeneral balance sheet) (3) 25136 44881 30262 6822 
Due to bankers (from aeneral balance sheet) 13) 16099 l credit) 2226 1330 2184 
Due on Great North advances 2124 
Estimated total debt {2) 25637 63707 48192 22527 
Gross annual revenue Ooen 6 months 3187 3123 3205 
Ratio of debentures to total capital raised 31.9% 30.1% 30.0% 14.8% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt nla 0.050 0.065 0.H2 (5) 
(1): Not all interest was paid at the due date and so estimated debt cannot be derived from data in the revenue 
account of interest paid. 
(2): Estimated debt Is derived from the data for debentures, sundries, bank balances, and advances from the 
Great North shown in the capital account and the general balance sheet of the company. 
(3): The accounts do not detail the level of bank loans, but the company took £12,110 in loans from the 
Aberdeen Town and County and North of Scotlan_d Banks on 12 F~~ruary 1861 (NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.67), for 
which 1,211 shares were issued guaranteed by directors, and add1bonalfy £16,600 of debentures were laauad 
88 security on 28 May 1861 (NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, p.76). Such loans must be assumed within the amounts shown 
in the general balance sheet for sundries and in the capital account for debentures. The sums due to bankers 
on the general balance sheet 1863-65 comprise arrears of Interest. 
(4): The temporary advances made by the Great North_were not identified separately in the accounts and must 
be assumed to be included in the amount due to sundries. Such advances represented further debt on the 
company; tor example, the auditor reported on 18 February 1865 that the Great North had advanced £12,894 
plus interest by 31 August 1862 (NAS/BR/KDR/1/1, 18 February 1865, p.151-2). Great North policy was that 
interest due and unpaid was built in a suspense account, but only one such specific entry was made In Keith 
and Dufftown accounts, which is shown In the 1865 accounts. 
(5): The Improvement in the 1865 ratio of debenture loans to capital raised was caused by the Great North 
taking up £16,870 of share capital to replace advances and other debt of the Keith and Dufftown thereby 
releasing some debentures held as security (Minutes of the adjourned Ordinary General Meeting of the Keith 
and Dufflown Railway, 28 February 1865, pp.147-51; Railway Timas, 11 March 1865, pp.302-307). The 
auditor's report in 1865 Indicated that £13,320 had been received from debentures in 1864 and not the £16,600 
shown In the accounts (NAS/BR/KDR/1/1 18 Februarv 1865 P.151-2 and paae 19 of Printed report). 
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Table 17: Accounts of the Morayshire Railway 
17(a): Authorised capital of the Morayshlre Railway, September 1864 
(£) shares loans total 
9 & 10 Vic. cap.178, 1846 but reduced bv 1851 warrant (1) 29700 9900 39600 
19 & 20 Vic. cao.86 1856 25000 8333 33333 
23&24Vic.cap.116 1860 40000 13300 53300 
24 Vic. cao 30, 1861 20000 6600 26600 
26 & 27 Vic cap 210, 1863 25000 8300 33300 
Total 139700 48433 188133 
Source: Minutes of the Moravshire Railwav, 1846-67 (NAS/BR/MOR/1 /1-3) . 
(1 ): Capital under 9& 10 Vic. cap.178, 1846 was £75,000 with borrowing powers of £21,500 for a railway 
from Lossiemouth to Elgin, Rothes and Craigellachle, but reduced In 1851 to the Losslemouth-Elgin 
section. 
17(b): Capital account of the Morayshire Railway, 1852-1860 
CAPITAL(£) 
30 Seotember 1852 1853 185-4 1855 1858 1857 1858 1859 1880 
Caoital raised 39360 39676 409-45 40162 40329 42273 57973 68735 71974 
Balance 7673 3858 - 670 -2626 -2496 - 1768 
-
198 • 1576 6-466 
Caoital spent 31687 35818 41615 42788 42826 44041 58171 70330 78441 
Sources: Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 1846-61 (NAS/BR/MOR/1/1 -2) and Bradshaw's Railway 
Almanack, 1854-61 . 
(2): Shillings and pence have been rounded do"'!'; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. Company records do not provide data for 1854-61; the 1854-61 data above is derived from 
Bradshaw's Railway Almanack. 
(3): In 1854, when the Morayshire operated the 5½ mile line between Elgin and Losslemouth, capital costs per mile 
were £7,566. 
(4): Authorised capital of the line b~fore the 1~60 Act for the Glen of Rothes extension to Elgin was £54,700 plus 
£18,233 In borrowing powers. Capital expenditure by 1860 was 43.4% a~ove estimate and the capital cost per 
mile was £8,716 for the Lossiemouth-Elg1n and Orton-Rothes lines of 9 miles. The estimated cost for the revised 9 
mile line was £6,078 per mile. 
(continued) 
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17(b): Capital account of the Morayshire Railway, 1861-1874 
CAPITAL I£) 30 Seotember 1861 1862 1863 186-4 1865 1886 1817 
Ordinarv shares 46620 57104 57774 57874 57878 57887 
Preference stock 39670 55000 55340 55340 55340 55340 
Debentures 31100 40033 37133 39070 37960 38130 
Forfeited decosits 576 576 576 576 576 576 
Received on Junction railwav (5) 10457 
Total capltal raised 96581 128424 152714 150824 152882 151755 151934 
Balance -20952 -17238 - 3985 -10622 - 9734 -18113 -15934 
Total Cepltal ex..,.ndlture 117533 145662 156699 161446 1625116 167888 167888 
Cacital scent in orevious vear 116134 138320 
Less stock transferred to Great 10477 
North of Scotland Railwav 
Cacital scent in vear 22186 9739 
Cacital soent on Junction railwav 7342 19716 
sources: Minutes of the Morayshlre Railway, 1861-81 (NAS/BR/MOR/1 /3-4) and Railway Tlm&s, H&rapath 's Railway 
Journal and Bradshaw's Railwav Almanack. 
(5): The Junction Railway was the short extension over the Spey to meet the Strathspey Railway at Cralgellachle for 
which capital powers not exceeding £20,000 were obtained under 24 Vic. cap.30, 1861, The Morayshlre Railway Act. 
(6): Company records provide little data_ other ~an totals for ~pital ,receipts and expenditure for 1862-67; further data 
has been comciled from volumes of Ra1/wav Times, Heraoath s Ra1/wav Journal and Bradshaw's Rallwav Almanack. 
CAPITAL(£) 1870 1871 1872 30 Seotember 1888 1889 1873 1874 1878 
Caoltal ralHd 
Ordinarv shares 52887 52887 57887 
Preference shares 34820 34820 
Account No.1 
Preference shares 12620 12620 
Account No.2 
Guaranteed shares 12900 12900 
1856 oreference shares 13640 
1860 creference shares 31360 
1861 preference shares 10000 
1863 oreference shares 340 
Total share capital 113227 113227 113227 113227 113227 113227 113227 113227 
Loans (8) 38130 38130 38130 38130 38130 38130 37660 38003 
Total capital raised 151357 151357 151357 151357 151357 151357 150887 151230 
Capital spent to end of 167868 
crevious vear 
Caoital soent in veer 6191 
Total capital 174080 174080 174080 171899 171899 171899 171899 172014 
exoenditure 
Caoital balance -22702 -22702 -22702 -20541 • 20541 -20541 -21011 -20784 
Balanced bv: (7) 
Fioatina debt (9) 16274 16274 
Debt on contracts and 6428 6428 
works (7): The 1868 and 1869 accounts are curio_usly presented in company minutes with floating debt and other debt 
Included as capital receipts so that the capital balance appears as zero. The table above has reconfigured the data In 
a more conventional way to correspond with the 1861-67 and 1870-75 format of Morayshire accounts. 
(8): Loans for 1870-73 are shown in the accounts as £38,120, £10 less than previously, but the published total of shore 
capital raised and the previous loan figures for 1868 and 1869 suggest that these figures may represent a 
typographical error in the printed report and so £38,130 has been used above to correspond with the published data for 
capital raised and the capital balance. 
(9): The £16,274 floating debt in 1868 included £12,211 at the Commercial Bank and a personal loan from chairman 
James Grant of £2,552. Furthermore, the interest paid from the revenue account (table 17(c) below) suggests the level 
of debt was slightly higher than the debt recorded in the capital account. 
11m: No data on cacital elC!lenditure is crovided in the company's minute book from Seotember 1869. 
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17(c): Revenue account of the Morayshire Railway, 1863-74 
REVENUE (£) 09.1853 09.1854 09.1855 09.1856 09.1857 09.1858 09.1859 
Total annual revenue 3485 nla 2529 2913 3342 n/a 6003 
Balance 1716 750 396 393 524 n/a 2546 
Total annual expenditure 1769 nla nla 2520 2818 nla 3457 
Net Balance 231 133 - 98 - 100 30 n/a n/a 
Amount paid on dividend 1485 494 494 494 
Ordinarv dividend (3) 5% 2½% 2% 2% 2% 20"' 4% 
Sources: Minutes of the Morayshire Railway, 1846-81 (NAS/BR/MOR/111-4) and Railway Times, 
Herapath's Railwav Journal and Bradshaw's Railwav Almanack. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum 
of component items. 
(2): Data in the company minute books is incomplete; some data is derived from BradsheW's Raft-Nay 
Almanack, Raitway Times and Herapath's Railway Journal. 
(3): Dividends paid in 1855 end 1856 were paid based on anticipated revenue from the followlng year's 
traffic. 
(4): The rise in revenue in 1859was the result of the opening of the line to Craigellachie on 23 December 
1858 
REVENUE 1£) 09.1882 09.1883 09.1884 09.1885 09.1188 09.1887 
Total annual revenue 8166 8595 6486 7602 8137 8225 
Balance 1117 32 1100 1870 2076 1980 
Total annual expenditure 7049 8562 5386 5931 6061 6245 
lncludina: 
Workina exnenses 3961 3558 2872 3395 3628 3558 
Total Interest 2306 4446 
Interest on debentures 1664 1583 1575 1740 
Additional llabllltles, lncludlna: 2278 2284 3014 2251 
Interest on GNoSR advances 960 1002 1236 502 
Bank interest 742 711 726 570 
Interest due to contractor and 576 
other advances made to MR 
571 620 668 
(total of f/oatina debt inlerestJ 2278 2284 2582 1740 
Overall balance -1178 • 614 · 937 • 270 % of gross revenue in interest 60.8 50.9 51.1 42.3 
Ordinarv dividend 2½% 0 0 0 0 0 (5): Accounts show an operational balance from 1864 but from which additional liabilities were deducted, 
includina interest on floatina debt leavina the revenue account balance in deficit. 
REVENUE 1£) 09.1868 09.1869 09.1870 09.1871 09.1872 09.1873 09.1874 
Total annual revenue 8085 8010 8327 8567 8961 8982 9262 
Workin!l expenses 4379 4376 4641 4701 4818 5048 4934 
Net revenue from which: 3705 3833 3888 3886 4143 31133 4328 
Debenture interest 1796 1870 1866 1832 1826 1808 1821 
Interest on guaranteed and 1694 1749 1736 1857 2074 2067 2051 
floatina debt 
Surplus (Including 214 13 93 269 511 53 509 balances brouaht forward) 
Contribution to repay debt - - - - - - 441 
Net surplus 214 13 113 2811 511 53 88 
% of gross revenue in 43.2 45.2 43.3 43.1 43.5 43.1 41.8 
inlerest 
Ordinarv dividend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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17(d): Financial Indicators for the Morayshlre Railway, 1862-74 
(£) 30 Seotember 1862 1863 1864 1865 1888 1887 
Caoital raised 128424 152714 150824 152862 151755 151934 
Debenture loans (3) 31100 40033 37113 39070 37960 38130 
Estimated floatina debt (2) (2) 45560 45680 51640 34800 
Estimated total debt (1\ 46120 88920 82673 84750 89600 72930 
Gross annual revenue 8166 8595 6486 7602 8137 8225 
Ratio of debentures to total capital 24.2% 28.2% 24.8% 25.8% 25.0•/4 25.1% 
rahted 
Ratio of gron revenue to total debt 0.177 0.097 0.078 0.090 0.091 0.113 (1): Estimated debt is calculated from a notional 5% interest rate on total gross interest paid, which was the rate 
charged by the Great North for plant use. 
(2): For 1862 and 1863, the accounts do not identify the component items of interest paid. Gross Interest at a 
notional 5% interest produces estimated total debt of £46,120 for 1862 and £88,920 for1863. From 1864, the 
accounts separate the Interest paid on debentures and floating debt. 
(3): Debenture data is not available from comoanv accounts prior to 1862. 
(£) 30 September 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Caoital raised 151357 151357 151357 151357 151357 151357 150887 
Debenture loans {3} 38130 38130 38130 38130 38130 38130 37660 
Estimated floating debt 33880 34980 34760 37140 41480 41340 41020 
Estimated total debt (1} 72010 73110 72890 75270 79610 79470 78680 
Gross annual revenue 8085 8010 8327 8567 8961 8982 9262 
Ratio of debentures to total 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 25.0% 
caoltal raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 0.112 0.110 0.114 0.114 0.113 0.113 u.118 
total debt 
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Table 18: Accounts of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway 
18(a): Capital account of the Perth and Dunkeld Rallway, 1855-63 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1855 07.1856 07.1857 07.18511 07.1859 
Ordinary shares 14597 66778 60402 64012 64842 
Debenture loans 13600 19700 20000 
Miscellaneous 353 
Total capltal raised 14597 667711 74355 113712 841142 Balance -13747 
- 3571 +3381 +7780 
-3428 Total capital spent 28345 63207 70974 75932 88270 
Including: 
Preliminary & Parliamentarv 1018 1653 1653 1653 1653 
Construction works 26096 52968 57294 66514 66987 
Land settlements 838 1099 2508 4545 15786 
Stations 0 4415 5908 
Commission/stamos on loans 0 37 85 
Interest paid to bank 1230 
Less interest on arrears of calls 729 
Not shown In oubllshed accounts 
Temporarv loan (3) 4000 
Source: Minutes and accounts of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 1853-64 
(NAS/BR/PDR/1 /1 -2). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely 
the sum of component items. 
(2): Authorised capital of the company was £80,000 with £20,000 borrowing powers (17&18 
Vic.cap, 148, 1854, The Perth and Dunkeld Railway Act). The estimated capita! cost per mlle for 
the 8¼ mile branch was £9,697. The line opened in 1856: by 1859, when land settlements were 
well advanced, capital cost per mile was £10,699 and capital expenditure 10.3% above estimate. 
Land costs in 1859 formed 17.9% of capital expenditure, but after long legal arguments, land costs 
rose to 20.3% of capital expenditure by the lime the line was leased in August 1863 by the 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway. The Perth and Dunkeld was amalgamated with the 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway from 28 February 1864. 
(3): A temporary loan of £4,000 was agreed on 12 November 1858 from the Central Bank of 
Scotland, backed by 250 shares and director guarantees. The loan was repaid In a minute of 7 
May 1862 (NAS/BR/PDR/1/2). A separate 'assignation' with the Central Bank for £3,000 was 
made on 14 March 1860 to settle claims with the contractor, which took the company above its 
authorised loan limit (Chairman's notes, Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 14 March 1860, minute 4, 
NAS/BR/PDR/1/5l. This £3 000 loan was not shown in the main capital account. 
(£) 07.1880 07.11181 07.1882 07.1883 
From calls and deposits 65777 66175 72900 76000 
Debenture loans 20000 20000 20000 20000 
Central Bank loan 3000 3000 3000 
Total capital received (4) 118777 89175 95900 96000 
Balance of account -3285 -4754 + 508 + 91 
Total capltal spent 92062 93929 95392 95909 
Including: 
Preliminarv & Parliamentarv exoenses 1653 1653 1653 1653 
Construction works 70525 70720 70729 70845 
Land settlements 16032 17591 19047 19445 
Interest paid 500 500 500 500 
Not shown In published accounts 
Temporarv loan 4000 4000 reoaid 
(4): The £96,000 capital of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway was replaced on amalgamation with the 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway by £76,000 of 6% Perth and Dunkeld preference stock to 
replace Dunkeld ordinary stock and £20,000 of Inverness and Perth Junction debentures to 
reolace the £20,000 of Dunkeld debentures, 
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18(b): Revenue account of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 1868-63 
REVENUE (£1 07.1858 07.1859 07.1860 07.1861 07.1862 07.1883 ½ vear revenue to 31 Januarv nla 3325 3291 3582 3987 4709 
½ veer revenue to 31 Julv 3099 3119 3355 3392 4358 3787 
Total annual revenue 6444 8848 8974 8345 8498 
Balance 1896 2005 1948 2754 3456 
Total annual expenditure 4548 4841 5026 5591 5040 
½ veer expenditure to 31 Januarv 2274 2322 2519 2762 3043 
½ vear exoenditure to 31 Julv 2067 2274 2318 2507 2829 1997 lncludlna: 1498 1585 1732 1925 2250 
Wor1<ing expenses: 1354 1434 1527 1609 2042 1271 50% of receipts to the SNER 
Line maintenance 133 133 145 145 140 103 
Debenture Interest 301 450 400 400 400 400 
Temoorarv loan interest 2 75 75 0 Ordinarv dividend to 31 Januarv 3% 2% 2% 2½% 3% 4% 
Ordinarv dividend to 31 Julv 2% 2% 2½% 2% 4% 4½% General balance sheet: 
Amount owina to bankers 8406 2550 2295 4166 1876 (crl 1835 (er) 
Source: Minutes and accounts of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway, 1853-64 (NAS/BR/PDR/111 -2). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Data for 1857 and the first half year of 1858 are incomplete in the company records. 
(3): Dividend of 4% was declared for the half years to 31 Januarv 1857 and 31 Julv 1857. 
18(c): Financial indicators for the Perth and Ounkeld Railway, 1859-63 
(£) 31 July 1859 1860 1861 1882 1883 
Caoital raised 84842 88777 89175 95900 96000 
Debenture loans 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 
Central Bank loan 3000 3000 3000 
Temoorarv loans (not shown in main accounts) 4000 4000 4000 
Total debt 24000 27000 27000 23000 20000 
Gross annual revenue 6444 6646 6974 8345 8496 
Ratio of debentures to caoltal raised 23.6•/, 22.5°/, 22.4% 20.9% 20.8% 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 0.289 0.248 0.258 0.383 0.425 
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Table 19: Accounts of the Scottish Central Railway 
19(a): Capital account of the Scottish Central Railway, 1846-61 
CAPITAL (£) 06.1845 07.1846 01.1847 07.1847 01.1848 
Caoital raised 72115 431257 573127 906463 109611 7 
Balance 54995 155894 43146 161 591 104785 
Capital scent 17120 275363 529981 744871 991331 
/ncludina: 
Land 42220 57753 81934 92332 
Rails and chairs 38110 92356 104723 130067 
Construction 151000 31 2000 445000 574000 
Tav Ferries 11010 11010 11010 
CAPITAL (£1 07.1848 07.1849 01 .1850 07.1850 07.18151 
Caoltal raised 1268242 1400363 1446848 (2\ 1470561 
Balance + 22746 - 48606 - 37100 • 58426 
Caoital soent 1245495 1448969 1483949 1528987 
/ncludina: 
Land (5) (6) (7) 104360 131030 134528 166211 
Rails and chairs 133012 133259 133259 133259 
Construction 642900 714245 714738 714847 
Tav Ferries 37926 39060 39060 39060 
sources: Reports and accounts of the Scottish Central Railway, 1841-50 (NAS/BR/RAC{S)/1/35) and 
minutes of directors and committees of the Scottish Central Rallwav 1848-52 (NAS/BR/SCC/1/2\ . 
(1 ): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. (2): surviving company records are not complete: the minute books of the Scottish Central give no capital data for 
the second half year of 1850 and omit any capital and revenue data thereafter until 1853. 
(3): The mileage of the Scottish Ce_ntral Railway is ~iv_en as 47 miles by PF Marshall, Thtt Scottish Cttn/ra/ 
Railway (Whitney, 1998), p.27. This figure, used within the analysis below, Is slightly greater than the authorised 
mileage of 45, given by HG Lewin, Thtt Railway Mania and ittl Aftermath, 1845-52, pp.388-391, but will reflect 
some small amendments to its system. Bradshaw's Railway Almanack, 1849, p.51 , gives a figure of 45 miles 
(table 16, chapter 3) . 
(4): Authorised capital in 1845 was £850,000 with £283,333 in borrowing powers. The estimated cost per mile 
was £18,085. Capital powers were increased in 1851 by £250,000 but increased borrowing powers were limited 
to an additional £16,000. (5): By July 1849, one year after opening, capital expenditure was 70.5% above estimate. The capital cost p r 
mile was £30,829; the construction cost per mile (excluding track) was £15,196 and £17,985 lncludlng land. Land 
costs comprised 9.0% of capital expenditure 
(6): By January 1850, the capital cost per mile reached ~31 ,573 with land costs comprising 9.1% of capital 
expenditure. Capital expenditure was 74.6% above estimate. Data from the committee of inquiry in 1850 
suggested a capital cost per mile of £31,803 based on a total capital expenditure of £1,494,745 
(NAS/BR/SCC/112). 
(7): The Investigation Committee of the Shareholders in 1850 (19 April 1850, NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1 /35 and 
NAS/BR/SCC/1 /2, page 4 of printed report) reported estimated land costs and claims to total £236,232 within a 
capital expenditure of £1,494,745 (15.8°~). However, data published In the accounts for expenditure on land by 
January 1850 represented 9.1% of capital expenditure and 10.9% by July 1851 , suggesting that some land costs 
identified by the committee of inquiry may have remained outstanding. 
(8): The capital account for July 1851 suggests the capital cost had risen to £32,532 per mile, 79.9% above 
estimate. 
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19(b): Revenue account of the Scottish Central Railway, 1849-51 
REVENUE {£) 07.1849 01.1850 07.1850 01.1851 
Total revenue 50~8 45006 35675 42492 
includino 
PassenQers, carriages 15297 18584 16105 21103 
Goods 11009 13441 13085 17059 
Mails 4718 1563 1427 included above 
Total Exnandlture (1) 26352 26165 33552 43324 
including 
Wor1dnq expenses 18664 16980 18182 18464 
Interest 7386 8685 12405 11808 
Balance (3) 23995 18840 2122 -831 
Ordinarv dividend 7" guaranteed 
°" °" 1" Sources: Accounts of the Scottish Central Railway 1841-50 (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1135) and 
minutes of directors and committees of the Scottish Central Railway, 1848-52 
lNAS/BR/SCC/1 /2) . 
(1): Expenditure in 1851 rose sharply as a result of special payments of £14,000 due to the 
Edinburgh and Glasgow and Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee Railways for outstanding law accounts. 
(2): Shillings and pence rounded down: totals may not match precisely the sum of component 
items 
(3): Company data is incomplete between 1851 and 1853. 
(4): The company began operating its own and Scottish Midland Junction services again from 
December 1849, and a tri-partite working agreement with the Scottish Midland Junction and 
Aberdeen Railways commenced in February 1851 . 
(5): Annual ordinary dividend rose to 3% by July 1852. Thereafter, 4% was paid In 1853 and 
1854, 5% in 1855 and 1856 and 5½ % in 1857 and 1858. 
19(c): Financial Indicators for the Scottish Central Railway, 1853-1854 
Data for half years (3) {£) 01.1853 07.1853 01.1854 
Half vearlv r:iross revenue 54510 51955 58507 
Gross annual revenue - 106465 110462 
Capital received 1646915 1656831 1682488 
Capital scent 1667905 1678627 1700773 
Capital balance -10495 • 21796 - 18285 
Debenture loans (2) 418613 418613 417680 
Credit at bank 1081 12544 360 
Ratio of loans to capital raised 25.4% 25.3% 24.8% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt - 0.254 0.28-4 
Source: Minutes of directors and committees of the Scottish Central Railway, 1852-57 
(NAS/BR/SCC/1/4). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely 
the sum of component items. 
(2): The accounts show that all interest paid was on debenture loans and preference stock. No 
temporary debt was taken in 1853-54. 
(3): Company records in the National Archives of Scotland are incomplete between 1851 and 
1853. 
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Table 20: Accounts of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway 
20(a): Capital account of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 1849-56 
CAPITAL (£) 01.1849 01.1850 01.1851 07.1851 01.1852 07.1852 
Miscellaneous receipts 19738 2283 3268 . . . 
Shares 560997 561072 561072 577848 596124 594904 
Loans 34373 37373 50273 77473 71133 66483 Capltal received 615108 600728 614813 855321 887257 8111387 
Balance 36354 11740 3319 12939 6553 9158 
Capital spent 578754 588988 811294 842382 860704 652229 
Including: 
Purchase: Newtyle & Couper Angus 13965 13965 13965 
Railway 
Purchase: Newtvle & Glammis Railwav 20563 20563 20563 
Land and compensation 69915 76054 77578 
Construction works under the contract 224050 224050 224050 
Additional construction works 29093 29211 30842 
Rails 87784 87784 87784 
Chairs 12514 12514 12514 
Plant 30389 31485 
Stations 17126 17226 17268 
Dunkeld branch expenditure 16091 16096 16096 (backed by a debenture\ 
CAPITAL (£) 01.1853 07.1853 01.1854 07.1854 01.1855 07.1855 01.1858 
Miscellaneous receipts . 7937 8518 9906 10228 10668 10974 
Shares 595154 587700 587700 587700 587700 585632 585775 
Loans 66483 69483 88983 113623 129379 136628 149102 
Capital received 661637 685120 685201 711229 727307 732928 745851 
Balance 8080 4294 8125 10368 7130 3407 7980 
Capital spent 653557 660826 677076 700861 720177 729521 737870 
sources: Accounts of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 1846-56 (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37) and minutes 
of shareholders directors and ioint committees 1850-56 (NAS/BR/SCM/1/1 and 1/3). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component Items. 
(2): Authorised capital in 1846 comprised £600,000 in shares and £200,000 In borrowing powers, provided to build 
Its original proposed line under 8&9 Vic. cap.170, 1845 and an enlarged system under 9&10 Vic. cap.75, 1846. 
The company's capital powers were relatively generous, given that its Blairgowrie and Klrrlemulr branches 
proposed in 1846 were not finally authorised under new legislation until 1853 and Its projected Dunkeld branch 
was constructed in 1854-56 by the independent Perth and Dunkeld Railway. 
(3): Had the original capital powers (granted under_8&9, Vlc. cap.170, 184~) for share capital of £300,000 and 
borrowing powers of £100,000 not been amended in 1846, capital expenditure by July 1851 would have been 
114.1 % above the original estimate. 
(4): The authorised mileage of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway was 30¼ miles, as quoted by HG Lewin, The 
Railway Mania and its Afte""ath, 184>52, pp.57-58. 
(5): With authorised capital of £600,000 from 1846, capital expenditure by July 1851 was Just 7.1% above 
estimate, which included the purchase costs of plant required after the collapse of the working agreement with the 
Caledonian Railway. The capital cost per mile in July 1851 was £20,890. Land costs comprised 11 .8% of capital 
expenditure, but these costs do not include the land element of the purchase costs of the two small Independent 
Newtyle lines to Coupar Angus and Glammis. 
(6): By January 1852, capital costs were £21,486 per mile, 10.1% above estimate, with land costs comprising 
11.7% of capital expenditure. 
(7): Capital e~penditure by amalgama~ion in 1856 was 23._0% above the revised 18'46 estimate, but still within the 
authorised limits of share and loan camtal set bv the state In 1846. 
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20(b): Revenue account of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway 1849-56 
REVENUE (£) 01.1851 07.1851 01.1852 07.1852 01 .1853 07.1853 
Half vear revenue 12821 14190 19901 18191 20066 21323 Total annual revenue 
-
27011 34091 38092 38257 41389 Balance - 815 2518 5915 6799 8714 9543 
Exnenditure 13636 11672 13986 11392 11352 11780 
Including: 
Workina exoenses 5249 3600 3841 4902 4069 4685 
Line maintenance 2056 2099 2080 2070 2060 2051 
Interest 1810 1042 1351 1179 995 1031 Ordinarv dividend 0 0 1½" 1¾" 2¼" 2¼" 
REVENUE (£) 01.1854 07.1854 01.1855 07.1855 01.1856 
Half vear revenue 24032 24320 27582 29415 30586 
Total annual revenue 45355 48352 51902 56997 60001 
Balance 11442 11959 130311 111232 15397 
Exnenditure 12590 12361 14546 13183 15189 
lncludlna: 
Workina expenses 4116 4166 6129 574 6901 
Line maintenance 2041 2031 2061 2443 1487 
Interest 1097 981 1193 2163 2567 
Ordinarv dividend 2½" 2¾" 3" 3½% 3½% 
Sources: Accounts of the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 1846-56 (NASIBR/RAC(S)l1/37) 
and minutes of shareholders, directors and Joint committees, 1850-56 
(NAS/BRISCM/111 and 1/3). 
(1 ): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely 
the sum of component items. 
20(c): Financial Indicators for the Scottish Midland Junction Railway, 1851-56 
Data for half years (£) 01.51 07.51 01.52 07.52 01.53 07.53 
Capital raised 614613 655321 667257 661387 661637 6651 20 
Debenture loans 50273 77473 71133 66483 66483 69483 
Temoorarv debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estimated total debt 50273 77473 71133 66483 66483 69483 
Gross annual revenue - 27011 34091 38092 38257 41389 
Ratio of debentures to total 8.2% 11.8% 10.7% 10.1% 10.0•1. 10.4o/o 
capital raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to total 
-
0.349 0.478 0.573 0.575 0.598 
debt 
Data for half years (£) 01.54 07.54 01.55 07.55 01.58 
CaPital raised 685201 711229 727307 732928 745851 
Debenture loans 88983 113623 129379 136628 149102 
Temporarv debt 0 0 0 0 0 
Estimated total debt 88983 113623 129379 136628 149102 
Gross annual revenue 45355 48352 51902 56997 60001 
Ratio of debentures to total caoltal raised 13.0% 16.0% 17.8% 18.6% 20.0% 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.510 0.426 0.401 0.417 0.402 (1): As a result of its amended capital powers in 1846, the company completed its line dose to estimate. It did not need to exercise its full borrowing powers and the accounts do not show any evidence of 
temporary hidden debt. As a result the comoanv's debt aearing was consistentlv strona . 
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Table 21: Accounts of the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 1856-62 
21(a): Summary data and financial Indicators for the Scottish North-Eastern Railway, 
1856-62. 
REVENUE (£) 07.1856 07.1857 07.1858 07.1859 07.1860 07.1861 07.1882 Half year revenue 91601 89883 93738 98157 104307 100253 109681 
- to 31 Januarv (4) 
Half year revenue 86334 89788 89158 91946 96642 97205 104461 
-to 31 Julv 
Total annual revenue 177935 179671 182896 190103 200949 197458 214142 
Balance 64345 91907 91683 97586 108558 108240 119313 Half year expenditure 69453 43568 45337 47474 47122 43438 48425 
- to 31 Januarv (5) 
Half year expenditure 44137 44196 45876 45043 45269 47780 48404 
-to 31 Julv 
Total annual exnAnditure 113590 87764 91213 92517 92391 91218 948211 Net revenue oaid to: Half year 
70% to Aberdeen 29537 64334 84178 68310 75989 74367 83519 30% to Scottish Midland 12659 27571 27504 29275 32566 31871 35794 
Ordinary dividends (7) The Aberd8en and Scottish Midland Junction Railways were amalgamated as the 
Scottish North-Eestem Railwav in July 1856 but with seoarate, rovlslon for dividends. 
Aberdeen Railway 
- to 31 January - 0 0 0 0 ½% 1½% 
-to 31 Julv 0 0 0 0 0 ½% 1¼% Scottish Midland Railway 
- to 31 January 3½% 3¾% 4% 4% 4% 4¾% 5¼% 
- to 31 Julv 3½% 3¾% 4% 4% 4¼% 4¼% 5 •A, 
CAPITAL (£) 07.1856 07.1857 07.1858 07.1859 07.1860 07.1861 07.1862 
Total loan caoital (6) 648755 699011 728835 742836 742645 741083 742909 Total capital raised (6) 2558449 2608745 2702285 2722100 2721909 2732797 2735823 Caoital account balance - 78578 - 45317 - 30515 - 18736 
- 73421 • 74039 • 97973 
Ratio of loan capital to 25.4% 26.8% 27.0'/. 27.3'/. 27.3'1. 27.1"1. 27.2'1. total capital raised 
Ratio of gron annual 
revenue to total debt (2) 
Aberdeen Railway 0.088 
To 31 Januarv 1856 
Scottish Midland Junction 0.402 
To 31 Januarv 1856 
Scottish North-Eastem 0.274 0.257 0.251 0.256 0.271 0.266 0.288 
Source: Accounts of the Scottish North-Eastern Railwav. 1856-66 (NAS/BR/RAC S)/1/36). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Debt gearing for the Aberdeen and Scottish Midland Junction Railways In January 1856 Is drawn from Appendix, 
tables 1(c) and 20(c). 
(3): The Scottish North-Eastern Railway was formed in July 1856 from amalgamation of the Aberdeen Railway and 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway. In 1863, the Scottish North-Eastern amalgamated with the Dundee and Arbroath 
Railway. 
(4): The figure of gross revenue to 31 January 1856 is drawn from the data of gross revenue for the Aberdeen and 
Scottish Midland Junction Railways prior to amalgamation, given in tables 1 (c) and 20(b). 
(5): Data for annual expenditure to 31 January 1856 £69,453) combines half yearly expenditure data for the Aberdeen 
Railway £54,264) and the Scottish Midland Junction Railway (£15,189) 
(6): Earlier debt of the ~o constitue_nt compa_nies was confined to the accounts of those companies by the act of 
incorporation and serY1ced from their respective revenue shares (70% to the Aberdeen Railway and 30% to the 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway). Thus the Scottish North-Eastern debt on formation comprised only its loan capital 
Without the burden of past debt, the Scottish North-Eastern was able to operate using authorised loan capital only and. 
its debt gearing was further strengthened by rising revenue. 
(7): The effect of confining past debt burdens to the ~evenue shar~ of the con~tituent companies Is illustrated by the 
dividends oak!: it was 1861 before the Aberdeen Ra1lwav. formed 1n 1845 oa1d its first dividend on ordinarv stock. 
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Table 22: Accounts of the Strathspey Railway 
22(a): Capital account of the Strathspey Railway, 1862-65 
CAPITAL 1£) 08.1882 08.1883 08.1884 08.1885 
Ordinarv shares (4) 27205 77523 77625 140200 
Amount in advance of calls (2) 90000 62550 62555 0 
Debenture loans 89999 89992 89992 
Capital raised (5) 11720S 230072 230172 230193 
Balance 1217 -22339 
- 59815 
- 68408 
Capital expenditure 115988 252411 289988 298599 
/ncludina: 
Prelim and Parliament 6153 6153 6153 6476 
Construction 98393 121731 155081 60428 
Land and compensation 194 6057 6451 8641 
Land consicinments 4850 38 
Interest account 3379 5399 144 246 
Interest on calls in advance 1560 3125 0 
Expenditure to 31 Auciust of the orevious vear - 115988 252411 289988 
Exnenditure in vear 115988 136423 37577 8610 
General balance sheet 
Due on sundries (3) 51059 41779 60000 68791 
Due to banks (al 1217 416 5220 
Amount due to contractors others and bills 13431 
Source: Minutes of the Strathspey Railwav, 1861-66 (NAS/BR/STY/111). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely 
the sum of component items. 
(2): The Great North provided a cash account to the Strathspey in return for its authorised £100,000 
shares. 
(3): The amounts due on sundries largely comprised advances made by Great North to the 
Strathspey. 
(4): By 1865, the Great North accounts show that it had invested £173,841 In the Strathspey of 
which £100,000 was in ordinary shares, shown in table 10(c). 
(5): At an extra-ordinary general meeting of the Great North on 23 June 1866 (NAS/BR/GNS/116 
pp.39-40), the Great North reported it had invested £192,700 in the Strathspey and other parties'had 
invested only £12,360, of which £11,000 had been subsaibed by the Keith and Dufftown Railway. 
Therefore, only £1,360 had come from individual shareholders. 
(6): Authorised capital for the Strathspey was £270,000 with borrowing powers of £90,000, giving an 
estimated cost per mile of £9,474. By 1864, when the line had been open for one year, capital 
expenditure was 7.4% above estimate. Land costs were 2.2% of capital, reflecting the widespread 
use of land feus. The capital cost per mile by 1864 was £10,175 for the 28½ miles to Nethy Bridge. 
(7): Authorised capital was increased by £25,000 in shares and £8,000 in loans under 28&29 Vic. 
cap.345, 1865, the Strathsp~y Railway (~ension) Act: The. Act also permitted the Great North to 
raise an additional £40,000 in share capital and subscribe this sum to the Strathspey, The Great 
North's authorised subscription to the Strathspey therefore rose from £150,000 to £190,000. The 4¼ 
mile extension of the Strathspey from Nethy Bridge to meet the Highland Railway at Boat of Garten 
was opened on 1 August 1866, the day that the Strathspey Railway amalgamated with the Great 
North of Scotland Rallwav. 
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22(b): Revenue account of the Strathspey Railway, 1863-65 
REVENUE (£) 08.1863 08.1864 08.1865 
Period of account 2 months Fu/I year Full veer 
Total revenue 1650 5930 5839 
Balance - 83 - 3564 
- 835 
Total expenditure 1733 9514 6874 
lnc/udina: 
Total working expenses 585 
Workina exPenses to the GNSR 1890 1875 
Interest account (3) 1138 7449 
-4351 
/ncludina: 
Interest on debentures 559 3592 3600 
Interest on bank accounts and temporary 71 3726 
loans 
Interest on advances 508 
Interest on contractors' bills 116 737 
Source: Minutes of the Strathspey Railway, 1861-66 (NAS/BR/STY/1/1). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): From 1864, very little detail of expenditure was provided to shareholders. 
(3): The company's interest account represented 125.6% of gross revenue In 1864 and 74.5% In 1865. 
(4): Gross revenue for the 11 months from 1 September 1865 until amalgamation on 1 August 1866 
was £4,223, indicatina a falling trend. 
22(c): Financial indicators for the Strathspey Railway, 1863-66 
(£) 31 August 1863 1864 1865 1866 (note 2) 
Capital raised (4) 230072 230172 230193 292975 
Debenture loans 89999 89992 89992 88272 
Temoorarv debt (3) 42195 65220 82222 14184 
Estimated total debt 13219-4 155212 172214 102456 
Gross annual revenue Open for2 
months onlv 
5930 5839 4607 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 39.1% 39.1o/o 39.1% 30.191. 
Ratio of gross revenue to total debt 
-
0.038 0.034 0.045 
(1): Not all interest was paid when due; interest on advances was accumulated In the suspense account 
within the general balance sheet under the Great North's policy for branches. 
(2): The 1866 accounts publish a figure of £4,223 for gross revenue for the 11 months from 1 
September 1865 until amalgamation with the Gr~at North on 1 August 1866. The figure of £4,607 
included above is therefore imputed for a full penod of 12 months. 
(3): An estimate of temporary debt is drawn from sundries and bills due on the general balance sheet, 
Appendix, table 22(a). For the 11 months from 31 August 1865, the general balance sheet contained 
£9,118 due on sundry debts and £3,884 due to contractors and banks and for bins. 
(4): The accounts do not show the level of bank loans, but the Strathspey issued £50,000 of debentures 
as security for an unspecified loan from the National and North of ScoUand Banks on 27 January 1863 
(NAS/BR/STY/1 /1, p.83). 
(5): Share capital raised rose from £140,200 in 1865 to £204,703 in 1866 as a result of the powers 
acquired under 28&29, Vic. cap.345, 1865, the Strathspey Railway (Extension) Act, to extend the 
Strathspey to join the Highland Railway at Boat of Garten. The Act authorised the Strathspey to raise 
an additional £25,000 of share capital and £6,000 In loans, but also authorised the Great North to raise 
an additional £40,000 of share capital and subscribe this sum to the Strathspey. As a result, the ratio of 
debentures to total capital for the Strathspey Railway is reduced because share capital then fonned 8 
larger oroportion of capital raised. 
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Table 23: Accounts of the Sutherland Railway and the Duke of 
Sutherland's Railway 
23(a): Capital account of the Sutherland Railway, 1868-75 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1888 08.1889 08.1870 08.1871 Shares 90664 126890 126920 Loans 59911 59911 59901 
Caoltal raised 150491 150578 188801 186821 
Balance • 91199 • 23481 8542 8423 
Caoltal expenditure 160191 174058 178259 178398 
lncludina: 
Capital spent in year 13866 4201 138 Land 659 1026 173 Construction 10504 3259 . 
Ralls sleepers . 1386 . 
Stations 3899 256 54 
Law, Parliamentary and aeneral costs 144 1225 20 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 
Shares 126920 126920 126930 134930 
Loans 59901 59980 60000 60000 
Caoltal raised 186821 186900 188930 194930 
Balance 4123 3651 2037 10047 
Capital expenditure 182698 183248 184892 184882 
lncludina: 
Caoital soent in year 4300 550 164 10 (Cr) 
Lend 221 89 303 37 
Construction 3600 138 901 
-
Rails sleepers -
-
. 
Stations - . . 
-Law, Parliamentary and aeneral costs 275 66 204 . 
Source: Minutes of the Sutherland Railwav 1864-84 (NAS/BR/SLD/1/1\. 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the 
sum of component items. 
(2): Authorised capital in 1865 (28&29 Vic.cap.169, 1865) was £180,000 with £60,000 borrowing 
powers, but increased in 1866 (29&30 Vic.cap.130, 1866) by £30,000 with £10,000 borrowing powers. 
The ortglnal estimate of capital costs per mile for the Bonar Brtdge-Brora llne of 32¼ miles In the 186S 
incorporation therefore was £5,496; the capital changes of the 1866 Act consequently amended this 
figure to £6,412 per mile. 
(3): The line failed to progress beyond Gotspie (26½ miles), and the Duke of Sutherland constructed the 
line from Golspie to Helmsdale (17½ miles) under 33&34 Vic. cap.31, 1870, The Duke of Suther1and's 
Railway Act. 
(4): By 1870, only 81 % of the route (26½ miles) had been constructed to Golspie at a capital cost of 
£6,727 per mile. While the capital cost per mile was 22.4% above the original estimate of £5,496 per 
mile for the full line to Brora, however, the total capital expenditure in 1870 of £178,259 was 1.0% 
below the original 1865 share capital limit of £180,000. Land costs by 1870 (£1,685) were only 0.9% of 
capital exoenditure, princioallv because the Duke of Sutherland owned the maloritv of land reouired. 
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23(b): Revenue account of the Sutherland Railway, 1868-75 
REVENUE (£) 08.1869 08.1870 08.1871 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 
Total annual revenue 5096 5089 5833 7092 7281 8034 9892 
Balance 576 633 1290 2115 2381 2313 3953 
Total annual expenses 4520 4456 4543 4977 4899 5720 5938 
and worklna charges 
Including: 
Debenture interest 2715 2700 2594 2429 2600 2589 2520 
Other Interest 733 1189 30 108 313 654 61 
Ordinarv dividend (3) - - - -
- - 1% 
Wor1dng expenses charged Max75% Max75% (1) 
by the Highland Railway 
Highland Railway wonting 4077 4419 4439 4543 5217 
charges (£) 
Traffic expenses as % of 72.16 66.00 
receipts (4) 
63.17 59.52 54.17 
Interest as % of total 67.7% 76.4% 45.0% 35.8% 40.0% 40.4% 26.1% 
revenue 
Other data contained In 
annual reports 
Mileaae owned 26½ 26½ 26½ 26½ 26½ 26½ 26½ 
Mileage run 37996 38010½ 39231½ 45003 45264 46324 53196½ (all mixed trains) 
Source: Minutes of the Suther1and Railway, 1864-84 (NAS/BR/SLD/1/1). 
(1): The Highland made a ne~ working agreement, ~roughlinto operaUon from 19 June 1871, by which It charged 
for trains run. Under the previous agreement, the Highland could take up to a maximum of 75% of gross receipts to 
cover costs. From_ 1871, two trains _each way dally we~e charged ~t £2a per '!Ille with additional trains charged at 
1 s.1 0d per mile (Minutes of the Ordinary General Meeting of the Highland Railway, 28 April 1871, NAS/BR/HR/1/2, 
pp. 73-7 4 and page 2 of inserted pr9nted report). 
(2): Accounts from 1872 include a debit of £100 as rent to the Highland Railway for the use of Bonar Bridge Station 
and a credit of £100 as rent from Duke of Suther1and's Railway for the use of Golsple Station. 
(3): The first dividend on ordinary shares was dedared in 1875 following the opening of the full far north route In 
1874. Small annual dividends ranging between¼% and 2% were declared each year thereafter until the company 
was amalgamated with the Highland Railway in 1884. 
(4): Traffic expenses included the Highland Railway's working charge and other costs, Including rent for the use of 
Bonar Bridae station taxes, feu duties salarv of the secretarv. and auditors' fees. 
23(c): Financial indicators for the Sutherland Railway, 1869-75 
1£1 31 August 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 
Capital raised 150576 186801 186821 186821 186900 186930 194930 
Debenture loans 59911 59911 59901 59901 59980 60000 60000 
Estimated debt from other 14660 23780 600 2160 6260 13080 1220 
interest (1) 
Estimated total debt (2) 74571 83691 60501 62061 66240 73080 61220 
Gross annual revenue 5096 5089 5833 7092 7281 8034 9892 
Ratio of debentures to capital 39.8% 32.1% 32.1% 32.1% 32.io/e 32.1o/• 30.811/. 
raised 
Ratio of gross revenue to 
total debt (2) 
0.068 0.061 0.096 0.114 0.110 0.110 0.162 
(1): Debt other than authorised loan capital is calculated by applying a notional 5% interest rate to the sums of 'other 
interest' paid from the revenue account. 
(2): The adjusted working charges from 187_1, by ~ich the Highland ~allway charged for the cost of trains run, 
assisted the slow improvement of debt geanng, which was further assisted by the Increase In revenue following the 
ooenina of the far north line to Helmsdale in 1871 and to Thurso and Wick In 1874. 
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23(d): Capital account for the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-75 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1871 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 
Capital received from Duke of Sutherland 61869 62862 62351 64723 64653 
Total capital expenditure 61869 62862 62351 64723 64653 Capital spendina within the vear - 993 511 (er) 2371 69 (er) 
lncludina: 
Land compensation and houses 16 1 1 602 295 (er) 
Construction 56926 110 36 135 229 
Stations 2135 590 297 1367 
Enaineering 1480 192 19 154 4 <erl Law, parliamentarv, Qeneral 1310 1310 3 86 
Miscellaneous - 98 3 25 
Proceeds from sale of old plant 872 (er) 
-
Estimate of further capital spendinQ reauired 3400 3000 3500 3000 500 
Source: Minutes and statement of accounts of the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-1884 
(NAS/BR/OKS/1 /1 ). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. Credit items for capital expenditure, land and engineering are Indicated by (er). 
(2): The line from Golspie to Helmsdale (17¼ miles) was authorised in 1870 as the Duke of Sutherland's Railway 
without specific capital powers as the Duke was to finance the line. The line opened In 1871 and by 1872, the 
capital cost per mile was £3,644; land costs were zero as the Duke owned the property reaulred. 
23(e): Revenue account for the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-75 
REVENUE 1£1 08.1871 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 
Total annual revenue 1549 3668 3955 4430 5124 
Balance to carry forward 304 597 833 958 1337 
Total annual expenditure 1244 3071 3121 3472 3787 
/ncludina: 
Traffic expenses prior to opening in June 1871 609 (3) 
HR working charaes after 19 June.1871 601 2815 2815 2886 3330 
Traffic aQent's salarv and expenses - 94 69 84 23 
Rent for Golsoie station 20 100 100 100 100 
Less rent for Helmsdale station 
. 100 
Other data contained In annual reoorta 
Train miles run (bv mixed trains) 17137 28614 28665 ½ 29413 ½ 33944 ½ 
Traffic exoenses as % of receipts (2) 75.39 69.89 66.11 
Fimenditure as % of receipts 78.78 78.83 74.36 
Source: Minutes and statement of accounts of the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-1884 
(NAS/BR/OKS/1 /1 ). 
(1): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. . . . , . 
(2): Traffic expenses included the H1ghla~d Railways working charge and other costs, Including rent for the use of 
Golspie station paid to the Sutherland Railway, but offset by rent paid by the Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
for the use of Helmsdale station from 1874-75, taxes, feu duties, salary of the secretary, and auditors' fees 
(3): The section of line between Dunrobin and West Helmsdale was used from November 1870, prior to th~ full 
line ooenin!l on 19 June 1871 . 
23(f): Financial Indicators for the Duke of Sutherland's Railway, 1871-76 
(£) 31 August 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 
Caoital raised 61869 62862 62351 64723 64653 
Debenture loans 0 0 0 0 0 
Total debt 0 0 0 0 0 
Gross annual revenue 1549 3668 3955 4430 5124 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised No loans 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt No debt 
(1 ): The Duke of Suther1and financed the line through the purchase of ordinary stock. There was 
therefore no debenture debt or other forms of fixed interest debt. 
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Table 24: Accounts of the Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
24(a): Capital account of the Sutherland and Calthness Rallway, 1871-79 
CAPITAL (£) 08.1872 08.1873 08.1874 08.1875 Shares 77198 202424 (3) 204254 (3) 204418 (3) 
Debentures - - 119960 119960 Total caoltal raised 77198 202424 324214 324378 Balance 6169 
-
819 • 4113 - 25088 Capital exoenditure Including: 71028 2030-43 328327 349484 Capltal soent during the year including: 132014 125283 211 37 
Land: 2635 
- 19709 1217 Construction 27044 67344 113657 18776 Rails sleeners etc. 33749 61404 
-
-Emiineerina and surveVina 4378 1447 
-
-Law, parliamentarv, aeneral charaes 2864 1509 3394 1143 Interest 356 308 6261 
Temoorarv debt 
Stock issued as securitv on loans 72000 (3) 72000 (3) 72000 (3) 
Temporarv loans 72000 72000 72000 
Source: Minutes of the Sutherland and Caithness Railwav. 1871-84 CNAS/BRISUCl111). 
(1) : Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): The authorised capital of the company was £360,000 with £120,000 in borrowing powers under 34&35 
Vic.cap.99, 1871, The Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act, giving an estimated cost of £5,393 per mile, 
(3) £72,000 of stock was issued in 1873 as security against a temporary loan from the Aberdeen Town and County 
Bank, which was consolidated within a £112,000 loan for a further three years on 15 April 1876 (NASIBR/SCRl111 ). 
The Special General Meeting of 31 October 18?3 ~~S/BR/SUCl1/1 , p.123) authorised the use of borrowing 
powers, but the issue of £72,000 stock In secunty 1nd1cates that only £130,424 of stock had been Issued and paid 
up, less than half the authorised capital. This £130,4~4 comprised £50,000 from the Highland and £60,000 from the 
Duke, with the remainder of £20,424 therefore subscnbed by local shareholders. 
(4): By 1875, one year after opening, capital expenditure was 2.9% below estimate, and only reached the authorised 
capita! level by 1877. The l_lne ran from ~elmsdale to Wick and Thu_rso, a distance of 66¼ mlles (comprising 60 
miles from Helmsdale to Wick and 6¼ miles from Georgemas Junction to Thurso). The capital cost per mile by 1875 
was £5 235. Land costs in 1874 and 1875 formed 6.0% of caoital expenditure. 
CAPITAL (£) Authorised 08.76 08.77 08.78 08.79 
Stocks and shares 360000 244928 245963 271849 294849 
Debentures 120000 119960 119993 119993 119853 
Total caoital authorised 480000 
Total caoltal raised 384888 365956 391842 414702 
Balance 11147 6413 27986 50112 
Capital soent 353740 359542 3831155 3845119 
Stock Issued as securitv on loans 112000 112000 137000 160000 
Temporarv loans 112000 (5) 112000 137000 160000 (6l 
Interest on debentures 5398 5846 5346 5526 
Interest on temoorarv loans 5539 5784 6284 6869 (5): on 15 April 1876, the temporary loan of £72,000 with the Aberdeen Town and County Bank was consolidated 
within a new £112,000 loan for three years at 4½ % (15 April, 1976, NAS/BR/SUC/1/1). 
(6): In 1879, the Duke of Sutherland agreed to borrow £100,00~ for ten years and to provide these funds to the 
company (22 February and 2 May 1879, NAS/BR/SUC/1 /1 ). This loan was secured on his land and estates· Interest 
charges were to be refunded to the Duke by the company. The Duke's loan allowed repayment of £100,000 of bank 
debt and, on the same day (2 May 1879), guarantees of £60,000 were signed by the Duke and Directors to the 
Aberdeen Town and County Bank for a reduced loan for that amount. Temporary loans, however, remained at 
£160,000 (£100,000 owed to the Duke and £60,000 to the Aberdeen Town and County Bank) until the company was 
amalgamated with the Highland Railway in 1884_. The Duke's loan did not reduce temporary debt, but gave the 
companv lonaer tern, securitv of temporary fund1na. 
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24(b): Revenue account of the Sutherland and Calthne88 Railway, 1874-79 
REVENUE (£) 08.1874 08.1875 08.1876 08.1877 08.1878 08.1879 Line opened In July 1874 Dsta for one Fullyesr FuUyfJSr Full year Full year Full year 
month 
Total annual revenue 1823 15389 16367 17865 17989 17483 Balance before Interest 263 -1421 2439 4301 4449 4282 Total annual expenditure 1559 16811 13928 13563 13529 13221 lnc/udina: 
Hiahland Railwav workina charae 1479 15809 12838 12598 12568 12344 
Ordinary dividend - -
Debenture interest 503 5383 5398 5846 5346 5526 Other interest 262 4559 5539 5784 6284 6869 Total Interest oaid 765 9942 10937 11830 11830 12395 Net balance -502 -11363 • 8498 • 7329 • 7181 -8133 Interest ss " of tots/ revenue (2) 42.09{, 64.6" 66.8" 65.1" 64.7" 70.9" Data contained In annual renorta 
Working chames as % receiots 81 .97% 104.50% 80.16 72.06 67.20 72.27 
Mileage owned 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Mileage run <all mixed trains) 15417 163043 130480 127878 127557 125104 Source: Minutes of the Suther1and and Caithness Railwav, 1871-84 (NAS/BR/SUC/1/1). 
(1 ): Shillings and pence have been rounded down; as a result some totals may not match precisely the sum of 
component items. 
(2): Net revenue in 1874-79 was insufficient to meet interest payments; interest represented approximately two-
thirds of gross revenue. Company accounts for 1880-84 (NAS/BR/SUC/1/1) show that balances before Interest 
remained insufficient to meet interest costs until the Sutherland and Caithness Railway was amalgamated into the 
Highland Railway in 1884. The balances before interest were £5,212 in 1880 (but with £11,902 Interest due) 
£4,421 in 1881 (with £12,526 intere~t due), £5,9~9 in 1882 (with £12,937 interest due), £8,710 In 1883 (with £13,2-4S 
interest due), and £9,377 in 1884 (with £13,160 interest due). 
(3): Receiots from mail traffic accounted for 21.2% of total revenue In 1875. 
24(c): Financial Indicators for the Sutherland and Calthness Railway, 1875-79 
(£) 31 August 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 
Capital raised 324378 364888 365956 391842 414702 
Debenture loans 119960 119960 119993 119993 119853 
Temporarv loans 72000 112000 112000 137000 160000 
Total debt 191960 231960 231993 256993 279853 
Gross annual revenue 15389 16367 17865 19089 17483 
Ratio of debentures to capital raised 37.0o/, 32.9o/, 32.8'/o 30.&o/, 28.9'/, 
Ratio of aross revenue to total debt 0.080 0.071 0.077 0.074 0.082 
(1): The Sutherland and Caithness Railway, together with the Sutherland and Duke of Sutherland's 
Railwavs were amalaamated with the Highland Railwav in 1884. 
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Table 25: Comparative financial data for the Highland and Great North of 
Scotland Railway companies, 1866-74 
Data for half years {£1 
HIGHLAND 02.1866 08.1866 02.1867 08.1867 02.1868 08.1868 
Temporary loans 465000 485000 505000 535000 535000 565000 
Total debt (loans and debentures\ 1134128 1178172 1199122 1232872 1235237 1265634 
Half veer revenue 82668 99744 96362 103766 100169 107164 Annual gross revenue 182412 196106 200128 203935 207333 
Ratio of revenue to temoorarv debt 0.376 0.388 0.374 0.381 0.367 
Ratio of revenue to total debt 0.155 0.164 0.162 0.165 0.164 GREAT NORTH 01.1866 07.1B66 01.1B67 07.1B87 01 .1888 07.1888 
Temporary loans 245156 274527 345972 303171 350348 181549 
Total debt (loans and debentures) 652977 733833 1101018 1059750 1148047 1015408 
Revenue !½ veer) 52112 51673 79112 86466 90112 90658 
Annual aross revenue 103785 130785 165578 176578 180770 
Ratio of revenue to temoorarv debt 0.378 0.378 0.546 0.504 0.996 
Ratio of revenue to total debt 0.141 0.119 0.156 0.154 0.178 Sources: Appendix, tables 10(cl, 10 dl and 10(e), and tables 11(8), 11(bl. 111cl and 11(e . 
Data for half years (£) 
HIGHLAND 02.1869 08.1869 02.1870 08.1870 02.1871 08.1871 
Temoorarv loans 625000 625000 625000 605000 520000 450000 
Total debt (loans and debentures) 1325569 1325699 1325709 1305759 1220877 1150723 
Half veer revenue 102563 110964 101251 113645 107967 118799 Annual arose revenue 209727 213527 212215 214896 221612 226766 
Ratio of revenue to temoorarv debt 0.336 0.342 0.340 0.355 0.426 0.504 
Ration of revenue to total debt 0.158 0.161 0.160 0.165 0.182 0.197 GREAT NORTH 01.1B69 07.1869 01.1B70 07.1870 01.1B71 07.1871 
Temoorary loans 94331 91963 39099 32674 32695 10300 
Total debt (loans and debentures\ 949192 944228 899173 893537 893490 870254 
Half vear revenue 90209 90700 89394 95214 97228 99690 
Annual aross revenue 180867 180909 180094 184608 192442 196918 
Ratio of revenue to temoorerv debt 1.917 1.967 4.606 5.650 5.886 19.118 
Ratio of revenue to total debt 0.191 0.192 0.200 0.207 0.215 0.226 (1): Comparative data is not shown for 1866 (1) as the Great North accounts do not reflect the amalgamated 
comoanv until 1866 (2). Debt aearina for the companies in 1865 and 1866 are shown In tables 10 (e) and 11(c). 
Data for half years {£) 
HIGHLAND 02.1B72 08.1872 02.1873 08.1873 02.1874 08.1874 
Temoorarv loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total debt (loans and debentures\ 697874 700636 700502 700788 700807 700822 
Half veer revenue 123117 131140 124792 133872 134288 146322 
Annual gross revenue 241916 254257 255932 258684 288180 280810 
Ratio of revenue to temoorarv debt - - - -
-
-Ratio of revenue to total debt 0.347 0.363 0.365 0.369 0.383 0.400 
GREAT NORTH 01.1872 07.1872 01.1873 07.1873 01.1874 07.1874 
Temporarv loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total debt (loans and debentures\ 864384 863250 863715 863504 858420 864316 
Half veer revenue 103621 105548 107745 112176 119613 121151 
Annual gross revenue 203311 209169 213293 219921 231789 240784 
Ratio of revenue to tem=rarv debt - - - -
- -
Ratio of revenue to total debt 0.235 0.242 0.247 0.255 0.270 0.279 
(continued) 
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Table 26 (continued): 
Share and debenture capital raised by the Great North and Highland Railways, 1870 
(a) Great North of Scotland Railway, July 1870 
GNSR 1870 Geared 'Yo of capita( 
1£) (July) raised 
GNoSR Preference Stock 5% (1859J 291090 291090 
GNoSR New Preference Stock A 4 ½ % (1859) 482050 482050 
GNoSR New Preference Stock B 4 ½ % (1862) 218030 218030 
GNoSR Old Meldrum) Preference Stock 4 ½ % (1866) 13810 13810 
GNoSR, Aberdeen &Turriff) Preference 5% 118661 25400 25-400 
GNoSR Formartine & Buchan) Preference 5% (1866) 172598 172598 
GNoSR Formartine and Buchan) Ordinary Stock (1866) 108466 
Banffshire Preference Stock 5% (1867) 46010 46010 
GNoSR Ordinary Stock 862655 
Subtotal 2218109 1248988 40.58% 
Debenture loans 8489-48 
Debenture stock 11915 
Subtotal 860883 880863 27.98°/4 
Total of capital requiring fixed Interest oavrnents 2109851 68.52'Y. 
Capital raised 3078972 
Total share and loan caaltal authomed, comorisina: 3419362 
Share capital 2554443 
Loan capital 864919 
Source: Accounts of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 31 July 1870 !NAS/BR/RAC(S 11/14). 
(b) Highland Railway, August 1870 
HR 1870 Geared % of capital (£) (August) rai.ed 
Dunkeld 6% Preference 76000 76000 
Nairn 5% Preference 44960 44960 
Nairn 6% Preference 59080 59080 
Class A 4½% Preference 505245 505245 
Class B 5 % Preference 384362 384362 
Ordinary shares 1034043 
Subtotal 2103890 1089847 38.14¾ 
Debenture loans 700049 
Debenture stock 710 
Total loans and debentures raised 700759 700759 24.99% 
Total of capital requiring fixed Interest navments 1770406 83.13% 
Total share and loan capital ralaed 2804449 
Total share and loan capital authorised, comorisina: 3029810 
Share capital, authorised under:: 2329000 
- Highland Railway Act, 1865 2249000 
- Suthar/and Railway Act 1865 30000 
- Dinawa/1 and Skye Railway Act, 1865 50000 
Loan capital 700880 
source: Accounts of the Highland Railway, 31 August 1870, reported to the Ordinary General 
Meetina 28 October 1870 (NAS/BR/HR/1/2 oo.25-26). 
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Table 26: Comparative costs of Scottish Railways, 1842-65 
Key to railway companies in table 26 
A&B: Aboyne and Braemar 
A&F: Arbroath and Forfar 
AV: Alford Valley 
AR: Aberdeen 
A&T: Aberdeen and Turriff. formerly the Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction 
BM& TE: Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension 
BP&S: Banff, Portsoy and Strathisla, later Banffshire 
D&A: Dundee and Arbroath 
DR: Deeside 
DER: Deeside Extension 
D&S: Dingwall and Skye 
DoS: Duke of Sutherland's 
E&G: Edinburgh and Glasgow 
EL&G: Edinburgh, Leith and Granton 
F&B: Formartine and Buchan 
GP&G: Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock 
GPK&A: Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and Ayr 
GNS: Great North of Scotland 
l&AJ: Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
l&N: Inverness and Nairn 
l&PJ: Inverness and Perth Junction 
K&D: Keith and Dufftown 
MR: Morayshire 
P&D: Perth and Dunkeld 
SC: Scottish Central 
SCR: Sutherland and Caithness 
SMJ: Scottish Midland Junction 
SR: Strathspey 
SuthR: Sutherland 
SCR: Sutherland and Caithness 
Sources: Data drawn from the minutes and accounts of the following railway companies:. 
• Aberdeen Railway (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/36); 
Aberdeen and Turriff Railway (NAS/BR/ABT/1/1): 
Aboyne and Braemar Railway (NAS/BR/ABR/1/1-2); 
Alford Valley Railway (NAS/BR/ALF/1/1 ); 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway (NAS/BR/BMEX/1/1); 
Banffshire Railway (NAS/BR/BAN/1/1-2); 
Deeside and Deeside Extension Railways (NAS/BR/DEE/1/1-3); 
Dingwall and Skye Railway (NAS/DSK/1/1); 
Formartine and Buchan Railway (NAS/BR/FBR/1/1); 
Great North of Scotland (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14); 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway( NAS/BR/IAJ/1/1-3); 
Inverness and Nairn Railway (NAS/BR/INR/1/1-2); 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway (NAS/BR/IPJ/1/1); 
Keith and Dufftown Railway (NAS/BR/KDR/1/1); 
Morayshire Railway (NAS/BR/MOR/1/1-4); 
Perth and Dunkeld Railway (NAS/PDR/1/1-2); 
Scottish Central Railway (NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/35); 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway (NAS/BR/SCM/1/1-3 and NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/37)· 
Strathspey Railway (NAS/BR/STY/1/1); ' 
Suther1and and Duke of Suther1and's Railways (NAS/BR/SLD/1/1 and NAS/BR/DKS/1/1)· 
Suther1and and Caithness Railway (NAS/BR/SUC/1/1); ' 
and from:• 
CJA Robertson, The Origins oflhe Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 (Edinburgh, 1963) table 25 
00.101-102 and tables 36-39 on.170-73. ' ' 
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Table 26: Comparative costs of Scottish Railways, 1842-75 
Company Date Length Estimate Cost (£/mile) Cost (£/mlle) %over Land as 'Yo (miles) (£/mile) lwlth plant) (no Dl■nt) estimate capital Inter-urban lines authorised before 1845 
MF 1842 15¼ 4115 8964 
- 117.9 12.5 
D&A 1842 16¾ 5241 9140 - 74.7 n/e 
EL&G 1847 5 20000 61024 
- 205.1 n/a 
GP&G 1844 22½ 17022 41068 
- 141 .3 18.1 
GPK&A 1843 55 11562 21908 
- 89.5 12.4 
E&G 1845 47 18994 36548 
- 92.4 13.0 Comoanles on the route to AberdHn 
SC 1850 47 18085 31573 
- 74.6 9.1 (10) 
SMJ 1851 30¾ 9756 (3) 20890 
- 114.1/7.1 11 .8 
AR 1851 72¼ 11487 22983 21571 100.1 9.3 Great North and allied branch companies 
GNS 1857 54 8704 (4) 15672 
13868 
80.1 11 .8 
MT 1859 18 6667 Waareement 8241 23.6 9.1 
BM&TE 1860 11 ¾ 6894 Waareement 6816 
- 1.1 3.4 
AV 1859 16 5313 Waareement 6310 18.8 3.4 
F&B 1865 54 7407 Waareement 11544 55.8 n/a <5) 
K&D 1862 10¼ 4651 Waareement 5632 21 .1 8.8 
SR (8\ 1864 28¼ 9474 Waareement 10175 7.4 2.2 
Northern lndeoendent companies 
BP&S 1861 18¾ 4800 Waareement 5465 13.9 7.5 
DR 1855 16 6640 8011 - 20.6 13.8 
DER 1860 15 ½ 5161 Waareemenl 6529 26.5 8.2 
MB 1869 11 6000 Waareement 6437 7.3 9.4 (6) 
P&D 1859 8¼ 9697 Waareement 10699 10.3 17.9 
MR 1860 9 6078 8716 - 43.4 n/a 
Inverness web com ,anles 
l&N 1857 15 5333 8003 7221 50.1 12.4 
l&AJ 1860 39¾ 8176 13395 11704 63.8 7.2 
l&PJ 1865 112½ 5813 Waareement 9387 (8745) (9) 61 .5 4.3 (9) 
SuthR 1870 26½ 5496 Waareement 6727 
- 1.0 0.9 
DoS 1872 17¼ n/a Waareement 3644 n/a 0.0 
SCR 1875 66¾ 5393 Weareement 5235 
- 2.9 6.0 
D&S 1872 631/2'53 7087 (7) Waareement 5557 (7) n/a n/a (1): Mileages are derived from CJA Robertson, The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 
(Edinburgh, 1983), HA Vallance, The Great North of Scotland Railway (Newton Abbot, 1965), HA Vallance, Th& 
Highland Railway (4th edition, Newton Abbot, 1985), PF Marshall, The Scottish Contra/ Railway (Whitney, 1098), 
HG Lewin, The Railway Mania snd its aftermath, 1845-52 (London 1936, republished Newton Abbot, 1968). 
(2): Where companies are shown with working agreements, the cost of the agreements waa charged to revenue 
which therefore produces a relatively lower capital cost per mile for these railways than for those companies ' 
which purchased their own plant. 
(3): The estimate per mile for the Scottish Midland Junction is based on Its original 18-45 capital powers. but these 
were doubled in 1846 for a revised scheme. Therefore a potential excess of expenditure over estimate by July 
1851 of 114.1%, based on original capital powers, was only 7.1% by that date. 
(4): The estimated cost of the Great North line is given from the estimate of £470,000 for the Aberdeen-Keith 
section (28 November 1849, NAS/BR/GNS/1/1, p.220 and NAS/BR/RAC(S)/1/14). 
(5): Land costs for the Fonnartine and Buchan Railway were 4.64% of capital spent by 1862, but only 29 miles of 
the planned 54 miles had been completed by that date. 
(6): Land costs for the Aboyne and Braemar Railway are only available up to 1867. 
(7): The estimated cost of the Skye ~ine is give~ for the or~inal scheme of 63½ miles to Kyle of Lochalsh. Th 
line was built to Strome Ferry (53 miles) on which the capital cost Is calculated. Land cost details are Incomplete 
in company records but, as several large landowners ~av~ land for shares, costs would have been relatively low. 
(8): The strathspey Railway was lengthened by 4¼ miles 1n 1866 when an extension was opened between Nethy 
Bridge and Boat of Garten to connect to the Highland Railway route between Inverness, Forres and Perth, giving 
a revised route mileage of 33¼. 
(9): See also table 14(a), notes (5) and (6), for derivation of capital costs per mile for the Inverness and Perth 
Junction Railway. Significant land costs on the Inverness and Perth Junction remained outstanding when the 
1865.accounts were published. 
(10): The land costs for the Scottish Central are given from company accounts for January 1850; by July 1851 , 
following the 1850 Committee of lnauirv. land costs had risen to 10.9% of capital exnenditure. 
536 
Definitions 
The abbreviations for northern railway companies listed below are drawn from the 
classifications in the National Archives of Scotland and are used within the footnotes 
and tables of the thesis (shown as NASIBR/reference/file numbe1'. 
Reference Company 
ABN The Aberdeen Railway 
ATR The Aberdeen and Turriff Railway (previously the Banff, Macduff and 
Turriff Railway) 
ABR 
ALF 
BAN 
BMEX 
CAL 
COB 
DEE 
DEX 
OKS 
DSK 
EDP 
FBR 
GNS 
HR 
IAJ 
INR 
IPJ 
IRR 
KOR 
MOR 
The Aboyne and Braemar Railway 
The Alford Valley Railway 
The Banffshire Railway 
The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway 
The Caledonian Railway 
The Callander and Oban Railway 
The Deeside Railway 
The Deeside Extension Railway 
The Duke of Sutherland's Railway 
The Dingwall and Skye Railway 
The Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee Railway 
The Formartine and Buchan Railway 
The Great North of Scotland Railway 
The Highland Railway 
The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway 
The Inverness and Nairn Railway 
The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway 
The Inverness and Ross-shire Railway 
The Keith and Dufftown Railway 
The Morayshire Railway 
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PDR The Perth and Dunkeld Railway 
SCC The Scottish Central Railway 
SMJ The Scottish Midland Junction Railway 
SNE The Scottish North-Eastern Railway 
SLD The Sutherland Railway 
STY The Strathspey Railway 
sue The Sutherland and Caithness Railway 
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Glossary of terms 
Assessment: 
Bill of exchange: 
Cheap railways: 
A tax set at a Scottish county meeting that was levied per acre 
on landowners, primarily to raise funds for the county's share 
of the cost of parliamentary roads. 1 
A written commitment to pay a sum due to a creditor by a fixed 
date, used widely in the nineteenth century by commercial 
enterprises to finance trade when funds were short. The bill 
provided short-term credit which, in the case of the nineteenth 
century railway companies, almost universally required 
payment of interest on the debt due until discharged. If the 
creditor required funds, the bill could be sold to a financial 
institution which would buy it at a discount, taking the 
difference between the discounted price and the eventual 
redemption price as its profit. The amount of discount 
charged, however, would be determined by the degree of risk 
of default and the time remaining before the bill was due to be 
redeemed. 
With the high capital costs per mile for railways (£38,258 in 
England and £32,113 in Scotland in 18512), economies in the 
costs of engineering, construction, land, and parliamentary 
and legal administration were sought to assist the extension of 
railways into less economically prosperous areas. Features 
might include a less direct route following natural topography, 
lighter construction designed to match expected traffic, 
replacement of bridges by level crossings, land obtained on 
lease terms and single track operation. Railway promotions in 
1 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the northern 
highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD thesis, Aberdeen University, 2001), p. 
(vii). 
2 CJA Robertson, 'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews Railway 
Company', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 1974), p.2. 
539 
Currency units: 
Feu duty: 
America and Canada using similar principles were identified 
as contemporary examples. 3 Herapath's Railway Journal was 
a strong advocate: 'The success of the cheap principle Is 
known to a few . . . It will soon be a fact beyond dispute that 
most branch and extension railways can be constructed for 
£8,000 and £10,000 per mile, and though serving districts 
possessing only thin traffics, may return highly remunerative 
dividends'." The Peebles Railway, the St Andrew's Railway, 
the Morayshire Railway and the Deeside Railway provide early 
examples of railway lines built in Scotland on 'cheap' 
principles. 5 
British currency units reported in company accounts In 1844-
74 comprised pounds sterling, shillings (twenty to the pound), 
pence (twelve pennies to the shilling), half-pence (two to the 
penny) and farthings (four to the penny). One shilling is 
represented by 10 pence of current (2007) currency, although 
the relative values have altered significantly (see entry on 
'price base' in this Glossary). Throughout the thesis, units of 
fess than one pound sterling have been rounded down to the 
nearest pound. 
Feu duties were annual sums, usually of a constant amount, 
payable in respect of grants of land in Scotland. 
3 Railway Journal, 23 April 1853, in 'Miscellaneous me~oranda on the history of the 
Highland Railway', NAS/BR/HR/4/3/11: Inverness Couner and Inverness Advertiser, 14 April 
1853, in Prospectus of the Perth and Inverness and Inverness and Elgin Railways, 1852-53, 
NAS/BR/PROS(S)/1 /15. 
4 Herapath's Railway Journal, 9 February 1856, pp.143-44. 
5 PF Marshall, Peebles Railways (Usk, 2005), pp.23-32; CJA Robertson, 'The cheap railway 
movement in Scotland - the St Andrews Railway', Transport History, 7, No.1 (March 1974), 1-
40· MC Reed, Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844 (London, 1975), p.13. The 
M~rayshire and Deeslde Railways are examined In chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
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Gearing: 
Heritors: 
Joint Stock 
Companies: 
Gearing is a measure of the debt held by a company and 
indicates the proportion of capital employed in a company that 
is financed by lenders rather than shareholders.• 
Heritors were landowners with land valued at over £100 Scots 
annual valued rent that were able to vote at a Scottish county 
meeting at which administrative matters in the county were 
decided.7 Heritors were also the designated road trustees for 
the county. 
The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act (7&8 Vic. cap.11 O, 1844) 
gave the protection of limited liability to investors, but only 
after three years had elapsed from the sate of their shares. 
The 1855 Limited Liability Act (18&19 Vic. cap.133, 1855) 
removed this anomaly and extended limited liability back to the 
date of registration of the company. Both acts were not 
applicable in Scotland, however, because Scots law had 
always regarded a format business partnership as a corporate 
body, able to sue and be sued In its own name rather than the 
names of individual members, and it also allowed the transfer 
of shares. Scots law thus gave some elements of limited 
liability protection to shareholders. This degree of legal 
recognition and protection within Scottish business 
partnerships was only available to English businesses by a 
Royal Charter or an act of incorporation prior to the above 
legislation. 8 Consolidation of the 1845 and 1855 acts was 
e w McKenzie, The Financial Times Guide to Using and Interpreting Company Accounts (3rd 
edition, London, 2003). p.153;_ M Pendleb~ry ~~d R Groves, Company Accounts: analysis, 
interpretation and understanding (1994, 6 ed1t1on, London 2004), p.288. 
1 JAR Smith, 'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads In the northern 
highlands of Scotland, 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD thesis, Aberdeen University, 2001), 
p.(vi). 
e RH Campbell, 'The Law and the Joint Stock Company in Scotland', In PL Payne (ed.), 
Studies in Scottish Business History (London, 1967), pp.140-41 and p.143; B Lanman, An 
Economic History of Modem Scotland 1660-1976 (London, 1977), p.168. 
541 
Price base: 
encompassed in the 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act (19&20 
Vic.cap.47, 1856), which was also applied to Scotland. 
Identification of a price base allows a comparison of the 
relative value of money between two specified periods. In this 
thesis, an Indicative multiplier of 50 Is applied to the hlstorlcal 
sums of money quoted in the text for dates between 1844 and 
1874 to derive an approximate equivalent value that is 
applicable to the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century.9 
e TR Gourvish in J Simmons and G Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway 
History (Oxford, 1997, re-issued 1999), appendix 3, p.579, gives a multiplier for 1995 values 
of 55.300 from 1845 values, 50.692 from 1866 values and 47.523 from 1872 values; D Ross, 
The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005), p.76, uses a multiplier of 50 for 2005 values when 
considering investment in the Dingwall and Skye Railway in 1865; J Roake In The Great 
North Review, 38, No.151 (November 2001}, pp.366-74, uses a multiplier of 50 for 2001 
values when examining the accounts of the Deeside Railway for 1854-64; D Stirling in 
Highland Railway Journal, 4 (early 2001);J>.6, uses a multiplier of 48 for 2001 when 
reviewing the estate expenditure of the 2 and 3rd Dukes of Sutherland in the period 1833-
79. 
542 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
543 
Unpublished Primary Sources 
Manuscript sources (National Archives of Scotland) 
BR/ABN/1 /1-17 
BR/ABN/1/18-20 
BR/ABN/1/22 
BR/ABT/1/1 
BR/ABT/1/2 
BR/ABR/1/1 
BR/ABR/1/2 
BR/ALF/1/1 
BR/AP(S)/120 
Aberdeen Railway: scroll minutes of directors, 1845-
1856 (17 volumes). 
Aberdeen Railway: account of the Ordinary General 
Meeting on 24 October 1850 (3 volumes). 
Joint Committee of the Aberdeen Railway and the 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway, minutes of 
meetings, 1855-1856. 
Aberdeen and Turriff Railway: minutes of meetings, 
1854-1866. 
Aberdeen and Turriff Railway: reports to directors, 
1855-1856. 
Aboyne and Braemar Railway: minutes of meetings, 
1865-1875. 
Aboyne and Braemar Railway: minutes of meetings, 
1875-1876. 
Alford Valley Railway: minutes of meetings, 1856-
1866. 
Great North of Scotland Railway: acts of Parliament, 
1846-1866. 
544 
BR/AP(S)/121 
BR/AP(S)/123 
BR/AP(S)/124 
BR/AP(S)/146 
BR/AP(S)/407 
BR/BAN/1/1 
BR/BAN/1/2 
BR/BMEX/1 /1 
BR/CAU1 /2-3 
BR/CAU1n 
BR/CAU1/14-16 
BR/CAU1/90 
Great North of Scotland Railway: acts of Parliament, 
1867-1890. 
Highland Railway: acts of Parliament, 1854-1882. 
Highland Railway: acts of Parliament, 1884-1903. 
Callander and Oban Railway: acts of Parliament, 1864-
1878. 
Caledonian Railway: acts of Parliament, 1845-1857. 
Banffshire Railway: minutes of meetings, 1857-1862. 
Banffshire Railway: minutes of meetings, 1862-1867. 
Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway: minutes 
of meetings, 1857-1866. 
Caledonian Railway: shareholder reports, 1852-1876 
(2 volumes). 
Caledonian Railway: minutes of meetings of directors 
and committees, 1844-184 7. 
Caledonian Railway: minutes of meetings of directors 
and committees, 1864-1868 (3 volumes). 
Caledonian Railway, Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway, 
and Scottish Central Railway: minutes of Joint 
Committee of Amalgamation, 1859-1864. 
545 
8R/CAU1/98 
BR/CAU1/99 
BR/COB/1/1 
BR/COB/2/1 
BR/DEE/1 /1-3 
BR/DEX/1/1 
BR/DGNS/1 /1 
BR/DKS/1/1 
BR/DSK/1/1 
BR/EDP/1/1 
BR/EDP/1/4 
Report of the Committee of Investigation to the 
Shareholders of the Caledonian Railway Company, 
1849. 
Reports of the Committees of Inquiry, Caledonian 
Railway Company, 1849 and 1867-1868. 
Callander and Oban Railway: minutes of meetings of 
directors and shareholders, 1864-1880. 
List of Subscribers to 'The Callander and Oban 
Railway' and number of shares taken by each, 1865. 
Deeside Railway: minutes of meetings, 1845-1876 (3 
volumes). 
Deeside Extension Railway: minutes of the provisional 
committee, 1857. 
Joint Committee of the Deeside Railway and the Great 
North of Scotland Railway: minutes of meetings, 1866-
1876. 
Duke of Sutherland's Railway: minutes of meetings 
and statement of accounts, 187 4-1884. 
Dingwall and Skye Railway: minutes of meetings, 
1864-1880. 
Minutes of meetings of shareholders of the Edinburgh, 
Perth and Dundee Railway, 1852-1860. 
Minutes of directors and committees of the Edinburgh, 
Perth and Dundee Railway, 1851-1853. 
546 
BR/FBR/1/1 
BR/FBR/1/2 
BR/FBR/3/1 
BR/GEN(S)/3/13 
BR/GNl/1/1 
BR/GNM/1/1 
BR/GNS/1/1-9 
BR/GNS/1/22 
BR/GNS/23/57-58 
BR/HR/1/1-5 
Formartine and Buchan Railway: minutes of meetings, 
1855-1866. 
Formartine and Buchan Railway: minutes of meetings 
with landowners, 1855-1858. 
Formartine and Buchan Railway: working agreement 
with the Great North of Scotland Railway. 
Historical information on the Great North of Scotland 
Railway and the Highland Railway. 
Joint Committee of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway and the Inverness and Aberdeen Junction 
Railway: minutes of meetings, 1855-1859. 
Joint Committee of the Great North of Scotland 
Railway and the Morayshire Railway: minutes of 
meetings, 1863-1867. 
Great North of Scotland Railway: minutes of 
proprietors, directors and committees, 1845-1876 (9 
volumes). 
Great North of Scotland Railway: shareholder reports, 
1855-1875. 
Inverness and Edinburgh Steam Packet Company: 
journal and ledger, 1859-1860. 
Highland Railway: minutes of shareholders, directors 
and committees, 1865-1887 (5 volumes). 
547 
BR/HR/1/33 
BR/HR/4/3 
BR/HRP(S)/1 /1 /20 
BR/IAJ/1/1-3 
BR/IAJ/1 /4-6 
BR/IAJ/2/1 
BR/INR/1/1-2 
BR/INR/1/3 
BR/INR/1/4 
BR/INR/3/1 
BR/IPJ/1/1 
Highland Railway: minutes of joint meetings with the 
Great North of Scotland Railway, 1866-1910. 
Miscellaneous memoranda on the history of the 
Highland Railway. 
Correspondence on a proposed national railway of 
Scotland, 1841. 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway: minutes of 
shareholders, directors and committees, 1855-1865 (3 
volumes). 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway: order of 
business books, 1856-1865 (3 volumes). 
Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway: register of 
dividends, 1864-1865. 
Inverness and Nairn Railway: minutes of meetings of 
shareholders and directors, 1853-1861 (2 volumes). 
Inverness and Nairn Railway: chairman's notes, 1856-
1858. 
Scroll minutes of meetings of directors of the Inverness 
and Nairn Railway, 1856-1861. 
Inverness and Nairn Railway: capital ledger, 1853-
1855. 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway: minutes of 
shareholders and directors, 1861-1865. 
548 
BR/IPJ/1/2 
BR/IRR/1/1 
BR/IRR/1/2 
BR/KDR/1/1 
BR/MOR/1 /1-4 
BR/MOR/2/1 
BR/PBR/1/2 
BR/PDR/1/1-2 
BR/PDR/1/5 
BR/PDR/1/6 
BR/PROS(S)/1/2 
BR/PROS(S)/1 /3 
Inverness and Perth Junction Railway: scroll minute 
book, 1860-1865. 
Inverness and Ross-shire Railway: order of business 
book, 1860-1662. 
Inverness and Ross-shire Railway: minutes of 
meetings, 1859-1862. 
Keith and Dufftown Railway: minutes of shareholders 
and directors, 1856-1866. 
Morayshire Railway: minutes of meetings of directors, 
1846-1881 (4 volumes). 
Morayshire Railway: list of shareholders, 1877-1889. 
Peebles Railway: minutes of meetings of shareholders 
and directors, 1853-1857. 
Perth and Dunkeld Railway: minutes of meetings of 
shareholders and directors, 1853-1864. 
Perth and Dunkeld Railway: chairman's notes, 1857-
1862. 
Joint Committee of the Perth and Dunkeld Railway and 
Scottish Midland Junction/Scottish North Eastern 
Railway: minutes of meetings, 1856-1862. 
Prospectus of the Caledonian Railway, 1844. 
Prospectus of the Callander and Oban Railway, 1864. 
549 
BR/PROS(S)/1/8 
BR/PROS(S)/1/9 
BR/PROS(S)/1/10 
BR/PROS(S)/1 /15 
BR/PROS(S)/1 /16 
BR/PROS(S)/1 /17 
BR/PROS(S)/1/18 
BR/PROS(S}/1/22 
BR/PYB{S)/1/477 /1 
BR/PYB(S)/1/477 /1 
BR/PYB{S)/1/477 /1 
BR/PYB(S)/1/477 /1-3 
BRIRAC(S)/1 /3 
BR/RAC(S)/1 /4 
Prospectus of the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock and 
Ayr Railway, 1836. 
Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
amended 1652. 
Prospectus of the Inverness and Nairn Railway, 1853. 
Prospectus of the Perth and Inverness Railway, 1653. 
Prospectus of the Scottish Central Railway, 1644. 
Prospectus of the Alford Valley Railway, 1845. 
Prospectus of the Inverness and Perth Junction 
Railway, 1860. 
Prospectus of the Morayshire and Perthshire Direct 
Junction Railway, 1860. 
Prospectus of the Great North of Scotland Railway, 
1845. 
Prospectus of the Inverness and Elgin Railway, 1845. 
Prospectus of the Perth and Inverness Railway, 1845. 
Law agent's papers on the Perth and Inverness 
Railway and the Inverness and Elgin Junction Railway, 
1845-1846 (3 boxes). 
Caledonian Railway: reports and accounts, 1845-1868. 
Caledonian Railway: reports and accounts, 1869-1890. 
550 
BR/RAC(S)/1/13 
BR/RAC(S)/1/14-15 
BR/RAC(S)/1/17 
BR/RAC(S)/1/35 
BR/RAC(S)/1/36 
BR/RAC(S)/1 /37 
BR/RAC(S)/1/68 
BR/SCC/1/1 
BR/SCC/1/2 
BR/SCC/1/4 
BR/SCC/1/10 
Highland Railway: reports and accounts, 1868-1922. 
Great North of Scotland Railway: reports and accounts, 
1849-1885 (2 volumes). 
Callander and Oban Railway: reports and accounts, 
1869-1922. 
Scottish Central Railway: reports and accounts, 1841-
1850. 
Scottish North Eastern Railway: reports and accounts, 
1856-1866. 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway: reports and 
accounts, 1846-1856. 
Miscellaneous papers containing reports and accounts 
of various subsidiary companies of the Highland 
Railway and the Great North of Scotland Railway. 
Scottish Central Railway: minutes of meetings of 
directors and shareholders, 1844-1848. 
Scottish Central Railway: minutes of meetings of 
directors and shareholders, 1848-1852. 
Scottish Central Railway: minutes of meetings of 
directors and shareholders, 1852-1856. 
Scottish Central Railway: minutes of meetings of 
directors and shareholders, 1864-1865. 
551 
BR/SCC/1/15 
BR/SCM/1/1 and 1/3 
BR/SCM/1/4 
BR/SCM/1/5 
BR/SCM/3/1 
BR/SCM/4/2 
BR/SLD/1/1 
BR/SNE/1/1-3 
Scottish Central Railway: general minutes of 
shareholders, 1860-1869. 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway: minutes of 
meetings of shareholders, directors and joint 
committees, 1854-1856 (2 volumes). 
Joint committee of the Scottish Midland Junction 
Railway and Aberdeen Railway: minutes of meetings, 
1849-1850; Joint Committee of the Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway and the Scottish North Eastern 
Railway: minutes of meetings, 1866-1867. 
Joint committee of the Aberdeen Railway and the 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway: minutes of 
meetings, 1855-1856. 
Scottish Midland Junction Railway: working agreement 
with the Perth and Dunkeld Railway. 
Notice to shareholders [of the Scottish Midland 
Junction Railway) concerning the Prospectus issued by 
the Provisional Committee of the Aberdeen Railway 
(1844). 
Sutherland Railway: minutes of meetings of 
shareholders and directors, 1864-1884. 
Scottish North Eastern Railway: minutes of meetings of 
shareholders, directors and committees, 1859-1866 (3 
volumes). 
552 
BR/STY/1/1 
BR/SUC/1/1 
Strathspey Railway: minutes of meetings of 
shareholders, directors and general purposes 
committee, 1861-1866. 
Sutherland and Caithness Railway: minutes of 
meetings, 1871-1884. 
Published Primary Sources 
Acts of Parliament 
7&8 Vic. cap.85, 1844 
7&8 Vic. cap.110, 1844 
8 Vic. cap.16, 1845 
8 Vic. cap.17, 1845 
8 Vic. cap.18, 1845 
8 Vic. cap.19, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.20, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.33, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.83, 1845 
The Regulation of Railways Act. 
An Act for the registration, Incorporation and regulation 
of Joint Stock Companies. 
The Company Clauses Consolidation Act, 
The Company Clauses Consolidation {Scotland) Act, 
The Land Clauses Consolidation Act. 
The Land Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act. 
The Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. 
The Railway Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act. 
An Act for the amendment and better administration of 
the laws relating to the relief of the poor in Scotland. 
553 
8&9 Vic. cap.96, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.153, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.158, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.161, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.162, 1845 
8&9 Vic. cap.170, 1845 
9& 10 Vic. cap.28, 1846 
9&10 Vic. cap.75, 1846 
9& 1 0 Vic. cap.103, 1846 
9& 10 Vic. cap.134, 1846 
9& 10 Vic. cap.135, 1846 
9&10 Vic. cap.137, 1846 
9& 1 o Vic. cap.158, 1846 
9& 10 Vic. cap.178, 1846 
An Act for the restriction of the powers of selling or 
leasing Railways contained in certain Acts of 
Parliament relating to such railways. 
The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
The Edinburgh and Northern Railway Act. 
The Scottish Central Railway Act. 
The Caledonian Railway Act. 
The Scottish Midland Junction Railway Act. 
An Act to facilitate the dissolution of certain Railway 
Companies. 
The Scottish Midland Junction Railway Branches Act. 
The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
The Alford Valley Railway Act. 
The Great North of Scotland Railway (Eastern 
Extension) Railway Act. 
The Scottish Grand Junction Railway Act. 
The Deeside Railway Act. 
The Morayshire Railway Act. 
554 
9&10 Vic. cap.189, 1846 The Scottish Central Railway (Perth Terminus and 
Stations) Act. 
10&11 Vic. cap.169, 1847 The Caledonian and Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock 
Railways Amalgamation Act. 
1 0& 11 Vic. cap.195, 1847 The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
1 0& 11 Vic. cap.239, 1847 The Edinburgh and Northern Railway Act. 
11&12 Vic. cap.3, 1848 The Railways (Extension of Time) Act. 
11 & 12 Vic. cap.67, 1848 The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
13&14 Vic. cap.78, 1850 The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
13& 14 Vic. cap.83, 1850 An Act for the Abandonment of Railways and 
Dissolution of Railway Companies. 
14 Vic. cap.25, 1851 The Scottish Central Railway Amendment Act. 
14&15 Vic. cap.55, 1851 The Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee Railway 
(Consolidation) Act. 
14&15 Vic. cap.75, 1851 The Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act. 
14& 15 Vic. cap.134, 1851 The Caledonlan Railway Arrangements Act. 
15 Vic. cap.61, 1852 The Deeside Railway Act. 
16 Vic. cap.34, 1853 The Scottish Central Railway Act. 
16& 17 Vic. cap.101, 1853 The Aberdeen Railway Act. 
555 
16&17 Vic. cap.153, 1853 The Edinburgh, Perth and Dundee Railway Company 
(Arrangements) Act. 
17&18 Vic. cap.31, 1854 An Act for the better regulation of Traffic on Railways 
and Canals. 
17 & 18 Vic. cap.148, 1854 The Perth and Dunkeld Railway Act. 
17 & 18 Vic. cap. 167, 1854 The Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act .. 
17 &16 Vic. cap.176, 1854 The Inverness and Nairn Railway Act. 
18 Vic. cap.28, 1855 The Great North of Scotland Railway Extension Act. 
18 Vic. cap.57, 1855 The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway Act. 
18 Vic. cap.65, 1855 The lnverury and Old Meldrum Junction Railway Act. 
18& 19 Vic. cap. 133, 1855 The Limited Liability Act. 
19&20 Vic. cap.40, 1856 The Alford Valley Railway Act. 
19&20 Vic. cap.47, 1856 The Joint Stock Companies Act. 
19&20 Vic. cap.86, 1856 The Morayshire Railway (Extension) Act 
19&20 Vic. cap.110, 1856 The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
19&20 Vic. cap.134, 1856 The Scottish North-Eastern Railway Company's Act. 
20&21 Vic. cap.5, 1857 The Inverness and Nairn Railway Act. 
20&21 Vic. cap.49, 1857 The Oeeside Railway Extension Act. 
556 
20&21 Vic. cap.SO, 1857 The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway Act. 
20&21 Vic. cap.53, 1857 The Banff, Portsoy and Strathlsla Railway Act. 
20&21 Vic. cap.87, 1857 The Keith and Dufftown Railway Act. 
21 &22 Vic. cap.45, 1858 The lnverury and Old Meldrum Junction Railway Lease 
Act. 
21&22 Vic. cap.107, 1858 The Formartine and Buchan Railway Act. 
22 Vic. cap.8, 1859 The Findhorn Railway Act. 
22 Vic. cap.11, 1859 The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Junction Railway 
Amendment Act. 
22 Vic. cap.12, 1859 The Formartine and Buchan Railway (Deviation) Act. 
22&23 Vic. cap.8, 1859 The Great North of Scotland Railway Consolidation 
Act. 
22&23 Vic. cap.59, 1859 The Railway Companies Arbitration Act. 
23&24 Vic. cap.9, 1860 The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
22&23 Vic. cap.63, 1859 The Scottish Central Railway Consolidation Act. 
23&24 Vic. cap.63, 1860 The Keith and Dufftown Railway (Deviation) Act. 
23&24 Vic. cap.116, 1860 The Morayshire Railway (Junction) Act. 
23&24 Vic. cap.131, 1860 The Inverness and Ross-shire Railway Act. 
23&24 Vic. cap.142, 1860 The Montrose and Bervie Railway Act. 
557 
24 Vic. cap.8, 1861 The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
24 Vic. cap.16, 1861 The Strathspey Railway Act. 
24 Vic. cap.18, 1861 The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction (Branch) Act. 
24 Vic. cap.30, 1861 The Morayshire Railway Act. 
24&25 Vic. cap.153, 1861 The Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act. 
24&25 Vic. cap.186, 1861 The Inverness and Perth Junction Railway Act. 
25&26 Vic. cap.62, 1862 The Great North of Scotland Railway Amendment Act. 
25&26 Vic. cap.64, 1862 The Scottish North-Eastern Railway Amendment Act. 
25&26 Vic. cap. 79, 1862 The Scottish Northern Junction Railway Act. 
25&26 Vic. cap.87, 1862 The Alford Valley Railway Amendment Act. 
25&26 Vic. cap.88,.1862 The Deeside Railway Act. 
25&26 Vic. cap.113, 1862 The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.32, 1863 The Inverness and Aberdeen Junction Railway (Bonar 
Bridge Extension) Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.58, 1863 The Inverness and Perth Junction and Perth and 
Ounkeld Railways Amalgamation Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.61, 1863 The Inverness and Perth Junction (Deviations) Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.65, 1863 The Fochabers and Garmouth Railway Act. 
558 
26&27 Vic. cap.164, 1863 The Great North of Scotland (Aberdeen Junction) Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.170, 1863 The Banffshire Railway Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.188, 1863 The Banff, Macduff and Turriff Extension Railway Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.189, 1863 The Formartine and Buchan Railway Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.210, 1863 The Morayshire Railway Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.223, 1863 The Scottish Central Railway (Dundee, Perth and 
Aberdeen Railway Purchase) Act. 
26&27 Vic. cap.231, 1863 The Scottish North-Eastern Railway Act. 
27 &28 Vic. cap.26, 1864 The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
27 &28 Vic. cap.111, 1864 The Denbum Valley Railway Act. 
28&29 Vic. cap.168, 1865 The Highland Railway Act. 
28&29 Vic. cap.169, 1865 The Sutherland Railway Act. 
28&29 Vic. cap.223, 1865 The Dingwall and Skye Railway Act. 
28&29 Vic. cap.266, 1865 The Callander and Oban Railway Act. 
28&29 Vic. cap.279, 1865 The Aboyne and Braemar Railway Act. 
28&29 Vic. cap.287, 1865 The Caledonian and Scottish Central Railways 
Amalgamation Act 
28&29 Vic. cap.345, 1865 The Strathspey Railway (Extension) Act. 
559 
29&30 Vic. cap.30, 1866 The Morayshire Railway Act. 
29&30 Vic. cap.181, 1866 The Sutherland Railway Act. 
29&30 Vic. cap.288, 1866 The Great North of Scotland Railway (Amalgamation) 
Act. 
29&30 Vic. cap.292, 1866 The Caithness Railway Act. 
29&30 Vic. cap.350, 1866 The Caledonlan and Scottish North-Eastern Railways 
Amalgamation Act. 
30&31 Vic. cap.190, 1867 The Great North of Scotland Railway (Further Powers) 
Act. 
31&32 Vic. cap.19, 1868 The Dingwall and Skye Railway (Deviations) Act. 
31 &32 Vic. cap.119, 1868 The Regulation of Railways Act. 
33 Vic. cap.9, 1870 The Callander and Oban Railway (Abandonment) Act. 
33&34 Vic. cap.31, 1870 The Duke of Sutherland's Railway Act. 
33&34 Vic. cap. 78, 1871 The Regulation of Railways Act. 
34&35 Vic. cap.99, 1871 The Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act. 
36&37 Vic. cap.107, 1873 The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
37 Vic. cap.3, 187 4 The Highland Railway (Additional Capital) Act. 
37&38 Vic. cap.110, 1874 The Callander and Oban Railway (Tyndrum to Oban) 
Act. 
560 
38 Vic. cap.16, 1875 The Sutherland and Caithness Railway Act. 
39&40 Vic. cap.124, 1876 The Great North of Scotland (Further Powers) Act. 
40 Vic. cap.4, 1877 The Highland Railway (Steam Vessels) Act. 
41&42 Vic. cap.167, 1878 The Callander and Oban Railway Act. 
43&44 Vic. cap.129, 1880 The Highland and Dingwall and Skye Railway 
Companies Amalgamation Act. 
44&45 Vic. cap.201, 1881 The Great North of Scotland Railway Act. 
45&46 Vic. cap.126, 1882 The Great North of Scotland (Buckle Extension) 
Railway Act. 
47 &48 Vic. cap.183, 1884 The Highland Railway (New Lines) Act. 
47&48 Vic. cap.184, 1884 The Highland Railway (Northern Lines) Amalgamation 
Act. 
56&57 Vic. cap.91, 1893 The Highland Railway Act 
Parliamentary records 
Select Committee on Standing Orders for Railroad Bills 1836, PP 1836 (511) XXI. 
Select Committee on Railways 1839-40, PP 1839 (222) X and (517) X, first and 
second reports. 
561 
Select Committee on Railway Communication 1840, PP 1840 (92, 299, 437, 474) 
XIII, second to fifth reports. 
Report of the Committee appointed by the Lords of the Treasury respecting Railway 
Communication between London, Dublin, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1841, PP 1841 
(132) XXV, fourth report .. 
Select Committee on Railways 1844, PP 1644 (37, 79, 166, 263, 316) XI, five 
reports. 
Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on Schemes for extending 
Railway Communication in Scotland, 1845, PP 1845 (120), XXXIX. 
Select Committee on Railway and Canal Amalgamation 1846, PP 1846, first report, 
8 April 1846. 
Select Committee on Railway and Canal Bills 1853, PP 1852-3 (310, 736) XXXVII, 
fourth and fifth reports, 8 July 1853. 
Newspapers and Periodicals 
Aberdeen Journal 
Banff Journal 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
Bradshaw's Railway Gazette 
Chambers' Edinburgh Journal 
562 
Herapath's Railway and Commercial Journal 
Elgin Courant 
Inverness Advertiser 
Inverness Courier 
Nairnshire Telegraph 
Railway Chronicle 
Railway Magazine 
Railway News 
Railway Times 
Ross-shire Journal 
Scottish Railway Gazette 
The Times 
Contemporary works 
Acworth, WM The Railways of Scotland (London, 1890). 
Anderson, Miss IH Inverness before Railways (Inverness, 1885). 
563 
Anderson, G and P Handbook to the Inverness and Nairn Railway and scenes 
adjoining if (Inverness, 1856). 
Anderson, G and P Handbook from Perth to Forres, Inverness to Bonar Bridge by 
the Inverness and Perth and Aberdeen Junction Railways 
(Edinburgh, 1864). 
Anon. 
Anon. 
Aytoun, WE 
Aytoun, WE 
Bradshaw 
Chattaway, ED 
Cook, T 
'Illustrated Interviews No.19 - Mr Thomas Addy Wilson, 
General Manager, Highland Railway', Railway Magazine, vol.4 
(January-June 1899), 1-17. 
'Illustrated Interviews No.28 - Mr William Moffat, General 
Manager, Great North of Scotland Railway', Railway 
Magazine, vol.5 (1899), 289-301. 
'How we got up the Glenmutchkin Railway, and how we got 
out of it', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, vol.58 (October 
1845), 453-66. 
'Railways', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 
vol. 58 (November 1845), 633-48. 
Railway Almanack, Directory, Shareholders Guide and 
Manual, annual volumes 1848-1876. 
Railways: their capital and dividends with statistics of their 
working in Great Britain and Ireland (London, 1855-1856). 
Scottish Tourist Practical Directory, a guide to the principal 
tourist routes, conveyances, and special ticket arrangements, 
sanctioned by railway, steamboat and coach companies, 
commanding the Highland excursion traffic (London, 1866). 
Ferguson, W 
Foxwell, E and 
Farrer, TC 
Fraser, JB 
Graham, G 
Grant, D 
Highland Railway 
Lardner, D 
Loch, J 
Mitchell, J 
Mitchell, J 
Ramsey, A 
Tuck, H 
The Great North of Scotland Railway - A Guide (Edinburgh, 
1881). 
Express Trains - English and Foreign (London, 1889). 
The Perth and Inverness Railway: its importance as a national 
and commercial enterprise (London, 1846). 
The Caledonian Railway: account of its origin and completion 
(Glasgow, 1888). 
A Handbook to the Great North of Scotland Railway and 
branches (Aberdeen, 1862). 
Highland Railway Tours 1880- programme of arrangements 
(Inverness, 1880). 
Railway Economy (London, 1850). 
An Account or the Improvements on the Estates or the 
Marquess of Stafford in the Counties of Stafford and Salop, 
and on the Estate of Sutherland, with remarks (London, 1820). 
Reminiscences of My Ufe in the High/ends (2 volumes, 
privately published, 1663 and1684, reprinted Newton Abbot, 
1971). 
The Construction and Works of the Highland Railway, a paper 
read to the British Association In Dundee (September, 1667). 
Guide to the Great North of Scotland Railway (Banff, 1854). 
Railway Shareholder's Manual, 1845 and 1847. 
565 
Whishaw, F Railways of Great Britain and Ireland (London, 1842, reprinted 
Newton Abbot, 1969). 
Secondary sources and unpublished these§ 
Allison, J, 
Fenwick, K 
and Sinclair, N 
Ahrons, EL 
Alborn, TL 
Alderman, G 
Alderman, G 
Armstrong, J (ed.) 
Arnold, AJ and 
McCartney, S 
Bagwell, PS 
Eastgate II: a brief history of the Inverness site (Highland 
Railway Society, 2003). 
Locomotive and Train Working in the later part of the 
Nineteenth Century, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1952). 
Conceiving Companies: joint stock politics In Victorian 
England (London, 1998). 
'The politics of the railway passenger duty', Transport History, 
vol.3, No.1 (March 1970), 1-20. 
The Railway Interest (Leicester, 1973). 
Coastal and Short Sea Shf pplng: Studies In Transport History 
(Aldershot, 1996). 
'Rates of return, concentration levels and strategic change In 
the British railway industry, 1630-1912', Journal of Transport 
History, 3rd series, vol. 26, No.1 (March 2005), 41-60. 
'The railway interest, its organisation and Influence 1839-
1914', Journal of Transport History, vol. VII, No.2 (November 
1965), 65-86. 
566 
Bagwell, PS The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy 1842-
1922 (London, 1968). 
Bagwell, PS The Transport Revolution 1770-1985 (London, 1974). 
Barclay-Harvey, M A History of the Great North of Scotland Railway (London, 
1949, 2nd edition, reprinted Shepperton, 1998). 
Borthwick, G 'The financing of Scottish railways in the 1840s' (unpublished 
MA dissertation, Institute of Railway Studies and Transport 
History, University of York, 2000). 
Broadbridge, SA 
Broadbridge SA 
Broadbridge, SA 
Bruce, WS 
Butt. J and 
Ward, JT 
'The Sources of Railway Share Capital', in MC Reed (ed.), 
Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969), 
184-211. 
'The Early Capital Market: The Lancashire and Yorkshire 
Railway', Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol. VIII (1955-
1956), 200-12. 
Studies in Railway Expansion and the Capital Market In 
England, 1825-1873 (London, 1970). 
The Railways of Fife (Perth, 1980). 
'The promotion of the Caledonlan Railway Company', 
Transport History, vol. 3, No. 2, part 1 (July 1970), 164-92 and 
vol. 3, No. 3, part 2 (November, 1970), 225-57. 
Caimcross AK (ed.) The Scottish Economy (Cambridge 1954). 
Campbell, JE The Iron Track through the Highlands (Inverness, 1921). 
567 
Campbell, RH 
and Dow, JBA 
(eds.) 
Campbell, RH 
Campbell, RH 
Campbell, RH 
Cannadine, D 
Carter, EF 
Casson, M 
Chandler, AD, Jr 
Chandler, AD, Jr 
Channon, G 
Source Book of Scottish Economic and Social History 
(Oxford, 1968). 
Scotland since 1707: the rise of an industrial society (Oxford 
1965, reprinted 1971 ). 
'The Law and the Joint Stock Company in Scotland', in PL 
Payne (ed.), Studies in Scottish Business History (London, 
1967), 136-151. 
The Rise and Fall of Scottish Industry, 1707-1939 (Edinburgh, 
1980). 
The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (Basingstoke, 
1990, republished 1996). 
An Historical Geography of the Railways of the British Isles 
(London, 1959). 
The Evolution of the British Railway Network, 1825-1914 
(Economic and Social Science Research Council Report, 
R000239586, January 2005). 
'The Railroads: Pioneers in Modem Corporate Management', 
Business History Review, vol. 39 (1965), 16-40. 
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977). 
'The Aberdeen Beef Trade with London - a study in 
Steamship and Railway Competition 1850-1869', Transport 
History, vol.2, No.1 (March 1969), 1-24. 
568 
Channon, G 
Channon,G 
Channon, G 
Checkland, SG 
Checkland, SG 
and Checkland, 0 
Church, R (ed.) 
Cleveland-
Stevens, E 
Clew, KR 
Coleman, D 
Cook, RA 
'Railway Pooling in Britain before 1900: The Anglo-Scottish 
traffic', Business History Review, vol.62, No.1 (Spring 1988), 
74-92. 
Railways, vol.II: studies in transport history (Aldershot, 1996). 
Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940 
(Aldershot, 2001 ). 
Scottish Banking, a History 1695-1973 (Glasgow, 1975). 
Industry and Ethos: Scotland 1832-1914 (London, 1984). 
The Dynamics of Victorian Business: Problems and 
Perspectives to the 1870s (London, 1980). 
English Railways: their development and their relationship to 
the State (London, 1915). 
The Dingwall Canal (Dingwall, 1975, reprinted 1988). 
'The uses and abuses of business history'. Business History, 
vol. XXIX, No.2 (April 1987), 141-156. 
Great North of Scotland Railway and Highland Railway 
historical maps (Railway and Canal Historical Society, 
Caterham, 1977). 
Cormack, JRH and Highland Railway Locomotives, 2 volumes, (Lincoln, 1986 
Stevenson, JL and 1990). 
569 
Cottrell, PL 'Railway Finances and the Crisis of 1866: contractors' bills of 
exchange and finance companies', Journal of Transport 
History, new series, vol.Ill, No.1 (February 1975), 20-40. 
Cummings AJG and Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700 
Devine, TM (Edinburgh, 1994). 
Dawson, IK 
Devine, TM 
Devine, TM 
and Orr, WJ 
Devine, TM 
Devine, TM 
Devine, TM 
Dickinson, WC 
and Pryde GS 
Dow,G 
Dyos, HJ and 
Aldcroft, DH 
Ellis, CH 
The Findhom Railway (Trowbridge, 1983). 
The Potato Famine In the Scottish Highlands, 1840-1800 
(Economic and Social Science Research Council Report, 
March 1985). 
The Great Highland Famine (Edinburgh, 1988). 
Clanship to Crofters' War: the social transformation of the 
Scottish Highlands (Manchester, 1994). 
Exploring the Scottish past - themes in the history of Scottish 
society (East Linton, 1995, reprinted 1996 and 1998). 
The Scottish Nation 1700-2007 (London, 1999, reprinted 
Harmondsworth, 2000, new edition, London, 2006). 
A New History of Scotland (2 volumes, Edinburgh, 1961-
1962). 
First Railway across the Border (LNER, 1946). 
British Transport (3"' edition, Harmondsworth, 1974). 
Highland Engines and their work (London, 1930). 
570 
Ellis, CH 
Ellis, CH 
Farr, AD 
Fenwick, K 
Fenwick, K 
Fenwick, K 
Fenwick, K and 
Jones. K (eds.) 
Fenwick, K 
Fenwick, K and 
Sinclair, NT 
Fenwick, K 
Ferguson, N 
Ferguson, N 
British Railway History 1830-1876 (London, first published 
1954, third impression 1960). 
The North British Railway {London, 1955). 
The Royal Deeside Line (Newton Abbot, 1968). 
'link with the Aberdeen Railway'. Great North Review, vol.26, 
No.109 (May 1991), 215-17. 
'Genesis of the Great North', Great North Review, vol.33, 
No.128 {February 1996), 242-45; vol.33, No.129 (May 1996), 
283-92; vol.33, No.140 (August 1996), 306-11. 
'The Deeside Railway Accounts - the later years', Great North 
Review, vol.40, No.159 (November 2003), 539-41. 
150 Years of the Great North: Tales of the Little but Good 
(Great North of Scotland Railway Association, 2004). 
The Inverness and Nairn Railway (Highland Railway Society, 
2005). 
The Perth and Dunkeld Railway (Highland Railway Society, 
2006). 
Railways of Keith (Great North of Scotland Railway 
Association, 2006). 
The Dundee and Newtyle Railway (Headington, 1995). 
The Arbroath and Forfar Railway (Usk, 2000). 
571 
Fraser WH and 
Morris, RJ {eds) 
Freeman MJ and 
Aldcroft DH (eds.} 
Fryer, CEJ 
Gardner, JWF 
Gordon, WJ 
Gourvish, TR 
Gourvish, TR 
Gourvish, TR 
Gourvish, TR 
Gourvish, TR 
Gourvish, TR 
People and Society in Scotland, volume II, 1830-1914 
{Edinburgh, 1990). 
Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988). 
The Callander and Oban Railway (Headington, 1989). 
Railway Enterprise: the origin and subsequent development of 
the Railways of Scotland {Glasgow, 1934). 
Our Home Railways, vol.2 (London. 1910). 
'The Bank of Scotland, 1830-1845', Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, vol.16 (November 1968}, 288-305. 
'Captain Mark Huish: A Pioneer in the development of Railway 
Management', Business History, vol. XII, No.1 (January 1970), 
46-58. 
Mark Huish and the London and North Western Railway, a 
study of management (Leicester, 1972). 
'The performance of British railway management after 1860'. 
Business History, vol. XX, No.2 {July 1978}, 186-99. 
Railways and the British Economy 1830-1914 (London and 
Basingstoke, 1980). 
'British business and the transition to a corporate economy: 
entrepreneurship and management structures•, Business 
History, vol. XXIX, No.4 (October 1987), 18-45. 
572 
Gourvish, TR 'Railways 1830-1870: the formative years', in MJ Freeman and 
DH Aldcroft (eds.), Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 
1988), 57-67. 
Gourvish, TR (ed.) Railways, vol. I: studies in transport history (Aldershot, 1996). 
Gourvish, TR and 'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a comment'. 
Reed, MC Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol.18 (1971), 209-219. 
Gray, M 'Organisation and growth in the East-Coast herring fishing 
1800-1885', in PL Payne (ed.), Studies in Scottish Business 
History (London, 1967), 187-216. 
Greville, MD 'Scottish Railways in 1853', Railway Magazine, vol.99 
(1953), 8-9. 
Griffiths, I Creative Accounting: how to make your profits what you want 
them to be (London, 1968). 
Handley, JE The Nawy in Scotland (Cork, 1970). 
Hassan, JA 'The Supply of Coal to Edinburgh 1790-1850', Transport 
History, vol.5, No.2 (July 1972), 125-51. 
Hassan, JA 'The coal industry and the transport revolution In the Lothians 
1780-1880', Transport History, vol.11, No.3 (Winter 1980), 
208-227. 
Hawke, GR Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales 1840-
1870 (Oxford, 1970). 
Hawke, GR 'Pricing Policy of Railways in England and Wales before 1881', 
in MC Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton 
Abbot, 1969), 78-110. 
573 
Hawke, GR 
and Reed, MC 
HawkinsC, 
Reeve, G and 
Stevenson,J 
Heap, C and 
van Riemsdijk, J 
Hudson, P 
Hunter, DLG 
Hunter, J 
Hutton, G 
Irving, RJ 
Jackson, D 
Jackson, D 
Jackson, D 
Jones, KG 
'Railway capital in the UK in the nineteenth century'. 
Economic History Review, new series, vol. XXII (1969), 269-
266. 
LMS Engine Sheds: their history and development, vol. 0, the 
Highland Railway, (Pinner, 1989). 
The Pre-Grouping Railways, Part 3 (London, 1965). 
The Industrial Revolution (London, 1992). 
The Highland Railway In Retrospect (Edinburgh, 1986). 
The Making of the Crofting Community (Edinburgh, 1976). 
Caledonian: the monster canal (Glasgow, 1992). 
'The capitalisation of Britain's railways 1830-1Q14, Jouma/ of 
Transport History, 3n1 series, vol.5, No.1 (March 1984), 1-24. 
The Speyside line (Great North of Scotland Railway 
Association, 1996, revised 2006). 
Royal Deeside's Railway (Great North of Scotland Railway 
Association, 1999, revised 2001 ). 
Rails to Alford (Great North of Scotland Railway Association, 
2006). 
The Railways of Aberdeen: 150 years of history (Great North 
of Scotland Railway Association, 2000). 
574 
Keith, A 
Keith, A 
Kellett, JR 
Kellett, JR 
Kenwood.AG 
King, L 
Kostal, RW 
Leckie, J 
lee, CE 
Lee, CH 
Lee, GA 
Lee,J 
The North of Scotland Bank Limited, 1836-1936 (Aberdeen, 
1936). 
A Thousand Years of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, 1972). 
'Glasgow's railways 1830-1880 - a study In natural growth'. 
Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol.17 (1964), 354-68. 
The Impact of Railways on Victorian Cities (London, 1969). 
'Railway Investment In Britain 1835-1875', Economica, vol.32, 
No.127 (1965), 313-322. 
The Last Station (Lochgelly, Fife). 
Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1875 (Oxford, 
1994). 
'The Circumbendibus', Great North Review, vol.4, No.14 
(August 1867), 45-49. 
'The Dundee and Arbroath Railway, Railway Magazine, 
vol.104 (1958), 24-30. 
'Some aspects of the coastal shipping trade: the Aberdeen 
Steam Navigation Compa~y 1835-1880, Journal of Transport 
History, new series, vol.Ill, No.2 (September 1975), 94-107. 
'The concept of profit in British accounting, 1760-1900', 
Business History Review, vol. XLIX (1975), 6-36. 
'The construction costs of Irish railways, 1830-53', Business 
History, vol. IX, No.2 (July, 1967), 95-109. 
575 
Lenman, 8 
Lenman, B 
Lester, VM 
Lewin, HG 
Lindsay, J 
Lindsay, J 
Lythe, SGE 
Lythe SGE and 
Butt,J 
MacAskill EHL 
McConnell, D 
McConnell, D 
An Economic History of Modem Scotland 1660-1976 (London, 
1977). 
Integration, Enlightenment and Industrialisation: Scotland 
1746-1832 (London, 1981). 
Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and 
Company Winding-up in Nineteenth-Century England (Oxford, 
1995). 
The Railway Mania and its Aftermath, 1845-52 (London 1936, 
republished Newton Abbot 1968). 
'The Aberdeenshire Canal 1805-1845, Journal of Transport 
History, vol.VI, No.3 ( May 1964), 150-65. 
The Canals of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1968). 
The early days of the Arbroath and Forfar Railway', Railway 
Magazine, vol.99 (1953), 53-59 and 128-32. 
An Economic History of Scotland 1100-1939 (Glasgow, 1975). 
The Highland Transport Revolution: the growth of the Highland 
railway networlc 1855-1930 (Highland Environmental Link 
project, 1988). 
Rails to Kyle of Lochalsh (Headington, 1997). 
Rails to Wick and Thurso (Dornoch, 1990). 
576 
McCrorie, I 
McGregor, JA 
McGregor, J 
McGregor, J 
McKean, C 
McKenzie, W 
Maclean, L 
Marriott, P, 
Edwards JR and 
Mellett HJ 
Marshall, PF 
Marshall, PF 
Marwick, WH 
Royal Road to the Isles: 150 years of MacBrayne Shipping 
(Gourock, 2001). 
All Stations to Mallaig! (Truro, 1982). 
The Politics of Railway Promotion In the Scottish Highlands; 
The West Highland Railway Mallaig Extension (Milton Keynes, 
2001). 
The West Highland Railway: Plans, Politics and People 
(Edinburgh, 2005). 
Battle for the North: The Tay and Forth Bridges snd the 
19"'-Century Railway Wars (London, 2006). 
The Financial Times Guide to Using and Interpreting Company 
Accounts (3rd edition, London, 2003). 
The Hub of the Highlands (Edinburgh, 1975). 
Introduction to Accounting (3rd edition, London, 2003). 
The Scottish Centro/ Railway (Witney, 1998). 
Peebles Railways (Usk, 2005). 
Scotland in Modem Times (London, 1964). 
Mason, R and People and Power in Scotland: Essays In honour of TC Smout 
MacDougall, N (eds.) (Edinburgh, 1992). 
577 
Mellor, REH (ed.) 
Merricks, R and 
Roake, J 
Michie, RC 
Michie, RC 
Michie, RC 
Michie, RC 
Mitchell, BR 
Mitchison, R 
Mortimer, G 
The Railways of Scotland: the papers of Andrew C O'Dell 
(Aberdeen, 1984). 
'Coaches in connection', Highland Railway Journal, 5, No. 78 
(Summer 2006), 4-9, No.79 (Autumn 2006), 12-16, and No.BO 
(early 2007), 4-8. 
Money, Mania and Markets: Investment: Company Formation 
and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth Century Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1981). 
'Investment and railways in nineteenth-century Scotland', 
Scottish Industrial History, vol.5, No.1 (1982), 45-53. 
'Trade and transport in the economic development of North-
East Scotland in the nineteenth century', Scottish Economic 
and Social History, vol.3, No.3 (1983), 66-91. 
'Sir Alexander Anderson", in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.), 
Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, vol.2 (Aberdeen, 
1990), 399-400. 
'The coming of railway and United Kingdom economic growth', 
Journal of Economic History,. 1 •• series, vol.24 (1964), 315-36; 
also in MC Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy 
(Newton Abbot, 1969), 13-32. 
'The Highland Clearances', Scottish Economic and Social 
History, vol.1, No.1 (1981), 4-24. 
'The Social and Economic Effects of Railway Development In 
North East Scotland', Great North Review, 2 parts, vol.34, 
No.134 (August 1997), 439-45, vot.34, No.135 (November 
1997), 470-75. 
578 
Mowat, IRM 
Munn, CW 
Munn, CW 
Munn, CW 
Newlands, A 
Nock, OS 
Nock, OS 
Nock, OS 
Nock, OS 
O'Dell AC and 
Richards, PS 
Easter Ross 1750-1850: the double frontier (Edinburgh, 1981 ). 
The Scottish Provine/al Banking Companies 1747-1864 
(Edinburgh, 1981). 
'The emergence of joint stock banking in the British Isles: a 
comparative approach'. Business History, vol. XXX, No.1 
(1988}, 69-83. 
'The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre', In AJG 
Cummings and TM Devine (eds.), Industry, Business and 
Society in Scotland since 1700 (Edinburgh, 1994 ), 125-41. 
The Scottish Railways: a sketch of their growth and rec,mt 
development (London, 1921). 
Scottish Railways (Edinburgh, 1950, reprinted 1961). 
The Caledonlan Rai/way(London, 1963; 2nd edition 1964). 
The Highland Railway (London, 1965). 
Scottish Railways (Edinburgh, 1950, reprinted 1981). 
Railways and Geography (London 1956, republished 1971). 
Owen, JS Coal Mining at Brora 1529-1974 (Inverness, 1995). 
Paget-Tomlinson E The Railway Carriers (Lavensham, 1990). 
Parris, H Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain 
(London, 1965). 
579 
Payne, PL (ed.) Studies in Scottish Business History (London, 1967). 
Pearson, D 'The Aberdeenshire Canal', Great North Review, vol.41, 
No.162 (September 2004), 84-87. 
Pendlebury, Mand Company Accounts: analysis, interpretation and 
R Groves understanding (London, 1994, 6th edition, 2004). 
Pittock, MGH The Invention of Scotland: the Stuart myth and the Scottish 
identify, 1638 to the present (London, 1991 ). 
Pollins, H 
Pollins, H 
Pollins, H 
Pollins, H 
The finances of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway', 
Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol.5 (1952), 90-97. 
'A note on Railway constructional costs', Economics, new 
series, vol.19, No.76 (1952), 395-407. 
'The marketing of railway shares in the first half of the 
nineteenth century., Economic History Review, vol.7, No.2 
(1954), 230-39. 
'Aspects of Railway Accounting before 1868', In Reed, MC 
(ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy, (Newton Abbot, 
1969), 138-161. 
Pollins, H 'Railway contractors and the finance of railway development In 
Britain', Journal of Transport History, vol.Ill, No.1, part 1 (May 
1957), 41-51, and vol.Ill, No.2, part 2 (November 1957), 103. 
11 0; also revised edition in MC Reed (ed.), Railways In the 
Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot. 1969). 212-228. 
Pollins, H Britain's Railways: an Industrial History (Newton Abbot, 1971 ). 
580 
Porritt, LM 
Prebble, J 
Ransom, PJG 
Reed, MC 
Reed, MC 
Reed, MC 
Reed, MC 
Reed, MC 
Richards, E 
Richards, E 
Richards, E 
Perth General Station (private publication, 1987). 
The Highland Clearances (London, 1963, reprinted 1969). 
The Archaeology of Railways (Tadworth, 1961 ). 
'Railways and the growth of the capital market' in MC Reed 
(ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 
1969), 162-183. 
'Railways in the Victorian Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969). 
'A note on subscriptions to the Glasgow, Paisley and 
Greenock Railway', Transport History, vol.6, No.3 (November 
1973), 268-74. 
Investment in Railways in Britain, 1820-1844: a Study in the 
Development of the Capital Market (London, 1975). 
The London and North Western Railway: a history (Penryn, 
1996). 
The Leviathan of Wealth (The Sutherland fortune in the 
Industrial Revolution) (London, 1973). 
'An anatomy of the Sutherland Fortune: Income, Consumption, 
Investments and Returns, 1780-1880', Business History, vol. 
XXI (1979), 45-78. 
A History of the Highland Clearances (2 volumes, London, 
1982 and 1985). 
581 
Roake, J 
Roake, J 
Robbins, M 
Robertson, CJA 
Robertson, CJA 
Robertson, CJA 
Robertson, CJA 
Robertson, CJA 
Robertson, WA 
Ross,O 
'Accounts of the Deeside Railway', Great North Review, 3 
parts, vol.38, No.151 (November2001), 366-74, vol.39, 
No.152 (February 2002), 398-402, vol.40, No.159 (November 
2003), 539-41 by K Fenwick). 
'The Inverness and Ross-shire Railway Act 1860'. Highland 
Railway Journal, vol.4, No.62 (summer 2002), 8-12. 
The Railway Age (3rd edition, Manchester, 1998). 
'The Cheap Railway Movement in Scotland: the St Andrews 
Railway Company', Transport History, vol. 7, No.1 (March 
1974), 1-40. 
'Early Scottish railways and the observance of the Sabbath', 
Scottish Historical Review, vol.57 (1978), 143-66. 
The Origins of the Scottish Railway System 1722-1844 
(Edinburgh, 1983). 
'Sir James Robertson', in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.), 
Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, vol.2 (Aberdeen, 
1990, 311-14. 
'Railway Mania in the Highlands: the Marquis of Breadalbane 
and the Scottish Grand Junction Railway', in R Mason and N 
MacDougall (eds.), People and Power in Scotland: Essays In 
honour of TC Smout (Edinburgh, 1992), 189-217. 
Combination among Railway Companies (London, 1912). 
The Highland Railway (Stroud, 2005). 
582 
Ross, D 'The enigmatic Mr Dougall', Highland Railway Journal, vol.5, 
No.75 {Autumn 2005), 12-14. 
Ross, DM (ed.) History of Banking II, 1844-1959 (10 volumes, London, 1998). 
Ross, J 
St J Thomas, D 
and Whitehouse, P 
The Travellers' Joy 1852 (Elgin, 2001). 
The Romance of Scotland's Railways (Nairn, 1993). 
Sangster, AH The Story and Tales of the Buchan Line {Poole, 1983). 
savage, ct An Economic History of Transport (2nd edition, London, 1961). 
Sherrington, CER The Economics of Rail Transport in Great Britain: vol. 1 -
History and Development {London, 1928). 
Simmons, J The Railways of Britain (London 1961 ; 2nd edition 1968). 
Simmons, J The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, vol.1 
(Leicester, 1978). 
Simmons J 'Railways, Hotels and Tourism in Great Britain', Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 18, No. 2 (April 1984), 201-222. 
Simmons, J The Railway in Town and Country 1830-1914, vol.2 (Newton 
Abbot, 1986). 
Simmons, J The Victorian Railway (London, 1995). 
Simmons, J and The Oxford Companion to British Railway History (Oxford, 
Biddle, G 1997, re-issued 1999). 
Simms, WF Railways of Caithness (Rustington, 1998). 
583 
Simms,WF 
Simnett, WE 
Sinclair, N 
Sinclair, N 
Sinclair, N 
Sinclair, N 
Railways of Sutherland (Rustington, 1998). 
Railway Amalgamation In Great Britain (London, 1923). 
'Boat of Garten in the 19th Century', Great North Review, 
vol.12, No.46 (August 1975), 120-
The Highland Main Line (Penryn, 1998). 
'The Aviemore Line: Railway Politics In the Highlands, 1882-
1898), Highland Railway Journal, vol.3, No.46 (summer 1998), 
4-12, and vol.3, No.47 (autumn 1996), 7-11. 
Highland Railway: People and Places (Derby, 2005). 
Slaven, A and Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography (2 volumes, 
Checkland, S (eds.) Aberdeen, 1986 and 1990). 
Slaven.A 
Slaven.A 
Slaven, A 
Smith, JAR 
The Development of the West of Scotland: 1750-1960 
(London, 1975). 
"David MacBrayne', in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.), 
Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, vol.2 (Aberdeen, 
1990), 295-97. 
'Sir Alexander Matheson', in A Slaven and S Checkland (eds.), 
Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, vol.2 (Aberdeen, 
1990), 301-302. 
'From Isolation to Integration: the development of roads in the 
northern highlands of Scotland 1800-1850' (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2001). 
584 
Smout, TC 
Smout, T 
Smout, T 
Stephenson 
Locomotive 
Society 
Stephenson 
Locomotive 
Society 
Stirling, D 
Stirling, D 
Stirling, D 
Stover, JF 
Thomas, J 
Thomas, J 
'Scottish landowners and economic growth 1650-1850', 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 11 (1964), 218-34. 
A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (London, 1969). 
A Century of the Scottish People 1830-1950 (London, 1986). 
The Great North of Scotland Railway, Journal of the 
Stephenson Locomotive Society, vol. XXX, No. 352, 
(September 1954). 
The Highland Railway Company and its constituents and 
successors 1855-1955 (London, 1955). 
'The Morayshire Connection', Highland Railway Journal, vol.1, 
No.7 (winter 1988), 4-7. 
'Land, Railways and the Dukes of Sutherland', Highland 
Railway Journal, vol.4, No.56 (early 2001), 4-7. 
'Neighbours at Perth', Highland Railway Journal, vol.2, No.29 
(spring 1994}, 20-22. 
History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad ~est Lafayette, 
Indiana, 1987). 
The Callander and Oban Railway (Newton Abbot, 1966). 
The North British Railway (two volumes, Newton Abbot, 1969 
and 1975). 
585 
Thomas, J 
Thomas, J 
Thomas, J 
Thomas, J and 
Tumock, D 
Tumock, D 
Tumock, D 
Tumock, D 
Vallance, HA 
Vallance, HA 
Vallance, HA 
Vamplew, W 
Vamplew, W 
A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, vol. 6 
Scotland (the Lowlands and the Borders) (Newton Abbot, 
1971, revised edition 1984). 
Forgotten Railways: Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1976, 2nd edition 
1981). 
The Skye Railway (Newton Abbot, 1977). 
A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, vol. 15: 
North of Scotland (Newton Abbot, 1989). 
The Historical Geography of Scotland since 1707 (Cambridge, 
1982). 
Railways in the British Isles; landscape, land use and society 
(2nd edition, Newton Abbot, 1990). 
An Historical Geography of Railways in Great Britain and 
Ireland (Aldershot, 1998). 
The Highland Railway (first published 1938, revised 1963, 3n1 
edition 1969, 4 th edition, Newton Abbot, 1985). 
British Branch Lines (London, 1965). 
The Great North of Scotland Railway (Newton Abbot, 1965). 
'The railways and the iron industry: a study of their relationship 
in Scotland' in MC Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian 
Economy (Newton Abbot, 1969), 33-77. 
'Sources of Scottish railway share capital before 1860', 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol.17 (1970), 425-40. 
586 
Vamplew, W 
Vamplew, W 
Vamplew,W 
Vamplew, W 
Vamplew, W 
Waterman, JJ 
Weir,T 
Weir,T 
Whatley, CA 
Whatley, CA 
Wheeler, PT 
Willis, D 
'Railway investment in the Scottish Highlands', Transport 
History, vol.3, No.2 (July 1970), 141-53. 
'The financing of Scottish railways before 1860 - a reply', 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy vol.18 (1971 ), 221-23. 
'Banks and railway finance: a note on the Scottish experience', 
Transport History, vol.4, No.2 (July 1971 ).166-82. 
'Railways and the transformation of the Scottish economy', 
Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol.24 (1971 ), pp.37-54. 
'Railways and the Scottish transport system in the nineteenth 
century', Journal of Transport History, new series, vol.I, No.3 
(February 1972), 133-45. 
The Coming of the Railway to Aberdeen in the 1840s 
(Aberdeen, 1975). 
The Kyle Line (Gartochan, 1972). 
The Highland Line (Gartochan, 1978). 
The Industrial Revolution in Scotland (Cambridge, 1997). 
Scottish Society 1707-1830: beyond Jacobitism, towards 
industrialisation (Manchester, 2000). 
'The development of shipping services to the east coast of 
Sutherland', Journal of Transport History, vol.VI, No.2 
(November 1963), 110-17. 
The Story of Crofting in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1991 ). 
587 
